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A B S T R A C T
peter novitzky : ethics of ambient assisted living technologies for per-
sons with dementia
Ageing populations worldwide are leading to an increasing incidence of dementia. Am-
bient Assisted Living (AAL) technologies are seen as one of the solutions to tackle a
variety of problems posed by dementia. In this thesis, the ethical challenges and oppor-
tunities of AAL technologies for Persons with Dementia (PwDs) are identified through
a systematic literature review. The three most prominent ethical issues are informed
consent, special vulnerability of PwDs, and the value of the goals of AAL technologies.
These key issues are comprehensively analysed in dedicated normative chapters as they
arise during research & development (R&D) and clinical application of AAL technolo-
gies for PwDs. The analysis is performed using a methodological framework based on
the principles of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) developed
by UNESCO. Each normative chapter concludes with a set of recommendations for the
effective management of the ethical issues.
xv

1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In this introductory chapter, the research objectives of this dissertation are presented, to-
gether with the methodology describing how these research objectives are met, followed
by a section about the relevance of the research topic, and the outline of this thesis.
1.1 research objectives
The intention of this research is to contribute to the responsible development, clinical
research, and application of Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) technologies for Persons
with Dementia (PwDs). This demands substantial analysis of the ethical issues that
might arise during research & development (R&D), clinical trials and eventual clinical
application (Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady 2000; Emanuel, Wendler, Killen, et al. 2004).
Accordingly, this dissertation aims to meet the following research objectives:
1. Ethical Challenges and Opportunities – The identification of the ethical challenges
and opportunities associated with the development and application of AAL tech-
nologies for PwDs, and the selection of the most prominent ethical issues. These
prominent ethical issues are identified from the systematic literature review pre-
sented in Chapter 3 and are as follows:
• Values of the goals of AAL technologies.
• Special vulnerability of PwDs.
• Informed consent of PwDs.
2. Interpretation of Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) Prin-
ciples – The interpretation of the UDBHR principles related to the most prominent
ethical issues. This interpretation is based on the overview of the related essential
literature and policy documents.
3. Normative Analysis of Ethical Issues – The normative analysis of the most prominent
ethical issues in specifying the UDBHR principles to the context of PwDs and AAL
technologies.
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4. Conclusions of the Ethical Analysis – The analysis is concluded with recommenda-
tions regarding how to tackle the ethical issues related to the application of AAL
technologies for PwDs.
1.2 methodology
1.2.1 First Research Objective: Ethical Challenges and Opportunities
The first research objective is the identification of the ethical challenges and opportuni-
ties involved in the various stages of R&D, clinical experimentation, and clinical appli-
cation of AAL technologies for PwDs. These are identified by conducting an extensive
systematic literature review.
The systematic literature review is a well-established instrument that in this case pro-
vides the means to identify the ethical challenges and opportunities of AAL technolo-
gies for PwD. The literature review also makes it possible to systematically categorise
the variety of the ethical challenges and opportunities specific to the realm of AAL tech-
nologies and PwDs. The methodological details of the literature review are explained in
Chapter 3.
The most prominent ethical issues are selected by screening all of the ethical chal-
lenges and opportunities in the literature review. The screening selects ethical issues
that are important and have yet to be addressed sufficiently in academic debate.
1.2.2 Second Research Objective: Interpretation of UDBHR Principles
The most prominent ethical issues are specified using the principles of UDBHR. In the
subsections below, the rationale for selecting the UDBHR framework is presented. This
is followed by an explanation of how the principles of the UDBHR are to be interpreted.
1.2.2.1 The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights
The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights1 is deeply embedded in the hu-
man rights tradition2 that has been developed and adopted since World War II by a
1 For the whole text of the UDBHR (2005) see Appendix A on p. 267.
2 The historical development of the concept of human rights involves the emergence and subsequent mould-
ing of various philosophical, moral, and political ideas (Fagan 2015). At least four stages of this develop-
ment can be identified:
1. The first stage is a formulation of the theory of (objective) natural rights: an ideal world built upon
rational principles of nature as a point of reference, and the universality of the rights common to
every society (Vincent 1986). These classic natural right teachings include Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and
the Stoics’ accounts. Plato refers to ‘nature,’ or ‘according to nature’ (e. g. Plato 1997b, pp. 808–
809, 464b–465d; p. 851, 506d–507a; Plato 1997c, p. 130, 1.626a; p. 1322, 1.627d; p. 1326, 1.631d; for
a more comprehensive list see Lewis 2011) to represent a rule of reason, which is universally nor-
2
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variety of international, intergovernmental organisations, as well as the European Coun-
cil, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Council for International Organizations
mative for human affairs. Since the Sophists, the term ‘convention’ referred to something that is a
consequence of human arrangement. With the introduction of the reference to ‘nature’ and its law,
Plato aims to question the conflict between convention and nature, by highlighting that there is
something permanent and not human-made in politics (Lewis 2011; d’Entrèves 1970). Aristotle, by
defining every human as a member of a wider community by nature (Aristotle 1959, p. 9, 1253a3),
advances the concept of natural law by stating three premises. Firstly, individuals are naturally
subject to law (Aristotle 2009, p. 92, V.6 1134b10). Secondly, there are unchangeable and universal
natural laws (Aristotle 2009, pp. 92–93, V.7 1134b20–1135a10; this thesis has been recently questioned,
cf. Corradetti 2009, pp. 113–115). Thirdly, Aristotle also acknowledges that the good of an individual
is secondary to the state by its very nature (Aristotle 1959, p. 11, 1253a20). Although Aristotle holds
primacy in formulating an account, where the conventional and natural becomes compatible with
each other (Corradetti 2009), the opposition of these concepts has been again revived by the Stoics,
e. g. Cicero (1999, pp. 71–72, 3.33 and pp. 115–117, 1.29–33) or Seneca (2010, p. 89, 6.1.12; p. 114,
6.32.12).
2. The second stage towards the development of human rights may be identified with the emergence
of natural law theories. These attempts tried to synthesise and harmonise the relationship of natural
rights with other laws. One of these attempts is in the Digest of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the com-
pilation of legal materials completed in 534 AD by Byzantine lawyers of Emperor Justinian. The
Roman law with its distinction between ius civile, ius gentium, and ius naturale preserved the idea of
universal and rational justice (Vincent 1986; d’Entrèves 1970). A detailed and full account on natural
law is developed by Thomas Aquinas, when he identifies God as a source of natural law (Dyson
2002, pp. 89–90, IaIIae q.91 a.4), and natural law can be used to evaluate the reasonableness of any
human action (Dyson 2002, p. 119, IaIIa q.94 a.3). Persons acting on the basis of natural law are
participating in the eternal law of God, which represents God’s rational plan of providence (Dyson
2002, pp. 101–113, IaIIae q.93).
3. The third stage towards the development of human rights was the formulation of a doctrine of
(subjective) natural rights. The formulation of this doctrine by John Locke is traditionally considered
to be a decisive break from the natural law tradition, although this view has recently been challenged
by Tierney (2005). The doctrine of natural rights is based on every person’s duty of self-preservation
towards God (Locke 2003, p. 28). The duty for self-preservation translates into natural rights of every
human being to be free from threats of life, the right for liberty, and right for personal property. Due
to Locke’s interpretation that any political community is artificial, in the state of nature people
provide consent for the formation of the political society to protect their natural rights (Locke 2003,
pp. 101–106; Fagan 2015; Tierney 2005). Additionally, the emphasis on individual rights and liberties
became the key concept of the Enlightenment, especially in the documents like the US Declaration
of Independence (1776), or the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (1789) in the First French
Republic.
4. The fourth stage of the development of human rights is its codification. The initial steps toward an
international peace were made at the Hague Peace Conference (1899, Normand and Zaidi 2008, also
called First Hague Conference). Despite the ratification of the UDHR (1948), Moyn (2010) highlights
the fact that human rights did not play a central role in wartime and postwar rhetoric. Moreover,
the Holocaust consciousness did not trigger the human rights movement in this period. Instead, the
human rights movement emerged during the 1970s, gaining momentum from the collapse of other
universalistic doctrines (Moyn 2010, pp. 7–8). Since the 1970s, United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has been increasingly interested in issues regarding life sci-
ences. This led, first, to the formation of the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) in 1993, which
has been granted Statutes, and later in 1998 its mandate has been confirmed. Since 2002 UNESCO
has been coordinating activities of international bodies in the area of bioethics. Simultaneously, the
earlier intensive work resulted in the expressed interest of 191 Member States to elevate ethics to the
priority-list of UNESCO in 2002 (ten Have, Jean, and Kirby 2009).
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of Medical Sciences (CIOMS; Gordijn and ten Have 2014; ten Have, Jean, and Kirby
2009).3
The UDBHR consists of: a) the reasons noted in the Preamble, which led the General
Conference towards elaborating upon the UDBHR, with explicit reference to related
United Nations (UN) documents, such as the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights (1997) or the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003);
b) general provisions, which define the scope and aims of the declaration; c) a list of fifteen
principles; with guidelines for d) the application and e) the promotion of these principles;
together with f) the final provisions of the declaration (UDBHR 2005).
The UDBHR constructs three types of relationships between the human rights tradi-
tion and bioethics. These are (Gordijn and ten Have 2014, pp. 833–834):
• Human rights as a foundation and context of bioethics – UDBHR refers to human
rights as the frame within which bioethical issues should be analysed.
• Human rights as a fundamental principle of bioethics itself – the initial principles,
according to Gordijn and ten Have (2014), suggest that human dignity and basic
human rights have a fundamental role in the way we understand and apply the
other principles of the UDBHR.
• Human rights as a limitation and definite authority for bioethics – every specifica-
tion and any application of the principles should be compliant with human rights
laws.
Gordijn and ten Have (2014) list certain positives4 of the close connection of UDBHR
and human rights tradition. Such a connection is beneficial because many ethical issues
have to be dealt with on a worldwide level. Ethical questions that humanity encounters
do not stop at the national borders (e. g. pandemics, international drug trials, migration
of healthcare professionals, pollution, etc.). Moreover, a development on one side of
the globe unavoidably affects the developments on the other side of the globe because
3 The human rights tradition applicable to bioethical issues also includes documents such as The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), “Declaration of Helsinki” (1964), the Proposed International Guidelines
for Biomedical Research involving Human Subjects (1982), the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights (1997); the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997); International Declaration on
Human Genetic Data (2003); and Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005; Gordijn and ten
Have 2014; ten Have, Jean, and Kirby 2009).
4 Tierney (2005) highlights, referring to the publications of Glendon (2004) and Glendon (1993) that despite
the limitations and abuses of ‘rights talk,’ these abuses are not intrinsic to the human rights discourse.
Additionally, the UDHR (1948) does not follow atomistic and selfish individualism but reaffirms the role
of a family as a fundamental unit of every society (Tierney 2005). This motif is noted also by Fagan (2015),
referring to Nickel (1987). Nickel (1987), according to Fagan (2015), provides two additional positives of the
human rights tradition. One of these is that the human rights tradition provides much greater engagement
with the issue of the realisation of equity in the positive actions of the state compared with natural rights
theories. The second positive manifests itself in the greater engagement in international advocacy for active
promotion and protection of human rights compared with natural rights theories (Fagan 2015).
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of interconnected societies worldwide. With its established nature, the human rights
tradition seems nowadays to be one of the most effective means for addressing the
demand for such international solutions. Among the positives of the UDBHR and its
close links with the human rights tradition, therefore, are (Gordijn and ten Have 2014,
pp. 834–837):
• Familiarity and reputability – everybody on the globe has heard about human rights,
unlike other ethical theories (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc.), which
remain the preserve of a few academics. Human rights are a well-tested and long
established common language, and are present in international institutional prac-
tice.
• Affinity between bioethics and human rights – both have the same motivation of pro-
moting human rights and public health, having been founded by similar social
and historical forces and events. This closeness of the two may eventually develop
in the future into a synthesis.
• Universalism – there is no special requirement needed to enjoy the rights, being a
human is the only requirement. This universalism can overcome issues of cultural
diversity.
• Flexibility – although the human rights claim universality, it is at the same time
not blind to cultural and local diversities, in which specific rights and articles are
interpreted and implemented. It acknowledges cultural diversity as a source of
exchange, innovation and creativity, up until the point the cultural specificities
violate the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms (esp. Art. 12 of the
UDBHR).
• Effectiveness and enforceability – the human rights movement enjoys great sup-
port from international organisations, as well as non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). These may effectively influence the definition of policies. With this char-
acteristic, human rights reinforce the link to law-making and policy-making.
5
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Despite all the positives, various critical comments5 have also been expressed regarding
the UDBHR and its close links with the human rights tradition (Gordijn and ten Have
2014, pp. 837–839):
• Problems of human rights theory – the origins of the human rights theory can be
found in the 17th–18th century philosophical and religious reflection on ‘natural
rights,’ ‘unalienable rights’ or ‘rights of man.’ These were related mostly to the con-
cept of God-given rights, which at the present time does not provide an acceptable
premise in modern secular societies, or societies with different religious traditions.
Referring to the concept of human dignity does not provide enough support in the
argumentation of human rights theory because it has also its origins in a religious
concept. Moreover, the Kantian understanding of human dignity does not include
individuals who have lost their rational capacity. Additionally, the anthropocentric
approach that is embraced in the human rights theory is problematic, claiming an
exclusive position for the human species on the Earth.
• Impotence – human rights theory focuses predominantly on rights but fails to de-
fine the necessary corresponding obligations, without which the rights are mean-
ingless.
• Activism’s deleterious effects on academic work – the human rights movement, which
focuses on social change, can negatively affect, with social activism, the area of
scholarly work. There is a fear that such activism can instrumentalise academic
debates for its goals.
5 One of the major criticisms of the human rights tradition was formulated by the philosopher, Alasdair Mac-
Intyre, who in his book, After Virtue, criticised both the 19th century philosophers’ reference to self-evident
truths in relation to natural rights, and 20th century philosophers’ reference to moral intuition regarding
human rights. MacIntyre (2007) thus states that the existence of human rights cannot be demonstrated, and
the belief in them is comparable with the “belief in witches and in unicorns” (MacIntyre 2007, p. 69). An-
other criticism is formulated by Rorty (1998), who refers to any foundationalist approach towards human
rights as “outmoded and irrelevant” (Rorty 1998, p. 170). Instead of grounding the shared human attributes
on rationality, and searching for ahistorical foundations of human nature, one should focus on historical
and cultural facts that distinguish human beings from animals. These facts lead in the post-Holocaust world
to human beings culturally ‘naturalised’ in human rights (Rorty 1998). The third criticism of human rights
comes from cultures that accuse human rights of being based on the Judeo-Christian tradition (Littman
1999). These include islamic countries with governments based on Sharia (e. g. Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan; Price 1999), or signatories of the Bangkok Declaration (1993), who stress the universality, objectivity,
and non-selectivity of human rights with the need to avoid double standards in Asian countries, while at
the same time emphasising the “respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference
in the internal affairs of States” (Bangkok Declaration 1993, p. 1). The latter demand of Asian countries is
congruent with the criticism of Ignatieff (2005). He criticises the US in three aspects. Firstly, as one of the
leading countries involved in drafting the UDHR (1948), the US continues to exempt itself from interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law conventions. These include the formulation of explicit reserva-
tions (e. g. handing over US nationals to the International Criminal Court; ratifying International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights with the exemption on death penalty on juveniles), non-ratification or ratification
of negotiated treatises after extended delays (e. g. Convention on the Rights of the Child), or non-compliance
with the agreed treatises (e. g. stipulations that international rights provisions cannot supersede US domes-
tic law). These issues render any criticism against countries for poor adherence to international agreements
questionable, due to accusations of practicing double standards (Ignatieff 2005).
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• Western imperialism – Hyakudai Sakamoto emphasises the difference between East-
ern and Western bioethics, which have very little in common. The importance of
human rights in Asia is appreciated in a culturally different way. In addition, it
has triggered many conflicts in Asian societies (Sakamoto 1999).
The UDBHR has been unanimously adopted by UNESCO in its 33rd General Conference
on 19th October 2005 (Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005; ten Have, Jean, and
Kirby 2009).6 The purpose of the Declaration was to satisfy the growing need for a set of
rules and principles for national and international guidelines covering bioethical issues.
The goal of the Declaration is to help scientists, practitioners, law-makers and citizens in
general set the actual standards regarding human dignity, human rights and freedoms,
and provide benchmarks for evaluating these norms.
The particular rationales, in this dissertation, for applying the principles of the
UDBHR in the analysis of the ethical issues surrounding AAL technologies and PwDs
are as follows:
• The UN today is the only existing platform that provides nations with the means
to share and discuss their values or principles internationally, with the possibility
to negotiate and agree on certain normative instruments. The UDBHR is a result of
such an international standard-setting effort (ten Have and Jean 2009). Standard-
setting is a process whereby universal agreements are made. Such agreements can
be reached as a result of a delicate balance between developing universal principles
grounded in shared values, and promotion of pluralism through the recognition
of diversity. For this purpose, the platform of the UN—according to ten Have and
Jean (2009)—provides a necessary framework for reflecting on the standard-setting
process, especially at the global level (ten Have and Jean 2009).
There are certain global issues, which the UDBHR framework may be especially
helpful in solving. One of them is the issue of growing portions of the population
which suffer from dementia. This poses increasingly great challenges in the fields
of healthcare and bioethics. A further issue is the world-wide experience of ageing
6 The Director-General was requested by the General Conference on its 31st session in 2001 to submit a report
on “the technical and legal studies undertaken regarding the possibility of elaborating universal norms on
bioethics” (Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005, p. 1). The initial document, entitled ‘Report of the
IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics’ was drafted and finalised at the
request of the Director-General by the IBC on 13th June 2003, which was then discussed at the 32nd session
in October 2003 of the General Conference. Member States, international organisations and relevant national
bodies were invited for this discussion. The Director-General was requested to continue the preparatory
work on the declaration in order to submit a draft of the future declaration at the 33rd session (32 C/Res. 24).
The Director-General then entrusted the International Bioethics Committee with initiating the drafting of
the declaration. The Executive Board of UNESCO then on its 169th session in April 2004 approved the
timetable of the declaration. Again, many discussions were conducted with Member States, specialised
agencies, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and various national bodies and specialists (Explanatory
Memorandum on UDBHR 2005).
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societies, including those nations, which are currently at the stage of their popu-
lation boom but later will face the same problem of ageing societies. These two
issues together demand a global approach to the ethical standard-setting regard-
ing dementia. Therefore, using a global framework from the very beginning of
the ethical analysis could be beneficial and particularly effective in the standard-
setting process. Additionally, the principles of the UDBHR make it possible to
include the specificities of local cultures as well, until such standards violate basic
human rights. This should also mean that the framework is more acceptable at a
worldwide level.
• The source of the principles is not purely the product of academic scholarly dis-
course; it is also the result of the active contributions made by political and inter-
governmental bodies that have contributed to the development of the UDBHR (An-
dorno 2007). The UN Member States expressed their need for regulation and
legislation of bioethical issues. Furthermore, the whole procedure of reaching an
agreement is a result of a multiple steps: elaboration, examination, adoption, and
follow-up, all agreed and accepted by the Member States in consensus. This means
that the resulting Declaration is also a product of political negotiation, expressing
commitment and willingness of the Member States to gradually incorporate these
principles into their legal systems.7
This condition also promotes effectiveness. Thus, the resulting legislation a) can be
informed about the experiences and results of the application of these principles
in other Member States; b) can be easily adopted from other Member States, if they
fit into the particular cultural framework of the country; c) is, instead of a limited
scholarly discussion, open to the widest democratic public debate; d) provides the
individual citizen of a Member State with the possibility of enjoying the benefits
of ethical reflection as entitlements adopted in the new legislation within the legal
system.
• The principles defined in the UDBHR are not only the result of collaboration be-
tween intergovernmental, governmental, and non-governmental bodies, but also of
religious representatives (Buddhist, Catholic, Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, and Jew-
ish) who were invited to express their viewpoints during the drafting process (ten
Have and Jean 2009). This fact suggests that the UDBHR is one of the most widely
discussed and accepted frameworks on the global level.
7 The legal status of the UNESCO UDBHR declaration is as an officially non-binding, so-called soft law, in-
strument. Unlike conventions, soft law declarations have weaker effect because they do not oblige states to
enact the formulations based on common standards. However, the states are encouraged to enact them (An-
dorno 2007). Such an approach, according to Andorno (2007), motivates the states to take on commitments
they would normally not take. Furthermore, soft law instruments make it possible for the countries with
various cultural and political settings to become familiar with the proposed standards, and prepare the
grounds for a development of binding convention in the future (Andorno 2007).
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The conferring process adopted in the UN not only ensures a thorough discussion
of the proposals. The UN also sees to it that the proposals are being discussed be-
tween a variety of governmental, non-governmental, and religious representatives.
Such a process, during which the widest possible debate is being held among a
multitude of political, philosophical and religious world-views, declares the will-
ingness of the UN to provide a) the most universal frameworks for adoption, while
at the same time it expresses also b) due respect towards these world-views.
• The UDBHR principles are necessarily minimalist, open to various interpretations
and applications within the framework of human rights and freedoms (ten Have
and Jean 2009). Therefore, it follows that when it comes to interpreting the prin-
ciples no particular definitions are being preferred exclusively. Furthermore, the
principles remain open to new interpretations and specifications, so long as they
do not violate the basic human rights. Thus, the principles can be universally ap-
plied to any bioethical issue; they remain open to new interpretations and cultural
differences globally.
• The principles of UDBHR have not yet been applied to the challenges of AAL for
PwDs, at least not in the scholarly literature. The aim of this dissertation is to
develop an ethical analysis in this field employing the principles of the UDBHR.
This is in accordance with the overall spirit of the Declaration, which encourages
the further specification of principles to particular cases (ten Have and Jean 2009).
By employing the principles of the UDBHR, this dissertation omits systematic discussion
of the legal issues that arise during technological research. The application of legal stan-
dards and regulations specific to particular countries are already acknowledged through
Art. 27 of the UDBHR. References to various legal regulations are made throughout the
thesis whenever it is relevant to the interpretation of the UDBHR principles. However,
legal documents in this dissertation are not reviewed systematically in this regard.8
Similarly, other related aspects such as issues arising regarding patents and biobanks
are not discussed systematically. This dissertation also considers the 15 principles of
the UDBHR as a sufficient amount of principles for the purposes of normative ethical
analysis of AAL technologies for PwDs. Extending this number of principles by other
additional principles,9 defined either by the UN or other expert bodies, would undesir-
ably increase the complexity of the proposed normative analysis while the benefit of
8 These topics were already more systematically reviewed, for example, by B. D. Mittelstadt (2013), Stanberry
(2001), Chan, Estève, et al. (2008), or Ahonen et al. (2010a).
9 Additional principles refer to principles of later declarations or conventions, e. g. Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and Optional Protocol (CRPD; 2006). As the UDBHR was published in 2005, it cannot
refer to the CRPD (2006). The CRPD (2006) does not refer to the UDBHR. Only documents that are referred
to by the UDBHR (cf. footnote 10), or documents that directly refer to the UDBHR are considered in this
dissertation.
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such a step would remain questionable. The UDBHR with its set of principles is con-
sidered as a complete document, along with its explanatory memorandum (Explanatory
Memorandum on UDBHR 2005).
1.2.2.2 Interpretation of Principles
Every normative chapter (Chapters 4–6) provides an in-depth overview of the related
UDBHR article(s). This overview is provided, firstly, by presenting the interpretation
of the essential literature concerned by the UDBHR articles. The sources for this inter-
pretation include the corresponding chapters of The UNESCO Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights: Background, Principles and Application (ten Have, Jean, and
Kirby 2009), Handbook of Global Bioethics (ten Have and Gordijn 2014), and the related
reports of the International Bioethics Committee (e. g. IBC 2008, and IBC 2013).
Secondly, the interpretation of the UDBHR principles is followed by the overview of
the important policy documents, along with national and international guidelines. These
include for example “The Nuremberg Code (1947)” (1996), Belmont Report (1978), “Dec-
laration of Helsinki” (1964), Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997), CIOMS
(2002) and many others.10
Thirdly, the interpretation also provides an overview of the academic literature of
leading scholars, whose contributions are relevant for the appropriate interpretation of
the general principles provided in the UDBHR.
1.2.3 Third Research Objective: Normative Analysis of Ethical Issues
The third research objective is to provide a detailed analysis of the most prominent ethi-
cal issues identified regarding the application of AAL technologies to the care of PwDs.
These selected ethical issues undergo a deeper normative analysis. For this purpose, this
study applies the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR
2005). The normative analysis involves first a specification of the UDBHR principles to
the context of PwDs and AAL technologies, and secondly, if required, a balancing of
conflicting UDBHR principles.
10 As noted in the Preamble of the UDBHR, other relevant principles from the Universal Declaration on the
Human Genome and Human Rights 1997, the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 2003 should be
mentioned as well. Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR (2005, p. 2) lists three especially important interna-
tionally accepted instruments, whose principles may be helpful in the normative analysis of ethical issues:
a) the “Declaration of Helsinki” (1964) developed by the World Medical Association (latest version: “Decla-
ration of Helsinki” 2013), b) the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997 of the Council of Europe,
and c) the International Ethical Guidelines For Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects by the Council
for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS 2002). Also, the Explanatory Memorandum on
UDBHR (2005) requires the use of other relevant international instruments for bioethical issues from the
WHO or Food and Agriculture Organization. Ultimately, because of the indisputable foundations of mod-
ern bioethics on The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948), references to this document are
made where necessary.
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1.2.3.1 Specification of Principles
Any general principle, like those in the UDBHR, demands a specification for its applica-
tion in specific contexts. The principles of the UDBHR undergo a process of specification
(i. e. the understanding of a general principle in a specific context), as a result of en-
gagement with the three sources of the interpretation (e. g. UDBHR-related literature,
policy documents, and academic literature). Wherever needed, additional literature will
be provided in order to support the arguments provided during the specification of the
general principles of UDBHR for the cases of PwDs and AAL technologies.
1.2.3.2 Balancing of Principles
By employing the principles of the UDBHR, this methodology adopts a pluralist prin-
ciplist approach. Unfortunately, these approaches are susceptible to the possibility of
clashing principles. In order to maintain the coherence of the ethical framework, there
are three possible ways of resolving a conflict of principles:
1. The first option is to provide a hierarchical order of general principles, which con-
sistently and sufficiently ranks the rules in order of priority (Richardson 1990).11
2. The second option is specification. During specification, the meaning, range, or
scope of a general principle, narrowed by its application to a specific case, is re-
duced to a level at which the application of that principle no longer conflicts with
any of the other principles. As such, the principles that do not or no longer conflict
may then become action guides (Childress 2009).12
3. The third option is to provide a balancing with constraints to reduce excessive
intuition, partiality, and arbitrariness. During the balancing process, the conflict
between general principles that are applied to the special case is resolved by defin-
ing which principle is more plausible under the given circumstance (Childress
2009).
The UDBHR provides a tenuous hierarchical, ranked order of principles, which one may
call a ‘weak hierarchy.’ Such a categorisation is apparent from the text of the Declara-
tion (UDBHR 2005). The weakest of the principles within the Declaration is the principle
of respect for cultural diversity (Art. 12). It is emphasised that this principle should never
infringe upon any of the other principles. Conversely, Art. 3—respect for human dignity
and human rights—is the strongest principle of the Declaration. It is stressed in Art. 28
that nothing from UDBHR should be interpreted or applied to violate this principle.
11 An example of such an approach has been explored by Veatch (1981).
12 Such an approach has been elaborated by Richardson (1990). DeGrazia (1992) interprets and designates
Richardson’s approach as ‘specified principlism.’
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The Declaration does not provide any further hierarchical ordering of the remain-
ing principles. Therefore, in various circumstances, these remaining UDBHR principles
might clash. This conflict of principles is analogous to the conflict of prima facie duties
described by Ross (2002). Ross’ definition of prima facie duties is applied to the interpre-
tation of the UDBHR principles for the purpose of this study. For Ross, a duty might
be either a prima facie duty (i. e. a consideration that tends to amount to a duty)13 or an
actual duty (duty proper; Ross 2002).14 Prima facie duties are such generally promotable
self-evident duties, which provide the agent with guidance for performing a morally
right action.15 However, these guidelines are not absolute. A prima facie duty may be
outweighed by another prima facie duty. However, when a prima facie duty is outweighed
by another prima facie duty, the more important prima facie duty becomes the actual duty
of the agent (Ross 2002, p. 19).
From Ross’ description it is clear that prima facie duties are not duties, nor are they
anything illusory, as the term prima facie might initially suggest.16 Instead, for Ross
(2002), prima facie duties reflect some features of the situation (and characteristics of
the act) that are related to the (proper) duty in a special way (Ross 2002, p. 20). These
features inform the moral agent about the reasons why certain actions would be morally
right in a given situation. These moral features are related to the objective fact involved
in the particular elements of the nature of the situation. In case of conflict these features
provide genuine (and not only apparent) reasons for the omission of one prima facie duty
in favour of respecting another prima facie duty, which forms the basis of the performance
of an act that is morally right (Stratton-Lake 2002, p. xxxiv).17 As a result, the agent
13 “We have to distinguish from the characteristic of being our duty that of tending to be our duty. [ . . . ] In
virtue of being the breaking of a promise, for instance, it tends to be wrong; in virtue of being an instance
of relieving distress it tends to be right. Tendency to be one’s duty may be called a parti-resultant attribute,
i. e. one which belongs to an act in virtue of some one component in its nature. Being one’s duty is a
toti-resultant attribute, one which belongs to an act in virtue of its whole nature and of nothing less than
this.” (Ross 2002, p. 28).
14 Ross (2002) sometimes referred to actual duty as absolute duty, in the sense defined by Kant (for example,
see Ross 2002, p. 28).
15 Ross lists the following as prima facie duties: a) fidelity, b) reparation, c) gratitude, d) justice, e) beneficence,
f) self-improvement, g) non-maleficence (Ross 2002, p. 21).
16 While one might interpret Ross’ ‘prima facie duties’ as one’s duties ‘at first sight,’ and the proper duties are
one’s ‘real’ duties, this is not so. Ross (2002) himself struggled with the correct terminology, and at the time
of writing his book, he failed to find a better term than prima facie duties, for which he apologised (Ross 2002,
p. 20). Kagan (1989) therefore proposes renaming Ross’ prima facie duties as pro tanto duties, since they are
‘most of the time’ our action guides, unless, exceptionally, the general reason to promote good is outweighed
by other morally acceptable reasons (Kagan 1989, p. 17). Philip Stratton-Lake in his Introduction to Ross
(2002) mentions an alternative term suggested by Broad (1930, pp. 164–165, 219, 278), referring to a specific
‘fittingness’ of a situation and the moral action, which might be used instead of ‘prima facie duty’ (Stratton-
Lake 2002, pp. xxxiv–xxxv). Alternatively, these features may be also called dispositions, tendencies, or
certain responsibilities towards oneself and to others for acting (Stratton-Lake 2002, pp. xxxiv–xxxv).
17 According to Philip Stratton-Lake, these definitions appeared first in Ross’ book Foundations of
Ethics (Stratton-Lake 2002, referring to the reprinted version of Ross 2008).
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recognises the actual duty (duty proper) that emerges from the totality of the nature of
the situation (Ross 2002, p. 20; Ross 2008, p. 81).18
From the weak hierarchy of UDBHR principles, it follows that Art. 4–11 and Art. 13–
17, interpreted as prima facie duties in the Rossian sense, may occasionally conflict. To
tackle these possibly conflicting prima facie duties, this dissertation uses Bernard Gert’s
approach of two-step procedure for justifying violations of moral rules (Gert 2004; Gert
2005).
The rationale for using Gert’s procedure is that it can provide a more conclusive
method to addressing the ambiguities inherent in pluralist principlist approaches. Ross’
moral system relies solely on the agent’s moral intuition in resolving the conflict of
prima facie duties (see previous footnote 18 and in particular Ross 2002, pp. 29–30 and
Stratton-Lake 2002, p. xliii). However, in certain cases, reference to one’s moral intuition
might result in inconclusiveness in moral judgements. Especially in conflicts of prima
facie duties that are equally weighted, it might be irresolvable to decide which of the
conflicting duties is more applicable under the given circumstances.
The desirable conclusiveness in moral judgements (and their possible consequences)
can be introduced by the categorisation based on whether the judgements can be pub-
licly allowed, as defined by Gert (Gert 2004; Gert 2005). His two-step procedure of jus-
tifying the violation of moral rules can be applied to any plural principlist approach
that refers to common morality (Gert 2005, p. 116).19 For Gert every moral rule should
be obeyed “except when a fully informed, rational person can publicly allow violating
18 The definition of prima facie duties reflects basic aspects of Ross’ moral theory, namely, his moral realism
and non-naturalism. The realism means that the rightness and goodness described in moral theories are
objective qualities of the moral order, which are perceived as properties of the existing world. The non-
naturalism means that the aforementioned moral properties cannot be fully understood by psychological,
sociological, evolutionary or other (empirical) scientific terms without falling into a reductive, naturalistic
fallacy (Stratton-Lake 2002, pp. x–xii). The third attribute of Ross’ moral theory follows from the non-
naturalist interpretation of the moral order: our moral knowledge is partly based on derivative moral
evaluation, and partly on deontic truths (e. g. one should not kill, etc.). The moral evaluation is based on
the determination and appraisal of self-evident premises, among which belong both the relevant moral
and also non-moral facts. The deontic truths, however, cannot be derived from non-moral premises (they
describe intrinsically good actions). Therefore, the realisation of the deontic truths must be based on the
direct understanding of the moral properties. The most fundamental moral properties – of which prima facie
duties are also part – are a priori self-evident, directly understandable truths, recognisable for moral agents
by apprehension (Stratton-Lake 2002, p. xliii; Ross 2002, pp. 29–30). As much as one’s moral intuition is clear
about the recognition of prima facie duties, this does not extend to one’s moral judgement. The agent’s moral
judgements cannot be so certain in particular cases (Stratton-Lake 2002, pp. xliii–xliv; Ross 2002, pp. 30–31).
Additionally, although prima facie moral duties are self-evident, they are not instantly perceived as such by
everyone (Ross 2002). As self-evident mathematical proofs are understood after reflection on their meaning,
according to Ross, the same is applicable to the a priori moral duties. Hence, the self-evidence of prima facie
duties does not necessarily mean that they are automatically palpable to the moral agent herself (Ross 2002,
p. 12). The prima facie duties are thus recognised in considered moral judgements. Therefore, Ross’ definition
of prima facie duties is appropriate for the interpretation of the UDBHR principles, thereby facilitating a
basic framework from which the balancing of principles can be initiated.
19 Morality for Gert is an informal public system, which applies to all rational persons. Morality governs be-
haviour by its moral rules, moral ideals, and virtues. Its main goal is to protect the persons from harms (Gert
2005, p. 14).
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it” (Gert 2005, p. 203). Publicly allowing a violation of a moral rule can be justified only
if the violation has far better results than compliance (Gert 2005, p. 208). The first step
of the two-step procedure is to identify the morally relevant features of the particular
case (Gert 2004, pp. 58–74).20 In the second step, the consequences of the violation of
the moral rule are forecasted, and the positive and negative consequences of the viola-
tions are weighted, based on the scenario that the public is informed that this kind of
violation is allowed (Gert 2004, pp. 74–76).
By employing Gert’s two-step procedure, this dissertation aims to balance any conflict-
ing principles by first identifying which principles conflict in the specific context, along
with which stakeholders are directly and indirectly affected, and any other morally rel-
evant circumstances. This balancing process is then to focus on delineating the possible
outcomes of each of the conflicting UDBHR principles being violated, with the viola-
tion being publicised as permissible within the particular context of PwDs and AAL
technologies. The consequences of the violations are weighed based on the resulting
amount of potential benefit for and harm to the PwD. The central role ascribed to the
PwD in the weighing process is based on the fact that the whole development of AAL
technologies is aimed at serving them, assuming that they are the most vulnerable group
amongst the stakeholders involved. The normative analysis also includes an analysis of
the available academic literature, to support the considered judgements and moral intu-
itions of the author of the dissertation in the process of weighting the violations of the
UDBHR principles. Special attention is given to the published and speculative opinions
of the stakeholders identified in the literature review in Chapter 3. These stakehold-
ers are considered as reasonable and impartial moral agents, as defined by Gert (2004,
pp. 53–57).
As in every pluralist principlist method, Gert’s two-step procedure for justifying viola-
tions of moral rules cannot completely omit the use of moral intuition in the forming of
20 Gert for this purpose lists 10 questions (Gert 2005, pp. 226–236; Gert 2004, pp. 58–73):
1. What moral rules are being violated?
2. What harms are being caused, avoided, or prevented by the violation of the moral rule?
3. What are the relevant desires and beliefs of the people toward whom the rule is being violated?
4. Does the person, violating the moral rule, due to her special relationship towards whom the rule is
being violated, have a duty to sometimes violate moral rules, independently of their consent?
5. What goods and benefits are being promoted by the violation of the moral rules?
6. Is, by the violation of a moral rule that is being prevented, an unjustified or weakly justified violation
of a moral rule?
7. Is the rule being violated toward a person because he has violated a moral rule unjustifiably, or with
a weak justification?
8. Are there any alternative actions that would be preferable?
9. Is the violation being done intentionally, knowingly, voluntarily, freely, or negligently?
10. Is the situation sufficiently rare that no person is likely to plan or prepare for being in it?
14
1.3 relevance
moral judgements (Tomlinson 2012, p. 79). Therefore, this is one of the methodological
limitations of this study.
To summarise: in this dissertation, the principles of UDBHR are used systematically.
These principles have a weak hierarchical order, singling out one principle (Art. 3) as
the strongest and another one (Art. 12) as the weakest and leaving the 13 remaining
principles on an equal footing. These remaining principles are understood as prima fa-
cie principles in the Rossian sense (Ross 2002). If the application of these principles to
specific cases (e. g. the application of AAL technologies for the care of PwDs) shows
any signs of conflict, the conflicting principles are balanced using Gert’s two-step proce-
dure (Gert 2004; Gert 2005).
1.2.4 Fourth Research Objective: Conclusions of the Ethical Analysis
Based on the normative analysis of the selected issues, lists of recommendations are
developed on how to address the ethical issues present in the application of AAL tech-
nologies for the care of PwDs.
The summary at the end of each normative chapter (Chapters 4–6) should help ad-
dress the presented ethical issues. These recommendations stand as a conclusion of the
normative analysis of the main ethical issues of these chapters.
1.3 relevance
Due to increased life expectancy and a falling birth rate, the age distribution in devel-
oped countries is gradually shifting towards older populations. Even though the pop-
ulation on our planet is still increasing overall, the birth rate in some countries has
decreased to such a level that it has become impossible for them to internally maintain
the sizes of their populations. The cohort aged above 60 worldwide is expected to rise
from 11 % to 22 % between the years 2000–2050 (Global elderly care in crisis 2014).
One of the first nations confronted with this trend was Japan. Its current demographics
already demonstrate a high proportion of over-60 year olds, a result of repeated baby
booms after World War II. In 1950, Japan’s population pyramid was a standard slow
growth (box) shape but by 2010, 23 % of its population was older than 60. Within the
next 40 years, that percentage is predicted to almost double to 39 % (Statistics Bureau,
Japan 2011).
Eurostat (2011) reveals that Europe is going through a similar process. Whilst in 1960,
an average ratio of three young people to one elderly person existed, it is predicted
that there will be more than two elderly people to one young person by 2060. For most
of the 20th century, the country with the highest median age, at 36, was Sweden. This
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was surpassed in the 1990s by Italy. It is predicted that in the next 30 years, Germany
will become the oldest country in Europe, which will then be superseded by Latvia and
Romania by the year 2040, at which time, Sweden will have one of the lowest median
ages. The proportion of the ‘oldest-old’ elderly persons (aged over 80) in Europe’s aver-
age population will be about 10 % by 2060, five- to ten-fold more than the 1–2 % at the
beginning of the 20th century (Eurostat 2011).
From the World Population Prospects of the UN figures, revised in 2006, it is obvious
that almost none of the countries in the world will avoid the consequences of the ageing
population, over the next 50 years. By 2050, all developed countries, together with Latin
America, the Caribbean, and most of Asia including China, are expected to have a me-
dian age of around 40 years. Most African countries will still have a median age of 30
years by 2050 compared to 25 years at the moment (UN 2006).
The Care in Crisis 2014 (2014) report of Age UK, quoted by Global elderly care in crisis
(2014), ascertained that public funding of social care systems in the United Kingdom fell
between the years 2010–11 and 2013–14 by 15.4 %, that is a massive cut of £1.2 billion.
The portion of elderly who received social care services dropped from 15.3 % in years
2005–6 to 9.9 % in 2012–13. This means that in the UK itself around 800 000 people did
not receive any care support from agencies in the public, nor private sector (Global elderly
care in crisis 2014).
A similar case is present in the United States, where an article from The Washington
Post calls the situation a “caregiving cliff” (Harris 2014). Most of the caregivers in the
US providing assistance are unpaid, one in four adults identifying themselves as family
caregivers (Global elderly care in crisis 2014).
A much more dramatic situation could arise in middle-income or lower-income de-
veloping countries, for example China. As the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
Study21 in 2013 reported, China comprises more than 185 million people aged above
60 years, from which 32 % are considered to have poor health, 38 % reported difficulties
with their everyday living, 40 % showed symptoms of depression, with 23 % below the
poverty threshold (Global elderly care in crisis 2014).
The authors of the editorial in Global elderly care in crisis (2014) request a cultural and
political paradigm shift, which should include a more age-friendly approach, ensuring
healthy and dignified ageing. Also more financial and human resources investments
are required, supported by better coordination in healthcare, long-term care and social
services. According to the editors elderly care is at the moment in crisis, and it has been
at this stage for too long (Global elderly care in crisis 2014).
An earlier study by the Alzheimer’s Disease International (2013) suggests also a dra-
matic growth of PwDs until the year 2050 worldwide.
21 http://charls.ccer.edu.cn/en (visited on 30/07/2015).
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What all this evidence points to is an unavoidable, worldwide, increase in the age pro-
file for humankind and therefore an increase in the prevalence of age-related diseases,
including dementia. The ageing of the population and its consequences necessitate bet-
ter and more effective healthcare systems and health technologies. In such a scenario a
deeper and more detailed ethical analysis of the needs of PwD would be desirable, es-
pecially if their care is facilitated by novel technologies such as AAL technologies. These
relatively recent and constantly expanding technologies in general neither received sat-
isfactory ethical attention in the scholarly debate, nor have their consequences been
examined in the application to the particular care for PwDs.
1.4 outline of the study
In Chapter 2, the basic terminology and definitions related to dementia and AAL tech-
nologies and their classification are clarified. The importance of clarifying both of these
areas appears to be essential for the appropriate identification of the contexts of PwDs
and AAL technologies, which may at first seem rather distant from each other. In Chap-
ter 3, a literature review with the selection of prominent ethical issues is presented.
These issues undergo a normative ethical analysis in the subsequent Chapters 4–6. At
the end of each normative chapter, a set of recommendations point out how to deal with
the ethical issues in practice. In Chapter 7 the results are summarised and suggestions
for future research are presented.
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T E R M I N O L O G Y
2.1 dementia
2.1.1 History of Dementia
A description of dementia would not be possible without the thorough and meticulous
work of Alois Alzheimer (1864–1915) that was conducted at his research laboratory in
Munich. Before joining the “Anatomical Laboratory” newly established by Emil Krae-
pelin at the Royal Psychiatric Clinic/Department at the Ludwig-Maximilians University
in Munich in 1903, Alzheimer worked as a clinical assistant at the Municipal Mental Asy-
lum1 in Frankfurt am Main (from 1888 to 1902), and in the Psychiatric Department of
Heidelberg University (1902). Maurer et al. (1997) note that although Alzheimer moved
to Munich, he followed the course of his patients in Frankfurt even after the year 1903
(especially Auguste D’s case until her death in 1906, as mentioned below). During his ca-
reer Alzheimer worked with specialists like Emil Kraepelin, Franz Nissl, Camillo Golgi,
Arnold Pick, Hans Gerhard Creutzfeldt, Alfons Maria Jakob, Fritz Lewy and many oth-
ers (Zilka and Novak 2006; Maurer et al. 1997).
In November of 1906 at the 37th Meeting of Southwest German Psychiatrists in Tübin-
gen, Germany Alzheimer presented a case of a woman (originally without identifica-
tion), Auguste D (51), with various clinical and neuropathological findings. She was
suffering of, as Alzheimer depicted it with the expression that became ever since then
famous: “a peculiar disorder of the cerebral cortex.”2 Her condition caused Auguste
memory loss, disorientation, depression and hallucinations. Pathological investigations
revealed atrophy, and particular lesions characterised by Alzheimer as a “paucity of cells
in the cerebral cortex and clumps of filaments between the nerve cells” (Zilka and Novak
2006, p. 344). The first publication of Auguste D’s case, six months after her death, has
been submitted in the form of a title and short abstract on the 1906 neurological meeting
1 Maurer et al. (1997) mention an institute where Alzheimer worked in Frankfurt as “Hospital for the Men-
tally Ill and Epileptics” (Maurer et al. 1997, p. 1546).
2 In original German: “eine eigenartige Erkrankung der Hirnrinde” (Müller et al. 2013, p. 129; Zilka and
Novak 2006, p. 344).
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in Tübingen. The abstract was deemed to be too short and insufficient for short presenta-
tion.3 Therefore it was rejected for publication in the Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie
after its presentation as a case study at the convention of psychiatrists in Tübingen in
1906 (Weber 1997).4 The next version in a form of abstract was then published without
any illustrations in 1907 (Zilka and Novak 2006). In 1909 Perusini examined four cases
in his article (Perusini 1909), where the case of Auguste D was referred to as case no. 1
mentioning her given name ‘Auguste,’ the initial ‘D’ of her surname and the profession
of her husband (Maurer et al. 1997). Another article based on Alzheimer’s second case
(Johann F) with the first drawings of the amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles
(based on the results from his first case of Auguste D) was published in 1911 (Maurer
et al. 1997). In this later article Alzheimer provided a differentiation of the histopatho-
logical spectrum of Alzheimer’s disease with various forms ranging from ‘plaque only’
to ‘tangles and plaques’ (Zilka and Novak 2006).
Alzheimer’s findings were confirmed by the subsequent reports of similar cases pub-
lished by other researchers. These have been summarised by Solomon Fuller (Weber
1997), the already mentioned Perusini (1909), Bonfiglio (1908), and Fischer (1907; Zilka
and Novak 2006; Maurer et al. 1997; Weber 1997). The famous Handbook of Psychiatry
(Psychiatrie: Ein Lehrbuch für Studierende und Ärzte) written by Emil Kraepelin in 19105
proposed the naming of these conditions after Alois Alzheimer as Alzheimer’s Disease
(AD). Alzheimer’s attention was raised by the fact that although the anatomical find-
ings suggested that the conditions were a serious form of senile dementia, in this case
the disease started much earlier, around the late forties. Therefore the age became very
important in the definition of the new brain disease. Therefore two categories existed at
that time: senile dementia which usually developed in a later age of the patient, and a
much rarer AD occurring at an earlier age (Zilka and Novak 2006).
There are various views on why Kraepelin made such a hasty decision6 to sepa-
rate the pre-senile form of dementia from the senile form and creating the eponym
of Alzheimer’s Disease:
• Scientific reasons – according to which Kraepelin believed that Alzheimer had dis-
covered a new disease (Maurer et al. 1997; Weber 1997)
• Political reasons – the desire for prestige, based on an existing rivalry between the
Munich laboratory, where both Alzheimer and Kraepelin worked, with the labora-
tory in the German part of the Charles University in Prague with scientists Arnold
3 Alzheimer’s text was the 11th submission, with the title “Über einen eigenartigen schweren Erkrankungsprozeß
der Hirnrinde” (Maurer et al. 1997, p. 1548).
4 Alzheimer’s submission was followed with the comment “zu kurzem Referat nich geeignet” [not appropri-
ate for a short publication] (Maurer et al. 1997, p. 1548).
5 Weber (1997) notes that the 8th edition of Kraepelin’s textbook has been published in 1909.
6 Weber (1997) reminds that Kraepelin drafted his textbook between the years 1908–1909, when only two
cases of AD have been reported by either Alzheimer or Bonfiglio (Weber 1997).
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Pick and Oskar Fischer, who were also researching dementia in their laboratory.
In the background of this argument was the wish of Kraepelin to demonstrate
the superiority of his school over Pick’s neuropathologic laboratory or Freudian
psychoanalytical theories over dementia (Maurer et al. 1997; Weber 1997).
• Reasons related to funding – Kraepelin could have sought to acquire additional
funding for the extension of his neuropathologic laboratory in Munich, a goal
which would have been supported by the publication of new and original findings
that could attract greater attention, funding, and resource allocation (Weber 1997).
• Personal reasons – close collaboration which lasted between Kraepelin and
Alzheimer already for two decades, while being aware of Alzheimer’s scientific
work on pre-senile cases, demonstrating Alzheimer’s influence in clinical teach-
ings, and a wish to reward Alzheimer for being a selfless co-worker (Maurer et al.
1997; Weber 1997).
However, Maurer et al. (1997) are convinced, supporting the scientific explanation, that
the reason why the disease is called after Alois Alzheimer is based on the first report
on Auguste D’s case from 1907 (Maurer et al. 1997). Weber (1997) favours the view that
explains Kraepelin’s act based on his personal reasons (Weber 1997).
Recently a group of scientists re-examined the histopathological specimen of one of
the most famous patient of all times, Auguste D, with state-of-the-art methods and tech-
niques. From modern medical knowledge we now are aware that dementia has a mul-
tifactorial cause: genetic markers and environmental factors which both contribute to
the development and expression of the disease. The most predisposing genetic variant
is 4 allele of the apoliproprotein E gene (APOE). The most important environmen-
tal factor is advanced age. Mutations in any of the three genes of amyloid precursor
protein (APP) on chromosome 21, presenilin 1 (PSEN1) on chromosome 14, and prese-
nilin 2 (PSEN2) on chromosome 1 can cause autosomal dominant Alzheimer’s disease,
meaning that anyone living long enough with these mutations will develop Alzheimer’s
disease. These mutations are inherited in a very small number of people (less than 2 % of
all the cases). The scientists found evidence that Auguste D had an autosomal dominant
form of the disorder (although she had 3/3 APOE genotype, so the 4 genetic risk
allele was not present, she had a mutation in her PSEN1 gene). With modern analytical
methods it has been confirmed that Auguste D’s case was consistent with the clinical
findings of her histopathological specimen made by Alzheimer more than a hundred
years ago. This re-examination also uncovered the cause of her disease (Müller et al.
2013). Moreover, the reason that we know so much about the case of Auguste D and
Alzheimer’s work is that Alzheimer’s medical notes have been found in his birthplace
in Marktbreit, Germany, in 1995. This finding allowed the detailed insight into the clini-
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cal cases of Alzheimer’s patients during his stay at the clinic in Frankfurt (Maurer et al.
1997).
2.1.2 Diagnosis of Dementia
Dementia has a relatively wide variety of scientific definitions that usually describe a set
of symptoms and signs: memory problems, communication difficulties (apraxia), issues
with organising and planning everyday tasks, changes in mood, changes in behaviour,
gradual loss of control over physical functions (Hope et al. 2009). Further issues are loss
of the ability to recognise objects (agnosia) and problems with abstract thinking and
complex behaviour.
These symptoms may be interpreted as a consequence of damage to the brain, caused
by a variety of diseases: AD, vascular dementia, Dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB),
Parkinson’s disease, Fronto-temporal Dementia (FTD), Huntington’s disease, alcohol-
related dementias (Korsakoff’s syndrome), prion diseases, dementia from syphilis. There
are approximately one hundred different types of dementias, out of which certain de-
mentias are reversible. Alzheimer’s disease is the most common one (62 % of the cases
in UK), followed by vascular dementia (17 %), DLB (4 %), FTD (2 %), and Parkinson’s
disease (2 %). The contemporary research also focuses on the estimated 10 % that hap-
pen to be interpreted as dementias of mixed origin, incorporating symptoms of both
AD and vascular dementia. However, the exact figures are not universally accepted and
they are the subject of on-going scientific research (Hope et al. 2009).
2.1.2.1 Types of Dementia
alzheimer’s disease
AD can be described as a form of dementia during which excessive and abnormally
folded proteins, so-called ‘plaques’ around the neurones and ‘tangles’ inside the neu-
rone cells accumulate in the brain. These structures damage the brain causing the death
of brain cells, predominantly in the region of memory. Neurotransmitter communica-
tions are also negatively affected. The factors contributing to the onset and further de-
velopment of the disease include, as already mentioned before, environmental factors
(mostly age), genetic inheritance, diet and overall general health condition (Hope et al.
2009).
vascular dementia
Vascular dementia may be caused by a series of small strokes resulting in a damage of
blood vessels within the brain. Such damage causes disruptions in the delivery of oxygen
to the brain cells causing their death. The damage on the brain and its consequences
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depends on the areas affected by the death of the brain cells. Scientists differentiate
between a) single-infarct vascular dementia caused by one single stroke in one larger
area of the brain, and b) multi-infarct vascular dementia caused by a series of small
strokes over time causing the death of brain cells in many small areas. These strokes
may remain unnoticed by the person affected. Vascular dementia can be a result of
small vessel disease (sub-cortical vascular dementia or Binswanger’s disease), which
causes damage in the deeper layers of the brain’s vessels. The risk factors for vascular
dementia are: high blood pressure, heart issues, high cholesterol, diabetes.
dementia with lewy bodies , parkinson’s disease dementia
DLB and Parkinson’s disease dementia (PDD) are caused by Lewy bodies, which are
spherical protein deposits building up in the brain cells, interfering with the neurotrans-
mitters. The detailed mechanism of a disruption is not known yet precisely. The higher
amount of Lewy bodies are also found in the brains of people suffering from Parkin-
son’s disease, which results in a higher prevalence of dementias in this group of people.
PDD may be related to DLB, described as a result of the same continuum, but with
two different set of signs and symptoms (conditions) caused by differing distribution of
Lewy bodies in the brain (Hope et al. 2009).
fronto-temporal dementia
FTD is a rarer form of dementia, covering various conditions (Pick’s disease,7 frontal
lobe degeneration,8 motor neurone disease related dementia). The damage in this case
happens in the frontal lobe or temporal lobe areas of the brain. Around 50 % of the cases
have an hereditary component. Various genetic mutations are involved too, causing ab-
normalities in the production of proteins (tau, progranulin, TDP-43, ubiquitin). In these
cases the symptoms may vary between different individuals, but the damage in most
cases happens in the front part of the brain. This affects more the behavioural and mood
areas of the individual, rather than causing problems with memory (Hope et al. 2009).
other dementias
Other rarer causes of dementia include progressive supranuclear palsy, Huntington’s
disease, prion diseases (e. g. Creutzfeld-Jakob disease), alcohol-related dementia, HIV,
multiple sclerosis (MS), syphilis. A possible relationship has been suggested between
7 A former name of a typical form of dementia linked to frontal abnormalities (Brand and Markowitsch 2008,
p. 29).
8 Brand and Markowitsch (2008) mention Fronto-temporal Lobe Degeneration (FTDL) as a heterogenous
category, linked to atrophy of frontal and temporal areas of the brain. According to this source the group
of FTDL consists of three syndromes that are rather subsumed to this category, which means that the
categorisation is opposite to what is published in Hope et al. (2009): FTD, semantic dementia, and primary
progressive aphasia (Brand and Markowitsch 2008, p. 29).
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head injuries and a later development of dementias. However, this explanation is still a
subject of scientific debate (Hope et al. 2009).
inherited dementias
Inherited dementias in the most common forms could be described as ‘sporadic,’ mean-
ing that they do not have any particular pattern. Most likely they are a result of environ-
mental factors and the genetic inheritance of the individual. As mentioned above, a small
amount of dementias have a strong genetic component (e. g. FTD with Parkinsonism-17,
familial British/Danish dementia, Gerstmann-Straissler-Scheinker disease; Hope et al.
2009).
2.1.2.2 Identifying Dementia
Different symptoms tend to express themselves at various intervals, progressing with
time. Therefore a more formalised description has been introduced, defining various
stages of progress. This has been reached by the use of Mini-Mental State Examinations
(MMSE),9 also called Folstein test, in the case of Alzheimer’s disease, in which case
eleven questions are being asked of the person assessing five different areas of cognitive
ability. With a maximum score of thirty the stages of Alzheimer’s disease could be
defined as (Hope et al. 2009):
• Mild dementia – reaching the score 20–24/26.
• Moderate dementia – reaching 10–19.
• Severe – 0–10.
Other tests are also being used. Examples are: Abbreviated Mental Test Score (AMTS,
Hodkinson 1972); Modified Mini-Mental state examination (3MS, E. L. Teng and Chui
1987); Cognitive Abilities Screening Instrument (CASI, Evelyn L. Teng et al. 1994); Trail-
making test (TMT, for general mental functioning; Tombaugh 2004); Clinical Dementia
Rating (CDR, Morris 1993); Clock Drawing Test (CDT, Sunderland et al. 1989; Tuokko
et al. 1995); Mini-Cog test (CDT expanded by a short-term recall test, Borson et al. 2000);
National Adult Reading Test (NART, Fazel et al. 1999); Cambridge Mental Disorders
of the Elderly Examination Revised (CAMDEX-R, for global cognitive evaluation; Roth
et al. 1999); MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool (MacCAT; Appelbaum and Grisso
9 The Mini-Mental State Examination test has been originally distributed for free (Folstein et al. 1975). How-
ever, Psychological Assessment Resources (PAR), the current copyright holder, “will not grant permission
to include an entire test or scale in any publication, including dissertations and theses”. For more details
see http://www4.parinc.com/Faqs.aspx?FaqCategoryID=31#e-Manuals (visited on 25/05/2015).
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1995; Grisso, Appelbaum, et al. 1995; Grisso and Appelbaum 1995); Measure for assess-
ing Awareness of Financial Skills (MAFS, Van Wielingen et al. 2004); Financial Com-
petence Instrument (FCI, Marson et al. 2000); Testament Definition Scale (TDS, Foun-
toulakis and Despos 2008); and Hopkins Competency Assessment Test (HCAT, Hughes
2008).
It is relatively easy to measure physical autonomy of the Persons with Dementia
(PwDs) by scales. They are both used in clinical trials and clinical practice world-
wide (Soto and Vellas 2008). Amongst the most widespread assessment tools are the
activities of daily living (ADLs) created by Katz et al. (1963), and instrumental activi-
ties of daily living (iADLs) developed by Lawton and Brody (1969), which examine the
activities listed in Table 2.1 (Soto and Vellas 2008).
Table 2.1 – Comparison of ADL and iADL Scales’ Items
ADL iADL
Bathing Shopping
Dressing Preparing meals
Toileting Travelling
Transferring Doing housework
Continence Doing laundry
Feeding Using telephone
Taking medications
Managing money
Katz et al. (1963) Lawton and Brody (1969)
Table 2.1: Comparison of ADL and iADL Scales’ Items
The use of the ADL/iADL scales is not only to confirm the diagnosis of dementia, but
they should be repeated at every visit of the specialist. This will provide (Soto and Vellas
2008, p. 36):
• An objective in physical therapeutics, defining which activities can be still per-
formed by the PwD, trying to avoid failure situations.
• A help to set up medical and non-medical support, by having an overview of the
alterations to ADLs/iADLs.
• Help evaluating the severity and the prognosis of the disease.
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence – United Kingdom (NICE) guide-
lines for diagnosis of dementia is preferred to be made after a thorough assessment
of (Hope et al. 2009):
• Medical records of the individual.
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• Examination of cognitive and mental state, physical examination, assessing factors
affecting person’s cognitive and functional performance (mental and physical ill-
nesses, disabilities, educational level and comparing these with the former levels).
• Reviewing existing medication.
When the results yield mild symptoms (or the symptoms are still questionable), the
aforementioned assessment should be followed by formal neuropsychological tests.
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and computer tomography (CT) are the usual forms
of structural imaging techniques. Various forms of single-photon emission computer to-
mography (SPECT) are used for differentiating the various forms of dementias (Hope
et al. 2009). In certain cases further diagnostic tools and methods such as electroen-
cephalography, amyloid imaging by positron emission tomography (PET scanning), tests
of the cerebrospinal fluid (CFS), genetic or other diagnostic techniques might be found
useful (APA 2013, pp. 599–643).
2.1.2.3 Definitions of Dementia
nuffield council on bioethics
The definition of the term ‘dementia’ by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics reflects rather
the effects of all the different damages of the brain. Hence the Council’s understanding
of dementia does not follow its explanation as a mental disorder. It explains dementia
rather as a physical condition which affects mental capacity. The Council defines demen-
tia this way despite the actual definition in the mental health legislation in UK (Hope
et al. 2009, p. 4).
american psychiatric association
A different approach is taken by the 5th version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders: DSM-5 of the American Psychiatric Association. The goal of DSM-5
is to be a standard reference for clinical practice in the field of mental health (APA
2013, p. xli). Compared with the earlier version of DSM-IV,10 after a 12-year process of
working on it, DSM-5, amongst others, introduces a more specific distinction of major
and mild Neurocognitive Disorders (NCDs), where dementia is listed, based on the
advances in neuroscience, neuropsychology and brain imaging in the past 20 years. It
also incorporates a better compatibility with the future 11th Revision of The International
Classification of Diseases (ICD) of the World Health Organization (WHO), which is due in
2017.
A mental disorder is defined in DSM-5 as a
10 Although the actual 5th version of DSM-5 uses an Arabic numbering in its title, the previous version of
DSM-IV used a Roman numbering.
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“[ . . . ] syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an in-
dividual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunc-
tion in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying
mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated with significant
distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important activities. An
expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss,
such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant
behavior (e. g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily
between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the de-
viance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual [ . . . ]” (APA
2013, p. 20)
This definition of mental disorder was developed for the purposes of clinical, public
health, and research. As already mentioned, dementia is listed under the heading of
Neurocognitive Disorders. Earlier in DSM-IV NCDs has been referred to as “Dementia,
Delirium, Amnestic, and Other Cognitive Disorders.” The use of the word ‘demen-
tia’ is retained in DSM-5 for continuity and because physicians and patients may be
accustomed to it. However, a more precise term of ‘neurocognitive disorder’ is often
preferred because it involves conditions affecting not only elderly but also younger in-
dividuals. Also the term of NCD may include cases of substantial decline in a single
domain (e. g. complex attention, executive function, learning and memory, language,
perceptual-motor, social cognition) of a diagnosis, for which the term ‘dementia’ would
not be used (APA 2013, p. 591).
Under NCD DSM-5 understands a group of disorders in which the primary clinical
deficit is cognitive. Furthermore, it is more an acquired rather than a developmental
condition. There are few mental disorders in which cognitive deficits are being expressed
(e. g. schizophrenia, bipolar disorders, etc.), however, only disorders with core cognitive
features are included into the category of NCDs. Therefore NCDs are those disorders in
which the impaired cognition was not present at birth or early life, and they represent a
true decline from the previously reached functional level (APA 2013).
The classification of NCDs in DSM-5 starts with delirium, which is then followed by
the major and mild (less severe cognitive impairment, which still can be a subject of
care)11 NCD syndromes and their etiological subtypes (APA 2013, pp. 596–643):
• Delirium
• Major or mild NCD
– NCD due to Alzheimer’s disease
– Vascular NCD
11 Formerly listed under the heading “Cognitive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified” in DSM-IV.
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– NCD with Lewy bodies
– NCD due to Parkinson’s disease
– Frontotemporal NCD
– NCD due to traumatic brain injury
– NCD due to HIV infection
– Substance/medication-induced NCD
– NCD due to Huntington’s disease
– NCD due to prion disease
– NCD due to another medical condition
– NCD due to multiple etiologies
– Unspecified NCD
The diagnostic criteria of major NCD consist of evidence of significant cognitive decline
compared with the previous attained levels in at least one of the cognitive domains
mentioned above. This evidence can either be expressed by the affected individuals
themselves, or a knowledgeable informant or clinician; or it can be a result of a stan-
dardised neuropsychological testing or other quantified clinical assessment document-
ing substantial decrease in cognitive performance. These identified cognitive deficits
furthermore must interfere with the independence and everyday activities of the af-
fected person. Finally, the cognitive decline must not occur exclusively in the context of
delirium, and it must not be amenable to better explanation by other mental disorders
(e. g. depressive disorder, schizophrenia, etc.; APA 2013, pp. 602–603). The diagnosis of
major NCD should specify also whether the person has or does not have any behavioural
disturbances (e. g. psychotic symptoms, mood disturbance, agitation, apathy, other be-
havioural symptoms), as well as the severity of the symptoms (APA 2013, p. 605):
• Mild – difficulties with iADL (e. g. housework, managing money, etc.).
• Moderate – difficulties with basic activities of daily living (e. g. feeding, dressing,
etc.).
• Severe – fully dependent.
The evidence of modest cognitive decline that is not occurring exclusively in delirium,
while it does not interfere with the capacity for everyday activities and independence
should be diagnosed according to DSM-5 as mild NCD. Of course, this is true under the
condition that these deficits cannot be better explained by another mental disorder (APA
2013, p. 605).
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world health organization
A very similar definition of dementia is present in the 10th Revision of the ICD, which
describes dementia as a
“[ . . . ] syndrome due to disease of the brain, usually of a chronic or progres-
sive nature, in which there is disturbance of multiple higher cortical func-
tions, including memory, thinking, orientation, comprehension, calculation,
learning capacity, language, and judgement” (WHO 1992a)
In this case consciousness is not clouded, and the symptoms must be present at least for
a duration of six months to avoid confusion with other possible diagnoses (WHO 1992a;
WHO 1992b). The only definitive method of confirming dementia is that by autopsy (Ep-
ple 2002).
Various approaches of defining dementia have been presented in this section. While
DSM-5 and ICD-10 approached dementia from its neurocognitive decline, the definition
provided by the Nuffield Council of Bioethics understands dementia primarily as a phys-
ical condition, which affects, amongst other functionalities, also the mental capacity of
the person. The question arises, which of these definitions would be more appropriate
to use for the ethical analysis of assessing the consequences of using assistive technolo-
gies for PwDs. Given the fact that Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) technologies do not
limit their support solely on the empowerment of mental capacities but aim for the
support of physical and other faculties (cf. Chapter 2), it seems appropriate to consider
the Nuffield Council of Bioethics’ definition of dementia as a standard for the purposes
of this ethical analysis. This choice is further supported by the recent developments in
the healthcare practice that respect the PwD as a person, as recommended by T. Kit-
wood (1997). The understanding of dementia as a physical condition affecting mental
capacities of the person is also in accordance with the spirit of the methodology of this
dissertation (section 1.2), which is based on the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human
Rights (UDBHR), and the human rights tradition, respecting basic principles of human
dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of human beings. Therefore, the definition
of dementia provided by the Nuffield Council of Bioethics is employed throughout the
proposed ethical analysis and recommendations regarding AAL technologies for PwDs
in this dissertation.
2.1.3 Care and Treatment of Dementia
In the early stages, a PwD needs memory support, help with regular daily activities
and social contact. In the mild stage of the disease, special medication and medical care
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become necessary. Care and management continue and are progressively more intensive
as the disease progresses until it reaches the most severe stages. One of the symptoms
of AD is a tendency to wander from the home and at some point sleep eventually enters
a phase shift with wakeful nights leading to night-time wandering, which is usually the
precursor to institutionalisation.
Care and management of PwDs are multi-faceted, and can include prevention, en-
ablement and treatment once the disease presents. The prevalence of the disease and
the heterogeneity of the age cohort affected means that there are a variety of needs that
have to be recognised (Gaul and Ziefle 2009; Grönvall and Kyng 2012; Jeffrey Kaye 2010;
Lynch et al. 2009; Mordini et al. 2009; Oppenauer et al. 2007; Remmers 2010; Salces et al.
2006), which can often only be fulfilled at significant economic, personal, organisational,
social and managerial costs (Mandell and Green 2011).
There are a few medical treatments approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) agency of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (such
as Tacrine, Donepezil Hydrochloride) temporarily improving the symptoms. However,
there is no known medical treatment to stop, nor cure the progression of dementia at the
moment. Many experimental treatments are under development (like the experimental
vaccine AN-1792, etc.). Brain imaging techniques (CT, MRI, PET, and SPECT) are also
being recently used for either monitoring the progress of the disease, or for clinical
research purposes (O’Brien 2005).
The care and management of dementia by AAL technologies attempt to address mul-
tiple areas of PwDs’ needs, either by empowering them in their ADLs, or by providing
various solutions for support, monitoring, therapy, and comfort. These classifications of
treatment by AAL technologies are detailed in the following section, especially in sec-
tion 2.2.1. Conventional treatment options will not be discussed in a systematic manner
in this dissertation because it is outside the scope of the research objectives defined in
Chapter 1.
2.2 ambient assisted living
ambient intelligence
In this subsection a basic definition and description of the main characteristics of ambi-
ent intelligence (AmI) will be provided. Due to the recent development within this field
of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), as well as the plans for apply-
ing these technologies to the healthcare practice, and PwD in particular, various terms
and definitions are available regarding AmI and its use within the healthcare realm in
the scholarly literature. The purpose of this subsection is to list these definitions, de-
scribe their historical, conceptual roots, and to clarify the differences within the nature,
purpose and aims of such technologies.
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The idea of AmI is relatively recent, the reference to the technologies expressed by
the term AmI vary in academic and popular publications considerably. First, the term
of AmI have to be clarified. Weiser (1991), then head of the Computer Science Labora-
tory at Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, first proposed the idea of a technology that is
present and at the same time disappears into the background of everyday life. Accord-
ing to Weiser the most profound technologies are those that vanish into the background,
do not require special attention of their user(s) and are ready for immediate use when
required. He called such a technology “ubiquitous computing” (Weiser 1991, p. 95).12
The attribute ‘ubiquitous’ covers this disappearance-into-background in an invisible, in-
terconnected and non-intrusive way (Duquenoy and Whitehouse 2006; Duquenoy 2004).
Due to the invisibility, given the definition of ambient intelligence (disappearance-into-
background), Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010) notes also partial uncontrollability as one
of the consequences of such ambience. Amongst the attributes of AmI is its integration
into everyday objects (Kosta, O. Pitkänen, et al. 2008; Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010).
The term ‘pervasive,’ often used in relation of AmI, refers to ICTs that are avail-
able “everywhere, for everyone, at all times” (Duquenoy and Whitehouse 2006, p. 293).
This pervasive, ubiquitous and non-intrusive nature is often also called ‘calm comput-
ing’ (Spiekermann and Pallas 2006; Wallace et al. 2010). The term “calm technology”
has been proposed by Mark Weiser and his colleague John Seely Brown (Weiser and
J. S. Brown 1996, p. 7), and describes a widespread distributed form of computing that
slowly imbeds itself into the world, and becomes ubiquitous. However, it stays calm.
This calmness is a requirement of the fact that computers are present everywhere, peo-
ple want to compute, stay informed while doing something else, so computers have to
stay in the background to allow people to be more fully human. Weiser and J. S. Brown
(1996) regarded in 1996 calmness of technology (e. g. ubiquity, non-intrusiveness, per-
vasiveness) as the fundamental challenge of the next fifty years. The benefit of calm
technology would be that it would be able to move to the centre of our attention, and
back to the periphery automatically when needed. Such an approach will ensure that the
technology is under control and information is brought to the attention of its users with-
out dominating their lives. As a result calm technology will comfort users by putting
them “at home, into a familiar place” (Weiser and J. S. Brown 1996, p. 11).
In the healthcare arena the term Digital Assistive Technologies (DATs) is being used
by Francis et al. (2009) for any item that assists persons with their disabilities (Francis et
al. 2009). DATs are a kind of AmI, which involves intelligent computing, with elements
of pervasiveness and ubiquity with the focus on assistance. Similarly, Appleyard (2005)
defines Assistive Technology (AT) as “any item, piece of equipment, or product system,
whether acquired commercially, modified, or customized, that is used to increase, main-
12 The edition of this article in Scientific American due to multiple reprints has various page numbering
available. This is the reason why e. g. Portet et al. (2011) and others often refer to the same article with
differing page numbers.
31
2.2 ambient assisted living
tain, or improve functional capabilities of individuals with disabilities” (Appleyard 2005,
p. 134).
The term ‘intelligence’ refers to the adaptability of a system to the presence of human
beings (hearing, vision, language, knowledge) and to the needs of the user (Cook et al.
2009).
According to Cook et al. (2009) the term ‘ambient intelligence’ (AmI) refers to
“a digital environment that proactively, but sensibly, supports people in their
daily lives.” (Cook et al. 2009, p. 279)
This definition of AmI is a result of their literature review. According to this literature
review AmI usually include technologies that are: sensitive (S), adaptive (A), transpar-
ent (T), responsive (R), ubiquitous (U), and intelligent (I). These technologies are a part
of context-aware computing (Cook et al. 2009, p. 279).
Zaad and Ben Allouch (2008) list five key features of AmI: 1) embedded network
devices, which are 2) context aware, 3) personalised, 4) adaptive, and which 5) anticipate
the needs of their users (Zaad and Ben Allouch 2008).
welfare technology, ubiquitous computing
B. Hofmann (2012) calls the usage of AmI for actual help in everyday-tasks a Welfare
Technology (WT). According to the definition, formulated by the Information Society
and Technology Advisory Group (ISTAG) of the European Commission, AmI is a con-
vergence of three major key technologies: ubiquitous computing, ubiquitous commu-
nication, and interfaces that adapt to the users (A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011). Ac-
cording to B. Hofmann (2012), its aim is to provide better and more specific care and
to reduce risks and therefore increase safety, making it possible for the vulnerable to
increase their ability to cope and thus improve their capacity for self-determination, as
well as enabling them to stay at home for longer before being institutionalised.
Cook et al. (2009) referring to Maeda and Minami (2006) emphasises a major difference
between AmI and ubiquitous computing, namely that the former often provides support
for hearing, vision, language and knowledge related to human intelligence. Therefore,
such an understanding of AmI diverges from the definition of ubiquitous computing,
which is supposed to disappear into the background (Cook et al. 2009).
Ubiquitous computing in the context of (elderly) care is also sometimes referred to as
health telematics (Friedewald and Raabe 2011). Health telematics could be categorised as
a form of telemedicine, which is defined by Maheu and Allen as
“the use of audio, video, and other telecommunications and electronic infor-
mation processing technologies for the transmission of information and data
relevant to the diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions, or to provide
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health services or aid health care personnel at distant sites.” (Chan, Estève,
et al. 2008)
telemedicine , ehealth
Telemedicine, going back to the early days of the use of ICT within the healthcare set-
tings, originally supposed to provide distant consultation services through video, and
this communication is usually restricted to interactive patient-physician teleconsulta-
tions (Maheu et al. 2002). The term first appeared in the publication of Willemain and
Mark (1971). However, this area in recent decades advanced so much due to clinical
decision databases, electronic patient records, artificial intelligence (AI), administrative
support, etc., that a new term telehealth has been recently introduced, as noted by Moore
(1999):
“the full array of technologies, networks and healthcare services provided
through telecommunication, including delivery of educational programs, col-
laborative research, meetings,13 patient consultation and other services pro-
vided with the purpose of improving health” (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008)
Telehealth towards the end of 1990s gained big popularity, and the term is often used
synonymously to the older term of telemedicine (Maheu et al. 2002). Since then a new
term of eHealth has been also introduced by Eysenbach (2001) that is defined as
“[A]n emerging field in the intersection of medical informatics, public health
and business, referring to the health services and information delivered or
enhanced through the Internet and related technologies.” (Chan, Estève, et al.
2008)
Chan, Estève, et al. (2008) explain that the term eHealth in a broader sense is a state
of mind, that can be characterised as a new paradigm of commitment and global, net-
worked thinking about the use of information and communication technology to im-
prove healthcare locally, regionally and worldwide. It refers to all forms of electronic
healthcare delivered via the Internet, while embracing concepts called ‘the five C’s’: con-
tent, connectivity, commerce, community and clinical care, often with the addition of the
sixth: computer applications in the form of application service providers (ASPs).14 The
main differences of eHealth from telehealth or telemedicine, according to Maheu et al.
(2002) are:
13 The word ‘meetings’ is missing from the definition provided by Chan, Estève, et al. (2008), however it is
present in the original article of Moore (1999), to which Chan refers to.
14 Eysenbach (2001) lists in his article, based on a speech delivered at UNESCO in June 2001 in Paris, ten E’s in
eHealth: efficiency, enhancing quality, evidence based, empowerment, encouragement, education, enabling,
extending, ethics, equity.
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a) that eHealth is not professional-centric, it is not lead by health professionals but
rather by consumers;
b) eHealth services are motivated by financial gain, while telehealth and telemedicine
were not.
The term telehomecare is a special form of telemedicine that uses a mixture of telecom-
munication and video-conferencing technologies to connect the physician and the pa-
tient situated at home (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008). Consequently the concept of home-
based eHealth, introduced by Demiris (2004), includes both telehomecare and smart-
homes (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008). The definition of the latter is the following:
“unobtrusive disease prevention and monitoring of residents who may not
receive other forms of home care, such as the disabled or elderly” (Chan,
Estève, et al. 2008)
telecare
S. Brown et al. (2004) and S. Brown et al. (2006) define telecare as the application of ICT
“to support elderly people who live alone” (S. Brown et al. 2004, p. 56; S. Brown et al.
2006, p. 65).
domotics
The term domotics is sometimes used as a synonym term to smart-homes in Latin lan-
guages (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008). Stip and Rialle (2005) also mention the term immotics,
which refers to the technical means allowing the adaptation of equipment into the house
for the domotic technology (especially its computer network architecture; Stip and Rialle
2005).
safety technologies , safety devices
Daniel et al. (2009) defines a broader term of safety technologies and safety devices as tech-
nologies and modifications of the environment of its users, the purpose of which are to
improve the safety of the inhabitants by lowering the risk of injuries. Safety technologies
may be categorised in five different groups: 1) general adaptive technologies, 2) passive
environmental sensors, 3) assistive technologies, 4) wander management systems, and
5) appliance technologies (Daniel et al. 2009).
ambient assisted living technologies
Finally, the term AAL refers to innovative technologies (relying on the field of AmI), in-
telligent systems of assistance that help elderly people (including those with disabilities,
34
2.2 ambient assisted living
such as PwDs) in all stages of their life in order to extend their stay in their preferred
environment, and to support systems that maintain the person’s health and functional
capabilities. This might promote a healthier lifestyle, thus allowing the elderly to con-
tinue an active and creative participation in their communities, and ultimately maintain
or improve their quality of life. Moreover, AAL technologies may provide useful data
that can be used to yield increased efficiency in care systems and care management. They
may also provide remote mobile support for caregivers, thus alleviating the caregivers
of certain tasks that can be automated (e. g. services for dressing, personal hygiene, drug
intake reminder, etc.), or delivered at a more affordable cost (Broek et al. 2010).
The goals of AmI, smart homes, and AAL often overlap; therefore it is sometimes hard
to provide clear contours of their borders. Both, AAL and smart-home environments try
to provide empowerment for their (somehow but not necessarily disabled) user, trying
to prolong the stay of such a person in his or her preferable natural home environment,
instead of being institutionalised.
In this dissertation the term AAL technologies will be used persistently in relation to
PwDs, if the phrasing does not require the use of the much more general terms of AmI
and ICT.
2.2.1 Classification of Ambient Assisted Living Technologies
The introduction of ICT in the home environment dates back at least twenty years, since
the publication of the article about ubiquitous technology by Weiser (1991), if not longer.
In the 20th century the homes of people underwent a dramatic revolution by the in-
troduction of domestic technologies. One of the main drives of this change was the
introduction of electricity to homes, which provided a clean and always-ready source
of energy. The next major development for homes was the introduction of information
technologies, which allowed the quick exchange of information between people, appli-
ances, and various systems within and outside of the homes. Finally, the 20th century
technological development also adopted different ‘time-saving’ and ‘time-using’ tech-
nologies that shortened the time spent on housework, but extended the time spent on
the users’ entertainment.15 According to Aldrich (2003) these factors were the seedbed
for the development of the smart-home concept (Aldrich 2003).
For the interlace of modern technology and home environments the researchers pro-
vide various terms. Zaad and Ben Allouch (2008) refer to the expression ‘home automa-
tion,’ which, according to their view, is a provision of technology and services in home.
Its main aim is the improvement of the quality of life of its users (usually with AmI) by
enhancing safety, comfort and better communication (Zaad and Ben Allouch 2008).
15 For a much more elaborate description of this process see Aldrich (2003, pp. 19–21).
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Another terminology is used by Bamigboye (2009) who defines Digital Homecare
as (Bamigboye 2009):
“any combination of Digital Technologies installed in a home environment
to enable delivery and management of health care. [ . . . ] Digital Technology
means any combination of software, hardware and communications config-
ured to provide the appropriate functionality for the patient and the carers
who support them.” (Bamigboye 2009, p. 97)
This category of support is usually provisioned in environment that are commonly de-
scribed as smart-homes, often called domotics.16
S. Martin et al. (2010) provide a further overview of the hierarchical classes of smart
homes, based on the publication of Aldrich (2003, pp. 34–35) as follows:
1. Homes containing intelligent objects – usually single stand-alone appliances, intel-
ligent objects;
2. Homes containing intelligent communicating objects – same as above but with an
option of exchanging information between devices for increasing functionality;
3. Connected homes – presence of internal and external networks, allowing remote
control of systems, access to services, information, from within and beyond the
home;
4. Learning homes – homes that are able to accumulate data about the patterns of
activities, resulting in a possible anticipation of user needs and therefore it is also
able to control the technology based on these needs (e. g. adaptive heating and
lighting usage patterns);
5. Attentive homes – constant recording of activity and location of people within the
home, the information is used for anticipating the needs of the users.
According to Aldrich (2003), each level of this classification represents an increase in
functionality of its user, hence the hierarchical attribute. Each level therefore depends
on the presence of a previous system level being in place (Aldrich 2003).
The introduction of smart-home technologies for PwDs is based on the special needs
that are being represented by this group of population. The provision of smart homes
belongs to the general technological development of our times. However, PwDs have
special needs and requirements for their care, for which the appliances and other ser-
vices of smart homes have to be adjusted. An insightful overview of the needs of PwDs
regarding ICT based services has been identified by Steve Lauriks et al. (2010) as fol-
lows (Steve Lauriks et al. 2010):
16 See the definition of smart-home in section 2.2 on page p. 34.
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• Need for general/personalised information (on dementia; service, care, and sup-
port provision; personal condition; care planning, appointments; legal and finan-
cial issues).
• Need for support of dementia symptoms (ICT compensation for disabilities (mem-
ory, ADL, iADL); ICT supporting the carer; ICT support for psychological, be-
havioural, and emotional changes).
• Need for socialisation of PwDs (keeping connections with family, friends, social
environment; feeling of usefulness).
• Need for health monitoring and safety for PwD (need to be cared for; need for
safety).
F. Meiland et al. (2010), from the same project called COGKNOW17 identified various
areas (memory; social contacts; daily activities; feelings of safety) and inventoried needs
regarding these areas (need for being reminded; need for support for conversations;
need for support with finances, shopping, and hobbies; need for security and safety
cooking, house appliances, etc.; F. Meiland et al. 2010).
The aforementioned needs may be then linked with the services provided by the
application of ICT in general, but also in a form of smart homes. An overview of AAL
technologies is provided by Chan, Estève, et al. (2008) with their functions for their users
(PwDs included). These involve (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008):
• Provision of support for disablement (hearing, visual disablement).
• Lifestyle monitoring.
• Delivering of therapy.
• Delivering of comfort (intelligent devices, smart objects, communication, activities
and leisure equipment, etc.).
The support and empowerment attributes of AAL technologies project the possible ap-
plication of these technologies not only for PwDs exclusively but also to a wider cohort
of (vulnerable) elderly, or every possible user in the future. Therefore, where the context
of AAL technologies can be extended to the empowerment of the elderly in general, the
terms PwD and elderly are used synonymously.
17 The project COGKNOW – Helping people with mild dementia to navigate their day was funded under
The Work Programme 2005–2006 of the IST Priority in the European 6th Framework Programme (FP6) for
Research and Technological Development, which included an eInclusion Strategic Objective. More informa-
tion: http://www.cogknow.eu (visited on 23/07/2014).
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support provision
Into this category Chan, Estève, et al. (2008) include wheelchairs, specialised interfaces
for disabled users. For visually impaired users here belong synthetic voice generation
(Text-to-Speech) for control and command, tactile screen, sensitive remote control, and
audible beacons. For hearing impaired users visible alarms, teletype machines (trans-
ferring audible information into written text), display screens for hearing, etc. All these
co-morbidities might be present in the case of elderly and PwDs. Therefore, the rele-
vance of these technologies in the home environment of PwDs is self-explanatory.
Chan, Estève, et al. (2008) list in this regard also rehabilitation robots and companion
robots. The term ‘robot’ has been first used in the notable drama of the Czech playwright
and littérateur Karel Cˇapek in 1920 (Cˇapek 1920), where it represents artificial people
made out of synthetic organic matter. Their role was to perform the manual work of hu-
man beings, however a rebellion of the robots leads to the extinction of the human race
as such. By contemporary definition, these creatures would be called rather androids or
cyborgs.
Decker et al. (2011) differentiate two main types of robotic systems, based on their
evolution during the history (Decker et al. 2011):
• Industrial robots – usually present in the manufacturing industry, with very little
exposure to human beings.
• Service robots – all non-production robots, usually present for defence, rescue, and
security purposes, usually present in environments populated by people.
Robots, as a joint effort of United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
and International Federation of Robotics (IFR) since 1995 has been working on a pre-
liminary definition of service robot, which have been adopted and resulted in a new
ISO-Standard 837318 effective since 2012:19
“A service robot is a robot that performs useful tasks for humans or equip-
ment excluding industrial automation application.”20
Decker et al. (2011) refer to the attributes of service robots, that may be defined as:
intelligence, autonomy, and cooperation. Especially one might notice the quick advances
in the development regarding the last group. Companion robots, also called social robots
(and the field of social robotics respectively) may be identified as a subgroup of service
18 ISO 8373:2012 – Robots and robotic devices – Vocabulary http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/
catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=55890 (visited on 23/07/2014).
19 For more information see: http://www.ifr.org/service-robots/ (visited on 23/07/2014).
20 Decker et al. (2011) in their article refer to the preliminary definition of service robots provided by IFR:
“A service robot is a robot which operates semi- or fully autonomously to perform services useful to the
well-being of humans and equipment, excluding manufacturing operations.” (Decker et al. 2011, p. 27).
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robotics. They may be further categorised as a type of domestic robots (D. Lee et al.
2010). The main feature of companion or social robots is their friendliness. They are
capable of creating an emotional link with their user (e. g. elderly, etc.). Hence, their
users feel more comfortable during the period they use them. Next to the friendliness,
companion robots may provide other effective services like that of informing, educating,
reminding, or analysis of the user’s feelings, thoughts or needs (D. Lee et al. 2010). With
these specificities we reach another terminology of service robots, which often refers to
the term carebots (i. e. caring robots). Carebots are defined by van Wynsberghe (2012),
citing the article of Vallor (2011), as follows:
“Carebots are robots designed for use in home, hospital, or other settings to
assist in, support, or provide care for the sick, disabled, young, elderly or
otherwise vulnerable persons.” (Vallor 2011, p. 252; van Wynsberghe 2012,
p. 3)
Their functions can be defined as (based on the list provided by A. Sharkey and N.
Sharkey 2012 and Vallor 2011):
• Performing or providing assistance in caregiving tasks.
• Monitoring the health or behavioural status of care receivers.
• Monitoring the provision of care by caregivers.
• Providing companionship to care receivers.
The definition of carebots directly refers to their introduction to smart homes. For ex-
ample, the GeckoSystems CareBot™ provides cost-effective constant remote monitoring
of elderly people; automatic reminders for drug-intake; an alerting system of doctor’s
visit, unexpected visitors or intruders; companionship for the care receiver by holding
conversations with the elderly person on various levels; and notifications of caregivers
of a possibly harmful event (e. g. fall, fire, person cannot be located, etc.).21
A randomised control trial performed by Moyle et al. (2013) proved a moderate to
large positive influence of companion robots to the quality of life of nursing home resi-
dents with dementia in Australia (Moyle et al. 2013).
monitoring
Another element of smart homes is the monitoring of the environment and the human
being present in this environment. This usually happens by using sensors, providing
21 For more information see: http://www.geckosystems.com/markets/CareBot_benefits.php (visited on
23/07/2014).
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assistive technologies for PwDs, monitoring and tracking the movements and locations
of the persons, and providing reminders.
A. Darwish and Hassanien (2011) define sensor networks as
“irregular clusters of communicating sensor nodes, which collect and pro-
cess information from onboard sensors, and they can share some of this
information with neighbouring or surrounding nodes or even with nearby
data collection stations” (A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011, p. 5565)
Chan, Estève, et al. (2008) differentiate fixed and wearable sensor systems. While the
former group is usually installed on a fixed location within the home of its user, the
latter group of sensors might be wearable. These might use either infrared waves, or,
in the case of wearable devices, accelerometers, active badges (RFID22 or NFC23 chips),
etc., (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008). Here belong also the in vivo implantable systems, for
example a drug delivery system of endoradiosonde, which is a microelectronic transmit-
ter device recording physiological data otherwise not obtainable from within its user’s
digestive tract (Chan, Campo, et al. 2009). As expected, the purpose of these sensors is
usually collection of physiological data (EMG, EEG, heart rate, blood oxygen saturation,
blood pressure, glucose level,24 temperature, etc.) about the person (Chan, Estève, et al.
2008).
The provision of functionalities of these micro-devices with sensors (micro-electro-
mechanical systems – MEMS) is usually established via some wireless technology (wire-
less sensor network – WSN). Therefore specific protocols (ZigBee, Bluetooth, etc.) and
networks (wireless body area network – WBAN, body area network – BAN, personal
area network – PAN, body sensor network – BSN, wearable wireless body area network –
WWBAN, implantable wireless body area network – IWBAN) have to be developed that
will allow the reliable communication between these devices and their super-nodes (A.
Darwish and Hassanien 2011).
Scanaill et al. (2006) list amongst the sensor technologies available for smart homes
pressure sensors, pressure mats that can detect movement of a person. Smart tiles can
detect footsteps and the direction of the walking of a person. Passive infrared sensors,
sound sensors in cooperation with magnetic switches can detect the type of the activity
performed by the user. Active infrared sensors and optical/ultrasonic systems can detect
the direction and size of a person passing through the doorway.
22 Radio-Frequency Identity Chip.
23 Near-Fieald Communication.
24 Google and Novartis recently introduced a smart contact lens project, which will contain sensors for making
measurements of blood-glucose levels through the tears of its user. More information: http://googleblog.
blogspot.hu/2014/01/introducing-our-smart-contact-lens.html (visited on 20/07/2014).
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Mihailidis et al. (2008) use the term of Cognitive Assistive Technologies25 for technolo-
gies that strive to support cognitive disorders. As a result Cognitive Assistive Technolo-
gies enhance the user’s autonomy (Mihailidis et al. 2008). The Ambient Trust Cube has
been developed in the US that helps elderly computer users to identify a trusted website
(glowing green) from an untrusted site (glowing red) while browsing the Internet, which
may therefore preserve the functional level of an elderly user of computers (Lorenzen-
Huber et al. 2011).
One of the significant issues of PwDs is their wandering, which results in them not
being able to remember their way home. Sometimes such a scenario ends tragically,
when the person gets lost in a hostile environment of wilderness and starves to death or
freezes in cold, or causes herself an injury. Therefore camera monitoring, location track-
ing and wandering detection play an important role in the smart home environment
functionalities.
Regarding wandering usually some GPS tracking solution is proposed in cooperation
with other services like RF26 watches, or hybrid land-based tracking devices (Assisted
GPS system using the GSM network). Within the KITE Project27 a device in the form
of an armband has been developed that provided location tracking while the PwD was
carrying on her hobby – running (Louise Robinson et al. 2009).
In the Netherlands the Unattended Autonomous Surveillance (UAS)28 system has
been developed, which aims to support the ageing-in-place by detecting the persons
present in the dwelling of its user, tracking their location and providing wandering
detection (J. van Hoof et al. 2011).
A distributed accelerometer, accompanied with reed contact, light and temperature
sensors have been found to be effective in detecting ADL of PwDs in the smart home
system established within the Living Lab Schwechat project in Austria (Diermaier et
al. 2008). In the same lab an e-Shoe has been developed, creating a wearable embed-
ded system, which was able to detect the fall of the person in her home environment.
The e-Home system further extended this functionality with a wireless monitoring and
guidance system, allowing the caregivers to identify the level of activities of PwDs in
different areas of the flat (Panek and Zagler 2008).
A 3D position detector imaging system has been developed for fall detection of the
elderly without the cooperation of its user in smart homes within the FP6 Project Net-
carity (Weimar et al. 2009). Such a system may avoid the necessity of wearing a wearable
device during the day, and therefore avoid limiting the mobility of a possibly frail elderly
person.
25 Cognitive Assistive Technologies are abbreviated as CAT. This should not be confused with Competence
Assessment Tool, which is also abbreviated as CAT.
26 Radio-Frequency.
27 The Keeping In Touch Everyday (KITE) Project has been funded by the Centre for Excellence and Life
Sciences (CELS), Newcastle upon Tyne, 2007–2008.
28 More information: http://www5.vilans.nl/smartsite.dws?ch=&id=135331 (visited on 23/07/2014).
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The introduction of any form of tracking and video-surveillance technology involves
an issue of user’s privacy. For maintaining the privacy of the users a 3D fall detection
system has been developed within the project CARE,29 where the representation of the
person’s fall does not reveal for the observer a complete picture of the person, but the
system is still able to recognise such an event. Using similar technologies, when the
person’s picture is in an unwanted and possibly embarrassing situation, the privacy of
the users in their dwellings can be maintained together with their safety (Belbachir et al.
2010).
therapy
Chan, Estève, et al. (2008) list in this section therapeutic devices that help for example
in drug delivery to the user.
The FP6 MINAmI Project30 developed a drug intake monitoring device. Their pillbox
prototype was able to record the date and time when the pillbox has been opened, and it
transferred the gathered data to a mobile phone. When the user forgets to take the pills
due to the effect of the medication, she received a call from the care centre to remind
her of the drug intake (Niemelä et al. 2007; Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010).
There are also plans for developing a mobile phone application promising the pos-
sibility of remote and automated diagnosis. An example of such an effort can be the
start-up company Akili Interactive Labs31 that with its Project:Evo tries developing a
computer game for iPads, through which it will be possible to identify people with the
risk of developing AD. Through the game it will be able to harvest data thirty times per
second for remote monitoring and analysis of its player (Strickland 2014).
The COACH System32 by using computer vision and AI techniques attempts to pro-
vide its users with verbal and visual reminders necessary to perform their ADL. Such
a system has been used to ensure that PwDs, for example, were supported in their per-
sonal hygiene, where LCD screen and speakers with a video-based prompt supported
its users with visual and audio guides of how to wash their hands properly (Mihailidis
et al. 2008).
29 The project CARE – Safe Private Homes for Elderly Persons was a Ambient Assisted Living Joint Pro-
gramme project between 2009–2011. More information: http://www.aal-europe.eu/projects/case/ (vis-
ited on 20/07/2014).
30 MINAmI – Micro-Nano integrated platform for transverse Ambient Intelligence application has been sup-
ported by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework (FP6) Programme for Research and Technological
Development. The project finished in 2010. More information: http://www.fp6-minami.org (visited on
23/07/2014).
31 Akili Interactive Labs: http://www.akiliinteractive.com (visited on 23/07/2014).
32 The COACH (Cognitive Orthosis for Assisting Activities in the Home) System has been developed in
the Intelligent Assistive Technology and Systems Lab (IATSL) at the University of Toronto, Canada. More
information: http://web.cs.toronto.edu/research/profiles/coach.htm (visited on 23/07/2014).
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The Dem@Care Project,33 run by the consortium of partners from industry and
academia, aims for contributing to the timely diagnosis, assessment, maintenance and
promotion of self-independence of PwDs. The objective of the research project is a
deeper understanding of how the disease affects the PwDs’ everyday life and behaviour.
By implementing a multi-parametric closed-loop remote management service, the PwDs
are able to provide their informal caregivers with adaptive feedback, while at the same
time enables clinicians remote follow-ups in order to gain and maintain comprehensive
insight of the health status of the persons concerned (Newman et al. 2012).
comfort
Amongst the comfort-providing technologies in smart homes belong intelligent house-
hold devices, smart objects (mailbox, closet, mirror, TV, etc.), and intelligent house equip-
ment (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008)
One of the important categories of comfort-providing technologies are those provi-
sioning active ageing. Active ageing can be supported by technologies that motivate the
users to do more physical activities. Such technologies may also provide smart leisure
equipment, for example in the form of digital gaming for the elderly. Gaming consoles
and technologies are both used for brain training of PwDs (McCallum and Boletsis 2013).
Virtual Reality (VR) technologies are also reported to be helpful in various training
scenarios in computer games.34
Technologies of autonomous robot cars (for example Google Self-Driving Car35) may
provide support for PwDs mobility, to be able to visit their family members, friends, to
socialise, or attend a lecture or play at the local theatre.
The Amazon Prime Air Project’s36 aim is to provide delivery services with drones.
Such a service may also have a beneficial effect for the frail elderly population, who are
unable or incapable of going out to do their shopping.
Another available technology that empowers people to stay at home for longer, is
the i-Stay-@-Home Project.37 Their website involves housing providers and technical
partners in the North and West of Europe which are willing to identify, test, and select
affordable ICT solutions that can help elderly to continue to live independently in their
homes. Their motivation is that being able to stay home for an older person should
33 The Dem@Care Project – Dementia Ambient Care: Multi-Sensing Monitoring for Intelligent Remote Man-
agement and Decision Support has been supported by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework
(FP7) Programme. The project finishes in 2015. More information: http://www.demcare.eu (visited on
30/11/2015).
34 See for example: The Rehabilitation Gaming System (RGS): https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/
news/rehabilitation-gaming-system-rgs (visited on 23/07/2014) or Seppala (2014).
35 Google Self-Driving Car Project website: https://plus.google.com/+GoogleSelfDrivingCars/ (visited on
23/07/2014).
36 Amazon Prime Air Project website: http://www.amazon.com/b?node=8037720011 (visited on 23/07/2014).
37 i-Stay-@-Home (ICT SoluTions for an Ageing societY) official website: http://wiki.i-stay-home.eu/index.
php/Main_Page (visited on 23/07/2014).
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not be a luxury. So far they have identified more than sixty ICT solutions in various
European countries (France, Germany, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, etc.).
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A R E V I E W O F C O N T E M P O R A RY W O R K O N T H E E T H I C S O F
A M B I E N T A S S I S T E D L I V I N G T E C H N O L O G I E S F O R P E R S O N S
W I T H D E M E N T I A
In 2013, in a team with other researchers, the author of this thesis conducted an extensive
literature review of the ethical issues present in the academic debate regarding Ambient
Assisted Living (AAL). The results have been published in 2014 (Novitzky et al. 2015).1
In this section I present the scope, methodology, results and the discussion of this review.
3.1 scope of review
Responsible development of AAL technologies demands substantial analysis of the eth-
ical issues, which might occur during research & development (R&D), clinical trials or
eventual clinical application (Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady 2000; Emanuel, Wendler,
Killen, et al. 2004). During these stages of development, various claims and interests
emerge from different stakeholders. Therefore, the question we address in this review is:
what are the ethical issues involved in the stages of R&D, clinical experimentation, and
clinical application of AAL technologies for Persons with Dementia (PwDs) and related
stakeholders? We limit the scope of our investigation to this area and pose questions
like how well-known are these issues, and are there any accepted resolutions. We do
this by carrying out a literature review and organising and categorising the information
we have found, and in the next section we describe the methodology we have followed
in carrying out this review.
3.2 methodology
A literature review is the most commonly-used methodology to survey an area, espe-
cially an emergent area which has many stakeholders and for that reason that is the
methodology we adopted. For our review, we used the following available medical,
1 The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-014-9552-x as
Novitzky et al. (2015).
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legal, sociological, engineering and computer science databases, which also cover the
fields of philosophy and applied ethics: Web of Knowledge (containing: Web of Science,
BIOSIS, MEDLINE, and Journal Citation Reports)2 with sources since 1945, Springer-
Link3 with sources ranging from 1832 to the present, and the meta-database Scirus
(Elsevier),4 which contains twenty databases (including major scientific databases such
as BMJ Group, IOP Publishing, MEDLINE/PubMed, Nature Publishing, Royal Society
Publishing, SAGE Publishing, ScienceDirect, and Wiley-Blackwell), with sources since
the year 1900. The searches were undertaken using a combination of terms in ten search
phrases, listed in Table B.1. The searches were adjusted according to the manuals of the
particular databases and their filters (using wildcards, regular expressions, etc.), which
varied slightly according to their required syntax.
Ten searches5 of the three databases produced a total of 1,720 hits (including possible
overlaps). These included a variety of sources such as articles in journals, literature
reviews, abstracts and conference proceedings, chapters of books and edited volumes.
Figure B.1 shows the number of identified sources in each database and demonstrates a
major increase in sources dealing with the ethics of AAL. The first article identified in
the search was from 1965.
A more detailed diagram of the search results per database shows that the largest
number of identified sources comes from SpringerLink, followed by Scirus, then Web of
Knowledge (Figure B.2).
Following this initial trawl of the literature, the relevance of the sources was judged
manually on the basis of title and abstract. Articles whose abstracts focused on very gen-
eral and broad topics of technology and ethics, and not directly connected to the ethical
issues of AAL technologies, smart homes, sensor technologies, elderly persons, persons
with dementia, etc., were excluded. An article was deemed relevant if it appeared to
focus on ethical issues relating to new (ambient-, sensor-, smart-) technologies for the el-
derly or PwD. Due to the large number of results and for reasons of practicality, sources
without available abstracts were excluded.
This initial analysis of the search results yielded 350 relevant sources. The major-
ity (341) of the relevant articles were in English, 6 in German, 2 in French, and one
in Norwegian. The number of duplicates within the group of relevant articles was 177,
resulting in 173 unique relevant sources from the 10 searches. Thirteen other sources
2 Accessible through: http://www.webofknowledge.com (visited on 27/7/2012).
3 SpringerLink website: http://www.springerlink.com (visited on 27/7/2012).
4 Scirus website: http://www.scirus.com (visited on 27/7/2012).
5 In the meta-database Scirus (Elsevier), the search was refined to Abstracts, Articles, Books, Conferences,
only PDF articles, with subject areas: Computer Science; Engineering, Energy and Technology; Law; Life
Sciences; Medicine; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Sociology. When the individual search phrase returned
more than 500 results, the expression ethic* was added. If the results then yielded more than 200 results,
the additional word dementia was added, further specifying the search phrases and subject matter of the lit-
erature review. The search was conducted in 2012, and therefore restricted to the end of 2012. The overview
of newer or unlisted relevant literature is provided in the normative Chapters 4–6 of this dissertation.
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were added, which were not present in the chosen databases; they were either listed in
the references of relevant articles, or they were found during the unsystematic search for
authors well-known in the field of AAL technologies, and which were seen as clearly rel-
evant for this review. However, they were not included in the 173 results of the original
10 searches. As a result, we had 186 relevant sources. From reading and systematically
classifying the content of these articles, a clear trend can be observed in the increas-
ing number of relevant articles addressing the ethics of AAL technologies, over time
(Figure B.3).
3.2.1 Terminology
According to the literature reviewed, the term Digital Assistive Technology (DAT) can
be used for any item that assists persons with their disabilities (Francis et al. 2009). DAT
are a category of ambient intelligence (AmI), which involves intelligent computing, with
elements of pervasiveness and ubiquity. The term ‘intelligence’ refers to the adaptability
of such a system to the presence of human beings and to the needs of the user. The term
‘pervasive’ refers (in the literature) to Information and Communication Technologies
(ICTs) that are available “everywhere, for everyone, at all times” (Duquenoy and White-
house 2006, p. 293). ‘Ubiquitous’ – the term introduced originally by Weiser (Portet et al.
2011) – covers the disappearance-into-background of the technology in an invisible, in-
terconnected and non-intrusive way (Duquenoy and Whitehouse 2006; Duquenoy 2004).
This pervasive, ubiquitous and non-intrusive nature is often also called ‘calm comput-
ing’ as referred to earlier (Spiekermann and Pallas 2006; Wallace et al. 2010). Due to
the invisibility of ambient intelligence, Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010) emphasise its
partial uncontrollability. Amongst the attributes of ambient intelligence is its integration
into everyday objects (Kosta, O. Pitkänen, et al. 2008; Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010).
As Cook et al. (2009) present it, the term ‘ambient intelligence’ refers to
“a digital environment that proactively, but sensibly, supports people in their
daily lives.” (Cook et al. 2009, p. 279)
B. Hofmann (2012) calls the usage of ambient intelligence for actual help in everyday-
tasks a Welfare Technology (WT). According to the definition formulated by the Infor-
mation Society and Technology Advisory Group (ISTAG) of the European Commission,
ambient intelligence is a convergence of three major key technologies: ubiquitous com-
puting, ubiquitous communication, and interfaces that adapt to the users (A. Darwish
and Hassanien 2011). According to B. Hofmann (2012), its aim is to provide better and
more specific care and to reduce risks and therefore increase safety, making it possible
for the vulnerable to increase their ability to cope and thus improve their capacity for
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self-determination, as well as enabling them to stay at home for longer before being
institutionalised.
Ubiquitous computing in the context of (elderly) care is also referred to as health
telematics (Friedewald and Raabe 2011).
The term Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) refers to innovative technologies (relying
on the field of ambient intelligence), intelligent systems of assistance that help elderly
people (including those with disabilities, such as PwDs) in all stages of their life in
order to extend their stay in their preferred environment, and to support systems that
maintain the person’s health and functional capabilities. This might promote a healthier
lifestyle, thus allowing the elderly to continue an active and creative participation in
their communities, and ultimately maintain or improve their quality of life. Moreover,
AAL technologies may provide useful data that can be used to yield increased efficiency
in care systems and care management. They may also provide remote mobile support
for caregivers, thus alleviating the caregivers of certain tasks that can be automated
(e. g. services for dressing, personal hygiene, drug intake reminder, etc.), or delivered at
a more affordable cost (Broek et al. 2010.
The support and empowerment attributes of AAL technologies project the possible ap-
plication of these technologies not only for PwDs exclusively but also to a wider cohort
of (vulnerable) elderly in the future. Therefore, where the context of AAL technologies
can be extended to the empowerment of the elderly in general, the terms PwD and
elderly are used synonymously.
3.2.2 Frequency of Occurrence of Most Ethically Relevant Terms
The usage frequency, namely, the number of different papers in which these terms oc-
curred from our set of 186 papers, was measured.
The most frequent term used in the selected sources was ‘home’ (140 occurrences),
which is understandable given that the purpose of AAL technologies is that of allowing
PwDs to stay at home for longer. A complete list of the usage frequencies of ethical
terms is presented in Figure B.4.
Various ethical theories were applied in the publications for the analysis of AAL
technologies: John Rawls’ theory of justice (Doorn 2010),6 Amartya Sen’s capability ap-
6 Doorn (2010) attempts to develop a procedural model that contributes to the alleviation of conflicts of re-
sponsibilities within professional settings of R&D. Based on the approaches of wide reflective equilibrium
and overlapping consensus (Rawls 1993), this model has been applied to the development of an in-house
monitoring system involving AmI. The procedural approach developed by Doorn (2010) may contribute to
the definition of various responsibilities within a research project, as it may also clarify what a fair respon-
sibility distribution in such large projects are. In addition, the Rawlsian idea of the veil of ignorance (Rawls
1999) may be further employed in a procedural approach for defining an acceptable and fair design for
PwDs, as noted by Duquenoy and Thimbleby (1999).
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proach (Coeckelbergh 2010; Coeckelbergh 2012; Toboso 2011; Vallor 2011),7 ethics of
care8 of Carol Gilligan (Stapleton 2008), Nel Noddings (Vallor 2011), Joan Tronto (van
Wynsberghe 2012), and a criticism of evolutionary theories (Foddy 2012).
3.3 results
This results section presents an overview of the ethical issues raised by the usage of
AAL technologies in the case of PwD. These are presented here from the point of view
of the stakeholders involved: the PwD, formal and informal caregivers (nurses, family
proxies), researchers and clinicians, (software/hardware) engineers, designers, and tech-
nicians. These stakeholders involved in our ethical analysis had been previously defined
by various authors (Allen et al. 2008; Duquenoy and Whitehouse 2006; Duquenoy 2004;
B. Hofmann 2012; R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow 2006; Sponselee et al. 2008; J. van Hoof
et al. 2011). For all these stakeholders we have listed the ethical issues present in the
group of relevant articles that occur in three different stages of the technology: R&D,
clinical trials,9 and clinical application. The complete set of ethical issues mentioned in
7 The capability approach have been developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (M. Nussbaum and
Sen 1993; M. C. Nussbaum 2007; Sen 2009) as a reaction to the incomplete measure of Gross National
Product (GNP) for estimating quality of life. Instead of the sole provision of formal freedoms, material
goods, technologies, etc., quality of life should be measured by the ‘real freedoms,’ and how the human
dignity of individuals can be empowered to enhance their capability to live better lives (Coeckelbergh 2012).
Coeckelbergh (2012) extends the idea of the capability approach to elderly care in order to enhance their
well-being and agency. By this approach, he expects a shift from focusing solely on the technology to a
much wider emphasis on what people can do with technology (Coeckelbergh 2012).
8 Ethics of care emphasises solidarity and the ideal of human relationship. This approach also considers
these issues as important from a communitarian viewpoint. Ethics of care stands in opposition with a more
prevalent ethics of rights approach with its emphasis on universal standards, professional codes, moral
rules and impartiality (Stapleton 2008). The approach of ethics of care has been developed by Gilligan (2009),
who—by challenging Kohlberg’s view (Kohlberg 1958; Kohlberg and R. H. Hersh 1977; Kohlberg 1981)
from a feminist perspective—differentiated three stages of female moral development: preconventional,
conventional, and postconventional stages. These represent a moral development from selfishness towards
selflessness (i. e. universal care; Gilligan 2009). The normative framework of ethics of care has been applied
to Assistive Technologies (ATs) and PwDs in relation to ethics of nursing. These sources do not limit their
investigations only to nursing homes, but also focus on topics of reducing the burden of care, maintaining
human contact between the caregiver and the person needing care, role of carebots in the caregiving process,
and the implication of these issues on R&D (Vallor 2011; van Wynsberghe 2012).
9 Clinical trials usually refer to “[a]n experiment done involving persons as study subjects for the purpose of
assessing the safety and/or efficacy of a treatment, especially such an experiment involving a clinical event
as an outcome measure, done in a clinical setting, and involving persons having a specific disease or health
condition” (Meinert 2012, p. 34). Clinical trials are subject not only to ethical standards (e. g. “Declaration of
Helsinki” 2013; Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997; etc.) but also legal regulations. In the US,
clinical trials are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and its 21 CFR (2009); in Canada,
it is Health Canada; in the EU, it is regulated by EU Clinical Trials Directive (2001/20/EC) (2004) and the
European Medicines Agency (EMA); and in Japan, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, to mention
few. Device trials are trials designed to test medical devices (Meinert 2012, p. 71). Research with medical
devices are regulated in the US centrally by the FDA and its 21 CFR H (2009). In Europe, it is regulated by a
series of Medical Devices Directives: Active Implantable Medical Devices Directive 90/385/EEC (1990) regulating
implantable devices, The Medical Devices Regulations (1994) covering most of the medical devices except
in vitro diagnostics, and Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices (1993; Eckstein
2003). Under the provisions of these directives, no medical device can be introduced to the EC market
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the literature is presented in Table B.2, which is inspired by Mepham’s methodology of
ethical analysis10 with the help of an ethical matrix, adjusted to the needs of this liter-
ature review (Mepham 2008). As Mepham’s ethical matrix is fundamentally a checklist
of concerns (Mepham 2008, p. 63), we use it to provide in Table B.2 a checklist of ethical
issues, which are present during the various stages of R&D, clinical trials and clinical
application of AAL technologies. The matrix was then modified. Whenever an ethical is-
sue was applicable to the sections both in the group of stakeholders or group of various
stages of research, this was scored in the matrix.
As stated earlier, we structured our analysis of the field in terms of the stakeholders
(PwDs, formal and informal caregivers, researchers and clinicians, engineers, designers,
and technicians) and for each of these we categorised the literature in terms of issues
to do with R&D, clinical trials, clinical application. Table B.3 shows the distribution of
the literature across this categorisation and in the remainder of this section we examine
each of the issues for each of the stakeholder groups, in turn.
3.3.1 Persons with Dementia
3.3.1.1 Research & Development
user involvement in r&d
Persons with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) have special needs and requirements,
which may not be immediately apparent to developers and researchers (Wallace et al.
2010). Wallace et al. (2010) emphasise the importance of providing feedback from the
user to reduce possible errors in the product while Francis et al. (2009) suggest that a
new technology might be rejected and abandoned by its potential users, if they have not
been directly involved in the R&D process from the very beginning.
without the CE marking (Eckstein 2003). Clinical investigations involving medical devices in the EU must
be reported to the Competent Authority of the individual Member State where the research is performed.
In the UK, for example, the Competent Authority is the Medical Devices Agency of the Department of
Health (Eckstein 2003). The regulations regarding clinical trials involving human participants are described
in Chapter 6 in further detail.
10 Mepham’s methodology of ethical analysis is a practical framework that is designed to guide ethical anal-
ysis and discussion, which can lead to rational decision-making regarding competing requirements. How-
ever, the framework was not designed for prescriptive decision-making but rather as an ethical map. The
framework involves the construction of a matrix, which first lists the interests of the various stakehold-
ers (agents), then identifies the ethical requirements of these interests (based on three relevant prima facie
principles: well-being, autonomy, fairness; representing the major traditional ethical theories: utilitarian-
ism, deontological tradition, and modern social contract theory). Finally, the importance of each ethical
requirement is rated (Mepham 2008).
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acceptance of ict
Panek and Zagler (2008) report that the user needs are usually ill-understood during
the processes of R&D and implementation, and according to S. Lauriks et al. (2007) and
Steve Lauriks et al. (2010), there are several unmet needs (general and personalised infor-
mation; support with regarding symptoms of dementia; socialisation; health monitoring
and perceived safety). Users’ cultural differences and backgrounds play a significant
role in the acceptance of ICT (Duquenoy and Whitehouse 2006). A very important as-
pect for the acceptance of ICT amongst the elderly, according to many authors, is the
motivation of the user (Gaul and Ziefle 2009; Grönvall and Kyng 2012; Holzinger et al.
2008; Remmers 2010; Salces et al. 2006; J. van Hoof et al. 2011). With correct motiva-
tion, a greater intention to use the ICT devices can be reached by the elderly (Zaad and
Ben Allouch 2008) who are willing to accept technology if it is worth the effort (Wallace
et al. 2010). It has been reported that designers are usually less successful than rela-
tives in motivating users to use ICT devices (Sponselee et al. 2008). Relatives can have a
major impact on PwD’s subjective norms for ICT acceptance (Steve Lauriks et al. 2010;
Zaad and Ben Allouch 2008). Training and education also play an important role in ICT
acceptance (Mordini et al. 2009; Oppenauer et al. 2007).
Authors disagree on the functionalities of ICT devices, with some proposing that they
should be reduced (Wallace et al. 2010) and others proposing that they should be ex-
tended by providing more alarms and more functions (Zaad and Ben Allouch 2008). It
should be borne in mind that the elderly (even those with mild dementia) are still able
to learn, albeit in a different way than usual (Wallace et al. 2010). Nevertheless, overly
complex systems with multiple-step procedures that place high learning requirements
on the diminished capabilities of PwDs have a greater likelihood of failure (O’Neill, Ma-
son, et al. 2011; Wallace et al. 2010). For instance, blinking LEDs or vibrating sounds (J.
van Hoof et al. 2011), a screw head looking like a button (O’Neill, Mason, et al. 2011), or
an amount of newly installed cables (J. van Hoof et al. 2011) can cause confusion or frus-
tration and can also have a major impact on the overall acceptance of the technology for
the user. PwDs will also have to learn to cope with AAL technologies, when employing
these assistive tools (Portet et al. 2011). A further way of enhancing the acceptability of
a system for the user is by the provision of sufficient customisation, adaptation possibil-
ities or high quality products (Abascal and Azevedo 2007; Francis et al. 2009).
Fairclough (2009) recommends the use of a ‘titration’ approach while defining the
needs of a vulnerable ICT user, which employs subjective self-reports to standardise and
personalise the various experiences of each participant, to provide a more objective and
scientific evaluation. Moreover, Francis et al. (2009) propose using the recommendations
of the The Autism Simplex Collection (TASC) project (1998), which involves using visual
communication tools for less-verbal users during the interview questions, thus helping
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to introduce these participants actively into the process of R&D, without recourse to
using abstract and complicated concepts.
3.3.1.2 Clinical Trials
informed consent, independence and self-determination
During the clinical trial period, the vulnerability of the PwD could raise certain ques-
tions regarding informed consent as the hi-tech nature of AAL technology may make
it difficult for a PwD to fully understand what their consent is being sought for. PwDs
could become dependent on AAL technology to such an extent that it reduces their
autonomy (e. g. a user who is over-dependent on a system may wait for the system
to report a complication on her behalf, instead of reporting it directly herself; Scanaill
et al. 2006). This dependence on the (hi-tech) pseudo-intelligence provided by AAL
technologies means that, while they empower very specific faculties, they can reduce
people’s autonomy. Consequently, they could also dramatically infringe the validity of
informed consent given by PwD at the more advanced stages of their AAL usage (B.
Hofmann 2012). Also, the ambient functioning of the AAL technology in the private
homes of PwDs would mean that additional informed consent would be needed from
co-habitants (B. Hofmann 2012). Moreover, Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010) criticise the
opt-out policy, which weakens personal autonomy and thereby the decision-making of
the user.
Remmers (2010) points out that the reduction of independence does not automatically
result in an incapacity of self-determination.11 According to him, the longest possible
preservation of self-determination is the main normative background legitimising the
usage of ATs in the home. Reciprocal dependency on other humans is unavoidable
because it is impossible for any human being to lead a completely independent, self-
determined life without at least once in their lifetime (e. g. childhood, teenage years,
etc.) needing support and aid. The use of ATs is mostly justified when the need for
such support emerges and the compensating functions of technologies are intended,
resulting in a regained personal self-determination. Thus, the form and consequences of
dependency linked with the use of ATs extend only to the dependency on a technical
instrument (Remmers 2010).
Picking et al. (2012) mention that researchers welcome the development of a certain
amount of dependency on a product, if the product provides support for independent
living. After all, according to Remmers (2010), such self-induced dependencies on arte-
facts are typical of modern civilisation.
11 Remmers defines self-determination, based on the traditions of the Stoics, Cicero, later Thomism, the nat-
ural law tradition of Pufendorf, and Kantian philosophy as: ‘freedom from constraint.’ Self-determination
tightly linked with human dignity is normatively a basic right, however it is acquired on a genealogical
level (biographical development of personal abilities; Remmers 2010).
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control of ict, customisation
Wallace et al. (2010) emphasise the different perception of technology by PwDs, who
might consider technology as not meant for them: the system is not of any use to them,
or not even relevant to them at all.
One of the major worries expressed by Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010) is that the
PwDs, when dealing with ambient technologies, will lack necessary control, becoming
prisoners of AAL technologies in their own homes. J. van Hoof et al. (2011) reported that
a high number of false alarms resulted in annoyance in some users, partially because the
falsity of the alarm needed to be verified through confirmation by the user, otherwise it
was automatically considered to be a true alarm.
During clinical trials, certain users reported fears about these technologies having a
‘life of their own.’ There is a risk that users might find the technologies obtrusive (Portet
et al. 2011). During trials, it has been observed that some persons with physical or
mild cognitive impairment prefer using voice commands to touchscreen control of the
devices (Portet et al. 2011), while others found the touchscreen control equally benefi-
cial (Wallace et al. 2010). In a discussion of the use of robots, Decker (2012) emphasises
that although it is recommended that a veto function should exist to allow users to
stop the robots’ actions, this view has been challenged where persons with cognitive
impairment are concerned. Also, some authors point out that during a trial, the partic-
ipants had to be protected against information overload (Duquenoy and Whitehouse
2006; Kang et al. 2010).
Zaad and Ben Allouch (2008) also mention the possible ‘compassionate interference’
between the user and caregiver. While users expressed their wishes for more direct con-
trol over ICT devices, the caregivers, however, wanted to prevent a user having control
over the supporting system (in some cases). Often, at first glance, it is not clear who the
real user of the system is. Therefore, user controllability and user-centredness does not
overlap in all cases (Zaad and Ben Allouch 2008).
prevention of harm , pervasiveness , medicalisation of home
environment
One of the major positives of AAL technologies is their ability to prevent certain harms
resulting from the frailty of PwDs (i. e. accidental falls; B. Hofmann 2012; Sponselee et al.
2008). This can have the positive benefit of reducing anxiety (B. Hofmann 2012). How-
ever, Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010) emphasise the fear about the laboratorisation of
the home, which is supported by J. van Hoof et al. (2011) and Landau and Werner (2012),
when they use the expression the ‘medicalization of home.’ The pervasiveness of AAL
technologies poses certain challenges to user privacy, due to the sometimes intrusive
nature of these ICT devices. Technologies with privacy-preserving video-sensing are
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also being developed (Belbachir et al. 2010). These technologies, following the principles
of privacy-by-design (Ahonen et al. 2010b; Batchelor et al. 2012; Cavoukian et al. 2010;
Friedewald and Raabe 2011; Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010), do not infringe on privacy
during their use (e. g. due to strong data encryption on the physical layer, Chan, Estève,
et al. 2008; or because they are based on wearable technologies, Piasek et al. 2013).
3.3.1.3 Clinical Application
ageing at home , autonomy, and dependence on a system
Almost every publication we encountered in our analysis of the field emphasises the
benefits of ageing at home instead of institutionalisation: inter alia more privacy, per-
sonal integrity, dignity and a positive impact on the self-image (Harrefors et al. 2012;
Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010). However, certain authors are sceptical whether the
actual autonomy of the PwD is really increased through AAL technologies. Enhanced
dependence on ICT might result in greater inactivity, promoting a lazy lifestyle instead
of a true and desirable independence (Portet et al. 2011; Maguire et al. 2011). Moreover,
dependence on technology requires us to put a certain amount of trust (Kosta, O. Pitkä-
nen, et al. 2008; Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010) and confidence in these systems, despite
potential problems e. g. regular false alarm warnings, incorrect notifications or even fail-
ures of the technology (J. van Hoof et al. 2011). Portet et al. (2011) report a certain fear
that growing user dependence on AAL technology could expose them to danger in the
case of emergency (i. e. if the technology were to breakdown). For example: an auto-
mated bed that deflated during a blackout hindered communication with the external
world (J. van Hoof et al. 2011). In addition, sensors, battery-driven devices, and exter-
nal devices should avoid causing problems for the mobility of users (A. Darwish and
Hassanien 2011), either when worn or when installed in their homes.
embarrassment, stigmatisation, social isolation
Ageing at home could have a positive impact on PwDs, especially when counter-
balancing the negative aspects of institutionalisation (especially in the case of couples,
who are used to living together and have done so autonomously and privately for
decades (J. van Hoof et al. 2011). However, the use of AT or leakage of disease data—
associated with the diagnosis of dementia —may cause embarrassment (Kumar and H.-J.
Lee 2011) or even stigmatisation (Chan, Campo, et al. 2009; Dishman and Carrillo 2007;
J. van Hoof et al. 2011; Kleinberger et al. 2007; S. Martin et al. 2010; O’Neill, Mason,
et al. 2011; Oppenauer et al. 2007; Palm 2012; Louise Robinson et al. 2009; Salces et al.
2006; A. Sixsmith and J. Sixsmith 2008; Sponselee et al. 2008; Wright 2011; Wright and
Wadhwa 2010; Zwijsen et al. 2010). Some AAL technologies evoked resistance in certain
persons with MCI because of their ‘handicapped-look’ design (Francis et al. 2009) so
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the design of the devices should be aesthetically pleasing for the users (Francis et al.
2009; Louise Robinson et al. 2009). Fairclough (2009) warns that an explicit feedback of
information of a delicate nature coming from an assistive device in front of others or
in public spaces can be embarrassing for its user. Stigmatisation can have major effects
on the isolation of the user (Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010; Portet et al. 2011; Salces
et al. 2006; Sorell and Draper 2012; Zwijsen et al. 2010), which can be followed by ghet-
toisation (Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh 2011) or victimisation (A. McLean 2011)
of the user.
monitoring , surveillance
AAL technologies raise security issues due to risks of surveillance (Kosta, O. Pitkänen,
et al. 2008; Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010), when monitoring of the activities of daily
living (ADLs) of PwDs. B. Hofmann (2012), discussing surveillance during the beneficial
use of monitoring, questions whether it is possible to define a standard of normal daily
activities that can be used in relation to WTs. The heterogeneity of the PwD cohort (Gaul
and Ziefle 2009; Grönvall and Kyng 2012; Jeffrey Kaye 2010; Lynch et al. 2009; Mordini et
al. 2009; Oppenauer et al. 2007; Remmers 2010; Salces et al. 2006) greatly complicates the
differentiation between normal and abnormal ADL. Moreover, it is unclear who should
define normal and abnormal ADL (B. Hofmann 2012).
social exclusion, digital divide , familiarity with ict, affordability
Kosta, O. Pitkänen, et al. (2008) and Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010) ask whether the
use of AAL technologies promotes social exclusion, rather than inclusion. Francis et
al. (2009) demonstrate this issue using an example: the use of technology for persons
with autism/Asperger’s syndrome enables them to communicate better, thus seemingly
promoting their social inclusion; however it can actually enforce their social exclusion
and cause more intense anxiety by increasing their interactions with others.
The relevant literature also lists another form of social exclusion that is caused by
technology, between users of ICT and non-users, namely the digital divide. The digital
divide, according to Francis et al. (2009), has arguably similar effects on stakeholders
as those of exclusion from ICT design cycles. The digital divide, as a form of social dis-
crimination (B. Hofmann 2012), drives society to elitism (Kosta, O. Pitkänen, et al. 2008;
Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010; Satava 2003). ICT devices can also widen the digital
divide (Wright and Wadhwa 2010) and any existing divisions for example, between the
quality of care (Walsh and Callan 2011) of those already familiar and those unfamiliar
with ICT. Batchelor et al. (2012) differentiate younger and older generations based on
familiarity with ICT devices, characterising them as ‘digital natives’ and ‘digital immi-
grants.’
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Francis et al. (2009) and B. Hofmann (2012) both mention that the prevalence of tech-
nology for certain people can cause feelings of alienation. Whilst Katz and Rice char-
acterise the role of communication technology as primarily interaction, this interaction
can be negative, for example where people cheat, exploit or hurt each other (Francis
et al. 2009). Therefore, education and training from an early age on how to properly
use ICT should be emphasised, enhancing the motivation to use, familiarity with and
overall acceptance of, the ICT systems (A. McLean 2011; Mordini et al. 2009; Oppenauer
et al. 2007). This could help address the aforementioned issue of digital divide and social
isolation.
Wright and Wadhwa (2010) point out that eInclusion (digital inclusion of a person)
might not be beneficial to everybody and that there will be certain social groups who will
self-willingly exclude themselves from ICT technologies. The group of people classed
as ‘lapsed users’ despite their familiarity with ICT, lack genuine interest in comput-
ers (Wright and Wadhwa 2010).
Other issues for the user, closely related to social discrimination and digital divide,
are the overall affordability (Niemelä et al. 2007; Satava 2003; Wright and Wadhwa 2010;
Zaad and Ben Allouch 2008; Zwijsen et al. 2010), feasibility (Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al.
2010), or cost (Daniel et al. 2009; Zaad and Ben Allouch 2008) of ICT systems. Economic
barriers can lead to isolation too (Abascal and Nicolle 2005).
3.3.2 Formal and Informal Care-Givers (Nurses, Family Proxies)
3.3.2.1 Research & Development
whose benefit?
The basic interest for caregivers in the development of AAL technologies lies in the
possibility of continuous monitoring of PwDs (A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011). An
important question here is whether AAL technologies mainly benefit the PwD or the
caregivers (B. Hofmann 2012). B. Hofmann (2012) points out that whilst many papers
mention benefits of welfare technologies, there is a lack of empirical evidence from
documented studies substantiating these claims.
3.3.2.2 Clinical Trials
data collection
According to Fairclough (2009), during clinical trials, the caregivers, together with the
PwD, have the right to know what data are collected about them; the right to access the
data if required; the right to provide/refuse their implicit/explicit prior consent; and
finally, the right to some benefit for permitting data collection.
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prevalence of technological rationality in human care
Several scholars are sceptical of AAL technologies because of their ability to replace
human proximity and care (B. Hofmann 2012; R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow 2006). More-
over, there are reports of concerns regarding the deception of vulnerable people by the
substitution of human emotions or relations by technologies (Oost and Reed 2011) and
insecurity (Sponselee et al. 2008) during the use of technology by the caregivers.
B. Hofmann (2012) questions whether all the stakeholders of the AAL technologies
are ready to translate the technologies of hospitals into the home (and private) environ-
ments. A home has a special symbolic meaning as a place of confidence, trust, comfort,
safety and privacy (Dekkers 2009), meanings which can be disrupted by hospital tech-
nology. B. Hofmann (2012) also questions the prevalence of technological rationality in
the care provided because it might reduce the potential to support and enhance patients’
agency.
3.3.2.3 Clinical Application
instrumentalisation of care , the value of human care
Care-givers, especially proxies, tend to welcome allowing PwD to remain at home,
e. g. helping couples to live their lives together for longer at home, even with a moderate-
dementia diagnosis instead of the institutionalisation of these persons. However, B. Hof-
mann (2012) reports that caregivers are increasingly concerned about the ethical respon-
sibility and legal liability for any possible misuse of the technology in the home setting.
He also stresses the possible risks of using ICT, which by its nature emphasises in-
strumental values, such as productivity and efficiency instead of important relational
aspects of human welfare. This criticism is based on the assumption that values such
as hope, coping, vulnerability, dignity, meaningfulness or proximity, which are essential
core aspects of the human caregiving activity, cannot yet be meaningfully replaced with
technologies (B. Hofmann 2012). The person-to-person interaction is emphasised as very
important (Walsh and Callan 2011) as opposed to the drives towards replacement of hu-
man care with ICT devices (Borenstein and Pearson 2010; Coeckelbergh 2010; Oost and
Reed 2011; Portet et al. 2011; R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow 2006; Vallor 2011).
Vallor (2011) expresses her concerns about the lack of academic discussion on the
question of value of caregiving for caregivers themselves. Whilst being aware of the
strenuous work during caregiving, she points out that in most of the literature about ATs
(or as she calls them ‘carebots’), the practice of caregiving per se is usually suggested as
“nothing except a burden” (Vallor 2011, p. 255). According to her, emotional and social
support is considered as a ‘task’ (R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow 2006), or caregiving as
simply a ‘burden,’ which technologies can help reduce (Borenstein and Pearson 2010).
Stip and Rialle (2005) mention the threat that artificial intelligence poses in replacing
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the physician/caregiver by a pure data-manager of a database, transforming the notion
of patient to a disembodied and virtualised user that is manageable from a distance. A.
Sharkey and N. Sharkey (2012) highlight the danger of objectification of the elderly by
the caregivers via technology (Vallor 2011).
overprotection, paternalism , previous work habits , rigid application
of protocols
Although caregivers are known for their general protective character and for trying
to protect the remaining privacy of the elderly (Sponselee et al. 2008), cases of over-
protection by caregivers have been reported (L. Robinson et al. 2007), which could be
understood as a form of paternalism (S. Martin et al. 2010).
Moreover, the literature emphasises the needs of users, which are not always in accor-
dance with the needs of caregivers. This is often the case when caregivers are reluctant
to use ICT devices in human care and stick to their previous work habits, irrespective of
the needs of the care receivers (Sponselee et al. 2008). Where the application of assistive
devices is utilised, the prescribed protocols are reportedly often rigidly followed by care-
givers, regardless of the needs or requests of the user (e. g. patient lifts, etc.) (Sponselee
et al. 2008).
not-invented-here syndrome
In caregiving institutions a ‘not-invented-here syndrome’ has been noticed, which means
that the formal caregivers tend to be less willing to adopt an AAL system, which was de-
veloped outside their caregiving institution or was not solely designed for care purposes
only (Sponselee et al. 2008).
3.3.3 Researchers and Clinicians
3.3.3.1 Research & Development
motives for participation in research , eagerness to please ,
power-relationship between the researcher and pwd
Elderly persons reported various attitudes and motives as reasons for taking part in re-
search: a wish to contribute to the development of AAL technologies, a feeling of obliga-
tion to participate in research that could result in progress in the field of study, feelings
of curiosity and loneliness, and a desire to find somebody willing to listen (Grönvall
and Kyng 2012).
During R&D and clinical trials, users tended to be eager to please the researchers or
feared offending them somehow (Wallace et al. 2010) or of ‘causing some problem by
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doing something wrong’ (Oberzaucher et al. 2009). They often blamed themselves for
causing problems (Wallace et al. 2010).
Moreover the physicians’/researchers’ relationship to a (vulnerable) user could be
a power relationship. The elderly tend to have less confidence in their own judge-
ment (Wallace et al. 2010) and regard researchers as people with higher status and
expertise (Maier and Kempter 2009). Therefore, they tend to defer to their opinion and
ideas. According to Maier and Kempter (2009), such power inequalities can negatively af-
fect the whole R&D process and its results. In cases like this, the elderly person should
be reassured that the researchers are performing the research in order that they may
learn from them (Maier and Kempter 2009).
3.3.3.2 Clinical Trials
meaningfulness and prioritisation of data
Despite the physicians’ declared lack of motivation to learn how to use new ICT tech-
nologies (Sponselee et al. 2008), the interest that clinicians and medical researchers take
in AAL technologies partially overlaps with that of the caregivers in the continuous mon-
itoring of the PwD. During the clinical trials, an important aspect for medical researchers
is the meaningfulness of the data gathered, both from a scientific and a medical point of
view, in order to be able to translate it into valid knowledge (Allen et al. 2008; Conley et
al. 2008; Cook et al. 2009; A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011; Kang et al. 2010; Jeffrey Kaye
2010; Noury et al. 2011; Romdhane et al. 2012; Viswanathan et al. 2012; Wherton and
Monk 2008). The accuracy and reliability of such data has to be prioritised, according to
their relevance, importance and urgency (A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011; Viswanathan
et al. 2012).
safety and security of pwds
With various technologies and their functions (location tracking, drug intake monitoring,
social interaction detection, etc.), the reduction of fear and insecurity amongst the elderly
has been documented, as well as an increase in both, genuine and perceived safety (B.
Hofmann 2012; S. Lauriks et al. 2007).
3.3.3.3 Clinical Application
human-centred approach
The clinical application of AAL technologies should incorporate two considerations with
regard to a human-centred approach. Firstly, a human-centred computing approach
should consider the health- and technology-orientation of an ambient system, along
with the need for comfort of the PwDs (i. e. their special needs as persons; the need
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for empowerment living in their homes; etc.; Portet et al. 2011; Zaad and Ben Allouch
2008). Secondly, a consideration of whether the need for AAL technologies is in the best
interest of the individual PwD (Scanaill et al. 2006). The aforementioned considerations
pose decision-making challenges linked with the responsibilities and competencies of
both the clinical researchers and clinicians (B. Hofmann 2012).
allocation of resources
Duquenoy (2004) stresses the question of who decides about the prioritisation of in-
formation, bandwidth, machine power, storage and, more generally, the allocation of
resources and trade-offs.
ict and diagnosis , automated machine diagnosis
The use of ICT devices in healthcare is divided between the services- and information-
related forms of telehealth (tele-care and tele-rehabilitation) for end-users, and
telemedicine, which is defined by Plaza et al. as ICT devices used for diagnosis (Plaza
et al. 2011). Behind the introduction of ICT into the arena of healthcare is the shift from
the traditional reactive approach, namely diagnosis and treatment or cure, towards the
preventive approach, namely, monitoring and early detection of diseases (Palm 2012).
Regarding PwDs, the focus in diagnosis is on the preclinical state, when the symptoms
provide enough variances during monitoring to enable the projection of the possible
later loss of independence and physical functioning (Merilahti et al. 2012). The role of
ICT in diagnosis is to predict and track the progression of the disease (Dishman and
Carrillo 2007), often doing so remotely (B. Hofmann 2012).
The automated diagnosis via ICT technology is welcomed by a few au-
thors (Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh 2011; A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011;
Friedewald and Raabe 2011). In addition to the current difficulties with fidelity and
trustworthiness of such systems (Fairclough 2009; Gaul and Ziefle 2009; Kleinberger et
al. 2007), there are also legal constraints. In the context of EU laws, persons have a right
not to be subjected to significant decisions based on any such automated processing
(European Commission Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 1995; Kosta, O. Pitkänen, et al.
2008; Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010). Similar regulation is present in Japan’s Doctor’s
Act no. 20, which prescribes that diagnosis should be provided only by direct examina-
tion of a patient, not by a machine (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008).
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3.3.4 (Software/Hardware) Engineers
3.3.4.1 Research & Development
user-involvement in r&d
It may be detrimental if engineers and designers of AAL technologies do not involve
PwDs in the customisation and co-design of these assistive technologies (Francis et al.
2009; Gaul and Ziefle 2009).
security of medical and personal data
A significant number of articles raise concerns about security (see Figure B.4), which
in the case of medical and personal data necessitates the provision of strong data secu-
rity, even automatic encryption (e. g. encryption in the physical layer Chan, Estève, et al.
2008). The encryption of personal data is stipulated by both international and national
legislation (e. g. 21 CFR 11 2009; or Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 1995). Kumar and
H.-J. Lee (2011) stresses the importance of protection against Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks on the whole system because of their potentially tragic consequences. Moreover,
the Quality of Service should be evaluated together with the security of the system (Ku-
mar and H.-J. Lee 2011).
safety of aal systems
The installation of assistive technologies, as previously mentioned, should not reduce
the mobility of their users (A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011). This also holds true for
implantable (in vivo) sensors (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008). These should also not overheat
or harm their user (A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011).
tasks not suitable for ict
During the R&D, according to B. Hofmann (2012), engineers should be aware of, or be
warned by other stakeholders about certain tasks, which are not suitable for ICT so-
lutions. R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow (2006) point out that, in future, different types of
assistive robots are supposed to provide either physical services, such as lifting, turning,
monitoring; or caring and emotional labour, such as conversations, social interactions,
sympathy, emotional support, etc. By introducing these solutions, we may also be with-
drawing the only regular human social contact for the elderly, namely the people pro-
viding physical care for them (professional caregivers, cleaners, household maintenance
assistants, etc.; R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow 2006). R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow (2006)
therefore emphasise that the human companionship provided by caregivers is at least
as important as the physical duties they perform.
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technical or ‘quick fix , ’ r&d for pwds as low prestige endeavour
The danger of regarding AAL technologies as ‘quick and easy fixes’ or a ‘technical fix’
to grave psycho-social and societal problems is still present (B. Hofmann 2012; Mordini
et al. 2009).
Moreover, researchers see the development of technologies for the elderly as a low-
prestige endeavour (B. Hofmann 2012; compared with other technologies, e. g. diabetic
insulin pumps, artificial cardiac pacemakers, wearable EEG systems, or wearable dialy-
sis machines, etc.), although the need for these technologies is increasing.
mismatched expectations of users and engineers
The literature warns about mismatched expectations of engineers/researchers and ac-
tual users of a system (Allen et al. 2008). For example, video-telephony is often under-
stood as enhancing the social inclusion of a user but according to van Hoof’s empirical
study, it did not always reduce feelings of loneliness or improve the social contacts of
the users (J. van Hoof et al. 2011). Therefore, an analysis of the broader social context is
required (Duquenoy and Whitehouse 2006; Duquenoy 2004).
interoperability and compatibility of systems
During R&D the longevity of AAL technologies requires that they must be developed
with the possibility of extending and integrating their use with other future systems and
sensors (Chan, Estève, et al. 2008; A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011; Román et al. 2009).
special status of human experimentation
The engineers should be aware of the dangers and issues linked with human experimen-
tation (Mordini et al. 2009).
3.3.4.2 Clinical Trials
indispensable third parties
The responsibilities of indispensable third parties, without any direct health responsibil-
ities (electricity-, heating-, gas-providers, technical service, etc., B. Hofmann 2012; J. van
Hoof et al. 2011) for the application of assistive technologies in home environments,
must be considered critically from the clinical trials stage onwards. An unexpected
power-cut or loss of internet connection by an Internet service provider could have tragic
consequences in a smart home and for a PwD using wearable life- and health-logging
sensors. Furthermore, privacy and confidentiality could be infringed (B. Hofmann 2012).
The question at stake is the allocation of the responsibility.
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Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010) express that the liabilities can be strict, meaning
that if, for example, from the clinical trials stage onwards, an unauthorised person gains
access to sensitive data, the controller should be held responsible for the damage re-
gardless of culpability. This view of liability could be applied to the indispensable third
parties as well.
Wright mentions the notion of “overlapping responsibilities” (Wright 2011, p. 211),
originally defined by Vedder and Custers (Wright 2011). In the development of new
technologies the stakeholders at various stages of the development have only limited
insight into the opportunities and risks involved, while at the same time having only
very limited means to respond. As it is undesirable to assign all the responsibilities of a
highly complex system to only one group of stakeholders, overlapping responsibilities
are favourable in cases when there is usually a responsibility gap (Wright 2011).
Finally, Decker (2012) calls for legal accountability of damages caused by service
robots themselves. In principle, the owner of a service robot is liable for the damages
caused only if he or those assisting him are personally responsible. Mistakes in the pro-
duction or instructions of a product are the responsibilities of the manufacturer (Decker
2012). However, the liability of the owner is again questionable, if such a robot adapts
autonomously to various situations, or can react to human beings, other robots or the
environment. Therefore, its behaviour is not predictable in detail. Decker et al. (2011) ask
whether, for such cases, an independent legal ‘liability’ and new rules of accountability
should be called for.
testing of aal technologies
B. Hofmann (2012) further expresses the need for more intensive testing of AAL tech-
nologies. Compared with the testing of drugs in healthcare, the regulation of ambient
technologies seems to be lax (B. Hofmann 2012). Portet et al. (2011) clarify that in prin-
ciple, there are three possible venues of testing: a) in situ (in the real environment of the
user), b) in vitro (in laboratories), and c) in-sitro/in-simu (in a simulated environment,
reproducing the users’ home environment). Against this background, Portet et al. (2011)
point out that there are very few instances of in-situ testing. He also remarks that al-
though the in vitro tests are more affordable and possibly more objective, the in situ tests
provide more realistic data, although at a higher cost and possibly with an observers’
subjective bias. The in-sitro/in-simu experiments are able to identify most of the usability
problems found in other conditions, though not as precisely as the in-situ experiments,
hence in-sitro/in-simu experiments are particularly suitable for prototyping (Portet et al.
2011).
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3.3.4.3 Clinical Application
data safety and protection
During clinical application, demand is placed on the engineers to deal with the issue of
data protection (Kosta, O. Pitkänen, et al. 2008), involving its secure storage for a req-
uisite amount of time, and its subsequent secure removal (Abascal and Azevedo 2007).
Duquenoy (2004) emphasises that the bandwidth, processing power, memory, etc., nec-
essary for transferring and processing medical data is a scarce resource and therefore, an
adaptive and on-going negotiation about operational space and its prioritisation should
be applied.
principle of proportionality
B. Hofmann (2012) indicates that the proportionality principle, should be applied dur-
ing the application of welfare technology,12 especially surveillance technologies. Ac-
cordingly, the harm and burden caused must be appropriate in relation to the benefits
yielded. For example, a tracking system should not impose physical restrictions or mo-
bility surveillance on its user by limiting his or her activities but rather, should apply
less obtrusive subjective barriers, with labels, mirror doors, RF13-coded access points, etc.
However, the benefit of these alternatives could also be questioned (B. Hofmann 2012).
easy to learn, error free ict
Assistive technology should be easy to learn for future users. Also, it should be as error-
free as possible (Portet et al. 2011).
different life-cycle of technology and service , technology push
The engineers of ambient assisted solutions should bear in mind the differences between
the life-cycle of a device (technology), and the life-cycle of the healthcare service provid-
ing it, as they are usually not identical. The health service begins with the person going
to see the clinician, and it ends when the clinician resolves the person’s problem. The
technological life-cycle is different: it is developed, produced in large quantities, and
distributed to selling points. From an ethical point of view, a service life-cycle is more
human-centric, while that of a product is more technology-centric. According to Kosta,
O. Pitkänen, et al. (2008) and Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010) the former should be
12 Hofmann defines welfare technology as a heterogeneous group of technologies which are “supposed to give
better and more focused care, reduced risk and increased safety, increased coping and self-determination,
make it possible to stay at home longer, avoid harm (from falling, fire, robbery), make more just resource
allocation, and to promote technology development, commercialization and growth.” (B. Hofmann 2012,
p. 391)
13 Radio-frequency.
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highlighted. Furthermore, because the difference between life-cycles is not clear, how
much ethical analysis is transposable from earlier product study, and how much new
ethical analysis is required in a new model of ambient intelligence (Kosta, Olli Pitkänen,
et al. 2010) is an open question. Related to this, Chan, Campo, et al. (2009) point out that
the technology push from the industry is usually greater than the demand pull from the
users’ needs, which can cause user disappointment.
the role of aal technologies
Rapoport (2012) notices that the role of ICT devices regarding the human body facili-
tates a new perception of the body itself: mediated through technologies. Moreover, be-
yond merely detecting, the technologies do currently also take on agency, make choices,
assume the intentionality allotted to human beings while performing actions in a pur-
poseful, goal-oriented manner. Such a technology thus turns into a proxy (Rapoport
2012).
3.3.5 Designers
3.3.5.1 Research & Development
design-for-all approach and heteronomous group of pwds
For the designers, the literature emphasises the user-centred approach to design (Wal-
lace et al. 2010), which means a universal design for users with various needs and
requirements. The design-for-all, universal design, and inclusive design approaches are
characterised by encouragement of designers to extend their designs to include older
and disabled people in all phases of R&D (Newell et al. 2011), despite the higher cost,
extra work (Abascal and Azevedo 2007; Sponselee et al. 2008) and greater attention re-
quired from the designers (Wallace et al. 2010). However, according to Portet et al. (2011),
the design-for-all approach may be inappropriate for PwDs because of their specific in-
dividual needs and pathologies. They emphasise that “no smart home application is
going to be successful if the intended users are not included in the design” (Portet et al.
2011, p. 132). It is imperative to focus on safety during the design process. This may be
achieved by employing the privacy and security by design model (Kosta, O. Pitkänen, et
al. 2008; Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010), and maintaining privacy (Portet et al. 2011) and
user-friendliness (A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011; Duquenoy and Whitehouse 2006).
user involvement in r&d
As stated before, the active involvement of users in the process of design is necessary
for the overall usability and success of AAL technologies (as is the case with the user-
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centred Participatory Design Approach during the design of disability assistive technol-
ogy for people with autism/Asperger’s syndrome (Francis et al. 2009). This approach
could also be referred to as ‘proactive design’ (Duquenoy 2004), as a holistic approach
or perspective (Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010), as value sensitive design (Wright 2011),
ergonomic design (Wallace et al. 2010), or simply as ethical design (Kosta, O. Pitkänen,
et al. 2008). The involvement of (vulnerable) users in the design process can be main-
tained by means such as role-playing (Picking et al. 2012), drama (Sponselee et al. 2008)
or acted performance (Newell et al. 2011), and interviews (Maier and Kempter 2009).
The feedback from users for design is crucial because every target user is a domain
expert (Allen et al. 2008). Borenstein and Pearson (2010), quoting Oosterlaken, empha-
sises that the details of design are morally significant. Details such as a step-by-step
design (Aarts et al. 2007; Burleson et al. 2012; Pulli et al. 2012), or large and coloured
buttons (O’Neill, Parente, et al. 2011; Picking et al. 2012), and the overall intuitive-
ness (Maguire et al. 2011) of a system are preferred if these are helpful for the end-users.
The reported difficulties of elderly users of ICT are usually about hardware issues, in-
consistent interface, screen size, height mobility, information interpretation or the over-
all mental (rather complex) model applied (Lorenzen-Huber et al. 2011; Wallace et al.
2010). M. Hersh et al. (2003) would also welcome financial payments for users providing
feedback.
definition of disability
Since the development of the classic functional model by Nagi in 1965 (Lynch et al.
2009), the design-for-all approach tries to address the paradigm shift from understand-
ing disability solely from a medical perspective to understanding disability in a social
context. In this approach, the biological and pathological characteristics of the impaired
individual are less important compared with the social context (functional limitations
and disability; Appleyard 2005; Darzentas and Miesenberger 2005; Lynch et al. 2009).
According to Abascal and Nicolle (2005), instead of being rigid, the design should be
adaptive, dynamically adjusting itself to the needs of its user, and consequently reducing
potential user’s anxiety. Bad design facilitates more handicaps through less accessible
systems (Abascal and Nicolle 2005).
relationship of designers with pwds
As the caregivers could be technophobic (Sponselee et al. 2008), the designers are in gen-
eral the opposite, technophiles (Wallace et al. 2010). In addition, the age gap between
PwDs and designers can be an issue (Wallace et al. 2010), triggering communication
difficulties in introducing ICT (Sponselee et al. 2008). The power relationship, between
the (formal) caregivers/researchers and the PwDs is, as mentioned above, possible be-
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tween the PwD and designers as well (eagerness to please, Francis et al. 2009; deferring
to the opinion of the researcher as a person with higher status and competence, Maier
and Kempter 2009; etc.). Hence, the use of focus groups, where the users share their
ideas with the researchers/designers in an interactive, open, and friendly manner, is
welcomed in most of the literature (S. Brown et al. 2004; S. Brown et al. 2006; Maier and
Kempter 2009; Walsh and Callan 2011). Wallace et al. (2010), however, find focus groups
unsuitable due to efforts to utilise as many participants as possible, resulting in less
useful discussion.
3.3.5.2 Clinical Trials
testing , impact assessment
Although some untested systems could be reportedly beneficial for the users (Steve
Lauriks et al. 2010), as already mentioned, very little in situ testing was reported by
Portet et al. (2011), with a lack of more general socio-economic impact studies (Chan,
Estève, et al. 2008), and a lack of studies of gender differences (Chan, Campo, et al. 2009).
Cahill et al. (2007) emphasises that pre-testing in the care of PwD is critical to ensure
the reliability and efficiency of the devices. According to Scanaill et al. (2006), very
few impact assessment methodologies were developed and a relatively small number
of them are able to enforce actions based on their results. Wright (2011) proposes a
framework (ethical principles, values, issues, and questions) for impact assessment to
ensure that responsibilities and considerations of the designers regarding technology
are ethically adequate and not detrimental to the generally accepted social values.
3.3.6 Technicians
3.3.6.1 Clinical Trials
sensitive installation of devices
Technicians are the mediators between the technology, the PwD, and their homes. Their
approach to the installation and removal of the technological equipment must be very
sensitive, in order to avoid producing extra harm and anxiety for the PwD. J. van Hoof
et al. (2011) mention the complaint of one of the participants of their research about the
drill-holes left behind by technicians in their home. Also, research participants may be
worried about the presence of ‘strangers’ in their home environment (J. van Hoof et al.
2011).
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3.3.6.2 Clinical Application
Naturally, the remark above about sensitivity holds for the application stage as well. Fur-
thermore, during a regular maintenance/check-up activity, technicians should consider
the special status of PwD, for example by minimising repeated departure-and-returns to
the easily confused patient’s home during a single session. Due to the possible memory
impairment of the PwD, technicians should work in pairs, in order to maintain a con-
stant presence and connection with the PwD residents and to avoid losing touch with
the PwD. They should also be able to listen and repeatedly explain their activities to the
PwD and answer their questions (J. van Hoof et al. 2011). In this case, the indispensable
third parties demand special attention because their staff may have different (technol-
ogy) competencies (J. van Hoof et al. 2011), and could also have very little experience of
working in healthcare.
3.4 discussion
In the current scholarly debate as identified in our study of the literature reported in
the previous section, privacy, safety and security issues are major concerns in relation to
AAL technologies for PwDs. It is also clear, however, that PwDs have persistent mobility
issues and need support for their everyday living at home, which can be provided by
AAL technologies. In addition to these issues, we wish to highlight the following ethical
aspects that have not received enough attention yet in the scholarly debate: 1) the value
of the goals of AAL technologies, 2) the special vulnerability of PwDs in their private
homes, and 3) informed consent.
The frequency of ethical terms in the reviewed publications highlights a heteroge-
neous set of goals that provide reasons for the development of AAL technologies. How-
ever, these goals and reasons are assumed to be beneficial for PwDs, and are only rarely
actually analysed from the ethical viewpoint. In some cases, ethical concerns related
to AAL technologies are mentioned but the consequences for the R&D of these tech-
nologies are rarely discussed. Therefore, a dedicated section aims to map the values
associated with the various goals, which AAL technologies aim to achieve.
The involvement of PwDs in the R&D process introduces additional ethical issues
related to the vulnerable status of these research participants. Ethical standards require
that due attention should be provided to the special vulnerabilities of PwDs for safe
and successful conduct of R&D, as well as the clinical deployment of AAL technologies
for their users. The section below highlights aspects related to special vulnerabilities of
PwDs with regard to the development and clinical application of AAL technologies.
A third section highlights additional ethical challenges that arise during research with
PwDs. The specific condition of PwDs with their MCI poses serious challenges and
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complications for the fulfilment of the requirement for valid informed consent. This
issue is one of the leading concerns in the reviewed literature, as well as being one of
cornerstones of medical ethics.
3.4.1 Value of the Goals of AAL Technologies
Here we consider whether the a) motives for the development and b) the ambitious goals
promised by the AAL technologies are really valuable. Our focus on the value of the
goals in this section will be exclusive. We will omit the assessment of the feasibility of the
goals of AAL technologies because such an assessment is subsidiary to an assessment
of the value of the goals, and does not focus solely on the ethical aspects.
Many of the articles we reviewed accept the benefits of using AAL technologies
(e. g. better care, 24-hour non-stop care, staying at home longer for PwDs, cheaper op-
tion than a nursing home, maintenance of independence and autonomy of PwDs, etc.).
Very few articles critically question this presumption.
Firstly, one should consider the question of who will primarily benefit from the ap-
plication of AAL technologies. B. Hofmann (2012) predicts that the use of assistive tech-
nologies (which he calls ‘Welfare Technologies’) will benefit the caregivers more than
those in need of care. This criticism raises serious questions about the justification of
using AAL technologies for PwDs, as it might turn out that the biggest share of benefits
are for third parties, whilst those most in need of care bear the brunt in terms of risks
and harms from their use. Therefore, the motivation of the R&D of AAL technologies
has to be clearly stated because different ethical considerations apply, particularly if
such a system benefits the caregivers more than those in need of the care.
Secondly, regarding the issue of motives for developing AAL technologies, Sorell and
Draper (2012) stress the fact that by definition, AAL technologies set as their main pri-
ority, the provision of independent living and staying longer at home (as Sponselee
et al. (2008) call it ‘extramuralization’) for persons with chronic diseases. The policy
changes in the UK for telecare serve as an example of the cutting back of institutionali-
sations and the shortening of hospital stays, indicating that the goals of AmI can align
with governmental policy. However, Sorell and Draper (2012) note that although this
policy coincides with the motivations of the elderly, this does not mean that the gov-
ernmental motivations are the same as those of the elderly and not solely economic.
Using an economic angle for policy, telecare (including AmI, AAL technologies) max-
imises self-financing. In the light of telecare having a cost-cutting effect, the presentation
of it solely as a means for prolonging independent living may be disingenuous. Simi-
larly, although increasing the default retirement age has a cost-cutting effect on pension
benefits, this governmental policy is often presented with the rhetoric of an anti-ageist
approach (Sorell and Draper 2012). Hence the motivation for cost-cutting has to be care-
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fully assessed. We agree with the finding of Holzinger et al. (2008) that the benefits of
using technology in the arena of healthcare (including care of PwDs) must be clearly
appreciable, either on physical, medical or emotional grounds. The recognition of these
values provides not only acceptance from its users but also motivation and justification
for its research (Holzinger et al. 2008).
The varied pathologies linked with dementia are currently the object of scientific
research, which investigates their biological nature as well other (phenomenological,
behavioural, etc.) aspects. Consequently, one of the goals of the development of AAL
technologies, from a medical point of view, is the recording of health-related scientific
information. The collection of data in-situ, i. e. within the home-settings of the PwD,
is very challenging for researchers. In addition, the presence and intrusive nature of
the AAL technologies in the home environment of a PwD, with their possibly harmful
effects, raises serious ethical issues (surveillance and continuous monitoring, pervasive
nature of the technology, data safety, etc.). That being said, it might open up the horizons
for establishing better scientific foundations for more sensitive diagnosis and treatment
or management of dementia. The perspective of better diagnostic techniques could be a
valid justification for the introduction of AAL technologies to PwDs. However, this ben-
efit, as such, may be too small to justify the serious potential harms and risks thus posed
to this very vulnerable segment of the population. Similarly, the application of sensor-
systems, mainly for research data collection could also go against the proportionality
principle.
Let us look at an example: One of the major fears of PwDs is falling, as reported by
B. Hofmann (2012) and J. van Hoof et al. (2011). However, even the most advanced and
complex ambient technology would be undesirable, if the benefit could also be provided
by a more lightweight, simpler, cheaper and easier-to-use system. Currently, despite the
immense efforts of research in the area of AAL technologies, the smart-home full of
sensors does not provide greater help in preventing or assuaging the fear, not to mention
coping with the situation of a PwD falling than a much simpler one-button, danger-
reporting alarm worn around the neck. AmI should provide much more benefit than
being just another solution for reporting complications for PwDs. The obtrusiveness of
AmI demands proportional benefits in the well-being of their actual users.
In addition to the issue of proportionality, B. Hofmann (2012) asks who will define,
and on what basis, what constitutes the average everyday normal activity for a PwD
under the control of surveillance technology? As mentioned before, the cohort of the el-
derly, including PwDs is a heterogeneous group (Gaul and Ziefle 2009; Grönvall and
Kyng 2012; Jeffrey Kaye 2010; Lynch et al. 2009; Mordini et al. 2009; Oppenauer et
al. 2007; Remmers 2010; Salces et al. 2006). Different users have different needs, be-
havioural expressions and habits. Therefore, the goals of AAL technologies should be
defined alongside the provision of a high level of customisation and adaptability of the
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system to the activities and needs of every individual user. Introducing an AAL sys-
tem to a private home should avoid forcing users into performing activities, which are
considered to be unpleasant and burdensome, and are required solely by the introduc-
tion of assistive technologies into the healthcare process. For example: users reported
problems with false alarms, which are, because of the sensitivity of the ambient technol-
ogy, somehow inevitable (J. van Hoof et al. 2011). AAL technologies should not give the
PwD unreasonable extra burden of taking care and managing the technology. The aim
of AAL technologies is to provide support and empowerment and a feeling of safety
and security, not the burden of performing extra tasks. Researchers cannot expect that
a person with MCI and with fading memory capabilities will defer to the requirements
of a system, which is not intuitive and easy to use. Such a scenario contravenes the
very definition of AAL technologies, which are supposed to disappear into background
without any undue need for human interference. Therefore, efforts should be made dur-
ing R&D to ensure that the technology fulfils the ‘ambient’ attribute of its definition.
As Abascal and Nicolle (2005), quoting Thimbleby (1994), remarked, “badly designed
systems handicap all users” (Abascal and Nicolle 2005, p. 491), not only PwDs but also
caregivers, family members and physicians.
The heterogeneity of the group of PwDs includes geographical and cultural differ-
ences too. However, there is a dearth of literature regarding the possible labelling of
AAL technologies. The development of AAL technologies should, in the future, discard
the label of being developed in highly industrialised and computerised Western soci-
eties. Therefore, in order to fulfil – globally – the goals of beneficence and value, the
variety of culturally influenced characteristics to be found between different countries
and cultures, deserve deeper analysis.
Also, when ambient technologies are widely used, the freedom to refuse assistance
from AAL technologies has to be considered. It is not known, whether, in the future,
compulsory introduction of AAL systems at home could be refused by a PwD, for ex-
ample, if they were offered by her insurance company. Also, it is not known whether a
proxy of a PwD would have a right to refuse the deployment of AAL technologies. More
empirical research is needed regarding the acceptance, usage and overall personal and
social impact of AAL technologies upon their users.
In summary, the value of the goals of AAL technologies is generally positive: accord-
ing to the literature, they aim to give assistance, support, empowerment, a sense of secu-
rity to vulnerable persons, and aim to facilitate them staying longer at home whilst main-
taining their comfort, social connections and security. However, extra attention should
be given to attempts to reduce the possible harms and risks for the vulnerable PwDs.
Researchers should bear in mind that the provisioning of AAL technologies for PwDs is
non-therapeutic, thus the justification of possible harms involved requires an outweigh-
ing amount of benefits to make the assistance of AAL technologies favourable. Still, due
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to a lack of sufficient empirical evidence, the feasibility of achieving all the beneficial
goals of AAL is still very much an open question and requires more research.
3.4.2 Special Vulnerability of PwDs in Their Private Homes
Although modern hospitals and care- and nursing-homes currently use a plenitude of
technologies, for which partial responsibilities are held by various stakeholders (engi-
neers, designers, etc.), there is usually a ‘safety net’ of human caregivers (nurses, clin-
icians, proxies) present in case of any malfunction of the technology. AAL systems by
their nature try to reach a level where such assistance should not be needed, thus en-
abling users to live at home for longer. Moreover, assistive technologies are not present
in clinical settings but rather in the private homes of PwDs. A misunderstanding with
technology at home can cause extra harm, instead of providing support for the PwDs,
compared with settings in hospitals or nursing homes. These facts introduce a need for
a much higher level of safety and reliability in AAL technologies than in technologies
used in hospitals and nursing homes.
Furthermore, where the interactivity of AAL technologies is necessary, the system
should also provide measures that allow the reporting of false alarms by the users them-
selves. The cognitive condition should not disqualify PwDs from a certain amount of
control, self-determination and evaluation of the applied AAL technology. The seem-
ingly contradictory requirements of AAL technologies, of being ambient and interactive
at the same time, necessitate a careful design process and empirical research about the
needs and habits of the users, while maintaining their safety and security in their pre-
ferred environment.
Besides, although debated by some (Decker et al. 2011), it would be ethically unac-
ceptable that in case of fault or malfunction, the responsibility is allotted to the ‘system’
and not to somebody, who designed, engineered, applied, or (mis)used it. Therefore,
there is a serious need for guidelines for the R&D of the AAL technologies, where the li-
ability and accountability of a developed technology is preserved throughout the whole
process of R&D, trial, application and ensuing continuous use of the AAL technology.
In the R&D stage, designers should actively involve PwDs as they will be the end-
users of the technology. In addition, during the R&D procedure, a correct balance should
be struck between cost-effectiveness on the one hand and the quality of the methodology
to obtain feedback from the participants of ambient technologies on the other. Such a
balance needs to be emphasised because methodologies to obtain quality feedback (in
vitro, in-sitro/in-simu, in situ scenarios) can significantly increase costs. Depending on
the costs involved, participant feedback methodologies are differently optimised and
can provide different results for the R&D process (Portet et al. 2011). These differences
may be crucial and could cause serious issues later on, during the final introduction
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of the AAL technologies to a wider group of PwDs. So the quality of the feedback
methodology directly affects the quality of the feedback from the PwD participants.
Therefore, as the introduction of the PwDs into the R&D process is vital, the quality of
the feedback itself must also be considered as essential for the entire project of the use
of ambient intelligence for PwDs.
However, the vulnerability of PwDs imposes serious requirements on the quality and
quantity of data collected during the R&D procedure (how many sensors can a research
participant with dementia wear, for how long, how many sensors are necessary to be in-
stalled in the in-situ private home environment, etc.). Therefore, judiciousness from the
researchers is required in their approach to the PwDs as human beings and at the same
time, in their assessment of the quality of data gained from the PwDs as research par-
ticipants. A more comprehensive human-centred approach from researchers and care-
givers can be extremely beneficial for all the stakeholders, especially during the R&D
process. With a human-centred approach, all the processes of introducing and main-
taining the AAL technologies could be made more successful by being stress-free and
goal-orientated, while also avoiding the dangers of technical/technology-based and eco-
nomic biases. This will very likely ensure a better applicability of the AAL technology
in the final clinical application period.
B. Hofmann (2012)’s comparison of the complexity and profundity of the testing of
pharmacological drugs and their introduction into the healthcare system with the rela-
tive lack of rigorous testing and regulation when it comes to medical devices in health-
care is noteworthy. Dishman and Carrillo (2007) find the approach of review boards
regarding everyday technologies for Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) care ill-equipped and
worthy of criticism because their members may be unfamiliar with the technology, and
often evaluate the risks of ICT devices on the basis of drug trials, while they involve
“little to no participant risk” (Dishman and Carrillo 2007, p. 232). However, despite the
lax regulation for testing medical devices, we are obliged to state that the impaired
condition of PwDs requires rigorous ethical considerations during research, testing and
application periods.
Finally, one of the expressed hopes of researchers is the future use of continuously
operating (ambient) machines for diagnostic purposes (Camarinha-Matos and Afsar-
manesh 2011; A. Darwish and Hassanien 2011; Dishman and Carrillo 2007; Friedewald
and Raabe 2011). However, in various countries, such a scenario is already subjected to
regulation and is legally prohibited (Beyleveld 2011; Chan, Estève, et al. 2008; Kosta, O.
Pitkänen, et al. 2008; Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010).
In short, the special vulnerability of PwDs with their declining cognitive abilities
should put the researchers on guard regarding the research and testing of AAL tech-
nologies on this group of participants. Researchers should also be more alert due to the
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lack of ‘safety nets’ in private home environments, which are usually present in hospital
and nursing home scenarios.
3.4.3 Informed Consent
Informed consent is considered crucial for the application of any research or treatment
with technology in healthcare. The importance of the notion of informed consent has
become more apparent since the Nuremberg trials and has accordingly been legally
embodied in many modern jurisdictions. Hence, the notion of informed consent has
a strong legal dimension. According to the definition of Beauchamp & Childress, in-
formed consent is an “individual’s autonomous authorization of medical intervention
or of participation in research” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, p. 119).
The present justification of informed consent is based on considerations of autonomy.
Not being treated as mere means but always as ends, means that people must have an
opportunity to choose to participate in research or to undergo a treatment (Beauchamp
and Childress 2009).
According to Árnason et al. (2011), the modern understanding of valid informed con-
sent consists of three parts: a) competence (ability to do what is needed to perform a
task), b) understanding (disclosure of relevant information is a precondition of adequate
understanding of the information about a treatment/research), and c) voluntariness (be-
ing aware of the possible outcomes).
The logic of competence means that even a healthy person is not globally competent
because no one has the ability to do all mental and physical tasks. Therefore, Árnason et
al. (2011) propose that competence should be understood as a task-specific notion, rather
than a global notion. This task-specificity is based on a person’s abilities to understand
and perform a particular decision-making task in a particular situation (Árnason et al.
2011).
Regarding understanding, Árnason et al. (2011) stress that no one has a pure and ab-
stract understanding of clinical treatments/research. A professional’s duty is to find
a correlation between the personal background knowledge of the participant and the
information about the treatment/research, in order to reach an adequate level of com-
prehension of the relevant information. This correlation has to be reached with the usage
of comprehensible (plain) language, while the participant is neither overloaded with the
information, nor under-informed (Árnason et al. 2011). These principles pose challenges
to the researchers when requesting informed consent from a PwD with gradually devel-
oping MCI or memory impairment.
Finally, a valid informed consent has to be voluntary. This means that in order to be
able to make a decision, one has to be aware of the possible relevant outcomes of the
research. In addition, informed consent had to be requested while not being under the
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influence of coercion, deception, persuasion, or manipulation. The assessment of the
voluntariness of consent usually is the responsibility of the researcher (Árnason et al.
2011) with oversight from the research ethics committees. As already mentioned, the
eagerness to please the researcher or a proxy, higher status and trust in the competence
of the researcher, family relationships can influence the voluntariness of consent of the
participant negatively. Cultural influences can play a specific role here, since certain cul-
tures prefer to make collective decisions (Árnason et al. 2011). In addition, voluntariness
should incorporate the possibility for a participant to opt-out of the research at any time
without necessarily giving a reason.
PwDs with MCI and memory issues pose a serious challenge regarding informed con-
sent. The developing MCI and progressive memory and communication issues of the
PwD may affect the quality of the aforementioned requirements of informed consent
considerably. During the progression of dementia, the task-specificity of competence
and the understanding of PwD may change. These require the introduction of a concept
of informed consent that is adapted to the altering conditions of PwD, which we call
‘rolling informed consent.’ Rolling informed consent involves: a) the necessity of repeat-
edly providing information on an iterative basis (i. e. not only when requested), and
also asking for consent during the various stages of the treatment/research; b) listening
to the content and nuances of the speech of PwD and continuously assessing whether
her participation is voluntary and not subjected to coercion, persuasion, manipulation,
or simple distress, which if so subjected, would be sufficient reason to end the session
for the researcher without needing the expressed request of the participant (Astell et al.
2009); while also c) communicating the possibility of opting-out or withdrawing from
treatment/research at any given stage. Rolling informed consent in the case of PwD
does not result in a single-event legal act but rather, is a continuous consideration of the
choices made by the vulnerable person. The need for a concept of rolling informed con-
sent is also supported by Árnason et al. (2011), when they define informed consent, not
as a unique (legal) event but rather, as a communicative process between the relevant
parties (Árnason et al. 2011). In practice, however, rolling informed consent could cause
issues for the caregivers, clinicians, and researchers regarding considerations of its va-
lidity and its being time-consuming to obtain. Rolling informed consent might prolong
the whole treatment/research process, hence caregivers might see it as an impediment
to their work.
The responsibility of the researcher in assessing the changing competence of the PwD
during the R&D increases within the context of rolling informed consent. Such an as-
sessment may be considered very subjective. However, the assessment may be based on
the special, often long-standing relationship and bond, which is usually shared between
PwDs and their clinicians/researchers. It is not clear whether researchers have a more
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objective means of assessing the changing competence of PwDs. The development of
such a protocol promises to be challenging and worthwhile.
Despite the difficulties of obtaining informed consent from PwDs, the introduction
and application of rolling informed consent is inevitable in the case of PwDs, given the
empirical characteristics and progressive nature of dementia, while at the same time tak-
ing seriously the participant’s autonomy. The principles of respect for the participant’s
autonomy and respect for potential enrolled subjects are broadly accepted as pivotal
ethical requirements in research and healthcare settings, especially when dealing with
vulnerable persons (Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady 2000).14
3.5 conclusion
AAL technologies are said to provide assistance and support to vulnerable persons and
those with dementia by allowing them to live for longer at home whilst maintaining
their comfort and security. However, the R&D, clinical trials and the application of AAL
technologies also pose serious ethical challenges. The ethical challenges mostly focused
on in the literature to date are concerns about safety, security and privacy.
Although these issues are undoubtedly relevant, further ethical issues need to be
addressed as well. They involve the value of the goals of AAL technologies, the special
vulnerability of PwDs in their private homes, and the complex issue of informed consent
from PwDs. These issues urgently need further analysis in order to ensure that R&D,
clinical trials and the application of AAL technologies take place only in accordance
with the highest ethical standards.
14 The topic of informed consent and the ethical issues related to PwDs are further analysed in Chapter 6 on
p. 183.
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4
VA L U E O F T H E G O A L S O F A A L T E C H N O L O G I E S
In the current chapter, the concepts of benefit and harm are examined in relation to
Persons with Dementia (PwDs) and Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) technologies. The
chapter focuses on addressing the following questions:
1. What does the literature interpreting Art. 4 of the Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) say about the benefit and harm evaluation,
the maximisation of the first, and minimisation of the second, and how should
respect for these principles be fulfilled?
2. How are benefit and harm interpreted in policy documents and academic litera-
ture?
3. How should Art. 4 of the UDBHR be understood in its application to the circum-
stances of PwDs and the context of AAL technologies?
4. Which principles of the UDBHR need to be balanced with the principle of benefit
maximisation and harm minimisation?
In order to answer the first question, the notions of beneficence and harm, present in
the UDBHR, are clarified. This step will utilise handbooks that directly interpret the
UDBHR principles, including dedicated sections referring to benefit and harm. This lit-
erature mainly includes The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights:
Background, Principles and Application (ten Have, Jean, and Kirby 2009), and Handbook of
Global Bioethics (ten Have and Gordijn 2014). Unfortunately, the International Bioethics
Committee (IBC) has not issued an explanatory report on Art. 4 of UDBHR.1
Addressing the second question of the descriptive part of this chapter involves an
overview of the international and national policy documents, along with notable aca-
demic literature relevant to the interpretation of the issue of vulnerability and personal
integrity.
1 The IBC has issued explanatory reports on other UDBHR articles, namely IBC (2008) and IBC (2013), which
are referred to in Chapter 6 and Chapter 5.
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4.1 interpretation of the principle
In the normative part of this chapter, the previously interpreted UDBHR principle of
benefit maximisation and harm minimisation are first specified to the specific context of
PwDs and AAL technologies. The specification will focus both on clinical research with
PwDs, and clinical practice with PwDs.
Then, other UDBHR principles that may conflict with Art. 4 are identified, examined,
and balanced, utilising the balancing process described in section 1.2.
At the end of this chapter, a dedicated section summarises the results of the specifica-
tion reached with outcomes of balancing, providing a brief overview of the normative
analysis of the requirement to benefit maximisation and harm minimisation of PwDs.
This summary will adhere to the spirit of the principle as stipulated in Art. 3 of the
UDBHR, applied to the cases of PwDs and AAL technologies.
4.1 interpretation of the principle
4.1.1 Principle of the UDBHR
Art. 4 of the UDBHR refers to the requirement related to clinical research, medical prac-
tice, and the utilised technologies to maximise the direct and indirect benefits of patients,
research participants and other involved individuals, while at the same time minimising
the possible harms.
Article 4
In applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice and
associated technologies, direct and indirect benefits to patients, research
participants and other affected individuals should be maximized and
any possible harm to such individuals should be minimized.
Art. 4 uses the notions of benefit and harm. In the following sections, these notions are
first, separately described, and secondly, their relationship with each other is interpreted.
4.1.1.1 Benefit
This section presents the concept of benefit, as founded upon the concept of human
dignity, a concept to which it is closely linked. This connection forms one of the crucial
notions of Art. 4 of the UDBHR. This is followed by the historical development of the
UDBHR formulation of Art. 4. The interpretation of the notion of beneficence concludes
with an overview of whether various levels of beneficence can be identified, and if so, in
what hierarchical order.
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foundation of the principle of benefit in human dignity
The achievement of adopting the UDBHR at the United Nations (UN) level is interpreted
as a logical and timely extension of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).
Therefore, the principle of benefit maximisation (and harm minimisation) formulated
in Art. 4 cannot be interpreted independently from the requirements to respect every
human beings’ dignity and equality (UDBHR 2005, Art. 1–3; UDHR 1948, Art. 1). Due
to the inherent dignity of every human being, their equality, and possession of reason
render human beings responsible for their actions. According to Pellegrino (2009), the
possession of these attributes obligates every human being to direct their actions towards
achieving good (Pellegrino 2009).
drafting of article 4
During the drafting process of the UDBHR, representatives of 27 UN member states,
13 national bioethics committees, 10 personal commentators, and one permanent ob-
server participated in the formulation and adoption of the declaration. Representatives
of the world’s main religions were also invited to comment upon the draft of the Dec-
laration. The UDBHR thus constitutes one of the most widely adopted international
agreements on the principles of bioethics, including the requirements of benefit maximi-
sation and harm minimisation (Pellegrino 2009).
The original title of the Fourth Outline of this article2 was Beneficence and Non-
Maleficence. However, at a joint session held in January 2005, a general consensus was
reached to avoid the use of these terms. One of the reasons was that these terms are not
commonly used by either policy-makers and the general public in many languages and
cultures. The other reason was that the original ancient meaning of the two separate
maxims of ‘do good’ and ‘do no harm’ (primum non nocere) have a different meaning
when joined together. As a result, the formulation of the principle has been altered to
reflect the standpoint of seeking a benefit and minimising the possible harm resulting
from a decision or practice (Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005).
Additionally, Andorno (2007) expresses personal regret that during the drafting of the
UDBHR, the recognition of the precautionary principle as a tool for public health risk
management was removed from the final version (Andorno 2007).
levels of beneficence
The requirement for doing good and avoiding harm can be further categorised, based
on the necessity and desirability of beneficence. Such a categorisation of beneficence has
2 The Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR (2005) lists this principle as Art. 6. However, in the final Declara-
tion it is listed as Art. 4. This difference in the numbering may be the result of the editing and discussions
during the drafting of the document. This may also be the case with other differing article numbers, which
are explained by the Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR (2005) document.
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been proposed in Frankena (1973), starting with the most important prima facie duty and
moving towards the least important one (Frankena 1973, p. 47):
1. One ought not to inflict evil or harm (what is bad).
2. One ought to prevent evil or harm.
3. One ought to remove evil.
4. One ought to do or promote good.
It is, however, rather difficult to precisely define at what point a certain level of benefi-
cence should be followed. It would depend greatly on the specific circumstances, details
of the situation, as well as on the nature and course of the human interaction (Pellegrino
2009).
Pellegrino (2009) emphasises that special obligations (e. g. those of researchers, physi-
cians, etc.) impose higher standards of beneficence.
4.1.1.2 Harm and Non-maleficence
the notion of harm in article 4
Another key notion used in Art. 4 of the UDBHR is harm, which everyone is obliged
to minimise in the healthcare setting. Not inflicting harm on patients (primum non no-
cere) is a requirement of the physician’s professional code ascribed to the Hippocratic
Oath (cca. 500 BC, Craik 2015).3
The issue with the identification of harms is similar to the issues of identifying benefits.
It is hard to identify harms on a general level, without the context. As presented with
examples by Evans (2014), an amputation of a leg can be perceived differently by a
paranoid schizophrenic patient, who could not imagine a life without a leg and would
prefer death above the amputation; while in the context of the World War I, a soldier in
a trench, who valued his life more with one leg than dying in a war with both of his
legs, would opt for the amputation (Evans 2014). A final example and an extreme case
is that of Kevin Wright, who, while suffering from body dysmorphic disorder, never felt
that his left leg was part of his body, and thus requested its amputation (Evans 2014).
Art. 4 uses the phrase ‘possible harm.’ The probability of causing harm by exposing
patients or research participants to risks is a real and valid concern. Therefore, criteria
for assessing risks, optimal applications of beneficence, and conditions of permitting
risks in specific cases need to be defined. According to Pellegrino (2009), in Art. 4, what
3 The Hippocratic Oath, as such, does not precisely contain the non-maleficence requirement. In the Hippo-
cratic Corpus, The Oath states “Into whatever houses I enter, I will enter to help the sick, and I will abstain
from all conscious wrongdoing and harm, especially from sexual relationships with women or with men,
slave or free.” (Craik 2015, p. 145).
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is without any doubt is the entitlement of everybody to be free from intentional harm.
This claim has to be further qualified because nobody can be protected against all harms,
and unintended harms are also possible, being sometimes required to be tolerated while
aiming for a benefit of a treatment. Art. 4 introduces the requirement into these cases
when it states that these exposures to risks are morally acceptable only if the benefits
are maximised, while, at the same time, harms are being minimised (Pellegrino 2009).
Compliance with the ethical standard set out in Art. 4 requires more than technical
competence and attention to moral content by physicians and researchers. Fulfilment
of the spirit of the standard in Art. 4 requires the application of prudential judgements
in the ethical assessment of circumstances. Prudential judgements, or the Aristotelian
phronesis (Aristotle 2009, p. 110, 1142a 10–30) – practical wisdom, are necessary for the
correct choice of the most practical means for reaching a good end in a particular situa-
tion. According to Pellegrino (2009), this is an intellectual virtue, in other words, a habit
that requires continuous cultivation (Pellegrino 2009).4
definitions of health
The assessment of the exposure to harm (and benefit) cannot be provided without some
notion of health (and health benefits). The intuitive interpretation of health is often
described as freedom from disease. However, it may be questioned whether such an
interpretation is correct. This is particularly relevant because, according to this narrow
definition, people who are healthy have no possibility of health benefit (Evans 2014).
A narrow definition of health is counter-intuitive when one considers the follow-
ing scenarios, when medical treatment is provided. Firstly, the provision of prophylac-
tic treatment to healthy individuals (e. g. vaccinations). Secondly, not all physiological
pathology stems from a disease; physical trauma such as that sustained in a traffic ac-
cident can result in pathology and ill health. Moreover, in cases of amputation (where
full bodily function cannot be completely restored), healthcare professionals may still
provide prostheses for retaining some bodily functions. Such a treatment by the physi-
cian may not be only partially restore bodily functioning but it is argued to address also
social needs by alleviating burdens of dysfunctional body (less discrimination, stigmati-
sation, etc.). Thirdly, mental health problems may also not be categorised as disease in
the narrow definition of health. Despite the narrow definition of health that may preem-
inently focus on physiological functioning, many would argue that psychological issues
clearly belong to the topic of health (Evans 2014).
4 Aristotelian virtue ethics and the role of prudential judgements of healthcare professionals in medical ethics
and ethics of nursing has been extensively discussed in Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993, especially pp. 84–
91), Pellegrino (1995), Flaming (2001), Svenaeus (2003), Vanlaere and Gastmans (2007), and Sellman (2009).
The importance of the promotion of risk assessment is again emphasised in Art. 20 of the UDBHR regard-
ing the application of UDBHR principles, while the requirement for appropriate education of healthcare
professionals is reiterated in Art. 23 of the UDBHR regarding the promotion of the Declaration.
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A more nuanced definition of health has been proposed by the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) in its Constitution accepted in 1946: “Health is a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infir-
mity” (Grad 2002, p. 984; Constitution of WHO 2006, p. 1). This definition was further
extended by the formulation “to lead a socially and economically productive life” in
1977 at the 30th World Health Assembly (resolution WHA30.43, Formulating strategies for
health for all by the year 2000 1979, p. 7). Despite this more nuanced and and more inclu-
sive definition, criticism has been raised that even the definition of health by the WHO
can disregard a significant group of people with medical conditions (Evans 2014). These
patients are those that are temporarily or permanently unable to live an economically
productive life. However, these people should also be allowed to benefit from research
activities or therapy, despite the fact that they may not be recognised by the definition
of health by the WHO as healthy individuals. Furthermore, the definition of health by
WHO may bring an illusion of an existence of some universal objective measures of
health and health benefits, which perception constitutes a reductionist view and would
lead to oversimplification (Evans 2014).
Evans (2014) notes that any definition of health would tend to be either too narrow
or too wide to apply to all cases. Therefore, sufficient effort to describe the details of
the context must be made to ensure that the particular circumstances of each patient are
considered. The result of such analysis would lead to a valid identification of the health
needs of a patient (Evans 2014).
4.1.1.3 Uncertainties
During the benefit-harm assessment, two kinds of uncertainties are present: empirical
and conceptual. According to Evans (2014), in the perspective of uncertainty in health-
care the administration of any drug is, in a way, an experiment. Adverse effects may
occur, as attested to in the product information leaflets. Human beings are individuals,
not only in a philosophical sense but also at a biological level. Thus, they may have
different reactions to various therapies. Although serious efforts are being made to limit
these adverse effect by the use of novel technologies, pharmacogenomics, etc., empirical
uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated nor ignored (Evans 2014).
Another type of uncertainties people may face are conceptual uncertainties. For exam-
ple, at intensive care units, people may be offered the chance to decide between retaining
or withdrawing a person from life-prolonging machines, i. e. keeping her alive, or allow-
ing her to die a ‘dignified’ death. The conceptual uncertainty in cases like these refer
to the dilemma during the decision-making process as to which of the treatments are
still beneficial and beneficent for the patient (Evans 2014). Evans (2014) remarks that
in situations with conceptual uncertainties there is a tendency to consider any choices
equally as beneficial or harmful (Evans 2014).
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4.1.1.4 Acuteness
No healthcare system is capable of treating all patients immediately as symptoms arise.
The lack of immediate treatment may incur risks of death or irreparable damage. There-
fore, it is important to introduce effective categorisation of various cases based on their
urgency. Differentiating between the need for immediate, urgent, semi-urgent, and rou-
tine care provides healthcare professionals with the possibility of ranking cases based
on necessity (Evans 2014). A widely-known international classification of cases based on
determining the priority of patients is the triage process, used during emergencies (in-
cluding hospital accident and emergency departments), disasters, catastrophes, or wars.
Evans (2014) emphasises that the use of such classification is acceptable insofar as
it is possible to grade the benefits and harms. Often, this is not possible due to the
aforementioned empirical or conceptual uncertainties. However, the temptation to still
grade relative harms and benefits (often required in resource-allocation management)
may lead to the comparison between incomparable conditions (Evans 2014).
It is noteworthy that the person concerned may regard such categorisation of her
condition as a sign of careless approach to her treatment. The patient may believe that
good outcomes appear to be less attainable, and hence find the categorisation personally
unacceptable (Evans 2014).
4.1.1.5 Limits of Benefit Maximisation and Risk Minimisation
Art. 4 requires more than the prevalence of benefit over risks in treatments and research.
The phrasing of Art. 4 explicitly requires the maximisation of the benefits, and the min-
imisation of possible harms. This claim is understandable in a world of scarce medical
resources. However, such claim may also echo an element of the utilitarian philoso-
phy (Evans 2014).
The next sections provide a brief overview of some influential accounts that deal
with the evaluation of risks and benefits. Although the related topics of these accounts
presented raise significant ethical issues, they are only referred to in an abbreviated
manner. These topics include: allocation of resources, qualitative approaches to health
needs assessment, etc.
quantification of health needs
One of the key philosophers of utilitarian thought, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), in his
book Utilitarianism (Mill 2003), defines qualitative distinctions of pleasures. The concept
of pleasures as a measure of happiness was originally introduced into philosophical
thinking by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) in his An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation (Bentham 1780). Mill’s principle of utility (also called the greatest happi-
ness principle) states that “actions are right in proportion as they promote happiness,
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wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (Mill 2003, p. 186). By hap-
piness, Mill means pleasure and the absence of pain (Mill 2003). Mill’s differentiation
of pleasures is based on whether the pleasure satisfies the ‘higher faculties’ (e. g. intelli-
gence) of human creatures or only lower ones. Happiness at the level of lower pleasures
is less satisfying for a human being than happiness due to higher pleasures.5
In conditions of scarce medical resources the principle of greatest happiness for the
greatest number of people cannot be applied unconditionally. Mill himself was aware of
the problems related to the application of his approach. Different people have different
views on what happiness is, in theory. Nobody can claim that he or she is the ultimate
expert on happiness (Evans 2014).
An attempt to find a common denominator for comparison and subsequent ranking
of health needs is that of Norman Daniels (1942–). He defines normal opportunity range,
extending Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness (Rawls 1999), as “the array of life plans
reasonable persons are likely to construct for themselves” in a given society (Daniels
2008, p. 45). This range of opportunities helps to identify healthcare needs and benefits,
together with their aggregation and protection. Healthcare needs are an important part
of basic needs that provide normal functioning (Daniels 2008).
A well-known quantitative approach of evaluation of health treatments is the Quality-
Adjusted Life Year (QALY) method. One QALY represents one year of life expectancy
in perfect health, and zero QALY represents death. By linking the quality of life with
life expectancy, QALY provides a single measure for the comparison and subsequent
cost-utility analysis of various treatments and their respective gain (Williams 1994). This
method had been criticised for its utilitarian bias in health benefit and harm assess-
ment, trying to quantify qualitative criterions that are per se immeasurable. Additionally,
the QALY approach is also known for being biased against the sickest and oldest per-
sons (Pellegrino 2009).
qualitative approaches towards health needs’ assessment
Instead of quantitative evaluations of benefit and harms, Pellegrino (2009) prefers quali-
tative evaluations. These can be described as probabilistic value judgements, which are
conducted in an informal manner, involving all stakeholders. Qualitative evaluations
are also broadly dependent on the personal values of the participants. Risk and benefit
assessments cannot be conducted without first knowing what the patient deems worth
living for, working for, or even dying for (Pellegrino 2009).
Evans (2014) favours this approach too, which he refers to as vertical aggregation.
In his view, ranking is unachievable across dissimilar conditions, except distinguishing
5 By Mill’s own words: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only
know their own side of the question.” (Mill 2003, p. 188).
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between elective and acute cases. Vertical aggregation enables clinicians to weigh the
severity of conditions, set priorities while calculating fairly the relative health needs
of their patients. Non-acute cases can be weighed based on the degree of need. Addi-
tionally, vertical aggregation makes the incorporation of aspects beyond the range of
quantitative methods (e. g. the ability to continue employment after the intervention,
future family duties, etc.) also possible (Evans 2014).
Although the qualitative assessment of health needs is admittedly an inexact science,
Evans (2014) remarks that without the knowledge of the particular patient’s narrative,
the patient’s needs may be mistakenly disregarded. However, this approach does not
involve the maximisation of benefits, as required by Art. 4. Evans (2014) considers the
discrimination of minority groups (e. g. chronically ill, elderly, mentally ill, etc.), repre-
sented by quantified methods, as being more harmful than the harm incurred by failure
to increase the health benefits. The overall lower level of benefits is compensated by
the fairer allocation of resources without the exclusion of groups in need, allowing the
prioritisation of cases that would otherwise be categorised as not acute (Evans 2014).
article 4 and benefit maximisation, risk minimisation
Pellegrino (2009) sheds light upon the complexities of the criteria that need to be taken
into account if one wants to evaluate the maximisation of beneficence and minimisation
of harms. Amongst these criteria are: the domain of prevention, treatment, or research;
the question of moral acceptability, reliability, or fairness; the nature of benefits in regard
to advancement of patient’s interests, finding new knowledge for future patients, or the
development of policies enhancing common good; the nature of harm (financial, phys-
ical, emotional, spiritual, separately or in combination); or the probabilities of harms
(risks; Pellegrino 2009).
However tempting a population-level benefit may be (e. g. statistical, economic, scien-
tific, or social), the benefit-harm ratio for individuals can never be overlooked. Art. 4 of
the UDBHR is safeguarded by the requirement formulated in Art. 3.2. This states that
the interests and welfare of the individuals should be always prioritised, and cannot be
disregarded by reference to the interests of the society or science (Pellegrino 2009).
4.1.1.6 The Importance of Education
It has been mentioned that clinicians, unlike economists, policy-makers, or health man-
agers, prefer to make prudential judgements (in an Aristotelian or virtuous sense) re-
garding the health needs assessment of benefits and harms (Pellegrino 2009). Such as-
sessment is dependent on personal and subjective values, where the role of education is
valued. In this regard, Pellegrino (2009) makes in important distinction between benefi-
cence and benevolence.
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While beneficence is an “act that enables one to do good” (Pellegrino 2009, p. 106),
benevolence refers to a character trait (virtue) that guides a person to habitually do
good (Pellegrino 2009). As a virtue, benevolence needs to be cultivated by healthcare
professionals. It is not sufficient to only define a principle of benefit maximisation and
harm minimisation. In interpreting Art. 4 of the UDBHR, the distinction of beneficence
from benevolence is remarkable as it thus also defines the kind of person required for the
fulfilment of the principle. The development of the virtue of benevolence as a habitual
act and practice should also motivate the education of future healthcare professionals,
and therefore, needs to be cultivated at all phases of the physician’s development (Pelle-
grino 2009).
4.2 policy documents and academic literature
4.2.1 Policy Documents
4.2.1.1 The Nuremberg Code (1947)
Following the Doctors’ Trial in 1946 (one of the twelve trials before the Nuremberg Mil-
itary Tribunals held between 1946–1949, after World War II) a Code was proposed and
accepted by the Counsel for War Crimes. As a reaction to the unregulated experimenta-
tion on humans, mostly in concentration camps, “The Nuremberg Code (1947)” defined
in ten principles the requirements for conducting research on human beings. Most of
these paragraphs relate to the risks and possible harms of research with human beings.
The first principle requires, amongst others, the proper provision of information about
all the inconveniences and hazards that can be expected during a participation in a
research. This information should be disclosed along with the effect of the research
upon the participant’s health (“The Nuremberg Code (1947)” 1996, § 1).
The second principle defines the requirement regarding the objectives of the investi-
gation, which need to aim towards the benefit of society. The objectives of the research
study must not be achievable by other methods, thus ensuring that the research is not
being conducted unnecessarily or randomly (“The Nuremberg Code (1947)” 1996, § 2).
The third principle requires that the research study and objectives be justified and
supported by, first, animal experimentation, and secondly, the anticipated results (“The
Nuremberg Code (1947)” 1996, § 3).
The fourth principle defines that any physical and mental suffering of the research
participant has to be avoided (“The Nuremberg Code (1947)” 1996, § 4).
The fifth principle ensures that no research is conducted, which may involve death
or disablement of the research participants. A single exception can be (with the clause
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‘perhaps’), if the participant is, in fact, also the researcher (“The Nuremberg Code (1947)”
1996, § 5).
The sixth principle attempts to define a principle of proportionality, by stating that
the risks of participating in a research study should not exceed the ‘humanitarian im-
portance’ of the research objectives (“The Nuremberg Code (1947)” 1996, § 6).
The seventh principle requires from researchers to provide the research participants
with adequate protection against—even remote—exposure to injuries, inflicting disabil-
ity, or causing death (“The Nuremberg Code (1947)” 1996, § 7).
4.2.1.2 Documents of the United States
belmont report (1978)
The Belmont Report (1978) provides an extensive account of the topic of risk-benefit as-
sessment.
The first mention of the assessment of risks and benefits in the Report occurs in rela-
tion to the protection of vulnerable populations, who deserve extensive protection. The
extent of this protection should depend upon the estimate of benefit, and the assessment
of the risk of being harmed (Belmont Report 1978, B.1).
One of the three basic ethical principles of the Belmont Report (1978) is beneficence.
Beneficence is understood as a two-fold obligation to, first, not do harm, and second,
maximise the possible benefits while minimising the possible harms (Belmont Report
1978, B.2). The former is part of the Hippocratic Oath, which requires that physicians
avoid causing harm to their patients, while also learning what is harmful, and acting in
accordance with what is beneficent for their patients, based on their best judgement as
physicians. This sometimes also involves exposing patients to risks, for their subsequent
benefit. The Belmont Report (1978) also recognises more challenging ethical situations,
such as the exposure of research participants (in this case, children) to more than min-
imal risks, when no immediate prospect of direct benefit can be expected. Arguments
remain unsettled whether such research studies should be regarded as unacceptable, or
whether they should be permitted in order not to rule out research benefits for future
patients. The Belmont Report (1978) does not provide any definitive answer in this re-
gard, rather it indicates conflicts of the principle of beneficence with other principles
presaging difficult choices to be made (Belmont Report 1978).
In the third part, Part C, about the application of the principles, § 2 describes the pro-
cedure and requirements for the assessment of risks and benefits. The risk in this regard
“refers to a possibility that harm may occur” (Belmont Report 1978, C.2). While benefit
represents a positive value that is anticipated, risk refers to the chance (probability) and
severity (magnitude) of the harm. The Belmont Report (1978) provides a list of examples
about the types of benefits or harms: psychological, physical, legal, social, and economic.
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During the assessment of benefits and risks, the Belmont Report (1978) notes the am-
biguous nature of such a balancing process. It is only in rare cases when quantitative
techniques of balancing can be applied. However, this complication should not endorse
the capitulation of the assessment of benefits and risks. Rather the opposite; a systematic
assessment of benefits and risks in research is much needed, in order to enable circum-
vention of misinterpretations and misinformations between Research Ethics Committees
(RECs) and researchers. Therefore, the validity of the research objectives should first be
rigorously and precisely reviewed, then followed by the identification of the nature,
probability, and the magnitude of the harms. The analysis of the risks should explicit
and its modalities made as clear as possible (Belmont Report 1978).
The justifiability of research is also affected by other considerations, such as: how in-
humane a treatment is; whether the risks are reduced to the minimal level in order to
achieve the research objectives; whether the involvement of human participants is nec-
essary at all; whether the research carries significant risks of impairment, and whether
the risk of the impairment are sufficiently justified; whether vulnerable populations are
involved; and whether the research participants were properly informed about the risks
in the informed consent (Belmont Report 1978).
4.2.1.3 Documents of International Biomedical Communities
declaration of helsinki (1964–2013)
The “Declaration of Helsinki” (1964), in its newest edition “Declaration of Helsinki”
(2013), dedicates a whole section (Section III) to the topic of risks and burdens, and the
assessment of risks.
Paragraph 16 acknowledges that most medical interventions involve risks and bur-
dens. These risks extend both to the areas of treatments and research studies (“Declara-
tion of Helsinki” 2013, § 16).
Medical research cannot be started without a careful assessment of the possible risks
involved. This assessment must involve the research participants but should also extend
to the groups involved, and the individuals and groups that may may be affected by the
results (“Declaration of Helsinki” 2013, § 17).
The “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013) also contains a rule of evaluation, which is
known as the principle of proportionality. However, it is split between § 16 and § 18.
The former states that research with human subjects may be performed only if the im-
portance of the research objectives outweigh the possible risks of participation. The latter
specifies cases when the risks outweigh the prospective benefits of the research study.
In such cases, the physicians (or researchers) should consider whether it is acceptable to
continue the study, or whether it needs to be modified, or even whether the study must
be stopped immediately (“Declaration of Helsinki” 2013, § 18).
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Other requirements of the “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013) demand active engage-
ment in minimisation of risks of research studies. These risks should be continuously
monitored, continuously assessed, and properly documented by the investigators (“Dec-
laration of Helsinki” 2013, § 17).
4.2.1.4 Documents of the European Union and the Council of Europe
convention on human rights and biomedicine (1997)
In Art. 16.ii, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) introduces the rule
based on the principle of proportionality, stating that the persons undergoing research
should not be exposed to disproportionate risks compared with the potential benefits of
the research study (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, Art. 16.ii). Persons
who are not capable of providing valid informed consent can be involved in research,
as with other people with other applicable conditions, if there are potential benefits
of the research study, and its risks are only minimal (Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine 1997, Art. 17.1.ii and Art. 17.2.ii). Otherwise, any therapeutic interventions
on incapable persons must provide direct benefit to the patient (Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine 1997, Art. 6.1). According to the Explanatory Report to the Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) there are only two exceptions from this latter
rule, which are: participation in research (based on the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine 1997, Art. 17), and the removal of regenerative tissue (based on the Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, Art. 20.2; Explanatory Report to the Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, pp. 11–12).
The articles of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) are legally bind-
ing for the European Council Member States that signed the Convention (by 2015 it is
25 Member States) and ratified it (29).6
4.2.2 Academic Literature
This section focuses on three areas related to the benefit-harm assessment regarding
Art. 4 of the UDBHR, as well as the application of AAL technologies for PwDs. The first
is the reception of Art. 4 in the academic literature, and the relevance of the criticism
formulated by Macklin (2005).
Secondly, the attempt for a more elaborated categorisation of benefits and harms is
presented, an account of King (2000), which distinguishes various levels of health bene-
fits, and strictly separates between the reasonable chance to benefit and the reasonable
choice of a research participant to join a study.
6 For more details visit: http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/164/
signatures?p_auth=ifD69f0C (visited on 30/11/2015).
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Thirdly, the value of the technology in healthcare is critically interpreted, using the
analysis provided by B. M. Hofmann (2015), Hoffmann and Chris (2015), and Fisher and
Welch (1999).
4.2.2.1 Non-maleficence and Beneficence of Beauchamp & Childress
Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress in their popular textbook, Principles of Biomed-
ical Ethics, argue that the distinction provided by Frankena (1973), cited above, mistak-
enly combines the obligations of non-maleficence with the obligations of beneficence.
With such conflation, important distinctions are missed, in their opinion (Beauchamp
and Childress 2009).
Therefore, Beauchamp and Childress propose the separation of Frankena’s hierarchi-
cal list into two principles, where the principle of non-maleficence comprises intentional
refrain from causing harm (e. g. avoiding inflicting evil or harm), and the principle of
beneficence comprises acts of help (e. g. the prevention of harms, removal of harms, and
the promotion of good; Beauchamp and Childress 2009, pp. 149–151).
The structure of the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence within the frame-
work of common morality does not exhibit any hierarchical ordering (Beauchamp and
Childress 2009).
principle of non-maleficence
The obligations posed by the principle of non-maleficence are often interpreted as more
stringent than the obligations of beneficence. However, as highlighted by Beauchamp
and Childress, this need not to necessarily be so. There is no rule in ethics that favours
abstaining from inflicting harm at all costs and under all circumstances over the provi-
sion of benefit to the person concerned (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
The principle of non-maleficence is closely linked to the concept of harm, which
has both normative and non-normative use. Harming is distinguished from wronging,
where the latter incorporates the violation of somebody’s rights, which is not necessarily
the case for the former concept. Therefore, the concept of harm in medical ethics rep-
resents the non-normative sense of “thwarting, defeating, or setting back some party’s
interests” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, p. 152). However, even if harm is not under-
stood in a legal way, harmful actions that justifiably limit a person’s interests need not
to necessarily be wrong (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
The principle of non-maleficence in medical ethics can be specified by the following
prima facie (i. e. not absolute) moral rules: not to kill; not to cause pain or suffering; not
to incapacitate a person; not to cause offence; and not depriving others of the goods of
life (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
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Physicians and researchers, by the principle of non-maleficence, are not only obliged
to not inflict harm but also to not impose risks of harms. This obligation is specified in
the standard of due care, related to the principle of non-maleficence. Due care is defined
as “taking sufficient and appropriate care to avoid causing harm, as the circumstances
demand of a reasonable and prudent person” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, p. 153).
If this standard is violated, the absence of due care is called negligence. Negligence can
occur in two forms: either as the intentional act of imposing unreasonable risk upon a
person; or the unintentional but careless exposure of a person to risks (Beauchamp and
Childress 2009).
The rules of non-maleficence are negative prohibitions of actions; they must be
followed impartially (i. e. not distinguishing between people who are close to the
moral agent and people who are not); their violation may result in a legal prosecu-
tion (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
principle of beneficence
The principle of beneficence in the Principles of Biomedical Ethics obliges physicians and
researchers to contribute to the welfare of persons. The authors differentiate between
positive beneficence and utility. The former requires the provision of benefits to others
(without mentioning benefits to oneself). The latter requires balancing between the ben-
efits, risks, and costs for providing the best overall results for everybody (Beauchamp
and Childress 2009).
Beneficence
Beauchamp and Childress define beneficence as “a statement of moral obligation to act
for the benefit of others” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, p. 197). Some forms of benefi-
cence are not obligatory, others are. Although some philosophical traditions of the Scot-
tish Enlightenment (e. g. Hutcheson 2014, Hume 1960) defined beneficence as the cor-
nerstone of their theories, Beauchamp and Childress do not ascribe the highest priority
to the principle of beneficence (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
Furthermore, in common morality, obligatory beneficence can be distinguished from
ideal beneficence. While the former defines moral rules of obligation, the latter is more
a moral ideal than an obligation. It has been argued that beneficence may be reduced to
the category of moral ideals. This is however under debate (Beauchamp and Childress
2009).
Beauchamp and Childress define an array of moral obligations related to the principle
of beneficence: to protect and defend the rights of others; to prevent harm; to remove
conditions causing harm; to help people with disabilities; and to rescue persons in dan-
ger (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
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The rules of beneficence are clearly distinguishable from the rules of non-maleficence.
The rules of beneficence represent positive requirements for action; they may not nec-
essarily be followed impartially; and in general, they do not provide reasons for legal
punishment in cases where they have not been adhered to (Beauchamp and Childress
2009).
Beneficence may also be specified as general beneficence, which includes the obliga-
tion to act to benefit every human being. Specific beneficence aims for beneficence of
specific parties, e. g. children, friends, patients, vulnerable, etc. (Beauchamp and Chil-
dress 2009).
Finally, the principle of beneficence is distinguishable from the virtue of benevolence,
where the latter refers to a specific character trait that disposes the moral agent to act
for the benefit of others (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
Utility
The principle of beneficence requires a moral balancing between benefits, risks, and
costs, for which Beauchamp and Childress employ the principle of utility. The principle
of utility, however, is not identical with the classic utilitarian principle, where the prin-
ciple of utility stands above every other moral principle and is the ultimate and most
prominent action guide. Within the framework of common morality, Beauchamp and
Childress view the principle of utility as one of many prima facie principles, which can
be constrained by other conflicting principles (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
4.2.2.2 Categorisation of Benefits and Harms
The attempt of King (2000) to develop categories of benefits and harms is particularly
related to conducting research. According to her, both low risk of great harm and high
risk of small harm has to be disclosed appropriately to the research participant, in a
way that the participant is able to comprehend and enable her adequately weigh the
consequences of participation (King 2000).
therapeutic misconception
The role of RECs in this process cannot be taken frivolously. In the last few decades, the
role of RECs was to define a clear-cut line between research bearing no benefit for the
(often healthy volunteers) research participants, and research bearing benefits by devel-
oping effective treatments. Gradually, it has been assumed that all research with patients
somehow directly contributes to the development of treatment with reasonable direct
benefits for the participants. This understanding is ethically incorrect and is known as
therapeutic misconception (King 2000).
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Therapeutic misconception is widespread because of technological optimism, and
popular public relation news about prospective preclinical (and partial) research results,
which lead to confusion and erosion of trust. People involved in research studies may
automatically assume that the investigational intervention is the best (state-of-the-art)
treatment option available, especially if they reason that they would not be offered an
ineffective treatment (King 2000).
This misconception, according to King (2000), was even encouraged, in recent times,
by researchers and RECs who devoted substantial effort to exaggerating or even invent-
ing benefits for research participants, in order to ensure that research proposals were
approved. Extensive lists of potential benefits in research studies have already been iden-
tified in research with children, pregnant women (and foetuses), persons with question-
able levels of capacity, and prisoners. King (2000) refers to this as ‘benefit creep’ (King
2000).
role of research ethics committees in categorisation of benefits and
harms
The functions of RECs can be, according to King (2000), improved in the following three
ways (King 2000):
1. By keeping the different types of benefits separate.
2. By thoroughly examining any claim of potential benefit.
3. By discussing the dimensions of benefit.
According to King (2000), these three dimensions often overlap with each other. Investi-
gators may find it difficult to specify direct benefit for the research participant because
this issue may be the content of the research question itself. Uncertainty factors also play
a significant role in the assessment of benefits and harm. However, benefits need to be
properly categorised for their correct assessment (King 2000).
Types of Benefits (and Harms)
Regarding the first claim, i. e. the different types of benefits need to be defined in sep-
arate categories, King (2000) identifies three types of benefits. Direct benefits pertain to
the participants and arise from receiving the intervention that is being examined. Col-
lateral or indirect benefit occurs from being a part of the research study, even though
one may not necessarily receive the experimental intervention. Aspirational benefits are
the benefits aimed at future patients, or the wider society. In research proposals and
informed consent forms, it is quite common that the direct and aspirational benefits are
confused. This occurs mostly in early-phase trials, when the project proposal of a single
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study may describe aspirational benefits expected from an entire research programme
(consisting of multiple research projects; King 2000).
Examination of Benefits (and Harms)
The second claim, which requires the proper examination of claims about potential bene-
fits, aims at identifying research studies that do not offer any prospective direct research
benefits for the participants. According to King (2000), it is quite normal that some re-
search studies, for example, early-phase clinical trials, Phase I oncology trials, and other
early-stage research studies, cannot foresee whether participants will gain any benefits.
These study proposals and documents should therefore not contain overly optimistic
views; rather, they should contain cautions that admit that direct health benefits may
be unlikely. Moreover, statements about the realistic probability of any benefits for the
participants should also be clearly stated (King 2000).
The other issue revolves around the question of what constitutes a reasonable chance
of benefit for a research participant? According to King (2000), guidelines like the Bel-
mont Report (1978), and IRB Guidebook (1993) are more successful in presenting the com-
plexities in this area, rather than in actually providing clear guidance. A more success-
ful account has been provided by the The National Commission For the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which, in its report Research
Involving Those Institutionalized as Mentally Infirm (1978), describes direct benefit as one
that has to be “fairly immediate” for the research participant (Research Involving Those
Institutionalized as Mentally Infirm 1978, p. 13).
A more recent attempt in this regard is the account of Edward W. Keyserlingk (1995),
who defined direct health benefits for PwDs as “a short- or long-range improvement,
or a slowing of a degenerative process, in the specific medical condition of the relevant
subject, whether in the patient’s condition of dementia, a medical symptom associated
with dementia, or another physical or mental condition unrelated to dementia” (Ed-
ward W. Keyserlingk 1995, p. 327). However, Edward W. Keyserlingk (1995) admit that
PwDs as research participants have little likelihood of direct benefit, due to the lack
of knowledge about the development of dementia, and hence also the lack of effective
preventions, therapies, and cures (Edward W. Keyserlingk 1995).
The direct and indirect (collateral) benefits do not have the same weight, when the
possible consequences of participation in the research study are being described to the
prospective participants and/or proxies. Moreover, it seems acceptable to grant the altru-
istic wish of a competent PwD to participate in a research study. Nevertheless, according
to Edward W. Keyserlingk (1995), it is unethical to seek the participation of incompetent
PwDs in a research study where only indirect benefits may be expected, unless the indi-
viduals express their wish to do so. This wish may be expressed in the advance directive
of the PwD, who may state her willingness to participate in a research study despite the
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likelihood of no direct personal benefit, and also in studies that involve higher levels of
risk than minimal risks. A PwD, who provides evidence that she has previously under-
gone similar levels of physical or psychological discomfort in a different therapeutic or
research setting, is entitled to accordingly raise the cap of allowable risk for prospective
research participation in her advance directive (Edward W. Keyserlingk 1995). However,
reasonable chances of possible benefit must be evident; only the reasonability of the
choice can be subjective and open to discussion (King 2000).
According to King (2000), RECs need better guidance in this area, for the evaluation of
the potential benefits for participants. RECs should also improve the way in which infor-
mation is disclosed and discussions are lead about the potential benefits and reasonable
choices for participants (King 2000).
Dimensions of Benefits (and Harms)
The dimensions of potential benefits (and harms) for the participants can be described
in three aspects, based on their nature, magnitude, and likelihood (King 2000).
The nature of potential benefits and harms is difficult to specify because it relies on
the purpose of the research study itself. This condition, however, does not alleviate
researchers from needing to clearly list all the uncertainties, unknowns, and unproven
statuses of the interventions being studied (King 2000).
Regarding the magnitude of benefits and harms, the purpose of this information is
to provide particulars about the size and/or duration of potential benefits and harms
(e. g. quality, time, etc.). These should include information about whether the benefits
or harms are temporary or permanent, or whether the effects of these benefits are
obvious or less obvious. This information is unfortunately rarely provided in consent
forms (King 2000).
Finally, the likelihood of benefits and harms can be based on the results of research. Re-
search provides information on the effectiveness and safety of a treatment, and thereby,
the likelihood of benefits and harms (King 2000).
uncertainty in research
King (2000) advocates that uncertainty is an organic part of any research and therefore,
it should be acknowledged without any ambiguity. Potential benefits should always
be reasonably claimed, and adequately supported by evidence that has already been
recognised. Potential benefits should never be overstated, either by excluding the harms
from the disclosure of information, or by referring to aspirational benefits as direct
benefits (King 2000).
Furthermore, a much stricter separation between the status of a patient and the status
of research participant is necessary. The prospective participant needs to know that en-
tering a research study brings consequences that are different from that of undergoing
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treatment as a patient. The risks may be higher, and a general statement about the pos-
sibility that one may eventually not benefit from the research study is insufficient (King
2000).
reasonable chance of benefit
To introduce a clearer category of what constitutes a reasonable chance of benefit, King
(2000) attempts to define it as:
“A reasonable chance of direct benefit exists when a reasonable person under
all the circumstances would consider the nature, magnitude, and likelihood
of direct benefit sufficient to reasonably choose to participate in research in
anticipation of the benefit.” (King 2000, p. 336)
By “a reasonable person,” she means “all reasonable people” (King 2000, p. 336), which
she argues is implicit.7 Without this implicit understanding, it might be misunderstood
that only a single reasonable person would be sufficient to state the likelihood of direct
health benefit (e. g. the researcher herself). There are other implicit claims in this defini-
tion. One of them is that evidence must be presented in all the three dimensions of direct
health benefit (i. e. nature, magnitude, likelihood of benefits). For this purpose, human
data and evidence from animal research can be utilised. A theory, however plausible
or logically convincing, is not sufficient to fulfil this claim. Another claim is that this
information needs to be judged in support of the decision, where a reasonable choice is
being made to gain a chance of benefit (King 2000).
As one may already expect, King (2000) strictly distinguishes between reasonable
chances of direct benefit, and reasonable choices about participation. While the former
belongs, strictly speaking, to the matter of disclosure, it is the latter which constitutes
the proper risk-benefit assessment of the participant.
Matter of Disclosure
When talking about reasonable chances of direct benefit, the emphasis is always upon
the correct presentation of all the evidence. The information about chances of benefit
should always be interpreted with some scepticism. At this stage, although evidence
claiming the beneficence of interventions are presented, it does not yet constitute the
evidence of the beneficence of the treatment as such. The importance of this stage is
that the proper disclosure of evidence supports the enrolment of participants in order
to perform the research study (King 2000).
7 King (2000) refers to this condition as implicit and self-evident standard in the application to informed
decision-making but she does not discuss it further (King 2000).
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It is also noteworthy that a lack of reasonable chance does not mean that no participant
may enrol (King 2000). In this statement, the importance of the difference between being
a patient and being a research participant prevails, as was commented upon earlier.
Matter of Risk-Benefit Assessment
A reasonable choice of the prospective participant for participation in a research study
is a choice that all reasonable people would endorse in order to attempt to secure the
benefits of the study, after disclosure of sufficient information. However, the definition
does not assume that it logically follows that when a sufficient level of information
has been disclosed, a reasonable person would opt for participation. Reasonable minds
differ, and even the rejection to participate in a research is a reasonable choice for a
person. This is so, even if all the important information has been disclosed and there is
a reasonable chance of direct benefit (King 2000).
Context-specific Threshold Requirements
The phrasing of the definition that refers to the assessment of direct health benefits “un-
der all the circumstances” (King 2000, p. 336) introduces an additional level of qualifica-
tion to the reasonable chance of benefit definition (King 2000). There are context-specific
conditions that are relevant for the benefit assessment, and that may divert the choice of
the participant to other alternatives. Among these are, for example, the specificities re-
lated to the condition of disease, subject population, the degree of disease burden, other
treatments available, etc. (King 2000).
King (2000) warns about two tempting simplifications that RECs need to avoid. The
first is the assumption that every intervention offered to a participant carries a reason-
able chance of benefit. RECs may assume that if a research proposal is acceptable by
many prospective participants, it expresses the reasonableness of that choice. However,
it is easy to recognise that a choice made under time-pressure or other stress (e. g. des-
peration, etc.) may involve therapeutic misconception (King 2000).
The second assumption relates to the presence of clinical equipoise. Clinical equipoise
refers to a difference of reasonable minds about what will be the better treatment be-
tween the various arms of the research study (e. g. research arm v. standard treatment,
or research arm v. no treatment). Clinical equipoise does not focus on the assessment
of potential direct benefits. The focus is rather on the overall risk-benefit calculus with
specific interest of aspirational benefits. Therefore, clinical equipoise fails to assess the
benefit-harm ratio for current research participants in a particular research study (King
2000).
RECs should pay significant attention in assessing the particular benefits and risks of
the research participants actually involved in research studies.
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4.2.2.3 The Value of Technology in Healthcare
The other extensively discussed topic related to the introduction of technology into
healthcare is the value of health technologies for its users and for the society. In this
section, various views and reflections are presented. First, the transforming factor of
technology is critically described, along with the expectations by, and impact on, the
stakeholders who use it (e. g. professionals, patients). Secondly, the negative conse-
quences that should be avoided in the application of health technology are focused
upon. Thirdly, how technology and our perceptions can together negatively influence
medical judgements about impairments, and how the realisation of the issues behind
these misconceptions can lead to risk-minimisation of harms will be discussed.
transforming factor of technology
The transforming factor of technologies upon medicine is manifold. Recent history has
shown that health technologies have unquestionably provided great advances and bet-
ter care overall for patients. However, these new methods and technologies have also in-
troduced some new issues, that challenge the effectiveness of their application. Among
these issues is the fact that technology increases and contributes to over-diagnosis. Subse-
quently, it increases over-treatment, and thus, unfavourably influences the benefit-harm
ratio by intensifying the harms that are already present during most of the testing and
screening activities (B. M. Hofmann 2015; Hoffmann and Chris 2015). Another negative
effect that technology induces is the tendency towards medicalisation (B. M. Hofmann
2015).
Half of the increase in overall healthcare costs is accredited to technologies, and re-
searchers warn that such an extensive use of technologies may go beyond benefits, and
actually cause more harm. The ever increasing implementation of health technologies
evidently affects every stakeholder (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
Technology Sought by Patients
The use of technologies in healthcare is actively sought by the patients. They usually
believe general social myths, for example, that new things are better than the old ones,
complicated things are better than simple ones, or more action is better than less ac-
tion (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
Patients are also more prone to exhibit some sort of optimistic bias. This is under-
standable given the particular disease for which they seek remedy. Patients naturally
demonstrate more hope, as well as a greater need for safety, sense of control, action,
or reassurance. It is also known that regarding expectations about benefits and harms,
patients rarely provide an accurate estimation of interventions. Overall, patients tend to
overestimate benefits, and underestimate harms (Hoffmann and Chris 2015).
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The overly positive patient expectations are further multiplied by the lack of direct
questions addressed to the healthcare professionals. Patients tend to avoid confrontation
with their physicians, even though discussion with them may provide an opportunity
for the correction of misbeliefs, and misperceptions about the effectiveness of interven-
tions (Hoffmann and Chris 2015).
Technology Sought by Professionals
The technology is also actively sought by the members of the medical professions. It
catalyses not only the development of novel technologies but also the delivery of care,
as it attracts patients who are willing to utilise the health service. There is also a techno-
logical arms race amongst healthcare professionals (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
Hoffmann and Chris (2015) emphasise that it is not only the patients who have overly
optimistic ideas about technologies in healthcare. Clinicians also expect overly high ben-
efits from technological interventions. The origins of such expectations may be linked
with the belief held by professionals that doing something is always better than doing
nothing. Additionally, beliefs in the pathophysiological effectiveness of a treatment may
further encourage the willingness to intervene (Hoffmann and Chris 2015).
Clinicians may have poor knowledge about the possible harms, simply by being un-
aware of the true effectiveness of an intervention, and how it influences the overall
benefit-harm ratio. Alternatively, clinicians may not be incentivised to discourage pa-
tients from continuously asking for more care. There may also be financial interests
(e. g. fee for service) behind a clinician’s failure to discourage a patient from opting out
of an intervention (Hoffmann and Chris 2015). The knowledge deficit about the harms
of interventions may also be due to the assumptions during research studies, based on
which researchers disregard the data inconsistent with the hypothesis. Also, it is rather
common in research studies that an identified source of harm is perceived as an isolated
finding (Fisher and Welch 1999), and as such harms, are less routinely evaluated than
benefits (Hoffmann and Chris 2015).
Other Driving Forces Behind Implementation of Technology into Healthcare
Technology is increasingly implemented due to its own attributes. One of these is the
ability of technology to compensate for human deficiencies. Technology is becoming
increasingly autonomous, and its measurements more precise than those made by hu-
mans (B. M. Hofmann 2015). These characteristics enrich the dependance on and trust
towards technologies.
Also, the push from the industry, which develops and implements technology into
various areas cannot be ignored. The so-called technology-push is one of the driving
forces behind their application in almost every aspect of our lives (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
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Technology Changes the Meaning of Disease
It has been argued by B. M. Hofmann (2015) that the prevalence and ever increasing role
of technologies is also noticeable in the perception of disease itself. Firstly, it influences
the definition of diseases because modern diagnostic methods are all reliant on devices.
Secondly, it influences the knowledge about the disease because most of the necessary
measurements are made by employing technological devices. Finally, through manipula-
tion by technologies, we can modify or diminish diseases (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
negative consequences of technology in healthcare
The pervasiveness of the application of technology and its influence upon healthcare pro-
vision can lead to the loss of focus on important goals of healthcare. This issue has been
called by B. M. Hofmann (2015) a self-perpetuating loop of diagnostics. The influence of
technology is continually increasing in healthcare due to the positive feedback loop in
diagnostics: the advances in technical performance lead to better diagnostic techniques;
better diagnostic techniques lead to the diagnosis of an increased number of diseases; in-
creased numbers of diagnosed diseases catalyses the need for therapeutic interventions;
and the increased need for therapy leads to the treatment of milder cases (i. e. those, that
were not treated before); by enhancing the feeling of success inherent in the increased
numbers of treatments, the technological innovation is boosted (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
The positive feedback loop in diagnostics leads to some particular negative conse-
quences, which, according to B. M. Hofmann (2015) need further attention.
Enhanced Leaps of Beliefs
The positive feedback loop in diagnostics may induce unwarranted enthusiasm on the
side of healthcare professionals, patients, and those who develop the technology. Pa-
tients are then especially prone to developing unrealistic expectations regarding their
conditions, and how they can be treated. For all the stakeholders, the benefits of the
ever increasing use of technologies may seem so evident that its downsides are simply
ignored, or actively suppressed (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
Good Tests Become Poor
The higher sensitivity of diagnostic devices results in an overall decrease in positive
results. B. M. Hofmann (2015) demonstrates this scenario, when the sensitivity of a
diagnostic technology is increased from 0.80 to 0.95, such an increase of specificity may
lower the chance of valid positive test result from 0.80 to 0.16, if the prevalence of the
diagnosis decreases, for example, from 50 % to 1 %. A technical improvement in this
case would lead to a lower threshold and alertness about a disease, and thus, such
improvement does not promise any clinical improvements (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
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On the systematic-scale, Fisher and Welch (1999) reminds us of the law of diminishing
returns. This holds that although the first input provides significant benefits, the amount
of benefits declines with every additional input, a tendency which would, at some point,
reach a point when any additional input would result in more harm than benefits (Fisher
and Welch 1999).
Detecting More Does Not Help
B. M. Hofmann (2015) also emphasises that a greater number of detected cases may
not necessarily result in increased levels of patients being treated. The only immediate
result of the increased sensitivity of diagnostic technologies would be the greater num-
ber of mild cases detected. High levels of over-diagnosis would subsequently result in
physicians having to devote less time to individual patients (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
Even if healthcare professionals were able to cope with such an increase in the number
of mild cases, it would not be possible to avoid an increased threat of over-treatment.
More medical care at times may produce more harm than benefit on, at least, three levels.
Firstly, it may result in a change of the diagnostic definition to be more inclusive. Sec-
ondly, it enforces labelling by forcing physicians to disclose to patients that they are not
well, when they would otherwise be asymptomatic and feel well. Thirdly, more medical
care boosts the development of pseudo-diseases, that is, diseases that would not become
apparent during the lifetime of the person were they to have eschewed the diagnostic
test. A further consequence of pseudo-diseases are the disagreement of physicians about
which patient has priority in the consecutive treatment. Pseudo-diseases lead to greater
anxiety for patients and increased numbers of people with disability (Fisher and Welch
1999).
Increased Activity
The prevalence of technology in healthcare also leads to the increased activity of physi-
cians. The more testing is done on the side of diagnostics, the higher likelihood that
some incidental findings will be noticed (B. M. Hofmann 2015). At the system-level, this
leads to tampering, which occurs when an intervention is adjusted to correct for ran-
dom rather than systemic variations. The result of addressing random deviances is that
it leads to unstable systems (Fisher and Welch 1999).
On a diagnostic level, the increased need for activity generates more work for physi-
cians but with less measurable outcomes (B. M. Hofmann 2015). Behind this incentive
for activity is the belief that doing more is better than doing less or doing nothing. How-
ever, as highlighted by Fisher and Welch (1999), this approach ignores the possibility
of causing harm. Harm can occur at any level of the intervention, at the particular dis-
crete level, or the general systemic level. According to Fisher and Welch (1999), there
is a dearth of studies that examine systemic-level harms in medical care. For exam-
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ple, it is notable that a system with free healthcare provision provides 40 % more care
than co-payment systems, which yields beneficial results in high-risk groups of patients.
However, the group randomised to receive more care showed no improvement in their
functioning, along with more pain, more worry, and more restrictions in their everyday
activities (Fisher and Welch 1999).
Increased activity on the physician’s side introduces more complexity to the tasks.
Greater complexity appears to be dangerous, not only on the systemic-level (i. e. more
steps needed to finish a task) but also on a particular discrete level, due to the higher
likelihood of being distracted during a more complicated task (i. e. missing an important
detail because other tasks need to be performed; Fisher and Welch 1999).
Increased Health Anxiety
On the side of the patients, greater activity may raise more concerns about their health,
causing individuals to become more worried and anxious about their health condition.
These concerns may increase the demand for testing and screening even more, and thus,
intensify all the aforementioned issues (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
Increased Costs
The convergence of the consequences of more intensive use of technology in healthcare
also results in increased costs. With greater testing and screening, more incidental find-
ings, and more follow-ups demanded by patients, resources may be directed away from
other healthcare areas, where they could be used more effectively. Ultimately, resources
may be withdrawn from areas like the development of innovative technologies (B. M.
Hofmann 2015).
Reduced Value
Another effect of over-diagnosis and over-treatment is the creation of medical labels
(or pseudo-diagnosis), the usefulness of which is deflated, according to B. M. Hofmann
(2015). The value of prescribed treatments for symptoms that are not troublesome may
be considered wasteful. Fisher and Welch (1999) also highlight that the near-term risks
of a treatment may prevail over long-term benefits. Additionally, a distinction between
efficacy (i. e. outcomes of treatment in ideal settings), and effectiveness (i. e. outcomes in
community practice) also plays an important role in the benefit-harm assessment (Fisher
and Welch 1999).
Undermining Trust
Finally, all the consequences together may result in the loss of trust by the general public,
which would be detrimental for clinical practice and also research (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
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Also, it should always be borne in mind that uncertainty plays a significant role in
medicine, and is simply unavoidable in practice (Fisher and Welch 1999).
negative influences on medical judgements
As it may be apparent for any valid benefit-harm assessment, a correct medical judge-
ment is necessary. However, medical judgement may be flawed. The negative impact of
the medical judgement can only be partially blamed on technology. Fisher and Welch
(1999) lists four other conditions that may negatively influence medical judgement, and
thus, the assessment of the benefit-risk ratio.
Missing Check on Reality
Firstly, the idea of disease may often be inconsistent with reality. It is tempting to per-
ceive the human condition as a dichotomous model, as either sick or healthy. This
affects not only the thinking of physicians but also the conduct and performance of
medical interventions. Such simplistic interpretations fail to consider wide-ranging vari-
ations in outcomes. Moreover, many diseases inevitably progress to the worst possible
stage. Therefore, healthcare professionals should consider an approach that better en-
compasses the full spectrum of disease when making decisions (Fisher and Welch 1999).
Results Extrapolated Too Broadly
Secondly, there is a noticeable tendency to apply particular findings to a wider area than
that investigated in the study. This occurs especially in cases when results of highly-
controlled studies are extrapolated to lower-risk patients than those studied, expanded
to include similar or related interventions, or providers with unknown capabilities. This
poses an increased risk of harm. Moreover, the attempt to introduce such extrapolation
carries also the burden of proof (Fisher and Welch 1999).
Missing System-level Research
A wide range of research studies investigated the implementation of changes made to
increase capacity (e. g. increasing visit frequency, hire additional personnel, purchase
new diagnostic technology); changes which also incur increased costs. However, it is
unknown whether these changes affect the outcomes of the interventions. Fisher and
Welch (1999) emphasise that not only costs but also outcomes (their benefits and harms)
should be precisely measured. The measurement should not focus on discrete groups of
patients but should extend to the wider population that is affected by the system-level
changes (Fisher and Welch 1999).
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Looking For More to Be Better
It is argued that findings that are inconsistent with the underlying beliefs of the re-
searcher(s) are often simply ignored or disregarded. Harms in studies are perceived as
isolated findings because it is believed that only benefits are expected with more care,
not harms. Little effort is invested in defining what not to do, as well as into the eval-
uation of clinical practice. Moreover, stakeholders are increasingly market-oriented and
profit-driven, leaving very little room for the exploration of the potential harms of tech-
nologies. Fisher and Welch (1999) note a danger in industry-sponsored research studies,
which carry a higher likelihood of publication bias and/or conflicts of interests. These
dangers, in their view, will only escalate in the future (Fisher and Welch 1999).
requirements for reducing harm from healthcare technologies
To minimise the dangers of influences that have negative impact on medical judgement,
along with the greater likelihood of harms in interventions instead of expected benefits,
it is insufficient to note these dangers and harms when they occur. The true challenge is
to actively look for these dangers and purposely identify them (Fisher and Welch 1999).
B. M. Hofmann (2015) adds that the medical community should halt the uncritical
implementation and use of health technology that endorses excessive medicine/medica-
tion. This can be done, for example, by eliminating all the traces of truism: that doing
more is better than doing less, that new is always better than old, and that advanced is
always better than simple (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
Responsible actions cannot be based upon the vague concepts linked with health tech-
nology, which are a sort of technological imperative of progress alongside of uninformed
patients’ demands (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
The dual role of technology has to also be acknowledged. Technology cannot be un-
derstood as a neutral, value-less means for human ends. It is at the same time an artefact
and an actor (B. M. Hofmann 2015, referring to Latour 2005).
Finally, health technology needs to be critically assessed with the same rigour as that
with which drugs are assessed (B. M. Hofmann 2015).
4.3 specification of article 4
This section specifies the requirement of Art. 4 to maximise benefits and minimise risks
of PwDs while using AAL technologies. The section is divided into the standard areas
of clinical research and clinical practice. This specification of Art. 4 also takes into ac-
count the highest requirement of UDBHR, i. e. assessing the protection of the human
dignity of the PwDs, and extending to the interests and motives of other stakeholders
(e. g. formal/informal caregivers, researchers, etc.) participating in the care of PwDs.
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4.3.1 Clinical Research
The maximisation of benefits in clinical research, required by Art. 4 of the UDBHR, is
much more difficult to achieve than in clinical practice. Participants may be limited by
their disease, and may be overly eager and willing to try novel (and potentially danger-
ous) experimental treatments. Investigators should never take advantage of this kind of
vulnerability, nor should this vulnerability be exploited for the sake of research (Pelle-
grino 2009).
Evans (2014) points out the inner incoherence of Art. 4 regarding clinical research. The
requirement to maximise research benefits appears impossible, since, due to the nature
of any experiment, no benefits can be assured (Evans 2014). This inconsistency may
be somewhat mitigated by the motives and justifications for conducting the research
study. The ultimate motives for conducting research studies is search for amelioration
of physical and/or psychological distress, pain, and disturbance. The justification for
conducting research studies with possible risks, besides all the efforts made to minimise
these risks and burdens, is based on the potential of discovering treatments, the benefits
of which will prevail over its dangers or discomforts.
It may be further argued that the phrasing of the Art. 4 requirements is extreme and
unbalanced. The maximisation of benefits and minimisation of risks are conditions at
opposing ends of the spectrum of research results. As such, they omit any mention of
proportionality, as defined by the principle of proportionality. The next section sheds
more light on this issue. The subsequent section specifies the reasons and benefits of
involving PwDs in research studies of AAL technologies and the needs of researchers.
4.3.1.1 Principle of Proportionality and Article 4
Hermerén (2012) argues that the principle of proportionality should be used more in a
plural form because there are many versions of principles of proportionality. Originat-
ing in legal form in German case law, the principle of proportionality also appeared in
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; Hermerén 2012). It is mostly
applied in areas of terminal care, crime and punishment, and military interventions (Her-
merén 2012).
The aim of the principle is to set-up a connection between the aims of an action
and the means used in order to reach it. According to the principle of proportionality,
this relation must be adequate and appropriate. Hermerén (2012) lists four constitutive
elements, which are required in the (various versions) of the principle of proportional-
ity: importance of objective, relevance of means, the most favourable option, and non-
excessiveness (Hermerén 2012).
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importance of objective
In order to make the risks placed on persons acceptable and justifiable, the principle of
proportionality requires that the objectives of the action are important. Without impor-
tant goals, any risky action that carries the possibility of harm is irrational.
However, the focus on the importance of the objectives may introduce additional is-
sues. In some cases, the importance of the aims is transient, e. g. what is important on
day 1 is not important on day 99, or what is important from a theoretical point of view
is not so significant from a practical point of view. The importance of an objective is
not a static entity; there may be many objectives with conflict and have different priori-
ties (Hermerén 2012). In medical circumstances, these may be the fast pain management
and alleviation of suffering; the middle-term goal of mitigating the disease; and the
long-term goal of restoration, maintaining or improving of the quality of life.
relevance of means
The means used for reaching the goals, according to the principle of proportionality,
have to be adequate and relevant to the risks taken and the benefits expected. Thus,
relevant means are also proportionate in terms of causality between the means and the
ends (Hermerén 2012).
There are two interpretations about what constitutes the relevance of means. Accord-
ing to the stronger interpretation, the means have to be sufficient or necessary to reach
the objectives. The weaker interpretation requires only that the means bring about, or
help to bring about, the objectives. The weaker interpretation assists in the criticism of
excessive expectations of novel and emerging research studies (Hermerén 2012).
The assessment of means is important because they also identify goals that may be
achievable. A goal cannot be reached with unsatisfactory or inadequate means; thus, the
means shape and limit which goals are achievable (Hermerén 2012).
the most favourable option
The requirement of the most favourable option appears to be the most problematic as-
pect in the application of the principle of proportionality. There is a distinction between
what constitutes risky treatment, and controversial treatment (Hermerén 2012). As the
phrases might suggest, risky treatment is considered by all those involved (as well as,
possibly, by the wider population) on a consensual basis as bearing the danger of pos-
sible harm, while the latter term refers more to treatments that introduce an element of
controversy (e. g. religious or political views). This poses additional issues related to the
interpretation of what constitutes favourable options, and of how they can be measured
or justified (who decides, on what grounds, etc.). All these issues demonstrate that the
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difference between risky and controversial favourable options cannot be equivalent, and
these terms cannot be interpreted as synonymous terms (Hermerén 2012).
non-excessiveness
Hermerén (2012) argues that a fourth condition applies, for the effective application
of the principle of proportionality, which is the non-excessiveness of the means. This
is defined as: “[t]he means used should not be excessive in relation to the intended
goal” (Hermerén 2012, p. 377). Assessing the non-excessiveness requirement means con-
sidering the measures, restrictions, and proper forces that may be used in a given situa-
tion. These become an issue when they are exceeded (Hermerén 2012).
The benefits and harms need an explicit estimate that reflect the specific context. For
such an estimate, circumstances like the type of harm or interests at stake need to be
considered. What may be considered as an appropriate type of harm in one situation,
may be considered as excessive in another situation (Hermerén 2012).
various interpretations of the principle of proportionality
Hermerén (2012) argues that the issues related to all the above-mentioned conditions of
the principle of proportionality suggest that there is no single principle of proportion-
ality but many. He distinguishes between extended, standard, and minimal interpreta-
tions (Hermerén 2012).
The extended interpretation involves all the conditions mentioned earlier: the require-
ment of the important objective, relevant means, choosing the most favourable and
non-excessive option. This interpretation is the most useful in considering applications
within research ethics (Hermerén 2012).
The standard interpretation involves the requirement of the importance of means,
choice for most favourable option, and non-excessiveness of the chosen means for reach-
ing the objective (Hermerén 2012).
The minimal interpretation of the principle of proportionality embraces only two re-
quirements: the relevance and non-excessiveness of the means. These two versions of
the principle of proportionality may be useful, mostly in bioethical evaluations of harms
and benefits (Hermerén 2012).
Hermerén (2012) concludes that the principle of proportionality can be considered
as a principle that helps raise additional questions in the ethical assessment of bene-
fits and harms. The principle of proportionality cannot be considered a basic ethical
principle because it produces various outputs in the context of a multitude of ethical
theories (e. g. utilitarian, human rights based, dignity oriented theories). Additionally,
its results may not necessarily be always conclusive, involving significant levels of grad-
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ing (whether the interests are fundamental, strong, or weak; or the harm involves the
majority, minority, or only few persons; Hermerén 2012).
is the principle of proportionality missing from article 4?
On closer inspection, there is no reference to a principle of proportionality in the
UDBHR. However, in earlier drafts of the UDBHR, reference was made to this principle.
As the Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR (2005) notes, earlier drafts of the Declara-
tion, in Art. 30 on the restrictions on the principles (content-wise this article in the final
version is under Art. 27), declared that restrictive measures in choosing between various
(conflicting) principles should be made proportionally. A necessary restriction of any of
the principles of the UDBHR (and the rights derived from it) should have been restricted
in the least limiting manner, and “only to an extent proportional to the legitimate end
of the restriction” (Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005, p. 16)
The Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR (2005) makes another link to the principle of
proportionality, referring to the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine (2005). The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) refers to the
principle of proportionality only in two occurrences. In Art. 6.2, in relation to a consent
of a minor, the opinion of the minor needs to be weighed in proportion to her age (Con-
vention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, Art. 6.2); and in Art. 16.ii, stating that
the risks for persons participating in research studies should not be disproportionate
to the benefits (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, Art. 16.ii). These re-
quirements are again confirmed in Art. 15.iv and Art. 6.1 of the Additional Protocol to the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (2005) respectively. It is this latter document
that the Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR (2005) refers to when it describes the mean-
ing of Art. 6 on benefit and harm, in the preliminary draft of the Declaration. According
to this statement, both documents require, in their principles, the search for benefit for
the person concerned in the research, while minimising the possible harms (Explanatory
Memorandum on UDBHR 2005).
However, the final accepted text of the UDBHR does not refer to the principle of
proportionality. The phrasing of the UDBHR does not require a simple proportionality
balanced in such a way that the benefits outweigh the harms but rather, it demands the
widest gap possible between the benefits and harms. As the text of Explanatory Mem-
orandum on UDBHR (2005) suggests, the dismissal of any reference to the principle of
proportionality is a result of both conceptual and political decisions during the drafting
of the UDBHR (Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005).
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4.3.1.2 The Involvement of PwDs into the Design of AAL Technologies
The literature review (Chapter 3) highlighted the requirements and beneficence of in-
volving PwDs in the research & development (R&D) and design process of the AAL
technologies. Such an involvement is expressed by many terms: holistic approach or
perspective (Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al. 2010), value sensitive design (Wright 2011), er-
gonomic design (Wallace et al. 2010), proactive design (Duquenoy 2004), or ethical de-
sign (Kosta, O. Pitkänen, et al. 2008).
A similar framework has been developed during the European Rosetta project,8 called
user participatory design. The user-friendliness and usefulness of the system has been
achieved by the active involvement of PwDs in the design process. Amongst the needs of
the PwDs were the support for memory, behaviour, and activities of daily living (ADLs).
The more inclusive involvement of research participants in the design process resulted
in fruitful and better targeted results. The PwDs reported better support in cases of
emergency. The informal carers were able to provide additional valuable feedback about
the usefulness (or the lack thereof) of the technology (e. g. difficulties in using buttons,
vision problems of PwDs, losing the mobile devices, etc.; F. J. M. Meiland et al. 2014).
Indeed, the involvement of PwDs into the R&D process is likely to increase in the
future, and should be actively encouraged in order to fulfil the requirements defined in
Art. 4 of the UDBHR. F. J. M. Meiland et al. (2014) highlight a few issues in the R&D of
AAL technologies, which may be avoided through a more inclusive approach towards
PwDs in the research of AAL technologies. Among these is the drawback of the frag-
mented functionalities of AAL technologies, i. e. they aim to support only a single need
of the PwDs. Instead, AAL technologies should be designed in a way that will enable
them to support various needs of PwDs, over the different stages of the development of
the disease. Also, more inclusive and participatory involvement of PwDs into a research
project provided engineers with the practical knowledge that modular systems serve
PwDs better. Unfortunately, some technologies used by PwDs were developed without
their active involvement, or were initially developed for younger generations (F. J. M.
Meiland et al. 2014).
inherent risks of living with ict
Coeckelbergh (2015b) highlights an additional and important aspect that goes beyond
the purely pragmatic approach of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
design. This overall aspect of living with ICT, in Coeckelbergh’s view, is an ethics of
vulnerability coping. The introduction of ICT, according to him, does not introduce
‘external’ harms. ICT is a part of our lives and as a consequence, their vulnerabilities are
all our vulnerabilities. Life with ICT inadvertently shapes our existence; it is our form
8 Project website: http://www.aal-europe.eu/projects/rosetta/ (visited on 27/11/2015).
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of life with ICT, which is therefore a life lived with risk. During the development of ICT,
human beings evaluate the (inherent) risks with which they are willing or unwilling to
live (Coeckelbergh 2015b).
Coeckelbergh’s interpretation opposes the view held by the Dutch design-oriented
philosophy of technology (Coeckelbergh 2015b, referring to Verbeek 2011; Verbeek 2005;
and van de Poel 2005). According to this design-oriented interpretation, living with
technology is a matter of choice. The way we live with technology is within our con-
trol; it is a lifestyle (Coeckelbergh 2015b). It is not tightly linked with our social and
cultural nature of living. Therefore, through the approach called ‘designing the moral-
ity of things’ (Coeckelbergh 2015b referring to Verbeek 2011), it is possible to shape
human behaviour and thus, human existence, through the interfaces of the technology.
The design-oriented approach interprets lives with ICT as a market, where individuals
make choices between various lifestyles, suggesting a consumer-like concept of morality
and human existence (Coeckelbergh 2015b).
Coeckelbergh (2015b) finds this interpretation misleading, as it fails to reflect upon
the importance of moral habits and moral cultures. Just as using a language, being part
of a society or culture is a style of living that is extremely hard to change. Changing the
style of living with ICT is similarly impossible on an individual level.
The conclusion that may be drawn, based of Coeckelbergh’s interpretation of living
with ICT, is that any use of technology carries an inherent risk of harm for its user.
It is impossible to completely circumvent these risks. Additionally, these risks cannot
be effectively minimised on an individual level. Living with ICT involves being in the
fabric of societies, the minimisation of the risks posed by ICT (i. e. with which risks we
are willing to live with, and which not) can be decided upon at the level of the wider
public and through the involvement of the relevant stakeholders.
4.3.1.3 Needs of Researchers
The unknown factors behind the pathology and the pathogenesis of dementia forms a
justifiable set of needs for researchers who wish to develop better and novel diagnostic
and monitoring means. As mentioned by König et al. (2015), in 2015, there were ap-
proximately 2500 trials listed in the official clinicaltrials.gov registry that studied
mild cognitive impairment (MCI), Alzheimer’s Disease (AD), and other dementias. It is
argued that the development and use of AAL technologies (especially their monitoring
abilities), and ICT devices for capturing and recording physiological and other data may
provide the researchers with these valuable data (Robert et al. 2013; König et al. 2015).
The appropriate assessments for diagnosis, in particular of cognition, behavioural, psy-
chological, and ADLs essentially provide the user-needs data for researchers regarding
this type of technology (Robert et al. 2013).
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ICT services are used for automated speech analysis, non-invasive 2D video record-
ings and video signal analysis, for computer games and actigraphy. In the future, it is
expected that ICT may provide researchers with a non-invasive, objective, and inexpen-
sive way of recognising and identifying the decline of various cognitive or functional
abilities in patients. This may facilitate the early detection of these impairments (König
et al. 2015).
Robert et al. (2013) defined the requirements and wishes that ICT should fulfil in order
to be of use in clinical trials. One of these requirements is that ICT needs to be accepted
as a valid clinical study endpoint by health authorities. Robert et al. (2013) argue that
introducing ICT into clinical practice is particularly important because it would encour-
age this acceptance, thereby allowing the application of ICT to move beyond the clinical
trial setting alone. Another requirement is the establishment of a correlation between the
data recorded by ICT and that obtained with various other clinical assessment tools. ICT
must also be able to record long-term data (frequency, intensity, etc.) on a wide range of
behavioural and psychological symptoms related to dementia (Robert et al. 2013).
Beside these essential requirements, Robert et al. (2013) also defined wishes and user-
needs that the ICT services might fulfil for researchers. Amongst these are the reduction
of the number of research participants dropping out, the elimination of the need for
repeat study visits to the research centre; the improved blinding about the evolution
of PwDs in order to reduce bias; the development of a more objective and homogenous
assessment of behavioural disturbances, the derivation of more precise insight regarding
behavioural disturbances; and the need for games in order to rate and manage PwDs’
behavioural issues (Robert et al. 2013)
Undoubtedly, the aforementioned aims, if achievable, would provide future PwDs
with notable benefits. However, it must be recognised that these goals are only aspira-
tional benefits, according to the categorisation of King (2000). This means that the distur-
bances and risks of PwDs participating in these research studies may be greater than the
direct benefits required by Art. 4 of the UDBHR. Moreover, Art. 3.2 places the interests
of individual PwDs above the needs of science. Therefore, the user needs of researchers
regarding ICT (e. g. to increase participants’ admission rates; to improve sensitivity of
detection of settle changes that would result in an improved accuracy of the research
objectives; or the reduction of required visits on the research centre and consequently
reducing the dropout rate; König et al. 2015) should be defined as secondary to those
needs of the PwDs and their caregivers regarding AAL technologies.
4.3.2 Clinical Practice
The principle of benefit and harm of Art. 4 of the UDBHR defines that in medical practice
and therapy, physicians are obligated to cure their patients whenever possible, amelio-
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rate their disease, relieve their pain, and provide care. According to Pellegrino (2009),
these requirements go beyond the simple removal, avoidance, or prevention of harm.
Art. 4 demands much more than these negative obligations. Art. 4 poses positive obliga-
tions of beneficence upon healthcare professionals, i. e. that positive good must be pro-
vided to patients. What the UDBHR states in Art. 4 is that the healthcare professional
carries the responsibility of weighing the potential risks and benefits. In Pellegrino’s
view, this weighing should be prudential (Pellegrino 2009).
The assessment of benefits and risks related to the application of AAL technologies
cannot be successfully conducted without a precise knowledge of the user-needs. In the
clinical application of AAL technologies, there are at least three different types of users,
with various user-needs: PwDs, formal and informal caregivers. The following sections
will specify their respective needs, and how AAL technologies can be help meet these
these. This will be followed by the specification of the risks that AAL technologies may
introduce in the care for PwDs.
4.3.2.1 User-needs
AAL technologies need to fulfil the expectations of three different groups of users and
their needs. This has implications for the benefit and harm assessment of the AAL tech-
nologies that is required by Art. 4 of the UDBHR.
persons with dementia
As argued in the literature review (Chapter 3), PwDs exhibit a great deal of heterogeneity.
Therefore, two types of user-needs can be defined: those that are required by all PwDs
as persons, and those that can differ significantly between PwDs, e. g. needs that differ
depending on the stage of the dementia.
General Needs of PwDs
The book, Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First (T. Kitwood 1997) provides a
definition of the general needs of PwDs. Kitwood’s initial encounter which dementia
prompted him to reconsider the overall paradigm present in dementia care. Kitwood
refers to this as a “standard paradigm” (T. Kitwood 1997, p. 2) or the “old culture of
care” (T. Kitwood 1997, p. 77). This standard paradigm is based on a medical model, in
which dementia is referred to as an ‘organic mental disorder.’ This reference is based on
the results of neuropathological investigations of 1960s. According to this approach, the
phenomenon of dementia must be understood in a ‘technical way.’ As a result of this
(objective) interpretation, namely, that behind dementia must be a structural failure of
the brain, a technical approach must also be the decisive element of dementia care (T.
Kitwood 1997, pp. 1–3).
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In contrast to this standard paradigm, Kitwood, during his initial research, focused on
how personhood is undermined in the various stages of dementia. He found that there
had been no attempt to interpret dementia from a subjective perspective. Therefore,
he proposed a hypothesis for defining dementia care (based on the psychological and
neurological basis of dementia) as requiring respect for a PwD’s personal emotions and
feelings in a more substantial and profound way (T. Kitwood 1997, pp. 4–6).
The main element of Kitwood’s approach is the concept of personhood. His under-
standing of the concept of the person cannot be interpreted as a mere synonym for
‘human being.’ Accepting Quinton’s criteria of personhood,9 T. Kitwood (1997), along
with other authors such as Post (1995), criticises the overt emphasis on rationality and
autonomy in the concept of personhood. Instead, the concept of personhood should be
more closely linked to feelings, emotions, and relationships, i. e. to areas in which people
with dementia are still often highly competent (T. Kitwood 1997, p. 10).
Therefore, against the background of the aforementioned criticism, T. Kitwood (1997)
defines personhood as
“[ . . . ] a standing or status that is bestowed upon one human being, by others,
in the context of relationship and social being. It implies recognition, respect
and trust.” (T. Kitwood 1997, p. 8)
The understanding of personhood is inspired by the philosophy of Martin Buber (1878–
1965) and his seminal work Ich und du (Buber 1923; in English Buber 1970).10 The recog-
nition of relational terms of human beings led Kitwood to redefine the understanding of
dementia care. He argues that, despite the severity of the cognitive impairment, Buber’s
I-Thou relationship between a PwD and a person unaffected by dementia can still be es-
tablished. The essence of the caregiving act is missing, if the I-Thou meeting never takes
place. This is unfortunately often the case, despite the efforts made to ensure the most
accurate assessment and diagnosis, and the most thorough care plan within pleasant
surroundings (T. Kitwood 1997, p. 12).
Kitwood calls his approach to the care of PwDs “person-centred care” (T. Kitwood
1997, p. 4). He and his colleagues also developed Dementia Care Mapping (DMC),
a method that helps evaluate the quality of provided care, usually in formal settings
(e. g. nursing homes). This method involves the use of empathy and observational skills.
The framework is based on trying to understand the caregiving process from the point
9 T. Kitwood (1997) refers to Quinton (1973) when listing the five criteria of personhood, as the possession
of a) consciousness (the idea of the self); b) rationality (the capacity for abstract thinking); c) agency (forming
intentions, considering options, direct actions); d) morality (accountability for one’s actions, living according
to principles); and e) relationship (identify and understand the desires and needs of others) (T. Kitwood 1997,
p. 9).
10 There are two standard translations of Buber’s Ich und Du (Buber 1923) into English. In 1937, Ronald
Gregor Smith published his translation (Buber 1937), and later, in 1970, Walter Kaufmann provided another
translation. The latter includes Buber’s own, previously unpublished, comments on the English translation
of Ich und du. For details, see Buber (1970, p. 5).
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of view of the person with dementia. It helps to assess the levels of deterioration for
introducing possible improvements (T. Kitwood 1997, p. 4).
Kitwood’s person-centred care tries to overcome the widespread tendency to deper-
sonalise those who are having some kind of noticeable physical or mental disability (T.
Kitwood 1997, p. 12). T. Kitwood (1997) refers to research conducted by Meacher (1972)
who found out earlier that the general arrangement and conditions present in residen-
tial homes were alone sufficient to “drive people demented” (T. Kitwood 1997, p. 46).
Therefore, every time Kitwood noticed any depersonalising tendencies during the care-
giving activity, he took notes of such episodes and included them into the topics of his
research. He referred to these depersonalising tendencies as “malignant social psychol-
ogy” (T. Kitwood 1997, p. 46). Kitwood admits that this term need not necessarily imply
evil intentions of caregivers because their work is usually led by kindness and good
intentions. He defined and listed these malignant approaches in Table 4.1 (T. Kitwood
1997, pp. 46–47).11
Table 4.1 – Malignant approaches to PwDs by T. Kitwood (1997, pp. 46–47)
Approach Description
Treachery Forms of deception to manipulate or distract the PwD, or to force them into compliance.
Disempowerment Not allowing a person to use her remaining abilities and failing to help them to complete their
initiated actions.
Infantilisation Patronising treatment of the person.
Intimidation Inducement of fear in a person via threats or physical power.
Labelling Using categories (e. g. dementia, ‘organic mental disorder’) as a main basis for interaction with a
person and explanations of their behaviour.
Stigmatisation Treating a person as a diseased object, an alien or outcast.
Outpacing Information overload when presenting choices, providing information, mostly in too high a rate,
putting the person under pressure by the speed they cannot deal with.
Invalidation Ignoring the subjective reality and feelings of persons.
Banishment Excluding a person either psychologically, or physically (e. g. sending PwDs away).
Objectification Treating a person as mere object, as a lump of dead matter (e. g. pushing, lifting, filling, pumping,
draining).
Ignoring Carrying on an activity (e. g. conversation) as if a PwD were not present.
Imposition Forcing a person to conduct certain activities without the possibility of choice, overriding their
desire.
Withholding Refusing to provide requested attention, or to fulfil an evident need.
Accusation Blaming a PwD with failures because of their lack of ability to finish certain actions, or their
misunderstanding of the situation.
Disruption Sudden intrusion or disturbance of a person’s action or reflection. Crude breaking of their frame of
reference.
Mockery Making fun of person’s inability, making remarks, teasing, humiliation or joking on their expense.
11 The original list contained 10 approaches (Tom Kitwood 1990), which were later expanded with 7 additional
approaches (T. Kitwood 1997, p. 47).
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
Approach Description
Disparagement Expressing the incompetency, uselessness, worthlessness, etc. of the person, damaging their
self-esteem.
Table 4.1: Malignant approaches to PwDs by T. Kitwood (1997, pp. 46–47)
Many elements from this list will never be possible to be mimicked by AAL technolo-
gies and ICT. Among these are stigmatisation, banishment, accusation, or mockery by
AAL technologies. However, other malignant approaches are indeed relevant, even for
the development of AAL technologies. Badly designed AAL technologies may disem-
power the PwDs, as they may infantilise, intimidate, label, or outpace them. ICT may
also be ignorant of the subjective reality of the PwD, and is almost unimaginable that
technology would ever be able to eradicate their objectifying approach to human beings.
The former issues may be avoided by more sensitive R&D processes, greater inclusion of
PwDs into the design process, etc. Unfortunately, the latter characteristics of technology
will be harder to eliminate.
Aspects of the malignant social psychology are part of the ‘old culture of care’ criti-
cised by Kitwood. This is often followed with pervasive neglect from caregivers. Care-
givers often interrogate already confused PwDs with questions and tasks, the purpose
of which are never fully explained to the PwDs, because the PwDs are not taken seri-
ously. Such an approach results in PwDs feeling as if they have been “left in chaos,” are
under “oppression,” experiencing “naked terror,” and feeling “abandoned for ever” (T.
Kitwood 1997, p. 77).
Besides the minimal requirements for the care of PwDs, technology should also fulfil
certain psychological needs of PwDs, which are defined as “[those] without the meeting
of which a human being cannot function, even minimally, as a person” (T. Kitwood 1997,
p. 81). These include comfort, attachments, inclusion, occupation, and identity (T. Kit-
wood 1997, pp. 80–84). Under comfort is meant the greater need of PwDs for tenderness,
closeness, security, and support. This need is even greater than in the healthy elderly
person due to the diminishing cognitive and other abilities of a PwD, or their fear of
losing a preferred lifestyle. The need for attachment assures the necessary safety nets,
feeling of security, and reassurance for PwDs. Inclusion, as opposed to social exclusion,
is aimed at preventing the decline and retreat of PwDs. Isolation in the history of hu-
manity has often been used as a form of punishment, therefore inclusion emerges as
an understandable and justifiable need of PwDs. The need of PwDs to avoid boredom,
apathy, and futility is concluded in the requirement of occupation. PwDs often manifest
this need in the form of eagerness to help, or participate in activities. Finally, PwDs need
to know, feel, and preserve their identities. This provides continuity with their personal
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histories, recollected not only by the PwDs themselves but also by their peers, friends,
and family members (T. Kitwood 1997).
The fulfilment of any of the aforementioned needs may be achieved by fulfilling all
of the other needs to some extent because they are interlinked. The fulfilment of these
needs, in Kitwood’s view, enables the PwD to realise her personality at least on a mini-
mal level, despite the deficits and gaps present in her functioning (T. Kitwood 1997).
Kitwood’s list of the malignant approaches during caregiving practice, and the psy-
chological needs of PwDs are important when considering the provision of care by AAL
technologies. If AAL technologies aim to provide only physical empowerment of PwDs,
it will still have to fulfil the requirements of avoiding malignant social psychology. If the
AAL technology aims to provide a wider spectrum of support than only those defined
as ADL, it will then—to certain extents—have to also fulfil the special psychological
needs of PwDs as well.
Special Needs of PwDs
Beside the general needs required by every PwD, additional special needs may be iden-
tified, depending on the actual situation and impairments of individual PwDs. These
include support for memory problems, information about one’s condition and about
the adequate provision of care, social contacts and companionship, monitoring of health,
safety, and daily activities (Wichert et al. 2012).
As noted by Wichert et al. (2012), some of these needs may be met by AAL technolo-
gies but many of these technologies are still in their infancy. The issue that emerges
most often with PwDs is their difficulty in learning to use new aids, due to their prob-
lems with memory, concentration, and understanding instructions. These problems are
then followed by others, like difficulties recognising objects or images, issues with ver-
bal expressions, carrying out complex tasks, and psychological and behavioural prob-
lems (Wichert et al. 2012).
The research conducted by van der Roest et al. (2009) identified many needs of PwDs,
which are currently met. Among these are professional assistance, assistance related
to food (e. g. shopping, preparing, composing diet, eating), household activities, or ac-
tivities related to memory health (coping with memory loss), financial assistance and
appropriate care (van der Roest et al. 2009).
The unmet needs are related mostly to areas of information provision about dementia
and its care (e. g. little or no available information, unclear printed information), issues
related to companionship, psychological distress, and the requirement for more profes-
sional help. Higher demand for services were also reported in the areas of mobility,
personal care, supervision, or behavioural problems (van der Roest et al. 2009).
Wichert et al. (2012) identified five areas where AAL technologies may be helpful for
PwDs. The first is in assuaging the need for assistance. PwDs require compensation of
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impairments. Here, technologies may provide PwDs with the necessary support, by way
of reminders (Wichert et al. 2012).
The second area where AAL technologies may be helpful for PwDs is in the provision
of information. There is high demand among PwDs for information about dementia,
and the services available for the care of dementia. PwDs also require information about
their personal condition (Wichert et al. 2012).
The need for social contacts forms the third area of need of PwDs, where technol-
ogy may prove to be helpful, by keeping PwDs in contact with their social environ-
ment (Wichert et al. 2012).
The fourth area is the need for health monitoring, mainly for two reasons: to re-
view the progression of the disease, and, more importantly, for safety reasons for the
PwD (Wichert et al. 2012).
Finally, the fifth area in which PwDs have expressed specific needs is the support and
monitoring of daytime activities. Although the monitoring of daytime activities was
found to be less helpful for PwDs (van der Roest et al. 2009), the importance of relaxing
or doing something useful was identified as a need of PwDs (Wichert et al. 2012).
caregivers
Alongside the needs of the PwDs, also the needs of the carers have to be considered.
Carers are a group of people who spend most of their time with PwDs, and who often
they have the greatest interest in providing the best care for PwDs.
Caregiver’s needs are usually identified in the improvement and support of caregivers
well-being (e. g. social, emotional, and information support), relieving of the caregiving
burden (e. g. stress, tiredness, improving care work; Topo 2009).
However, Jennifer Bray et al. (2015) note that the understanding of needs of infor-
mal carers is often unknown. For this purpose, they developed a caregiver-passport, to
complement the patient-passport (containing the recorded wishes of the PwD). These
passports contain information regarding how informal caregivers wish to be involved in
the assistance and care of a PwD (Jennifer Bray et al. 2015).
It has been reported that both the needs of informal caregivers and those of PwDs
are met in the area of household activities, finances, or food preparation and provision.
However, informal caregivers identified unmet needs for sufficient memory support,
support in daytime activities, and companionship for the PwDs (van der Roest et al.
2009).
Informal caregivers on average reported more needs in total than PwDs themselves.
Higher levels of unmet needs were reported by professional (formal) caregivers, espe-
cially when they had to provide care to a PwD with non-Alzheimer’s dementia, and
when they were highly burdened (based on subjective feelings of being burdened; in
respect of low income; being at the early stages of the career; or caring about a person
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with severe dementia). Formal carers also reported more unmet needs if they did not
share the household with the PwD and in cases of severe dementia (van der Roest et al.
2009).
Low levels of agreement are usually reached between PwDs and their carers on issues
of personal needs, accidental self-harm, abuse, or neglect. The best agreements between
PwDs and their carers are achieved in physical domains. Most of the unmet needs re-
ported by carers involve the lack of available services, or their distance, and their high
costs (van der Roest et al. 2009).
What needs to be particularly emphasised, according to van der Roest et al. (2009), is
the fact that the perspectives of both the PwDs and their carers need to be taken into
account. This is true, not only for services and information available to the PwDs and
their carers in general, but also for AAL technologies. For the successful development
of AAL technologies, both the user-needs of the PwDs and their (informal and formal)
carers need to be addressed. This poses specific technical and ethical challenges for the
R&D and clinical application of AAL technologies. All these challenges can be addressed
and put into the perspective, based on the requirements of Art. 4: the maximisation
of benefit and minimisation of harm. It is meaningless to only maximise the benefit
for PwDs, without maximising the benefit for their informal carers at the same time.
Similarly, minimising risks for only PwDs would miss its full purpose if those risks
were not also minimised for their respective informal and formal carers.
4.3.2.2 Health Technology Assessment
One of the approaches for evaluating the benefits and harms of health technologies12
is Health Technology Assessment (HTA). HTA emerged as a reaction to the need for
closer evaluation of biomedical developments and their justification, before these costly
medical technologies and procedures are introduced into clinical practice (Development
of Medical Technology: Opportunities for Assessment 1976).
Since its early days in 1970s, HTA has involved ethical analysis, along with cost eval-
uations. Various international and national networks and agencies employ HTA, such
as the International Network of Agencies for Health Technology Assessment (INAHTA),
the Health Technology Assessment international (HTAi), and the European network for
Health Technology Assessment (EUnetHTA; B. Hofmann et al. 2014).
HTA is also used for the evaluation of the role of ICT in healthcare. A HTA model for
assessing the effects and consequences of telemedicine was developed as a part of the
EUnetHTA project by Kidholm et al. (2012).
12 Health technology is defined as “[a]n intervention that may be used to promote health, to prevent, diagnose
or treat acute or chronic disease, or for rehabilitation” (HTA Glossary 2015). These include pharmaceuticals,
devices, procedures, and organisational systems that are being used in healthcare (HTA Glossary 2015).
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In relation to Art. 4 of the UDBHR, HTA using the Socratic approach may be inter-
esting. It has been argued that many health technologies are not afflicted by the issues
of human dignity, the persons’ integrity, and human rights. Therefore, a revised list of
the Socratic approach for HTA has been proposed (B. Hofmann et al. 2014). This not
only reflects the ethically relevant benefits and harms of the technology (in question 8)
but also assesses the challenges that technology may pose to the patient’s autonomy,
integrity, privacy, dignity, and human rights (question 5; B. Hofmann et al. 2014).
HTA tools, such as the aforementioned Socratic approach (B. Hofmann et al. 2014) or
the Swedish Council on Health Technology Assessment (SBU) approach (Heintz et al.
2015), may also be valuable in assessing the risks and benefits of AAL technologies in
relation to the care of PwDs.
4.3.2.3 Doom Scenarios
The literature review (Chapter 3) noted the criticism of AAL technologies regarding the
value of their care, voiced by R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow (2006), Vallor (2011), and A.
Sharkey and N. Sharkey (2012). These are identified as the instrumentalisation of care,
which is introduced by AAL when it dehumanises the caregiving process, resulting in
the objectification of the PwDs (Novitzky et al. 2015).
Coeckelbergh (2015a) recently provided valuable insights about the value of ICT in
elderly care, which may also be extended to AAL technologies. He identifies in pub-
lications of R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow (2006) and A. Sharkey and N. Sharkey (2012)
three elements, which address the above-mentioned criticism. These doom scenarios, as
Coeckelbergh (2015a) calls them, are based on the following assumptions: deception is
always morally unacceptable; ICT inevitably creates a ‘virtual’ world as opposed to the
‘real’ world; and that future generations of the elderly population will have the same
low levels of ICT skills as the present one.
acceptable deception in healthcare
Coeckelbergh (2015a) refers to the article, also cited in the literature review in Chapter 3,
of R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow (2006) that argues that good clinical care for the elderly
is incompatible with any attempt to deceive. R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow (2006) further
argue that the elderly should not be left in the hands of machines because good care is
characterised by human care. Without the companionship of humans in the caregiving
process, the elderly are not being provided quality care (R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow
2006).
According to Coeckelbergh (2015a), from the ethical point of view, this need not to be
necessarily so. Good care, in his view, may involve deception. The duty to respect the per-
sons’ autonomy in healthcare may be defined as a prima facie duty. However, caregivers
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often have to cope with the phenomenon that not all elderly persons are necessarily fully
autonomous. Proper care for their condition may therefore involve enhancing their sense
of autonomy, by convincing them that they are still capable of doing things, despite their
cognitive impairments. This may be accomplished by setting up an illusion for them that
they are fully autonomous, despite the fact that they are not. This approach is however,
severely conditioned. According to Coeckelbergh (2015a), deception may be legitimate
in relation to persons who have lost their autonomy due to their cognitive impairment,
if such deception enhances their overall quality of life (Coeckelbergh 2015a).
Coeckelbergh (2015a) argues that the provision of the illusion of full autonomy with
ICT may be one of the possible modes of treatment for elderly persons with compro-
mised autonomy, if caregivers, family members, and other relevant persons involved
in the caregiving process agree upon its beneficial effect. However, due to the fact that
every form of paternalism is morally questionable, such an ‘enhancement’ should be
introduced carefully and in small doses (Coeckelbergh 2015a).13
Behind the criticism of R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow (2006) based on the fear of decep-
tion in relation of dementia care with ICT may lie the phenomenon of disengagement, as
Coeckelbergh (2015a) calls it. The caregivers, due to the ever increasing involvement of
social robots, may feel disengaged from the caregiving process. This may manifest in the
loss of meaningful relations, and the loss of connection with the concrete, bodily, and
material realities that are involved in care. ICT devices may contribute to an atmosphere
that caregivers already find burdensome, including aspects such as the overall speed of
modern care, oriented to improve efficiency and cost-optimisations. As a result, PwDs
may not receive the necessary amounts of attention, care, respect, and dignity that they
deserve (Coeckelbergh 2015a).
Coeckelbergh (2015a), in response to these admonishments, emphasises that using
the word ‘deception’ in relation of care with ICT is too strong. He distinguishes between
the intention to deceive and ‘pretend,’ the latter describing the ICT action. Technology,
in his view, does not deceive us but rather is an integral part of our lives; we interact
and play with it. Just as prohibiting children from ICT would confine their world to
a non-technological one, similarly, the limitation of ICT devices in care may prohibit
PwDs from maintaining (or developing alternative) capabilities. Finally, if deception by
ICT is a serious issue, then it is not constrained to the area of care but to every area of
human life where ICT plays a role, and consequently would need to be addressed at
that level (Coeckelbergh 2015a).
13 An additional issue may be raised in this regard, namely, the question of whether PwDs retain any social
obligations to family to stay ‘authentic,’ meaning, authentic in coping with their cognitive impairment? The
communication of informal caregivers, friends, or other family members with the deceived PwD may run
ashore due to the inability to have more or less meaningful discussion about shared experiences. The AAL
may provide the PwDs with experiences that the informal caregivers have not shared.
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ict as the ‘virtual’ world
R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow (2006) also claim that the caregiving process should be based
on realities of the real world, not on utopian/dystopian goals of some ‘virtual’ reality.
Coeckelbergh (2015a) disregards this criticism as a narrow and dualistic interpretation
of our world. The dichotomy, even if it were true, between the real world of human care
and the virtual world of things fake, deceptive and illusory is too simplistic. Modern
lives accompanied with ICT are already hybrid. People today live both offline and on-
line lives, and the ever increasing issues of separating these two lives from each other
demonstrate the complexity and the uneasiness of categorising the latter as something
virtual and unreal. When using ICT, the user does not leave the real world; ICT remains
the part of one’s presence, existence, and embodiment. Moreover, ICT is still connected
to our materiality. Just as our minds do not disconnect from our bodies by using ma-
terial technologies, it follows that the disconnection of our bodies from our minds also
does not happen when we use ICT. Additionally, ICT is social because it enables real
social interaction. The only difference that ICT introduces into our lives is that most
of the activities we used to perform on our own we now perform with a mediation of
technology (Coeckelbergh 2015a).
Analogously, ICT-mediated care is not an unreal care. It is a different form of care (Co-
eckelbergh 2015a).
ICT-mediated care, moreover, demands special skills from its users. Such a skilled en-
gagement with ICT enables the users to be more social with the prospect of developing
other new skills. From this viewpoint, ICT may be characterised as an opportunity to
develop novel approaches to (re-)engagement. This interpretation opens up new hori-
zons for its user: it may empower engagement in different ways, even by developing
new skills, or maintaining existing skills; it may render the users’ lives meaningful by
providing new opportunities, challenges, and incentives; and may contravene the disen-
gagement of its user from activities (Coeckelbergh 2015a).
ict skills of future generations
The third misguided assumption originates from the interpretation of persons’ capabili-
ties as something independent from ICTs. Coeckelbergh (2015a) argues that these cannot
be separated from each other. This would project into the higher computer literacy of
the future generations of old persons. Moreover, they will demand the ICT that they
have been using their whole lifetime, to stay connected to their peers.14 Withholding the
ICT from a generation, which was socialised with the increased level of ICT use, would
lead to greater harm than benefit (Coeckelbergh 2015a).
14 Coeckelbergh remarks that discussions are being held about defining access to the Internet as a human
right (Coeckelbergh 2015a).
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ICT already left its imprint on our lives; a fact that definitely has normative conse-
quences on how we think about rights, needs, and capabilities related to ICT (Coeckel-
bergh 2015a). Life with ICT will require, in Coeckelbergh’s view, the art of living with
vulnerabilities. While ICT will diminish certain risks, other risks will be introduced by
ICT. ICT in this regard, only transforms the existential vulnerabilities of humans but it
does not eradicate it completely. Thus, the morality of living with other human beings
should be accompanied also by the morality of living with ICT (Coeckelbergh 2015b).
additional issues
Besides the issues identified earlier regarding the overall value of ICT services, and AAL
technologies in particular, that may expose their negative effect upon persons (also with
dementia), there are other more concrete and imminent problems regarding the value
of AAL technologies.
Blurring PwDs with the Group of Elderly
Membership of the elderly occurs when a certain age group is reached. According to the
definition of the WHO, “[t]he age of 60 or 65, roughly equivalent to retirement ages in
most developed countries, is said to be the beginning of old age” (Definition of an older
or elderly person 2015).
PwDs, however, by definition have to exhibit specific symptoms that are characteristic
to the syndrome linked with dementia (cf. the definition of dementia in Chapter 2). It is a
clinical condition, which no longer includes age in its definition. Indeed, the elimination
of age as a criterion in order to separate AD from senile dementia is considered to be
one of the most important developments that has emerged from the scientific research (P.
Fox 1989).
Unfortunately, this distinction is less rigorous in the context of the R&D of AAL tech-
nologies for PwDs. Numerous articles identify the applicability of AAL technologies for
both the elderly and PwDs (e. g. Benoit et al. 2015; Mahoney et al. 2007; F. J. M. Meiland
et al. 2014; B. Mittelstadt et al. 2011; Mok et al. 2014; van der Roest et al. 2009, and
others). It may be argued that AAL technologies aim to fulfil the needs of both of these
groups. This claim may be accurate in terms of providing increased levels of safety, secu-
rity, and other forms of assistance. Nevertheless, many conditions of PwDs are specific
to the diagnosis of dementia, which an average elderly person would not have. A typical
elderly person may therefore not need to use certain AAL technologies (e. g. monitoring
of wandering, extensive use of reminders, or recording of ADLs).
This differentiation between the elderly and PwDs is not based solely on the distin-
guished and specific user-needs. The vulnerability of PwDs, based on their MCI, re-
quires higher than average standards and functionalities of service provision from AAL
devices. For example, AAL technologies for PwDs should not increase the anxiety levels
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of the PwDs. Increased vulnerabilities of PwDs impose higher risks of harms due to tech-
nology, which makes the requirement formulated in Art. 4 of the UDBHR to minimise
harm and maximise benefit more important.
The distinction between the PwDs and the general elderly population in relation of
the requirements of Art. 4 also has consequences on the distribution of AAL technolo-
gies. While the elderly may themselves recognise their need for an assisting device and
actively seek it out, PwDs may not be aware of their need. Moreover, AAL technologies
for PwDs must be introduced based on the recommendation of a physician. This poses
a much higher demand on the adaptability and personalisation of AAL technologies,
meeting much more specific needs of PwDs, who may have less capabilities than the el-
derly in general. The services offered by AAL technologies will not end simply at their
deployment into the living environment of the PwD but they will need to be further
fine-tuned, to reflect the specific needs of PwD concerned. Similarly, PwDs in nursing
homes would require different functionalities and services from AAL technologies than
PwDs living in their home dwellings, either alone or in companion with their families,
and/or spouses.
Therefore, it would be beneficial for future R&D of AAL technologies to separate the
functionalities and aims of technologies to those aimed at the general elderly population,
and those aimed at achieving the high requirements of care for PwDs. This would reflect
the historical development of the definition of dementia, namely that dementia is not a
simple condition of ageing (Katzman 1976), and be more precise in accordance with it.
Lack of Justification of Research with PwDs
A clearer distinction between the goals of AAL technologies aimed at the elderly in
general and PwDs as users would also be beneficial for the performance of further
research in the field of dementia. It has been noted by Joost van Hoof, Wouters, et
al. (2011) that behind the lack of success during the introduction of home automation
systems in the early days was its focus on the persons demanding care (Joost van Hoof,
Wouters, et al. 2011 who, in this regard, refers to the Dutch report of The Netherlands
Institute for Telemedicine; Nispen 2004). The Dutch pilot projects often ignored the
negative connotations that were linked with these technologies. Not only that, they were
also usually labelled as ‘grey,’ ‘old,’ or ‘elderly’ technologies. The users also showed
lower willingness for using these technologies. In the view of Nispen (2004), the focus
of home automation systems should be shifted to younger generations in oder to achieve
greater success with their application for older persons (Joost van Hoof, Wouters, et al.
2011).
However, there is a problem behind such a paradigm shift. The most obvious one
is that great amount of research resources has been invested into the R&D of AAL
technologies. If the focus of research with PwDs were to be shifted to achieve greater
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success of AAL technologies for the elderly in general, the involvement of a vulnerable
population in the research would be unjustified. It would mean that the aspirational
benefits defined in the research project proposals were mistakenly granted. It would
also mean that the exposure of PwDs as research participants during these research
studies to possible harms were greater than minimal.
It may be argued that the harms encountered by the PwDs involved were not greater
than those of an average user of ICT devices, or those that PwDs would have experienced
anyway. However, evidence from various publications of different research projects sug-
gest that this might not be the case. As highlighted in the literature review (Chapter 3),
high levels of malfunctioning functionalities (Joost van Hoof, Kort, et al. 2007 citing Bron-
swijk et al. 2005), false alarms (J. van Hoof et al. 2011), the ICT’s ‘life on its own’ (Portet
et al. 2011), and other experiences that raised PwDs’ anxiety levels were reported. If the
results of these research studies were to be applied purely for the benefit of the general
public, relegating the interests and benefits of PwDs to a lower level, the risk-benefit
assessment of these research studies would need to be ex post reviewed. In fact, an ad-
ditional review of the already approved and conducted research studies is unlikely to
occur. However, it may be argued that the application of research results, obtained by
the participation of PwDs exposing them to risks of harms, to a different target group
than PwDs would also endanger the ethical approval of future research studies of AAL
technologies involving PwDs as participants. Any future study that would refer purely
to aspirational benefits should be deemed as scientifically unfounded. The consequence
would then result in an even greater harm upon the growing group of PwDs, who prefer
to stay longer in their homes instead of being institutionalised in nursing homes in the
form of lack of approved research studies.
A proper differentiation between the groups of general elderly population and PwDs
would also be beneficial to circumvent the adverse application of research results ob-
tained with the participation of PwDs to the general population. A research study focus-
ing on the needs of PwDs should focus solely on the benefits of PwDs. Consequently,
research studies aiming to develop assistive technologies for the greater elderly popu-
lation should be clearly distinguished from those aimed towards PwDs. Blurring the
differences of these two groups would not only lead to confusing results but also to the
lack of proper justification for conducting research with the involvement of PwDs.
4.4 balancing of principles
4.4.1 Principles Conflicting with Article 4
Two possible conflicts between Art. 4 and other articles of the UDBHR may be identi-
fied. Conflict may arise between the respect for autonomy required by Art. 5 and the
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requirement of providing direct and indirect benefits that should be maximised while
the risks should be minimised in Art. 4. An additional conflict may also arise between
the requirement of advancing scientific knowledge of Art. 14, and Art. 4 on maximising
direct and indirect benefits, while minimising the possible harms.
4.4.1.1 Conflict with Article 5
A conflict of may arise between Art. 4 and Art. 5 of the UDBHR, when a patient demands
a treatment before harms have been minimised, or willingly obstructs the attempt of the
physician to minimise the harms (e. g. by not giving up behaviour that increase the
likelihood of harms, non-compliant patients). However, the phrasing of Art. 5 does not
prioritise the autonomy of any of the involved stakeholders. It only states that the auton-
omy of those making the decisions should be respected. In this regard, both decisions
can be respected on the same grounds. The decision of the patient to act in a way that
increases the possibility of harms is respected as equal to the decision of the physi-
cian to not treat the patient because of her conduct. Moreover, Art. 5 also requires that
the decision-making parties take responsibility for their decisions, a condition which, in
this regard, favours the physician not to expose the patient or participant to even greater
risks than she is exposing herself already.
4.4.1.2 Conflict with Article 14
As noted in Macklin (2005), the responsibilities of researchers to advance scientific
knowledge through the promotion of health defined in Art. 14 may conflict with the re-
quirement of Art. 4 for maximising direct and indirect benefits, and minimising harms.
The conflict may be characterised by the opposing responsibilities of advancing scien-
tific knowledge on one hand, and the minimisation of possible harm acceptable to the
research participant on the other hand. To resolve this conflict, Art. 3.2 may be useful.
Art. 3.2 clearly states that scientific and social interests are second order interests to the
interests (and dignity) of the individuals. Therefore, in this respect, the minimisation
of harms for the research participants has priority over the advancement of scientific
knowledge.
4.5 summary
In applying Art. 4 of the UDBHR on maximisation of direct and indirect benefits, while
minimising the possible harms during the application and advancement of scientific
knowledge, medical practice, and associated technologies for the care of PwDs using
AAL technologies, the following recommendations can be made:
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• The deep roots in the concept of respecting the PwDs’ human dignity and basic
human rights of Art. 4 requires not only the maximisation of the direct and indirect
benefits and minimisation of possible harms of PwDs during medical treatments
and research activities. Art. 4 also requires the maximisation of direct and indirect
benefits during the R&D and application of medical technologies, including AAL
technologies.
• Every health intervention for PwDs may, besides aiming for some benefit, carry a
risk of causing some harm. Physicians and researchers are obliged to appropriately
inform the PwDs about the possible benefits and risks of the intervention.
• Health benefits, according to the definition of health by WHO, involve the ame-
lioration of disease and infirmity, as well as benefits that improve the physical,
mental, and social well-being of the PwD. This is in accordance with the definition
of dementia given by Hope et al. (2009).15 Therefore, the benefits of AAL technolo-
gies should not focus solely on the mental well-being of PwDs but should provide
support for the physical and social needs of PwDs.
• The assessment of health benefits should not be made employing a single quanti-
tative criterion. Such an assessment carries inherent risks of misconceived benefits
and risks of PwDs. It is beneficial to extend the assessment of health benefits and
risks of PwDs to also include qualitative evaluations.
• The needs of scientific research should not supersede the dignity and human rights
of PwDs.
• The highest level in the assessment of research benefits for PwDs are direct health
benefits, followed by collateral (indirect) benefits. The lowest level of benefits in
the research with PwDs are aspirational benefits. These levels of benefits should
be clearly separated.
• Therapeutic misconception should be eliminated wherever possible. The most com-
mon form of therapeutic misconception in a research proposal is the dressing up
of aspirational benefits as direct health benefits. Research need not necessarily in-
volve any benefits for the PwDs, which must be clearly and honestly stated.
• Any claim of potential benefit from a research study involving PwDs should be
thoroughly examined, and its nature, magnitude, and likelihood clearly identified.
Whenever possible, for a clear conceptualisation of the likelihood of potential ben-
efits, it is recommended that they be quantified in percentages.
15 (Cf. section 2.1.2.3, p. 26).
126
4.5 summary
• A reasonable chance of benefiting in a research study does not automatically mean
that is would be reasonable to participate and unreasonable not to join up the
study. Both decisions, to accept or reject an offer to participate in a research study,
made by a PwD (or her legal representative) might constitute a reasonable choice
by that person. Such a choice should not automatically lead to questions about the
competency of PwD, nor should be such a decision be overruled by the decision
of the researchers.
• Health technology may negatively impact the medical judgements of physicians
and/or informal caregivers about the PwD. Overemphasis on data provided by the
health technology may result in the overriding of other information, particularly
that from the PwD herself. This may lead to harm, which could undermine the
trust between caregivers and PwDs. Therefore, healthcare professionals should
not rely solely on the data provided by health technology but should also link the
data with the feedback from the PwD, which would enhance trust between the
PwD and the caregivers/physicians.
• Doing more with health technology need not necessarily mean it is better than
doing less; a newer health technology need not necessarily mean it is better than
the old technology; and more advanced technology need not necessarily mean it
is more beneficial than the simple one. Health technology should be designed and
provided to fulfil the needs of PwDs in order to enhance, empower and support
them in their everyday activities.
• Physicians and caregivers should not make decisions based solely upon data from
health technology, nor should they be unduly influenced by the push from indus-
try (that doing more is better than doing less, B. M. Hofmann 2015), or by pressure
from the patient (that more advanced is better than simple, B. M. Hofmann 2015).
• Technology is not a morally neutral, value-less means. Technology by its intro-
duction to the healthcare of PwDs eliminates certain risks but also produces new
vulnerabilities. Therefore, every introduction of AAL technologies should be ade-
quately assessed, whether it fulfils its purpose, and whether it fulfils the needs of
the PwD, without introducing more risks than benefits for its user.
• Health technologies, including AAL technologies, should be assessed by regula-
tory bodies as strictly and by the same level of authority as drugs.
• PwDs should be involved in the design process of AAL technologies from the very
beginning of the R&D.
• Although the user-needs of PwDs may be distinct from those of their informal
caregivers, they overlap in such a way that renders them inseparable as far as care
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for the PwD is concerned, particularly as most caregivers share a dwelling with a
PwD that they care for. Therefore, AAL technologies need to be designed to meet
not only the user-needs of PwDs but also those of their informal caregivers. AAL
technologies should address the general needs that all PwDs have, as well as be
customisable to meet specific (personalised) user-needs of individual PwDs.
• The needs of the researchers are not at the same level of priority as the user-needs
of PwDs and their informal caregivers. Every implementation of AAL technologies
should prioritise the user-needs of PwDs, along with those of their caregivers,
before fulfilling the specific needs of researchers.
• The needs of PwDs are different from the needs of the wider general elderly popu-
lation. These needs should be strictly distinguished and reflected during the R&D
of AAL technologies; otherwise, the involvement of PwDs in the development of
AAL technologies may lack justification and cause greater harm. PwDs should
not be involved in research studies the objectives of which can be achieved with
non-vulnerable research participants.
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S P E C I A L V U L N E R A B I L I T Y A N D P E R S O N A L I N T E G R I T Y O F
P E R S O N S W I T H D E M E N T I A A N D A M B I E N T A S S I S T E D L I V I N G
T E C H N O L O G I E S
In the current chapter, the concept of human vulnerability and personal integrity is
examined in relation to Persons with Dementia (PwDs) and Ambient Assisted Living
(AAL) technologies. The chapter focuses on addressing the following questions:
1. What does the literature interpreting Art. 8 of the Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) say about the concepts of vulnerability
and personal integrity, and how should respect for these principles be fulfilled?
2. How is the principle of respecting vulnerability and personal integrity interpreted
in policy documents and academic literature?
3. How should Art. 8 of the UDBHR be understood in its application to the circum-
stances of PwDs and the context of AAL technologies?
4. Which principles of the UDBHR need to be balanced with the principle of respect-
ing vulnerability and personal integrity?
By answering the first question, the notion of vulnerability and the requirement of re-
spect for personal integrity is interpreted in relation with PwDs. This step will utilise
the available handbooks and reports that directly interpret the UDBHR principles, with
their dedicated sections referring to the principle of vulnerability and respect for per-
sonal integrity. This literature mainly includes The UNESCO Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights: Background, Principles and Application (ten Have, Jean, and
Kirby 2009), Handbook of Global Bioethics (ten Have and Gordijn 2014), Explanatory Memo-
randum on UDBHR (2005), and The Principle of Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal
Integrity (IBC 2013).
Addressing the second question this chapter provides an overview of the international
and national policy documents, together with notable academic literature relevant for
the interpretation of the issue of vulnerability and personal integrity.
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In the normative part of this chapter, the previously interpreted UDBHR principles of
respecting vulnerability and personal integrity are first specified to the specific context
of PwDs and AAL technologies. The specification will focus both on clinical research
with PwDs, and clinical practice with PwDs. Secondly, any possible conflicts between
Art. 8 and other UDBHR principles are identified, examined, and balanced, utilising the
balancing process described in section 1.2.
At the end of this chapter, a dedicated section summarises the results reached with
outcomes of the specification and balancing, providing a concise overview of the nor-
mative analysis of the requirement to respect the vulnerability and personal integrity of
PwDs. This summary will adhere to the spirit of the principle as stipulated in Art. 8 of
the UDBHR, applied to the cases of PwDs and AAL technologies.
5.1 interpretation of the principle
5.1.1 Principle of the UDBHR
Art. 8 of the UDBHR refers to the requirements of respecting human vulnerability and
personal integrity of the persons in biomedicine.
5.1.1.1 Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal Integrity
Article 8
In applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice and as-
sociated technologies, human vulnerability should be taken into account.
Individuals and groups of special vulnerability should be protected and
the personal integrity of such individuals respected.
vulnerability
Art. 8 operates with the notions of vulnerability and personal integrity, which will be ex-
plained in detail in this section. Art. 8 also distinguishes between ‘human vulnerability’
and ‘special vulnerability,’ which distinction will be also explained in this section.
Etymology of Vulnerability
The etymological background of the concept of vulnerability comes from the Latin word
vulnus, -eris, n., which translates as wound, injury, or hurt (Glare 1968). The Latin infinite
of the verb, vulnerare means to (inflict a) wound (on), or to damage (Glare 1968). Hence
vulnerability can be understood as a certain susceptibility to being wounded (Neves
2009).
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Approaches to Vulnerability
The definition of vulnerability has not proved to be an easy task for philosophers and
researchers. Two main approaches can be identified regarding the definition of vulnera-
bility throughout the academic literature: one, where a definition is provided; and one,
where there is no definition provided nor any intention to provide one. The latter tends
to provide only a non-exhaustive list of descriptive features of vulnerable groups and
populations, instead of exposing itself to criticism by providing a definition. Such a list
appeals to the intuition of the reader to evoke an idea of what it means to belong to a
vulnerable group.
Defining Vulnerability
Those who have contributed to the definition of vulnerability are mostly international
expert bodies and philosophers. In Europe, the partners of the BIOMED II Project ad-
vanced “The Barcelona Declaration” to the European Commission in 1998, which defines
vulnerable persons as “those whose autonomy or dignity or integrity is capable of be-
ing threatened” (Kemp and Rendtorff 2009, p. 248; Rendtorff 2002, p. 243; for further
information see Rendtorff and Kemp 2000a; Rendtorff and Kemp 2000b). Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in cooperation with World
Health Organization (WHO) in 2002, defined vulnerable persons as those “who are rel-
atively (or absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests [ . . . ] they may have
insufficient power, intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes
to protect their own interests” (CIOMS 2002, Guideline 13). Finally, the World Medical
Association (WMA) in the Declaration of Helsinki (2008) describe particularly vulnerable
groups as “those who cannot give or refuse consent for themselves and those who may
be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence” (Declaration of Helsinki 2008, Art. 9). Inter-
estingly, this definition can no longer be found in the updated “Declaration of Helsinki”
(2013). In summary, these documents define vulnerable persons as those persons, whose
autonomy, dignity, and integrity is threatened due to various circumstances, which ren-
ders them unable to protect their own interests, and thus leaves them unprotected from
coercion or undue influence.
Philosophers also provide definitions of vulnerability. For Emmanuel Levinas (1906–
1995), vulnerability was equal to one’s subjectivity. According to his understanding, the
self always comes after the otherness because the self is always in relation with the
other human being.1 Levinas therefore interprets vulnerability as an intrinsic state of
the human,2 as well as the universal condition of humanity (Neves 2009).
1 Kottow (2005) translates from Levinas (1972): “vulnerability is the obsession for the other or the approxi-
mation of the other” (Kottow 2005, p. 283).
2 “The I, from head to foot and to the bone-marrow, is vulnerability” (Kottow 2005, p. 283).
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Hans Jonas (1903–1993) attempted to define vulnerability based on ontological and
natural terms, in his book Das Prinzip Verantwortung (Jonas 1979). Being vulnerable is a
perishable characteristic of anything that exists, and consequently extending this perish-
able reality to the whole of nature (Neves 2009).
As a result of these philosophical investigations about the definition and nature of
vulnerability, Neves (2009) herself defines vulnerability as a “human condition, inherent
to existence in its radical finitude and fragility, so that it cannot be eliminated or sur-
passed. It requires the care of others, the responsibility and solidarity of others in the
recognition and non-exploitation of that condition” (Neves 2009, p. 158). Other attempts
at defining vulnerability from a philosophical perspective include definitions from po-
litical philosophy,3 or anthropology.4
As well as the multiple approaches to vulnerability, the interpretation of it as a con-
cept demonstrates great variety. Philosophers, like Thomas Hobbes (1558–1679),5 John
Stuart Mill (1806–1873),6 Robert Nozick (1938–2002),7 Alasdair MacIntyre (1929–),8 and
many others, have tried to provide their readers with a specific interpretation about the
concept of vulnerability and what it consists of.
The concept of vulnerability was introduced into the field of bioethics alongside is-
sues related to human experimentation. Particular sections of various populations have
been defined as exposed to and unsatisfactorily protected against the maltreatment
and abuse of others. These populations, based on historical circumstances, were iden-
tified as: institutionalised groups like orphans, prisoners, elderly; and Jews, Chinese,
and other ethnic groups during World War II. The noun of vulnerable persons was later
expanded to include populations such as ethnic minorities, socially unprivileged groups,
or women (Neves 2009).
During the development of the concept of vulnerability within bioethics, two major
interpretations were formed. One interpretation reflects the approach of philosophers
3 Zion et al. (2000) define vulnerability as a genuine lack of basic rights and liberties that make vulnerable
populations particularly open to exploitation (Zion et al. 2000).
4 According to the care ethicist, Nel Noddings, “[w]hen citizens are defined by race, gender, adult rationality,
and/or economic status, those who do not fit the definition become vulnerable” (Noddings 2002, p. 441).
5 Hobbes, in his book, Leviathan, defines the reason for people establishing the institute of the commonwealth
as one founded on the premise: “to live peaceable amongst themselves, and to be protected against other
men” (Hobbes 1998, p. 115). Hobbes ascribes the universal vulnerability of every person, and the role of
the State as that of serving a protective function (Kottow 2005).
6 Mill, in his classic essay, On Liberty (Mill 2003), defends the protective role of the State, by stating: “the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 2003, p. 94).
7 Nozick, being a libertarian philosopher who favoured the minimal night-watchmen state argues: “The state
has means for the suppression of what the society considers to be wrongs or crimes: police, courts of
law, prisons, institutions which explicitly and specifically function in this area of activity. Moreover, these
institutions are stable within the frame of reference of the society, and permanent” (Nozick 1974, p. 116).
8 From his virtue ethics perspective, MacIntyre deals with vulnerability as part of the general human condi-
tion, which presents challenges and obstacles that are common to all and which can therefore ultimately
enrich the development of each person’s ability to recognise goods and reason independently (MacIntyre
1999, pp. 71–72; Kottow 2005).
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mentioned above, that of the universal vulnerability of every human being. The other
interpretation reflects the approach taken by International Bioethics Committee (IBC) in
mentioning special vulnerabilities. The latter interpretation can be defined as an Anglo-
American circumstantial interpretation, which ascribes adjectival function to vulnerabil-
ity by qualifying groups or persons who are vulnerable, thereby limiting the definition
and thus also the scope of inclusion of such groups. Vulnerability in this sense is contin-
gent and only temporary, and is being used as a factor of differentiation (and potentially
positive or negative discrimination). The Anglo-American approach is concerned mostly
with issues related to human experimentation, which require high respect of principles
of autonomy and informed consent. The former interpretation is referred to as the Euro-
pean theme-like interpretation, where vulnerability has a noun-function, characterising
a genuine reality common to every human being in its broader meaning. In this sense,
vulnerability is a universal and indelible condition, referring to the anthropological per-
spective of the foundation of ethics. Vulnerability therefore provides a rather equalising
factor. The European interpretation of vulnerability is thus concerned mostly with clin-
ical assistance and healthcare policies, which pose a high demand on the principles
of responsibility and solidarity (Neves 2009). According to Neves 2009, both of these
meanings of vulnerability are effectively incorporated into the Art. 8 of UDBHR.
The justification of defining vulnerable groups in biomedical ethics is based on the
reason to reinforce the principle of autonomy. Autonomy is a capacity common to all
persons, who hold certain world-views, make choices, and take actions based on per-
sonal values or beliefs. A continuous referral to the principle of autonomy creates not
only effective conditions for liberty but also enables, encourages, and supports the per-
son’s autonomous acts as a moral agent (Neves 2009, referring to Beauchamp and Chil-
dress 2009, p. 100). The reinforcement of this principle of respecting one’s autonomy is
achieved by demanding the fulfilment of the requirements of informed consent (Neves
2009).
The differences between the Anglo-American and European interpretations of vulner-
ability can be useful in the categorisation of the concept of vulnerability. A key differ-
entiator in the definition of vulnerability is in its transience. Vulnerability in this sense
can be categorised either as a universal and inherent condition, or as a transient and
contextual one (S. A. M. McLean 2014).
Another differentiator in the categorisation of vulnerability is based on the proactivity
required in relation to it. In this sense, vulnerability is related to a specific threat. From
this perspective, vulnerability transforms from a passive notion to an active one. Vulner-
ability, as an active notion, is then affected by different political systems, as well as by
socioeconomic and health-related circumstances. As a result, one becomes vulnerable to
disrespect, discrimination, and ultimately, lack of agency (S. A. M. McLean 2014). Con-
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versely, vulnerability in a general sense may not require an active response to a specific
threat.
Another differentiating factor, noted earlier, is that of traditional categorisation based
on group characteristics. This is based mostly on the grounds of historical or contempo-
rary realities. The potential downside of such a categorisation lies in the somewhat con-
troversial overgeneralisation of discrete groups into being necessarily vulnerable, for ex-
ample, children, pregnant women, females in general, and the elderly. S. A. M. McLean
(2014) thus emphasises that the protections triggered by the status of being vulnerable
should to be targeted, and should not be based solely on the grounds of a membership
to a particular group (S. A. M. McLean 2014).
This categorisation of people based on group membership is problematic at the theo-
retical level (i. e. issues related with the definition of the concept itself) and the practical
level. Defining who should be afforded protection because of a particular vulnerability
is extremely complicated, as is the determination of the form such protection should
take (Hurst 2008; S. A. M. McLean 2014). This critique is even more apparent when one
considers Macklin’s proposal for extending vulnerable groups to include whole com-
munities and countries that may be exposed to exploitation and double standards in
research (Macklin 2003; S. A. M. McLean 2014).
Not Defining Vulnerability
Some international and national expert bodies provide descriptive characteristics of vul-
nerable persons, groups, or populations, rather than particular definitions of vulnerabil-
ity. From these characteristics, one is able to extend the attribute of vulnerability to other
persons or groups by analogy. Examples of the formulation of vulnerability by listing
specific groups and populations are included in the Belmont Report (1978), Hope et al.
(2009), and IBC (2013).
The Belmont Report (1978), the first official document linked with medical ethics using
this term, is discussed later in section 5.2.1.4 (p. 150).
The report Dementia: ethical issues (Hope et al. 2009) issued by the Nuffield Council
on Bioethics describes the vulnerability of PwDs in relation to their declining capacity,
sense of loss, fear of social embarrassment, and anxiety of being a burden for their rela-
tives in the future. PwDs experience vulnerability in terms of their physical decline and
general frailty but also through discrimination and stigmatisation. Their real vulnera-
bilities that manifest in memory problems and feeling of disorientation are followed by
fears of neglect and abuse (Hope et al. 2009). The Report also associates the vulnerability
of PwDs pejoratively with dependence. The Report’s vocabulary utilises attributes like
potential vulnerability, inherent vulnerability, potential high vulnerability, and particu-
lar vulnerability, in relation to the vulnerable condition of PwDs, without providing a
direct definition about the nature and conditions of such a state (Hope et al. 2009).
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The IBC Report on vulnerability (IBC 2013) also provides examples and a non-
exhaustive list of situations for the description of vulnerability. The ultimate reason
for not providing a particular definition of the concept of vulnerability is justified by the
fact that any definition would either depict the concept too widely or too narrowly. As a
result, it would only trigger disputes rather than resolve them (IBC 2013). Furthermore,
according to S. A. M. McLean (2014), vulnerability is easy to recognise when it occurs
because it is an essential feature of human nature.
By avoiding the definition of the concept of vulnerability, the Report of IBC (IBC 2013)
provides a rather practical template for the implementation of Art. 8 of UDBHR, by
focusing more on the outcomes than the definition (S. A. M. McLean 2014). The analysis
given in the Report is neither exhaustive, nor prescriptive. Its examples extend to cases
of people suffering from HIV/AIDS; impoverished people involved in clinical trials that
fail to respect free and informed consent; and people disregarded in trials for the sake of
profit. Additionally, IBC provides special attention to the gender-related vulnerabilities
of women. The Report’s examples in their case depends on the fact that women usually
live longer; elderly women may find themselves abandoned by their families; they may
be subject to inadequate healthcare; or disregarded by society (IBC 2013).
The IBC Report on vulnerability connects respect for personal integrity with the recog-
nition of vulnerabilities, thus reinforcing the active need to protect vulnerable individ-
uals and groups (IBC 2013; S. A. M. McLean 2014). Art. 8 of the UDBHR provides
both negative and positive moral duties. The negative duties are the respect for human
vulnerabilities and personal integrity of individuals. The positive duties necessitate the
application and advancement of scientific knowledge, medical practice and associated
technologies in order to protect individuals and groups with special vulnerabilities (IBC
2013).
According to the IBC, Art. 8 of the UDBHR requires an interpretative perspective,
where the ultimate goal of scientific progress in compliance with bioethical standards
cannot be solely based on profit. By underscoring the importance of other related princi-
ples (e. g. autonomy, beneficence, justice, dignity, equality, etc.) and enhancing the value
of solidarity instead of sole individual interests, the concept of vulnerability might pro-
vide a bridge over the damaging gap between moral strangers, and pluralistic soci-
eties (IBC 2013).
Special Vulnerability
The IBC focuses its attention on special vulnerability in Art. 8, especially the scope and
content of special vulnerability. The focus on special vulnerabilities takes into account
conditions that undermine one’s capacity to live as a free and autonomous individual.
The attention paid towards special vulnerabilities reinforces the genuine right of every
human being to live in the world, where, despite the breadth of significant inequalities,
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everybody’s basic needs are taken into consideration. Therefore, the purpose of the IBC
Report on Art. 8 of UDBHR was to boost awareness of the various responsibilities of
the States. These responsibilities apply to both domestic and international levels. The
Report focusing on Art. 8 also demands the exercise of vigilance in the protection of
well-being of individuals and groups in all sectors of the society (IBC 2013).
Although the approach of not providing a definition for the concept of vulnerability
exposes the ethical analysis to criticism, Coleman (2009) remarks that the concept of
vulnerability, as a general call for providing protection, has an “intuitive ethical appeal”
and is unlikely to vanish (Coleman 2009, p. 14). In support of the approach coined by
IBC, i. e. not defining the concept of vulnerability, S. A. M. McLean (2014) notes that even
as a ‘plastic’ term, the discussions about vulnerabilities can trigger important protections
for individuals (K. Fox 2002; S. A. M. McLean 2014).
Various conditions and situations confer special vulnerabilities, for example, age, dis-
ease type, lack of access to healthcare, lack of patient or physician education. Other
determinants of special vulnerabilities may be their ‘natural’ characteristics (e. g. spe-
cial temporary or chronic disabilities; limitations imposed by the stages of human life);
or social, political, and environmental determinants (e. g. culture, economy, relations of
power, natural disasters, etc.), which are fundamental matters of justice and basic human
rights. Special vulnerabilities, according to the IBC, require special responsibilities (IBC
2013).
personal integrity
The other key concept present in Art. 8 is that of personal integrity. The IBC emphasises
the close relationship between the state of vulnerability with the condition of violated
personal integrity, by being ‘touched’ (IBC 2013). During such an invasion, one’s free-
dom is hampered, whereby one has no capacity to refuse unwanted exposure to possible
violation, harms and disadvantages. The elimination of these threats is at the core of hu-
man flourishing and self-fulfilment (IBC 2013).
Etymology of Personal Integrity
The etymological foundation of the word is from the Latin verb, whose infinitive is
tangere, meaning to make physical contact or to touch (Glare 1968). The related Latin
adjective, integer, describes a state of not being previously touched, tried or used, and
the word, integritas, -atis, f., translates as soundness, wholeness (of the body and mind),
purity, and normality (Glare 1968). Neves (2009) describes the noun, integrity, as a “state
in which all the parts are maintained and the quality of that which is unaltered, also
functioning then as an adjective” (Neves 2009, p. 159).
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Interpretations of Personal Integrity in Bioethics
The concept of personal integrity in bioethics currently appears in three variations. The
first interpretation of personal integrity is based on the etymological sources of the
word, namely, “the quality of that which is unaltered” (Neves 2009, p. 159). Personal
integrity understood as wholeness, completeness, or a reference point to some original
state is restated in documents like Belmont Report (1978), Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine (1997), and Rendtorff and Kemp (2000a). Rendtorff and Kemp (2000a),
by listing integrity amongst its four main principles, refer to the European humanist
tradition in bioethics by emphasising the fuller and plural sense of personal integrity.
This is defined as “an untouchable core, the personal sphere, which should not be subject
to external intervention” by reference to the “coherence of life of beings with dignity that
should not be touched and destroyed” (Kemp and Rendtorff 2009, p. 248; Rendtorff 2002,
pp. 237, 243; Neves 2009, p. 161).
The second interpretation of personal integrity in bioethics is built upon the negative
right of non-interference, to which all persons are entitled. Such a right abolishes dis-
respect from others, along with non-interference of others in the private sphere of the
self (Neves 2009). Moreover, respect of personal integrity is integral to the attribution of
human rights. Thus, this interpretation provides protection of negative rights, including
freedom from discrimination and exploitation (S. A. M. McLean 2014).
The third interpretation of personal integrity in bioethics is based on virtue theory. Per-
sonal integrity in this sense is a disposition to act in a certain way, which is attributed to
people, who remain unalterable and incorruptible, especially from external influences.
This interpretation is reiterated in its common deontological sense in international doc-
uments like the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) and
the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003).
Philosophical Definitions of Personal Integrity
As with vulnerability, philosophers have also contributed to the definition of personal
integrity. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), in his book Phénoménologie de la percep-
tion (Merleau-Ponty 1945), overcomes the traditional Cartesian dualist distinction of
body and mind by the notion of incarnate subjectivity (Neves 2009).
Another influential philosopher on the topic of personal integrity is Paul Ricoeur
(1913–2005), who in his article, “L’identité narrative” (Ricoeur 1988), examines the
hermeneutics of the person by focusing on her narrative identity and history of life, en-
compassing past experiences, together with future fears and expectations. Ricoeur finds
integrity in the totality and oneness of the person, where the coherence of one’s life
expresses itself in the plurality of dimensions throughout the person’s existence (Neves
2009).
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Personal Integrity in the Human Rights Tradition
Personal integrity is also guaranteed in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR
1948), where Art. 1 states that every human being is born free and equal in dignity and
rights. According to S. A. M. McLean (2014), the meaning of integrity, similarly with
dignity, attain form and content from experience and implicit understanding. Art. 1
of UDHR (1948) requires that people develop brotherly cooperation through reciprocal
respect, equality and solidarity (S. A. M. McLean 2014 quoting Sulmasy 2008).
Personal Integrity in Clinical Practice
Respect for personal integrity demands a new approach to the human body and disease
in clinical practice. This means a transition from interpreting the body as an object, to a
more subjective perspective of the human body as inseparable from the person. Also, the
approach towards disease should be more nuanced and not simplified to an objective
phenomenon. It should consider the accumulated reality of the lived body of a person,
which has significance in the history of life of the self (Neves 2009).
In clinical practice, ethically sound activity, based on the respect of personal integrity,
is entitled through the reinforcement of patients’ rights by the healthcare professional.
Just as in research, this means establishing symmetrical relationships, or requiring insti-
tutions to protect citizens even when no complaints are present (Neves 2009).
Personal Integrity in Research
In research, personal integrity mainly appears as an obligation that provides protection
through the requirement of informed consent. However, it also encompasses the prohi-
bition of the objectification of the body. Additionally, the protection of personal integrity
is sought in order to enable the forming of a meaningful relationship, and eventually a
partnership, between the participant and the researcher. This includes better and new
forms of communication, a more focused approach towards the person rather than to
her illness, a proactive involvement of the participant, the development of less invasive
therapies, and a more respectful approach towards the person (Neves 2009).
In research, personal integrity is protected and autonomy respected by the applica-
tion of the request for informed consent. None of these safeguards, however, eliminate
vulnerability completely. The major violations of personal integrity occur through the ex-
ploitation of participants. In practice, such exploitation can take many forms, including
presenting trials in an overly optimistic manner, offering (financial or other) incentives,
exaggerating biomedical success in mass media, or aggravated medicalisation. More-
over, people also often consent to participate because of false ideas about biomedicine
as panacea (Neves 2009).
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Personal Integrity in Healthcare Policies
In healthcare policies, respect for personal integrity is interpreted as a general prohibi-
tion against the commercialisation of human body parts. It also extends to safeguarding
the human genome by regulating human genetic manipulation, and even introducing
patents on human matters (Neves 2009).
The protection of personal integrity in healthcare policies should mostly be applied
at a social level, both nationally and internationally. The overarching rule in this area
should be that the benefit of some people should not be secured by the exploitation
of others, especially the weak. When only a minority of people receives the benefits
of well-being, others are often excluded, resulting in vulnerable individuals becoming
(even) more vulnerable (Neves 2009).
5.1.1.2 Drafting of Article 8
The content of Art. 8 was not originally part of any of the preliminary drafts of the
UDBHR proposed by the IBC. The principle of respect for vulnerability and personal
integrity was proposed and accepted during the 2nd and final Intergovernmental Meet-
ing of Experts in June 2005, preceding the final adoption of the UDBHR (Neves 2009).
Hence, the merit of the introduction of the reference to the principle of respecting human
vulnerability can be exclusively ascribed to an amendment requested by governmental
representatives (Andorno 2007).
For the interpretation of personal integrity in Art. 8, it is important to note that his-
torically, in the early proposal of the principle, its requirements were considered in a
restricted sense. In the initial drafts the requirements of the principle were applicable
only to the most vulnerable. However, during the drafting process, this restricted in-
terpretation transformed. Hence, personal integrity is represented in Art. 8 in a broader
sense. Firstly, it necessitates the consideration of the inherent and universal vulnerability
of all human beings. This is fulfilled by not being unnecessarily ‘touched’ by the other
person, e. g. to be subject to diverse and often subtle forms of exploitation, subject to
abuse, irrespective of one’s level of autonomy. Secondly, it necessitates the prioritisation
of groups classified as especially vulnerable. This is facilitated by providing protections
against being ‘wounded,’ by respecting one’s personal integrity, and by not being re-
duced to merely a part of oneself, or being considered too abstractly (Neves 2009).
Neves (2009) emphasises that Art. 8 is listed in the UDBHR after Art. 6, on Consent
and Art. 7 on Persons without the capacity to consent, which strongly suggests that
Art. 8 is aimed at addressing issues encountered in circumstances when the dignity of
the individual is violated by Art. 6 and Art. 7. Moreover, Art. 8 is strongly linked to the
Art. 3, on Human dignity and human rights, necessitating respect of the unconditional
value of every human being and demanding their inviolability (Neves 2009).
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5.1.1.3 Relevance of Article 8 in Clinical Practice
In the clinical setting, the respect for vulnerability and personal integrity described in
Art. 8 concerns mostly individuals who are sick, especially if they are experiencing pain.
The response to pain is usually discomfort, frustration, and potentially severely dimin-
ished physical and cognitive abilities. As a result, one’s capacity for self-determination
can be either limited, or non-existent at all (IBC 2013). Sick people are highly dependent
on healthcare, therefore irrespective of the context, every sick person must be deemed
vulnerable. The aim of any legislation in the context of vulnerability is to secure the
protection of those with limited abilities to self-determine. Such protection should be
defined in accordance with the principles of autonomy and personal integrity. More-
over, these laws should aim at redressing the imbalance between the (healthy) healthcare
professional and the (sick) patient arising due to differences in knowledge, context, or
authority (S. A. M. McLean 2014).
Universal and special vulnerability are also present as two distinct categories within
the clinical setting. The first category, termed as ‘average vulnerability’ (S. A. M. McLean
2014),9 acknowledges the unique vulnerability of average human beings when subjected
to medical care. This vulnerability exposes itself against the backdrop of the greater
expertise and social authority of the physicians (IBC 2013).
The second category, known as ‘special vulnerability’ (S. A. M. McLean 2014),10 repre-
sents a group, to whom the laws provide insufficient protection. Especially vulnerable
people are often exposed to systemic disrespect, inadequate funding, and are treated as
‘second class citizens’ (S. A. M. McLean 2014). According to Kottow (2005), due to their
circumstantial deprivation, poverty, disease, and suffering, these people deserve a more
specific ethical response. The reason for this response is based in double jeopardy: these
people not only suffer from the elevated risk of health problems occurring but also from
the greater likelihood of harm, once these problems occur. In addition to average vul-
nerability, individuals who are injured cease to retain their integrity and are no longer
‘only’ vulnerable. Thus, the state of being injured should be, according to Kottow (2005),
clearly differentiated from universal vulnerability.
susceptibility as special vulnerability
Kottow (2005) proposes the employment of the term ‘susceptibility,’ which is clearly
differentiated from average vulnerability. In his interpretation, vulnerability, as an es-
sential attribute of mankind, can be reduced by the equal protection of all members of
9 Kottow (2005) calls this type of vulnerability ‘essential vulnerability,’ while also notes the term ‘basic human
vulnerability’ coined by Onora O’Neill (Kottow 2005).
10 The exact terminology used in S. A. M. McLean (2014) is ‘especially vulnerable’ (S. A. M. McLean 2014,
p. 107). Synonymous terms used in the scholarly literature are ‘particularly vulnerable’ (Kottow 2003), or
as Onora O’Neill describes them: “more deeply, variably and selectively vulnerable” (Kottow 2005, p. 283).
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the society under the principle of justice (Kottow 2003; Kottow 2005). Hence, universal
vulnerability should be protected by human rights. Related to the principle of justice,
human rights, as in rem rights should appeal to the community at large, thus possibly
compensating for or eliminating vulnerability. Whenever such compensation is insuffi-
cient and citizens are susceptible to specific harm, further positive welfare rights should
be added to the general human rights (Kottow 2003). This is represented by the term,
susceptibility, which applies to specific accidental conditions that are diagnosed and
treated. Susceptible individuals already suffered harm: they are no longer intact and
have fallen from a state of integrity to one of damaged individuality, and are even there-
fore more vulnerable to further injury (Kottow 2005). This process of destitution can
be reduced or neutralised by the effective and active application of measures that are
specifically targeted against such destitution. This elimination of susceptibility should
be the goal of positive in personam rights, which should be based on the principle of
non-maleficence (Kottow 2003).
Blurring the distinction between average vulnerability and susceptibility is a danger-
ous euphemism. Kottow (2003) states that whenever the correct distinction between
the vulnerable and susceptible is ignored, society then fails to address the indifference
and neglect of others. This usually happens when the aged, the poor, women, ethnic
minorities, etc., are wrongly labelled as vulnerable because they are left destitute and
discriminated against, without the opportunity to address their own specific susceptibil-
ities (Kottow 2003).
In conclusion, it is important to emphasise that from the phrasing of Art. 8, it is
evident that both categories of vulnerability (i. e. average or universally vulnerable; and
especially vulnerable, the susceptible) are represented in the UDBHR.
principle of vulnerability, personal integrity and its relation to
technology
A new context relevant for the protection of the vulnerable and respect for personal in-
tegrity relates to technologies. New discoveries opened up novel and potent techniques
of exploitation (IBC 2013). S. A. M. McLean (2014) provides an example from the field
of Artificial Reproductive Technologies (ARTs), where female patients from developing
countries were enrolled in treatment on the condition that they also donated their eggs.
Such an inclusion criterion may result in situations when the donor remains childless,
while the egg recipient and ART company benefit from the donation. The validity of the
donors’ consent may further be questioned in certain situations: societal expectations
and pressure to conform, stigmatisation due to childlessness, failure to achieve the sta-
tus of a full member of the community if a woman fails to reproduce, unavailability
of appropriate technology and treatment. These all render prima facie the willingness
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to participate problematic, while at the same time open the opportunities for exploita-
tion (S. A. M. McLean 2014).
Due to ARTs, a new vulnerable population may be born, namely, the children them-
selves. They might carry the psychological burden of being conceived in unconventional
ways (e. g. surrogacy arrangements) or to unconventional (e. g. same-sex) couples, and
hence stigmatised in their own societies (S. A. M. McLean 2014).
Novel technologies discovered in the field of genetics may produce medical or finan-
cial benefits. However, the very possession of genetic information may render people
vulnerable, based on which they might be stigmatised and discriminated against by in-
surance companies, employers, or other groups. The sharing of this information also
opens a separate issue. Although at present, technologies in medicine are mostly used
for diagnosing, curing, palliating, or to circumvent established medical problems, in
the future, technologies may also use the human body as a mere source of information
(S. A. M. McLean 2014).
The IBC provides examples for avoiding vulnerability and protecting personal in-
tegrity during the use of technologies in cases indicating unfair pressure towards par-
ticipants for volunteering, premature application of technologies, person’s privacy, and
stigmatisation (IBC 2013).
5.1.1.4 Relevance of Article 8 in Research Context
The second well defined context for the application of the principle of respecting vul-
nerability and personal integrity is research. The context of research is specific due to
the very nature of research activity: to avoid biases, research requires a greater distance
between the researcher and the participant than in purely therapeutic situations because
in the centre of the activity is not the participant but the aims of the study. This results
in a fracture of the beneficent relationship usually observed in clinical practice (S. A. M.
McLean 2014).
Special vulnerability in research may exist on the individual level, the level of the
quality of information, the socioeconomic level or on other levels specific to the type of
research (S. A. M. McLean 2014). Grady (2009) points out that the categorical exclusion
of vulnerable research participants at a group-level may be harmful, as it can lead to the
cessation of research in a desired therapeutic area (Grady 2009; S. A. M. McLean 2014).11
Exclusion from research may render people especially vulnerable (S. A. M. McLean
2014), by denying them access or the possible benefits of research (IBC 2013). Moreover,
such exclusion may ultimately weaken the results of the research study (Grady 2009).
11 As an example of such a case serves the infamous thalidomide scandal. The drug, thalidomide, was pre-
scribed off-label to pregnant women in the 1950s and 60s to fight morning sickness. However, the drug had
very serious adverse side-effects (limb deformations, etc.) on the babies (McBride 1961). As a result of this
controversy, the pharmaceutical industries pulled out completely from the research of drugs for pregnant
women (S. A. M. McLean 2014).
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The IBC lists further situations that can put research participants into especially vul-
nerable positions. Among these is the absence of the physician’s general focus on restor-
ing the patient’s health. Also, the interests of the researcher and the participant may not
to always be in accord, which may result in a tendency to under-protect the participant
or foster ignorance of the participant’s well-being (IBC 2013).
The vulnerability of research participants is not necessarily caused by the above-
mentioned direct circumstances. They may also emerge indirectly, in the form of certain
pressures. These less salient pressures may lead individuals to act in a manner, which
may potentially compete with their interests. An application of pressure may occur, for
example, when a developed country is performing a research in a developing country.
Another indirect pressure may occur when exploiting the socio-political vulnerability
of the participants. Researchers may also render participants especially vulnerable by
the abuse with therapeutic misconception (IBC 2013). Due to the possibilities of indirect
pressures being exerted upon research participants, the guideline of CIOMS explicitly
requires special justifications for the invitation of especially vulnerable individuals into
research (CIOMS 2002, Guideline 13).
legal protection of vulnerable persons
One of the strongest protections the law can offer especially vulnerable research partici-
pants is their protection through the requirement of consent. However, informed consent
has its weak points (see Chapter 6). Firstly, it may be questioned, whether consent as it
is defined in law provides appropriate and sufficient protection, especially for the most
vulnerable individuals. Secondly, although appropriately informed of all the probable
and possible adverse outcomes, people providing informed consent to participate in re-
search may still experience adverse outcomes that were unforeseen. Therefore, the main
protection for especially vulnerable potential participants in research should be an open,
full and honest discussion about the possible benefits and harms of participating. This
requires a very high level of trust between the participant and the researcher (S. A. M.
McLean 2014).
The legal protection of consent may be more illusory than real, especially in light
of the many research misconducts that have taken place, where trust was completely
abused. Hence, the basic rules of protection have recently been extended, with the ad-
dition of new set of criteria. For example, the “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013, § 20)
requires not only proper justification for research with vulnerable populations but also,
the obligation to stay responsive to the health needs and priorities of such groups. These
groups should also benefit from the research practices and interventions, as well as the
knowledge and results gained by the research (S. A. M. McLean 2014).
Within the context of research, there are also cases where it is impossible to provide
participants with special protections (e. g. population genetic research). Again, the spe-
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cific population, due to the nature or design of the research study, may not benefit from
the results. The participants may agree to participate due to misconceptions, pressure,
and/or lack of awareness. Also, such a targeted population for research may at the same
time be poor, ill educated, isolated, under the influence of cultural traditions, etc. How-
ever, laws may not only fail to protect the especially vulnerable, they may also fail to
protect the personal integrity of research participants. Issues like lack of education, lack
of healthcare resources, or poor understanding of research may all contribute to the oth-
erwise avoidable violations of the integrity of research participants (S. A. M. McLean
2014). Individuals may have difficulties rejecting offers for research participation, if they
do not recognise the unfairness of the offer provided. Potential participants may feel
that the research does not offer anything, or simply that they are obliged to participate
without being able to refuse (S. A. M. McLean 2014, citing Grady 2009).
the relation of principle of vulnerability, personal integrity, and
integrity in research
Paying careful attention to both vulnerability and personal integrity in research means
that a possible future benefit of research—however promising—can never override the
requirement of non-exploitation of participants. The generic rule of the more invasive
the research, the higher standards of protection should be followed. Only in cases of less
invasive research, with very high possible benefits, can the approach towards protection
of participants be more casual. The goal of Art. 8, in such cases, is the protection of
research participants against physical or emotional harms. Sacrificing the consideration
of possible vulnerabilities, the fact that the research itself is an intrusion that may be
harmful, and the actual impacts of research on the respect participant would conflict
with the requirement defined in Art. 8 (S. A. M. McLean 2014).
Careful attention should also be paid to the protection of personal integrity. It is com-
mon in urgent situations that the argument about the greater good is used or abused,
which results in circumvention of Research Ethics Committee (REC) approvals. When
these situations occur in developing countries and the research is funded by developed
countries, an added level of vulnerability is introduced. Therefore, it may be easier to
circumvent best medical practice in developing countries, including the violation of per-
sonal integrity. It is paramount therefore that the protection of personal integrity should
be ensured by the obligation for scientific validity in research, and by the direction of
appropriate attention to, and respect for the rights of, participants at all times (S. A. M.
McLean 2014).
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shift in inclusion of vulnerable populations into research
The greater willingness of inclusion of vulnerable populations into clinical research is a
result of a recent development. As Mastroianni and Kahn (2001) note, since the Belmont
Report (1978) was first published, until the late 1980s, the general approach towards the
inclusion of vulnerable population into research was protection. However, as already
mentioned, this approach resulted, in the cessation of research into essential medical
conditions, due to the complicated and laborious requirement that needed to be ful-
filled in order to include vulnerable individuals in research (pregnant women, children,
prisoners, etc., S. A. M. McLean 2014). Thus, since the 1990s, research shifted and fo-
cused more on how vulnerable groups could be included in research. The justification
for this is based on the direct and potential medical benefits, and the imperative to
provide access to these goods (Mastroianni and Kahn 2001).
the issue of double standards
The IBC provides some examples of special vulnerabilities in research. These relate to
double standards employed during research (usually between developed and develop-
ing countries), or various forms of social vulnerability (e. g. poverty, gender discrimina-
tion, hierarchical relations, etc.; IBC 2013).
5.1.1.5 Vulnerability is Not an Isolated Ethical Issue
The IBC admits that vulnerability seldom exists in isolation. It notes that lack of ed-
ucation, lack of social authority, and limited access to healthcare independently make
individuals vulnerable, and can collectively have greater negative effects. Respect for
personal integrity can also be negatively affected by complex social, cultural and po-
litical status quos. Therefore, vulnerability cannot be fully abolished. The purpose of
constant reference to the protection of the vulnerable and the respect of the personal in-
tegrity is to support the determined quest towards eradicating their causes and contexts
of vulnerability. Securing the protection of these groups is fostered by the idea of equal
human rights and the dignity of every person (IBC 2013).
As such, the responsibility of protecting vulnerable people and their personal integrity
must manifest the joint effort of all the healthcare providers and agencies, private compa-
nies and industry, as well as countries (S. A. M. McLean 2014). This requirement should
be applicable for the development of AAL technologies for PwDs.
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5.2.1 Policy Documents
5.2.1.1 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948)
Art. 1 of UDHR (1948) refers directly to the principles of human dignity. It also refers
to one of the key elements of solidarity, by driving individuals’ actions “towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood” (UDHR 1948, Art. 1). Connecting these two elements
into a single article reinforces the foundation of human solidarity on the grounds of
universal human dignity.
5.2.1.2 Documents of International Biomedical Communities
This section specifies two documents of the international biomedical communities that
are explicitly referred to in the preamble of the UDBHR: the “Declaration of Helsinki”
(1964), and CIOMS (2002). The descriptive characterisation of vulnerability and personal
identity, in the perspective of the above-mentioned documents, has also been confirmed
during the discussion at the World Congress on Bioethics in Brasilia in 2002.
declaration of helsinki (1964–2013)
The first document is the “Declaration of Helsinki” (1964). The WMA, the issuer of this
set of principles, is an international organisation that represents physicians. Since its
first adoption in 1964, this document has been amended nine times in total (two of these
amendments were only notes of clarification), with the latest version of the “Declaration
of Helsinki” being published in 2013.
As the number of amendments may suggest, the development of the “Declaration of
Helsinki” (1964) is not particularly linear or gradual. When reviewing the differences
between the individual amendments, one may discover at least three major changes,
both in the structure of the Declaration itself and in its content. These changes are
particularly noticeable between the versions of 1964–1975, 1996–2000, and 2008–2013.
And yet, the continuous (and some would say, excessive) changes are also one of the
reasons for the Declaration is not being a legally binding document. Some countries
have rejected the current version, preferring to use an earlier version of the Declaration
(e. g. US), despite the WMA considering these versions as no longer valid.
Vulnerability
The concept of vulnerability was not mentioned in the first version of the “Declaration
of Helsinki” (1964). It first appeared in the Declaration of Helsinki (2000), which states
in its Introduction that “[s]ome research populations are vulnerable and need special
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protection” (Declaration of Helsinki 2000, § 8). The subsequent sentences suggest that the
Declaration at this point considers mostly two particular groups: those economically and
medically disadvantaged, and those who are incapable of providing valid informed con-
sent. While in the case of the first disadvantaged group, their needs must be respected, in
the case of people unable to consent, special attention is required (Declaration of Helsinki
2000, § 8). This distinction becomes more well defined contours in the Declaration of
Helsinki (2008), where the Declaration clarifies “particularly vulnerable” populations as
either “those who cannot give or refuse consent for themselves” or “those who may
be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence” (Declaration of Helsinki 2008, § 9). This
distinction is again confirmed in Declaration of Helsinki (2008, § 17), which states that
medical research on these vulnerable populations is justified only if it is “responsive to
the health needs” of the population concerned, and if this group is likely to “benefit
from the results” of such research (Declaration of Helsinki 2008, § 17).
The last Declaration of Helsinki (2008) underwent a major review, which resulted in
the addition of whole new section fully dedicated to Vulnerable Groups and Individuals
in the current “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013, § 19–20). In this version, being vulner-
able means having “an increased likelihood of being wronged or of incurring addi-
tional harm” (“Declaration of Helsinki” 2013, § 19). Regarding research with vulnerable
populations, the “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013) introduces additional criteria to those
presented in the earlier version of the Declaration of Helsinki (2008): research cannot be
carried out on the non-vulnerable part of the population, and in addition, the vulnerable
group should benefit from the “knowledge, practices or interventions that result from
the research” (“Declaration of Helsinki” 2013, § 20).
Personal Integrity
The requirement of respecting personal integrity is, unlike vulnerability, present since
the first version of the “Declaration of Helsinki” (1964). It states that each individual’s
right to protect her personal integrity must be respected, especially if the person resides
in a dependent relationship to the researcher (“Declaration of Helsinki” 1964, III. 4a).
This statement in the Declaration of Helsinki (1975) was moved to the first section of the
Declaration concerning Basic Principles. Moreover, it was linked with the requirement
of respecting one’s privacy, minimising the possible negative impact of the research
study on the participant. This impact may affect negatively either the physical or mental
integrity, or the personality of the research participant (Declaration of Helsinki 1975, I. 6),
thus they need to be protected. The Declaration of Helsinki (2000) extended the original
scope of respect of the research participant’s privacy also by the confidentiality of the
patient’s information.
The Declaration of Helsinki (2008) refers to integrity in two occasions. Firstly, integrity is
listed together with the protection of the life, health, dignity, right to self-determination,
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privacy, confidentiality of research participants. The protection of these are the duty of
the physician(s) conducting the research (Declaration of Helsinki 2008, § 11). Secondly,
integrity is again referred to in relation to the protection of privacy and confidentiality
of personal information in the research study, minimising the negative impact of partic-
ipation. The reason for this is the protection of the participants’ physical, mental, and –
newly – social integrity (Declaration of Helsinki 2008, § 23).
The “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013) reduces the reference to the protection of per-
sonal integrity of the research participant to one single occurrence. Furthermore, it clar-
ifies that the only responsible person for protecting the participants life, health, dignity,
right to self-determination, privacy, etc., is the physician or other healthcare providers
involved in the study. The research participant can never be solely responsible for the
protection of these. This requirement is not affected by the eventual provision of valid
consent by the participant in any way (“Declaration of Helsinki” 2013).
the council for international organizations of medical sciences
(cioms) guidelines (2002)
The CIOMS (2002), regarding research with vulnerable persons, notes that “[s]pecial
justification is required for inviting vulnerable individuals to serve as research subjects
and, if they are selected, the means of protection their rights and welfare must be strictly
applied” (CIOMS 2002, Guideline 13; S. A. M. McLean 2014). The document refers ex-
tensively to the issue of vulnerability, consistently using the word as an adjective while
describing classes of vulnerable individuals, subjects, persons, groups, populations, and
communities (Neves 2009). As such, CIOMS (2002) defines vulnerability as a “substan-
tial incapacity to protect one’s own interests” (CIOMS 2002, p. 12; Neves 2009).
Finally, during 6th World Congress on Bioethics in Brasilia (2002), it was agreed upon
that the principle of vulnerability must necessarily also refer to the principles of integrity
and dignity. Together, all three constitute the descriptive features of humanity, with its
subsequent normative implications (Kottow 2005).
5.2.1.3 Documents of the European Union and the Council of Europe
the convention on human rights and biomedicine (1997)
The countries of the EU agreed upon a Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(1997). Art. 1 of this Convention directly refers to the protection of dignity, integrity,
and other fundamental rights of all human beings during the application of biology and
medicine (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, Art. 1; Neves 2009).
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the barcelona declaration (1998)
A second important document regarding vulnerability and personal integrity in
biomedicine within the European context is the Barcelona Declaration (1998). This Dec-
laration provides a definition of the following four key ethical principles:
1. Autonomy – is defined as capacities of a) creating ideas and goals of life; b) moral
insight, self-legislation, and privacy; c) rational decision and action without coer-
cion; d) political involvement and personal responsibility; e) and informed consent.
Autonomy, however, remains an ideal (Kemp and Rendtorff 2009).
2. Dignity – a principle that should not be reduced to autonomy, and which refers
to an intrinsic value of every individual on one hand, and to the inter-subjective
value of every human being on the other hand (Kemp and Rendtorff 2009).
3. Integrity – is defined as inviolability of human being. Originally it meant the virtue
of an uncorrupted character, uprightness, honesty, and good intentions. Today in-
tegrity, similarly to dignity, refers rather to the quality of a person as such. Integrity,
thus, means one’s coherence of life in time and space on one hand, and a coher-
ence of memory and corporeal life expressed in remembrance and narrative on
the other hand. Integrity is closely related to the respect for one’s privacy, and
therefore it is the most important principle for the creation of trust (Kemp and
Rendtorff 2009).
4. Vulnerability – expresses, firstly, the finitude and fragility of life. Secondly, it refers
to the object of a moral principle requiring care for the vulnerable (Neves 2009).
These two basic ideas, i. e. finitude and suffering, describe together the univer-
sal human condition (Kemp and Rendtorff 2009). Vulnerability, however, does not
concern human beings exclusively but animals and all self-organising life (Kemp
and Rendtorff 2009). The essential difference regarding the provision of protection
against vulnerability depends on the interference. For non-human beings, the pro-
tection should be passive, i. e. by non-interference, or sustainable interference. For
human beings, the protection requires active involvement in preventing or avoid-
ing harm (Kottow 2005). Furthermore, vulnerability provides a necessary bridge
between moral strangers in pluralistic societies (Kemp and Rendtorff 2009). Finally,
respect for vulnerability should encourage outlining a right balance between the
struggle for immortality, and the finitude and suffering of human beings (Kottow
2005).
The four principles described in the Barcelona Declaration should always be promoted
within a framework of solidarity and responsibility (Neves 2009).
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5.2.1.4 Documents of the United States
the belmont report (1978)
In the US, the initial impulse to acknowledge the need for protection of vulnerable pop-
ulations began with the publication of the Belmont Report (1978). In the section dealing
with informed consent for research purposes, the Report lists certain groups of people,
who might be subjected to undue influences during research activities (e. g. racial mi-
norities, the economically disadvantaged, the very sick, the institutionalised (Belmont
Report 1978, C.1–3; Neves 2009).
the irb guidebook (1993)
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) Guidebook of the Office for Human Research Pro-
tections (OHRP), published in 1993, regularly refers to vulnerable populations. However,
it avoids providing an exact definition of these groups (OHRP 1993; Levine et al. 2004b).
us code of federal regulation 45 cfr 46 (2009)
The third important source of information on vulnerability in the US is the legislation
incorporated into the US Code of Federal Regulation (45 CFR 46 2009). Although this
regulation also does not define vulnerability, it does specify the requirement for special
protections of vulnerable populations (e. g. pregnant women, human foetuses, neonates,
prisoners, children, handicapped, mentally disabled, economically and educationally
disadvantaged) during research (45 CFR 46 2009; Levine et al. 2004b). This protection
is required because of the likelihood of “coercion or undue influence” being exerted on
these vulnerable populations (45 CFR 46 2009, 111b).
5.2.1.5 Documents of the UNESCO
Alongside to the UDBHR, two other documents of the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) refer in detail to the concept of vulnerabil-
ity and personal integrity.
universal declaration on the human genome and human rights (1997)
Art. 17 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) de-
mands respect for and the promotion of solidarity, especially with vulnerable groups
affected by disease or genetic disability. In Art. 24, the Declaration requires that RECs
organise consultations with representatives of vulnerable groups about the dissemina-
tion of the Declaration’s principles and the application and evolution of technologies
related to genetic research (Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
1997).
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international declaration on human genetic research (2003)
According to Art. 15 of the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003), in-
tegrity, along with meticulousness, caution, and intellectual honesty should be practiced
in the conduct of research (International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 2003, Art. 15).
This can take the forms of responsibility or virtue, which can be enhanced by either the
investigator herself, or a demand from society (Neves 2009). This requirement is also
expressed explicitly in the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
(1997, Art. 13).
5.2.2 Academic Literature
Due to the recent technological developments, the topic of vulnerability has gained sig-
nificant importance within the scholarly debate in the recent years. The academic litera-
ture either tried to propose alternative ways of describing vulnerability, often fine-tuning
the actual definitions; or it tried to challenge various aspects of the actual definitions.
In the following sections, this debate is presented. This consists, firstly, of presenting
the papers of Kipnis (2001) and Kipnis (2003), whose scientific input to the debate of vul-
nerability is still very influential. Kipnis challenged the unsatisfactory subpopulational
view of vulnerability by proposing an analytical categorical view.
Secondly, the view of Levine et al. (2004b) is presented, who extensively criticised
the whole scholarly debate of vulnerability. Although this criticism was recognised by
others as a valid one, other members of the scientific community argued that the concept
for protecting vulnerable populations remained relatively useful.
Thirdly, as a result of these discussions, further contemporary approaches to redefine
(or refine more precisely) the actual definitions are presented, from Kottow (2003), Luna
(2009), Luna and Vanderpoel (2013), Lange et al. (2013), and Hurst (2008).
5.2.2.1 Analytical Approach to Vulnerability
Whenever an official document (i. e. international declaration, or statement from profes-
sional communities) intentionally avoids the provision of a clear definition of vulner-
ability, it provides instead a non-exhaustive listing of possible vulnerable populations.
Besides the lack of a clear definition, such approaches also tend to be impractical. Re-
searchers must often exclude individuals due to their affiliation to the groups of pop-
ulation listed as generally vulnerable. Researchers are forced to do this, even if these
individuals are not necessarily vulnerable if they participate in a research study (Kipnis
2003).
These reasons lead Kipnis (2003) to abandon the subpopulational view. Instead, his
approach is more analytical. Kipnis asks what vulnerability consists of exactly, when this
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concept is applied in research. He, firstly, identifies a difference between the everyday
use of vulnerability, and the special use of this concept in research ethics. Secondly,
vulnerability is not the only reason for declaring a research proposal impermissible.
Lastly, participation in research should not always be considered burdensome for the
participant (Kipnis 2003).
As a result of his analytical approach, Kipnis introduces seven distinct varieties of
vulnerability that may affect the permissibility of participation in research (Table 5.1).
Although Kipnis’ initial focus was in paediatric research, his approach has, since its
publication, been successfully applied to other biomedical fields, both in research and
clinical practice (e. g. Horn 2007).
Table 5.1 – Overview of Kipnis’ Vulnerability Taxonomy (Kipnis 2003, p. 110)
Vulnerabilities Description
Incapacitational whether participant lacks the capacity to deliberate about and decide whether to participate in the
study
Juridic whether participant is liable to the authority of others who may have an independent interest in that
participation
Deferential whether participant is given to patterns of deferential behaviour that may mask the underlying
unwillingness to participate
Social whether participant belong to a group whose rights and interests have been socially disvalued
Situational whether participant is in the situation of medical condition that prevents the information and
deliberation needed for the participation in the research
Medical whether participant has been selected because of the presence of serious health-related condition for
which there are no satisfactory remedies
Allocational whether participant or proxy is lacking subjectively important social goods that will be provided as
a consequence of participation in research
Table 5.1: Overview of Kipnis’ Vulnerability Taxonomy (Kipnis 2003, p. 110)
Based on the description provided by Kipnis (2003), along with the development of the
application of this taxonomy by Horn (2007), one can define the following vulnerabilities
regarding PwDs and AAL.
incapacitational vulnerability
The condition of PwDs by its nature renders them vulnerable in this respect. PwDs, due
to the slow and irreversible deterioration of cognitive functioning, become progressively
vulnerable, deteriorating from a fully or partially competent state to a fully incapacitated
one.
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juridic vulnerability
PwDs may be exposed to juridic vulnerability, by questioning their competency. This
may happen, if the informal caregivers use surveillance technologies to monitor the ac-
tivities of a PwD. Such monitoring opens up the possibility of overriding or influencing
the free choices of a PwD, which otherwise would not be possible for the caregiver. Also,
researchers during the research & development (R&D) and clinical trial period may have
vast and hidden interests, which are not disclosed properly to PwDs. The conflict and
motivations for research between the researchers and caregivers may also render the
PwDs vulnerable.
deferential vulnerability
This type of vulnerability may, firstly, be present mostly in nursing homes, where, for ex-
ample, the financial dependence of PwDs on proxies may result in deference. Secondly,
applications of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), due to faulty or inap-
propriate ways of functioning (e. g. erroneous interpretation of the situation; continuous
and/or repeated nudging from ICT to perform an action), may mislead or pressurise
PwDs to defer in response to the ICT. Finally, cross-cultural differences in the interpre-
tation of autonomy may further expose PwDs to deferential vulnerability.
social vulnerability
Stigmatisation, and social exclusion of PwDs both belong to this category. PwDs may
become more vulnerable because of hidden agendas of researchers, or due to various
conflicts of interests and motivations that may exist between researchers and caregivers.
Finally, the subordination or ignorance of the PwDs’ limited decision-making capability
by AAL technologies may further extend this category of vulnerability.
situational vulnerability
Situational vulnerability may occur in the case of PwDs when they are temporarily
incapacitated and thus unable to make a decision, although this may rarely occur in the
early stages of dementia.
medical vulnerability
This type of vulnerability is present from the moment that mild dementia develops.
Medical vulnerability may increase after the removal of AAL technologies from PwDs
at the completion of a research study. Finally, a specific type of hopelessness and thus
medical vulnerability may be present due the fact that AAL technologies do not provide
any therapeutic remedies for the condition of PwDs.
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allocational vulnerability
PwDs may be vulnerable, in this regard, due to the fact that AAL technologies would be
a less affordable tool compared with the more cost-effective option of traditional institu-
tionalisation of PwDs in nursing homes offered by healthcare systems. The principle of
fairness is also questionable due to the fact that PwDs participate in research that may
not result in any direct benefit.
Kipnis remarks that despite the variety of available definitions, the main themes of
vulnerability show “remarkable universality” (Kipnis 2003, p. 119). Additionally, Horn
(2007), as a result of her analysis of vulnerability by applying Kipnis’ approach, rec-
ommends the formation of Community Advisory Boards, whose role should be to pro-
vide general guidance and protection to vulnerable populations (Horn 2007). This could
be reasonably understood as being applicable to PwDs. Also, the delegation of Occu-
pational Health Practitioners may be helpful during research or therapy in mediating
requests between the researchers/caregivers and vulnerable individuals (Horn 2007).
5.2.2.2 The Critique of the Concept of Vulnerability
The taxonomy of various vulnerabilities provided by Kipnis (2003) gained significant
attention amongst researchers. Along with the positive reception, in the form of appli-
cation in specific cases (e. g. Horn 2007), Kipnis’ approach has also been extensively
criticised (e. g. Levine et al. 2004b).
Levine et al. (2004b) note three crucial weaknesses that profoundly limit the concept
of vulnerability: a) its broadness, b) its narrowness, and c) tendency of stereotyping.
vulnerability – too broad
The concept of vulnerability has become so broad that one finds it difficult to identify
a group of people that is not vulnerable. According to Levine et al. (2004b), potentially
every human being is today considered in one way or another vulnerable somehow. The
“Declaration of Helsinki” (2013) does not define vulnerability at all, although it states
that “some groups” are particularly vulnerable (“Declaration of Helsinki” 2013, p. 2192,
§ 19). Similarly, the CIOMS (2002) refers to vulnerable groups as juniors, subordinate
members of hierarchical groups, elderly, or other groups or classes that may be con-
sidered vulnerable (CIOMS 2002, Guideline 13). Levine et al. (2004b) remark that the
most affected by being excluded from research due to their vulnerable status are those,
who may benefit from the research the most. She further emphasises that most clinical
research is combined with clinical care. The basis of her criticism of the overly broad
concept of vulnerability is the fact that if everybody is considered to be potentially vul-
nerable, the concept itself becomes meaningless. Additionally, she questions the general
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requirement for ‘special consideration’ by RECs to balance the vulnerability of research
participants. In Levine’s view, every research protocol requires special attention. More-
over, RECs have no effective guidelines on how to effectively focus the limited attention
and resources of researchers on cases requiring such special consideration (Levine et al.
2004b).
vulnerability – too narrow
Levine et al. (2004b) criticise the concept of vulnerability as (also) being too narrow. This
materialises in the requirement of informed consent. Groups that are not competent to
provide consent are considered vulnerable. However, such inflated focus on the obtain-
ing of valid consent diverts the researchers’ attention from the essential features of the
research, and from the social, economic, and institutional contexts. This diverted atten-
tion may, in fact, result in more harm for the research participants. On the one hand,
although consent is unquestionably a serious concern, it is not the only concern that
should be focused upon while investigating vulnerability. On the other hand, despite
the fact that modern bioethical discourse identifies vulnerability in being harmed or be-
ing wronged,12 the risks that research participants must bear are far greater than those
of being a member of one of the vulnerable groups (Levine et al. 2004b).
vulnerability – prone to stereotyping
The concept of vulnerability, according to Levine et al. (2004b), enforces thinking in
terms of stereotypes. Whole categories of populations are stereotyped by not making
distinction between those, who might have special characteristics and requirements that
need to be taken into account, and those, who don’t have such a need. Not all members
of a group are necessarily vulnerable, just as not all vulnerable persons are vulnerable
to the same extent. While the US National Institute of Health (NIH), based on the rec-
ommendations from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 1994, recommends to include
pregnant women into research, the current US regulation (45 CFR 46 2009, Subpart B) of
conducting research still consider pregnant women as vulnerable (Levine et al. 2004b).
Such inconsistencies within regulations and recommendations make the already com-
plex picture of vulnerability even less discernible.
special scrutiny and other recommendations
Levine et al. (2004b) therefore propose the following recommendations regarding the
interpretation of vulnerability. Firstly, it is crucial to consider certain aspects of research,
such as timing, the participants’ need for special protections, the nature of the study, and
the environment in which the study takes place. This is mainly due to the fact that some
12 See the etymological origins of the word ‘vulnerability’ (p. 130).
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people are vulnerable in certain situations but not in others. Secondly, the definition of
participant groups included in research should be as narrow as possible. Their inclusion
should extend to a period that is justifiable and not beyond. Thirdly, if necessary, spe-
cial protections should be considered for research participants with permanent cognitive
impairments (e. g. Alzheimer’s Disease (AD), etc.). Finally, a closer collaboration of re-
searchers, sponsors, study coordinators, ethicists, REC members, policy makers, etc., is
necessary. Their role is to implement and administer more targeted forms of protections
for participants.
In this regard, Levine et al. (2004b) propose a scheme called “special scrutiny” (Levine
et al. 2004b, p. 48).13 This scheme consists of more thorough review triggered by the
following three criteria: a) initial translation of new scientific advances to studies in
humans, especially when the intervention is novel, irreversible, or both; b) risk of signif-
icant harm, or no prospective direct medical benefit; c) ethical questions about research
with no consensus (Levine et al. 2004b; Levine et al. 2004a). Special scrutiny, triggered
by the fulfilment of these criteria, should result in an intensive review by REC (Levine
et al. 2004a).
In reaction to Levine’s criticism of the concept of vulnerability, Horn (2007) admits
the validity of the criticism. However, Horn (2007) argues that the taxonomy proposed
by Kipnis remains valuable. It proves helpful in identifying conditions that may expose
research participants to undue influence. Kipnis’ taxonomy successfully highlights and
calls to attention instances when the best interest of research participants is not being
respected, therefore exposing them to potential harm (Horn 2007).
5.2.2.3 Contemporary Alternative Approaches to Vulnerability
threats to susceptibility
One of the alternative approaches to vulnerability is, as already mentioned earlier in
section 5.1.1.3, Kottow’s distinction between vulnerability and susceptibility. Vulnerabil-
ity is universal and describes every human being, while susceptibility is specific and an
accidental condition to diagnosis and treatment. The former is linked with the principle
of justice, being thus the responsibility of the State, the latter is linked with the principle
of non-maleficence (Kottow 2003).
Kottow identifies three fields in which the concept of vulnerability is usually ig-
nored (Kottow 2003).
13 The deaths of research participants, Hoiyan Wan, Elaine Holden-Able, and Ellen Roche, stimulated the
development of this novel framework by Levine et al. (2004a). Its purpose is to avoid causing serious
harms to research participants. Although these participants were not initially considered vulnerable, the
consequences on their health of participating in a research trial were fatal. The framework aims to enable
RECs to provide prospective participants with better protections (Levine et al. 2004a).
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Double Standards
In Kottow’s view, bioethicists throughout history have all too often defended double stan-
dards in multinational research studies. Participants from developing countries are in a
more vulnerable position compared with more developed countries where the research
funding originates. Participants are clearly in an immersed state of frailty that is de-
plorable but which some regard as not needing any improvement in care and protection
beyond that which is available in the host country (Kottow 2003).
Exploitation
The exploitation of research participants is named by Kottow as the second domain where
vulnerability is ignored. This is manifested in taking advantage of the weak and utilising
them for selfish purposes (e. g. for profit; Kottow 2003).
Paternalism
The third threat to the respect of the vulnerability of research participants comes from
paternalism. Paternalism is, according to Kottow paraphrasing Kant (Kant 1991, p. 250,
§ 34), an insulting kind of benevolence. Paternalism may be exceptionally acceptable
when decisions are made for a disautonomous person by an authorised person. However,
the issue is that often paternalism originates from unauthorised sources (Kottow 2003).
layered vulnerability of luna
Luna (2009) proposes a different classification of vulnerability. For her, the subpopula-
tional view is a form of labelling of people with vulnerabilities. The issues with such
labelling are manifold: it fails to describe the complexities of human vulnerabilities; in-
dividuals may be vulnerable on more than one level and due to more than one reason;
belonging to a subpopulation may not represent an individual’s vulnerabilities correctly;
it carries the risk of stereotyping and hence undue stigmatisation (Luna 2009).
Instead of the subpopulational and labelling view, Luna (2009) proposes the layered
view. The layered view of vulnerability is relational (i. e. inessential). It does not consist
of identifying one single origin or feature of vulnerability but considers as many layers
of vulnerability as possible (Luna 2009; Luna and Vanderpoel 2013; Lange et al. 2013).
Furthermore, a layered view closely examines the context of vulnerability, by not focus-
ing solely on a single category or label of vulnerability. This view acknowledges that it is
not that a person is vulnerable but rather, that a particular situation renders the person
vulnerable (Luna 2009; Lange et al. 2013). Thus, as the circumstances change, so do the
presence and layers of vulnerability. This makes the layered approach to vulnerability
more dynamic (Lange et al. 2013).
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Based on the application of the layered view presented by Luna and Vanderpoel
(2013), the application of AAL technologies for PwDs carry the following layers of vul-
nerabilities.
Home-layer
While AAL technologies promise PwDs the ability to stay longer at home, it unavoidably
introduces the threat of medicalisation of the home environment. Home is considered a
place, which provides shelter from the external and public world, where the individual
has freedom to choose what belongs to his private sphere. However, AAL technologies
may turn the private sphere of home into a place equipped with hospital technology.
AAL technologies can be beneficial in continuous monitoring of dangerous situations
for the vulnerable PwDs. At the same time, such technology may also introduce dangers
of surveillance and loss of privacy, thus making PwDs vulnerable.
Home is also a place where the individual has control over her extent of privacy.
Although the introduction of AAL technologies can provide better information for the
clinical staff, even remotely, it can also introduce threats. For example, it is unclear how
the PwDs’ decisions about their privacy will be respected and protected in case of a
conflict with the clinical staff.
Information-layer
Another layer of vulnerabilities for PwDs in relation to AAL technologies is linked with
the information that the technology gathers. AAL technologies may empower PwDs
by keeping them informed and requesting their consent for actions. However, a great
amount of requests may be considered disruptive as, some PwDs may be overwhelmed
by the sheer volume of information, which can cause higher levels of confusion. Ad-
ditionally, such requests for interaction from the technology may interrupt the PwDs
activities, making them impossible to finish. This may result in more stress and anxiety
for the PwDs.
Technology-layer
While AAL technologies enable PwDs to perform various activities in their homes, they
pose a threat, not only through the possibility of deceiving or manipulating its user, but
also through coercion. PwDs may thus become vulnerable if their choices, preferences,
and wills are overridden by the software of the AAL technology.
Although the definition of AAL technologies requires their disappearance into back-
ground (i. e. ambient intelligence (AmI)), they can also be very intrusive. By enabling
PwDs to do something, AAL technologies must provide incentives, repeatedly remind-
ing and making suggestions to their users about tasks in order to reach the goal of the
started activity.
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Despite the potentially beneficial assistive nature of AAL technologies, these technolo-
gies may also manipulate and coerce their users into performing actions that she, the
PwD, no longer wants to perform. There is a danger that the technology will be unable
to recognise a change of mind by its user. It may happen that the user is performing
tasks recommended by AAL technologies because they want to perform it. It may also
be that a PwD does so because she is nudged into performing it because the easiest way
of satisfying the requests of the AAL technology is to perform them.
The incapability of interpreting the information may be pertinent in another field.
AAL technologies may be helpful in recording the fragmented wishes, advance direc-
tives, statements, or preferences of PwDs. However, these technologies as lifelogs may
be insensitive to the recording of adverse events, failures, or other negative issues that a
person prefers to be forgotten (Jacquemard et al. 2014).
While AAL technologies can provide clinical staff with relevant and important infor-
mation about the PwDs’ condition, the technology itself may be ignorant towards the
personal preferences of PwDs about the disclosure, use, and handling of such informa-
tion.
Societal-layer
AAL technologies are being introduced to provide PwDs with the opportunity for ac-
tive ageing. However, this opportunity may be interpreted by some as a requirement,
resulting in the demand for elderly people (and PwDs) to not be physically frail. The
application of AAL technology may thus result in the questioning of the universal vul-
nerability of human beings, rendering people especially vulnerable in this regard.
Although AAL technologies promise that they will be financially more affordable than
human caregivers, while providing better management of time and resources, this claim
may be questionable. PwDs, mostly during retirement or while unable to work full-time,
may be financially unable to afford AAL technologies, which raises questions about the
accessibility of AAL technologies for every PwD.
AAL technologies increase the chances for socialisation with distant family members,
friends, etc. However, as pointed out by R. Sparrow and L. Sparrow (2006), in the end,
PwDs may be stripped of human care, rendering them more vulnerable to loneliness.
Due to the prospect of better care, health insurance companies may prefer the
widespread deployment of AAL technologies to larger groups of PwDs. This raises the
question of whether PwDs will have the choice to refuse such an offer, and whether they
are not risking any penalisation if they do so due to their personal preferences.
vulnerability as a claim to special protection by hurst
Hurst (2008) finds the subpopulational view philosophically unsatisfying. She identifies
the purpose of vulnerability in protecting research participants with the need of special
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protections. Therefore, the concept of vulnerability is useless if it is defined too broadly
and universally. A restrictive definition of vulnerability is required (Hurst 2008; Lange
et al. 2013).
Hurst (2008) categorises the alternative analytical definitions of vulnerability in three
categories: consent-based, harm-based, and combined approaches. The first group rep-
resenting consent-based vulnerability considers as vulnerable those who are at risk of
not being competent to giving consent or are prone to exploitation (Hurst 2008). This
group, according to Hurst (2008), is represented with documents like ICH Harmonised
Tripartite Guideline (1996), or CIOMS (2002). Consent-based definitions of vulnerability
are, according to Hurst (2008), too narrow because they do not consider issues of harm,
disrespect, or injustice (Hurst 2008).
The second group are affiliated with definitions of vulnerability, whose focus is on
the added harms. This group is represented, for example, the definition of susceptibility
by Kottow (Hurst 2008). It is unclear, however, how harm-based definitions sufficiently
cover those groups, which are exposed to greater risk of harms. Harm-based defini-
tions include vulnerable or susceptible persons only after an actual harm occurred to
them (Hurst 2008).
Both of these approaches carry insufficient comprehensiveness in their definitions of
vulnerability. The third group of the combined approach aims to overcome this draw-
back, by covering three areas: a) vulnerability of those with compromised capacity to
protect their interest by either informed consent or the possibility of refusal of treatment;
b) vulnerability of those more likely to take on the burdens of participation in research,
especially if their increased risk-taking is not compensated by other benefits; c) vulnera-
bility of those less likely to gain benefits by participation in research, especially if their
participation is not compensated by other benefits (Hurst 2008). As a result, the com-
bined approach defines vulnerability as “increased potential that one’s interests cannot
be protected” (Hurst 2008, p. 194, citing Agrawal 2003, S26).
Based on this definition, Hurst (2008) defines vulnerability as “an identifiably in-
creased likelihood of incurring additional or greater wrong” (Hurst 2008, p. 195). This
definition allows Hurst (2008) to apply the concept of vulnerability to persons as a
claim for special protection. Firstly, there must be an identifiably greater likelihood or
likely degree of wrongs that may occur. Secondly, researchers share the duty to avoid
previously identified wrongs. Both of these conditions require increased attention from
researchers to avoid wrongs from happening (Hurst 2008).
This definition does not generate new obligations because it is restricted only to
wrongs that happen when the research participant has a valid claim, and it is denied
from her (Hurst 2008; Lange et al. 2013). These obligations already persist but sometimes
special efforts need to be made to fulfil them (Lange et al. 2013).
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Hurst (2008) proposes a 4-step approach that helps identify the vulnerability of re-
search participants, based on the proposed definition. This approach includes answers
to the following 4 questions (Hurst 2008, p. 197):
1. Is there an identifiable potential wrong?
2. If yes, are some people identifiably more likely than others to incur this wrong, or
likely to incur it to a greater degree?
3. Who shares in the duty to minimize, or avoid, this wrong, and does it include us
in any way?
4. What should we do to minimize this increased likelihood or degree, or to compen-
sate for it in ethically justifiable ways?
The definition does not include examining the responsibility of those who can be held
accountable for the avoidance or minimisation of wrongs. Therefore the question 3 is
included (Hurst 2008).
From the set of questions, it is evident that the ethical issues identified in the litera-
ture review (Chapter 3) may all be used. The first problem with this approach may be
that applying it to every ethical issue occurring in the application of AAL technologies
for PwDs may make the results exceptionally long. Additionally, the answers to the
questions 3 and 4 can be harder to determine. One of the reasons for this obstacle may,
for example, emerge during a multinational research study, with various overlapping
specialists, and with their various respective expertise. Another reason is that in many
cases, AAL technologies should perform some action, which may have ethically relevant
consequences. However, in such cases, it is very hard to identify the person responsible
when a harm occurs.
taxonomy of vulnerability of lange
Lange et al. (2013) review both of the aforementioned proposals for redefining the con-
cept vulnerability. They find Luna’s approach insufficient, in its specification of how the
different layers of vulnerabilities define the obligations attendant on researchers or RECs.
The only ‘recommendation’ is to carefully consider the context of research. Although the
subpopulational labelling may be flawed, this flaw does not automatically mean that all
taxonomy-based approaches are flawed. Moreover, these flaws can be mended in subse-
quent and improved versions of these frameworks (Lange et al. 2013).
Lange et al. (2013) consider the definition of Hurst (2008) valuable because it provides
clear categories for the parties involved. However, RECs can still, while using the 4-step
approach, fail to correctly identify the risks involved in complex phenomena. Therefore,
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the danger of labelling persists, while the approach still fails to produce clear action
guides (Lange et al. 2013).
Due to the insufficient reflection of complexities of previous definitions of vulnerabil-
ity, Lange et al. (2013) propose their own taxonomy of ‘more than ordinary’ vulnerability.
Every kind of vulnerability can be captured in one of the 3 main categories. Each vul-
nerability can further belong to short-term or long-term subtypes (see Table 5.2). This
approach, according to Lange et al. (2013) provides their users with concrete guidance
for recognising, reacting, and minimising vulnerabilities in research (Lange et al. 2013).
Table 5.2 – Taxonomy of ‘More Than Ordinary’ Vulnerabilities (Lange et al. 2013)
Vulnerabilities Subtypes Description
Inherent Occurrent (immediate/present)
age, health, gender, disability, capacities for resilience
Dispositional (latent/background)
Situational Intermittent, short term
social, political, economical, environmental situation
Enduring
Pathogenic14 Occurrent prejudice, abuse, neglect, disrespect, political
situation–injustice, persecution, political violence,
exacerbating feelings of embarrassment, shame, isolation,
inability to care for one’s family
Dispositional
Table 5.2: Taxonomy of ‘More Than Ordinary’ Vulnerabilities (Lange et al. 2013)
General Rules for Researchers
The general rules for every researcher consist of an obligation not to impede the au-
tonomy of vulnerable participants. The reason behind this requirement is instrumental:
autonomous individuals are usually better in protecting their interests than those with
weakened agency.15 This is granted not only by seeking informed consent but also avoid-
ing any forms of paternalism. This duty includes the promotion of participants’ under-
standing, duty to work with target populations, or provision of additional support or
advice from external and independent expert bodies (Lange et al. 2013).
Under no circumstances should well-intended extra protections exacerbate or create
additional vulnerabilities during research. The researchers have a special duty to not cre-
ate additional pathogenic vulnerabilities via design or conduct of research. By being part
of the research context, researchers are an unavoidable source of novel vulnerabilities,
or of their exacerbations (Lange et al. 2013).
14 According to Lange et al. (2013), pathogenic vulnerability is a subtype of situational vulnerabilities, which
emerges from dysfunctional social or personal relationships (Lange et al. 2013).
15 Lange et al. (2013) state in the article that the reason behind this requirement is purely instrumental. How-
ever, later in the article, they acknowledge ‘intrinsic reasons’, i. e. valuable aspect of human life, as an
additional basis to foster the participants’ autonomy (Lange et al. 2013, p. 337).
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Lange et al. (2013) emphasise that the procedures that create additional pathogenic
vulnerabilities in clinical application usually create the same vulnerabilities during clin-
ical research.
Application of the Taxonomy
Lange et al. (2013) provide an application of their taxonomy to research with partici-
pants with AD. Inherent vulnerabilities consist of, for example, the cognitive deficits of
PwDs, their vulnerability to harm and exploitation, and general physical vulnerabilities
of the elderly people (frailty). Situational vulnerabilities consist of mismanaged affairs
(e. g. financial vulnerability, fraud, costly mistakes, etc.), and being prone to accidents.
Pathogenic vulnerabilities in the case of PwDs are characterised by their dependency on
an incompetent or abusive caregiver, institutionalisation, and psychological vulnerabili-
ties (e. g. isolation, coping with unfamiliar surroundings, loneliness, disorientation, etc.;
Lange et al. 2013).
The suggestions stemming from this categorisation of vulnerabilities of research par-
ticipants with AD, according to Lange et al. (2013), focus on a few aspects. Firstly, PwDs
should be involved in research at the early stages of their disease. Secondly, the clinical
trials should not focus solely only on comparative drug testing but the tests should in-
clude comparisons with no-drug interventions too. The reason behind this suggestion
is based on the physical frailty of PwDs, whose existing medication can negatively in-
teract with the drugs tested in the trial. Thirdly, researchers should assess the effects
of the trial on the participants’ daily lives. The research study should not exacerbate
already existing situational or pathological vulnerabilities for the participant. Fourthly,
PwDs as research participants will already have a higher level of dependency on their
current caregivers for their health management. Followed by their limited abilities to
consent, research studies should be designed to minimise any additional dependencies
the study may impose on the participant. Additionally, the assessment of the compe-
tency of PwDs to participate in a research study should not be allowed to be exploited
by third parties (Lange et al. 2013).
Evaluation of the Taxonomy
The taxonomy proposed by Lange et al. (2013) clearly identifies some crucial as-
pects of research with PwDs. However, there are certain areas that are overlooked by
this approach. The categories of the taxonomy of vulnerabilities (inherent, situational,
pathogenic) only partially reflect the vulnerabilities introduced by the application of as-
sistive technologies. The biggest issue is the apparent autonomy of AAL devices, which
may be categorised as environmental situational vulnerability but at the same time may
not. Just as the place of researchers in the taxonomy of vulnerabilities is unclear, the
situation is similar with partially or fully autonomous AAL technologies.
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The second issue with the taxonomy presented by Lange et al. 2013 is the questionable
additional value of the distinction of occurrent/dispositional vulnerabilities beyond the
main types of vulnerabilities. Lange et al. (2013) themselves do not appear to employ
these subtypes of vulnerabilities, thus the added value of introducing such a distinction
is unclear.
Thirdly, the focus of the taxonomy on preserving the autonomy of a research par-
ticipant justified at times by instrumental value, and at other times by intrinsic value
referring to human dignity, is unclear. The claim to preserve a research participant’s
autonomy based on instrumental purposes may also trigger certain instrumental rea-
sons (e. g. for the beneficial results of the research study) to suppress her autonomy. The
autonomy of research participants, especially with a condition like dementia, is easily
questioned. In such a context, referring to goal-oriented reasoning, the drive towards
achieving results, which is inherent in every research project, may result in increasing
the vulnerabilities of participants, or even in their abuse.
Compared with the 4-step method proposed by Hurst (2008), the taxonomy of Lange
et al. (2013) lack a clear reference to any identification of who is responsible and liable
for actively minimising or conversely, exacerbating the vulnerabilities of research partic-
ipants during and after the study. This issue is even more relevant if AAL technologies
eventually become partially or fully autonomous.
5.3 specification of article 8
The vulnerability of PwDs consists of two elements. First, PwDs are vulnerable by being
part of the human family. Every human being is in a constant intrinsic state of vul-
nerability, and as such, universal vulnerability is the universal condition of humanity
and existence. Secondly, PwDs, due to their frailty, growing mild cognitive impairments
(MCIs), memory issues, and other progressively worsening dementia-related conditions
can be rendered especially vulnerable.
Therefore, the PwDs’ special vulnerability is based on the definitions provided by
CIOMS (2002) and Kemp and Rendtorff (2009): PwDs are especially vulnerable in their
(relative or absolute) inability to protect their own interests (e. g. lack the power, intel-
ligence, resources, strength, etc.); and PwDs are especially vulnerable regarding to the
threat of violating their autonomy, dignity, and personal integrity.
The personal integrity of PwDs is much harder to define. PwDs unquestionably may
exhibit certain behavioural changes, which are noticed either by others (e. g. relatives,
friends, etc.) or by the PwD herself. It remains unclear, whether the personality, per-
sonal identity (and hence integrity of a PwD) during the progress of dementia alters
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dramatically or not.16 Therefore, instead of a positive definition, which would set cer-
tain requirements towards the (virtuous) development of PwDs, a negative definition
of personal integrity of PwDs appears to be more appropriate. A negative definition of
respecting PwDs’ personal integrity sets requirements towards every other stakeholder
involved except the PwDs themselves. The content of the negative definition of the prin-
ciple of the PwDs’ personal integrity consists of the requirement of avoiding disrespect
to their personal sphere (irrespective of the changes of ‘consistency’ within the PwD’s
personality), supported by the standard of non-interference requiring the avoidance of
any undue external interventions to the person concerned. This respect, as required by
Art. 8 of the UDBHR, is based upon the universal dignity of every human being.
Due to the fact that vulnerability in the biomedical sphere is always related to a
specific threat, the violation of one’s personal integrity occurs either during clinical
practice, or during participation in research. These two contexts are specified in the
following sections in detail.
5.3.1 Clinical Research
In research settings, the vulnerability of PwDs reveals itself as special vulnerability, or
as an indicator of susceptibility to future harms. Although the universal vulnerability of
PwDs during research is also present, it is, however, only as a background issue (i. e. not
so obvious), which is present alongside any more serious concerns about the special
vulnerability of PwDs.
The types of vulnerabilities of PwDs during research of AAL technologies may be
categorised based on their three sources: a) vulnerabilities from researchers and from
participation in research studies itself; b) vulnerabilities related to close relatives and
proxies; and c) vulnerabilities from developing AAL technologies.
5.3.1.1 Vulnerabilities of PwDs from Researchers and from Participation in Research Studies
Due to the nature of research, PwDs are especially vulnerable to being treated with
greater distance and smaller levels of empathy. Researchers, while trying to eliminate
their subjective biases, focusing on recording meaningful and objective data may find
16 A recent paper published by Strohminger and Nichols (2014) examines which traits of the mind are consti-
tutive for the definition of one’s self. The authors suggest that distinguishing features (e. g. authentic experi-
ential memories) seem to be more important for the person herself, than to her close relatives/friends. The
authors examined in five conducted studies the reaction to changes in the constitutive elements of the self:
personality traits, memories, desires, perceptual faculties, cognition, and morality. Supporting the essential
moral self hypothesis, the studies concluded that the changes in one’s morality are considered as a more
dramatic change in the person’s personality, than any other of the aforementioned traits. For example, if
one’s episodic memories fail to restore but his moral traits are seemingly unchanged, the person is likely
to be considered more as herself than a different person whose moral traits changed significantly to her
previous self (Strohminger and Nichols 2014).
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themselves lacking genuine interest in curative or supportive activities, which may ren-
der PwDs especially vulnerable during their participation in research studies. This spe-
cial vulnerability may be exacerbated by the questioning of the remaining (limited) com-
petencies of PwDs by researchers. This may result in researchers ignoring the wishes,
interests of PwDs, and their potentially important insights and feedback.
PwDs should not be categorically excluded from research activities. However, their
inclusion into research should be duly considered and supported by strong justification.
The justifications need to be even stronger for the inclusion of PwDs in moderate or
severe stages of dementia. It may be worth considering research study inclusion to only
those PwDs at the early stages of dementia.
The inclusion criteria should be reviewed by appropriate RECs. Recruiting partici-
pants with dementia for research studies should only be allowed if the study focus
is directed at addressing their condition. Research studies may try to recruit research
participants with dementia for other motives than direct benefit for their participants,
which contravenes Art. 4 and Art. 7 of the UDBHR. The participation of PwDs in such
research would mean their increased special vulnerability due to possible exploitation,
which falls below the standard set in Art. 8 of the UDBHR. Further complications with
the vulnerability of PwDs may arise during likely scenarios such as that of a PwD find-
ing it increasingly difficult to withdraw from a research study due to her progressively
worsening condition. Despite the fact that the UDBHR ensures the possibility of with-
drawal from research without the provision of any reasons in Art. 6 and Art. 7, PwDs
may find it difficult to refuse to participate in a study. One has to consider that many cir-
cumstances may prevent the PwD from expressing her preference for withdrawal from
a study: the involvement of many researchers; lack of attention to the individual needs
of PwDs during research; the natural authority ascribed to scientists by the PwDs; the
preference to avoid conflicts with the people involved; respect for the invested work of
researchers; fear from social isolation that may occur after study withdrawal; or just the
often-experienced conciliatoriness of the elderly. These all constitute various levels of
vulnerability of PwDs, which can be experienced during research activities, in relation
to researchers, based on either fear, exploitation, or both.
As noted by Hurst (2008), researchers have a duty to avoid the worsening of previ-
ously identified harms, if possible. Researchers have a duty to actively minimise these
harms, as required by Art. 4 of the UDBHR. Researchers should also not create addi-
tional pathogenic vulnerabilities17 for PwDs (e. g. dependence on incompetent or abu-
sive caregiver; psychological harms due to institutionalisation, isolation, or unfamiliar
surrounding; etc.; Lange et al. 2013). The UDBHR furthermore requires that researchers
17 Lange et al. (2013) define pathogenic vulnerabilities as vulnerabilities originating from dysfunctional social
or personal relationships. Vulnerabilities based on prejudice, abuse, neglect, disrespect, etc., both on small
(inter-personal) and large (political, social) scale belong here (Lange et al. 2013).
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promote and empower the autonomy of PwDs, not only for its instrumental value but be-
cause this requirement is embedded in the highest standard set in Art. 3 of the UDBHR.
The authority of researchers may pose an additional level of vulnerability to the
PwDs. Paternalistic traits expressed by researchers during the investigation may render
the PwDs vulnerable without the participant herself noticing, as mentioned by Kottow
(2003) and Lange et al. (2013). The natural authority of researchers originating in their
expertise may increase the vulnerability of PwDs as research participants when undue
influence is placed upon the participants.
Careful attention should be paid towards the direct and indirect effects of the re-
search trial on participants’ daily lives (Lange et al. 2013). The development of AAL
technologies often occurs in the private home environment of PwDs, where additional
and unforeseeable consequences may arise, which were not recognised from initial trials
conducted in labs and/or nursing homes.
5.3.1.2 Vulnerabilities of PwDs from Close Relatives and Proxies
When PwDs consider participating in research studies, it is likely that they are seldom
alone, and are surrounded by family or other proxies where the AAL technology may
be deployed. Especially if the research focuses on AAL technologies deployed within
home environments, a necessary number of relatives and/or proxies need to be briefed,
contacted, and consented.
Furthermore, just as it is with researchers, the PwDs may experience undue influence
from their families or partners when decisions are required. In order to alleviate or
circumvent some of these issues, Horn proposes the introduction of independent media-
tors, which may be beneficial (Horn 2007). The role of mediators should be the protection
of the the rights and interests of PwDs, in communication with family members and/or
investigators of a research study in which the PwD is considering participating.
5.3.1.3 Vulnerabilities from Developing AAL Technologies
PwDs may also be rendered especially vulnerable in relation to the development of
AAL technologies. This special vulnerability emerges due to the invasive nature of the
technology in the private home environments of PwDs. This invasiveness is further mul-
tiplied by the intrusive nature of the technology, its expected partial or full autonomy
and agency. Developing AAL technologies may appear to be ‘less invasive research’ but
on closer inspection, it is apparent that the invasiveness is present in a different way
to that of invasive research studies that affect the body of a participant. Researchers
should be repeatedly reminded, that AAL technologies operate on the basis of contin-
uous collection of personal and medical data in the private dwellings of PwDs. These
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data must not cause concern in the PwD herself or her family members, or even third
parties unrelated to the research study.
Hence, during the R&D of AAL technologies involving PwDs, it is not only possi-
ble but also necessary to provide special protections. These should include the crucial
involvement of PwDs into the R&D procedure. The design of AAL technologies that
disrespect the special needs of PwDs is unethical and may not be sensible. Furthermore,
necessary support needs to be provided during the deployment of prototypes. Personal
and medical data of PwDs and proxies recorded by AAL technologies should also be
protected.
At the end of the study, the removal of AAL technologies is a source of another type
of vulnerability for PwDs. Research projects developing AAL technologies typically last
from 1 to 3 years, during which time, the PwDs may get accustomed to the presence
of this technology, or even develop a dependency on them. This needs to be considered
along with the likelihood that the PwDs’ severity of dementia will progress. The removal
of a device that the PwD is used to or depends on may cause anxiety, which opposes
the effective management of dementia.
On a policy and wider societal level, it has to be noted that populations in developing
countries currently benefit very little from the development of AAL technologies. AAL
technologies are currently being developed in mostly Western, developed countries, for
deployment into the homes of the developed world. As it is apparent from section 1.3,
other parts of the world will also suffer from growing numbers of cases of demen-
tia. However, by being excluded from research studies of AAL technologies, PwDs in
developing countries are withheld the opportunity of having their needs understood,
assessed, and met. As such, their exclusion from the R&D processes of AAL technolo-
gies may be considered discriminatory, and liable for accusations of double standards
or negligence. Such negligence may add to the vulnerability of the already ageing pop-
ulations in the developing world. This may ultimately result in a situation, whereby
the resources (incorrectly) invested into the R&D of AAL technologies in the developed
world are wasted because the results of the design of the research was one-sided, and
the conclusions inapplicable in other communities.
5.3.1.4 Respect for Personal Integrity in Research with PwDs
The requirement of Art. 8 for the respect for the PwDs’ personal integrity implies that
protection against excessive objectification of the body during research must be pro-
vided. A PwD participating in a research study does not cease to look for meaningful
relationships, or even partnerships, with researchers. PwDs do not provide their impair-
ment(s) as an object for research purposes only. They do not cease to exist as human
beings and persons (no matter how impaired). The researchers, thus, as required by
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Art. 8 of the UDBHR, should look to build meaningful relationships with their research
participants, and involve them proactively in the R&D process.
The requirement of respect for a PwD’s personal integrity means considering her as a
person with all her needs, frailties, and values. It also means considering their impaired
condition, and even the relevance and appropriateness of research goals of the study.
Respecting the PwD’s personal integrity may save researchers from inducing additional
vulnerabilities through inadvertent exploitation, paternalism, or double standards. Re-
specting the personal integrity of PwDs during the development of AAL technologies
requires, first, that the PwDs are not considered as secondary to the technology and its
functionings during research. Secondly, the respect for personal integrity should also
include that the researchers do not regard PwDs as only sources of data and other infor-
mation, no matter how relevant they are for the research study. The respect towards the
PwDs’ human dignity should be paramount, as it is one of the cornerstones and most
highly defended standards of the UDBHR.
5.3.2 Clinical Practice
Compared with clinical research, both the universal/average vulnerability and the spe-
cial vulnerability/susceptibility of PwDs are more apparent in the context of clinical
practice. Human beings manifest by their individual preferences, wishes, personal char-
acteristics, and other traits noticeable differences. Indeed, differences like these generic
human conditions—which render all of us somewhat vulnerable—should be ascribed to
average vulnerability. However, higher than average risk of possible future harms, due
to various pathological conditions, should be categorised as special vulnerabilities, or
susceptibilities. For cases of mild dementia, respect for average vulnerability should be
applicable. This respect towards average vulnerability should lead to the provision of
necessary support for recognised impairments and disturbances of PwDs. Moderate or
severe dementia should trigger not only adequate support, as required by respecting
average vulnerability. In addition, it should also trigger a dedicated effort of healthcare
professionals for active risk-minimisation and proactive avoidance of possible future
harms, in effect, respect for special vulnerability.
The vulnerabilities of PwDs during clinical practice with AAL technologies are af-
fected on the following three levels, which serve as the main rationale for their categori-
sation: a) interpersonal level; b) societal level; c) technological level.
5.3.2.1 Respect for Vulnerability on Interpersonal Level
Interpersonal communication and socialisation of PwDs is one of the crucial goals of the
management of the dementia and avoidance of social isolation and/or stigmatisation.
For this reason, AAL technologies try to provide more means and opportunities for
169
5.3 specification of article 8
socialisation. In everyday treatment and care for PwDs, the respect for their vulnerability,
requires the practice of certain important habits (or virtues). These are, for example,
tolerance, helpfulness, support for the coping with impairments. Education plays a very
important part in developing these habits. Due to the ever increasing numbers of PwDs,
the prevention of the development of individual indifference and neglect will be crucial
for the fulfilment of the requirements of respect for their vulnerabilities. It is almost
certain that relying exclusively on healthcare systems to cope with these issues will not
be sufficient and individual virtues will need to be developed for everyday functioning
with PwDs on a general level.
There is also an additional level of vulnerability, which has not yet been mentioned in
regard to PwDs. This additional vulnerability is their exposure to fraud and confidence
tricks, which can result in costly mistakes. This vulnerability is not only limited to the
clinical practice but to every domain of their daily lives, including the management of
AAL technologies, or basic instrumental activities of daily living (iADLs) (shopping,
managing money, etc.)
5.3.2.2 Respect for Vulnerability on Societal Level
The respect for the vulnerability of PwDs on the societal level should manifest in the
support for the empowerment of PwDs by compensating for their impairments. Leaders
and members of societies should actively engage in preventing future discriminations
and disrespect towards PwDs. Moreover, individuals who discriminate and show disre-
spect to PwDs should be legally accountable, with standards being clearly defined.
Respect for vulnerabilities in the clinical setting should furthermore avoid the overly
aggressive treatment of PwDs, which causes unnecessary escalation of vulnerabilities,
distress, and anxiety in the persons living with dementia. The lack of an effective cure for
dementia along with the argument of scarce resources should not be used as an excuse
to provide suboptimal treatment for PwDs. This will also increase the vulnerabilities
of PwDs during clinical practice. Proportional and well-balanced treatment should be
defined in order to provide PwDs with appropriate care.
Finally, just as in research, regulatory authorities should ensure that effective measures
are applied to protect against the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of PwDs. These vul-
nerabilities include financial vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities related to managing health-
care services and healthcare insurances, which may be moreover be open to various
forms of fraud. Furthermore, certain vulnerabilities are generated by the general intro-
duction of AAL technologies into private homes, including vulnerabilities related to
data safety and active data protection, which typically cannot be managed by the PwDs
or their family members.
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5.3.2.3 Respect for Vulnerability on Technological Level
The introduction of AAL technologies into private homes and into the healthcare process
of vulnerable PwDs offer another source of additional vulnerability. The intrusiveness
of AAL technologies during clinical application may cause harm to PwDs by its faulty
operation, ability to manipulate or coerce its user, aggressive or inappropriate nudging
that causes anxiety for the PwDs. The surveillance abilities of lifelogs may serve as ben-
eficial reminders for their users with memory impairments but may also cause harm by
their seemingly infinite memories resulting in undesired reminders of hurtful memories.
The source of these and similar harmful events is the incorrect design and application
of AAL technologies, which ignore the personal preferences of their users, resulting in
increased vulnerabilities of PwDs.
The vulnerabilities caused by incorrect design and application of AAL technologies
may also occur die to premature application. As noted in Chapter 3, lax testing standards
may be identified as one source of vulnerability. Another is the adoption of relatively un-
critical approach towards ICT devices overall, as they are already ubiquitous in everyday
use. However, very low or even lack of satisfactory testing standards and optimisations
of AAL technologies may introduce more harms and anxieties to the lives of PwDs than
advantages.
It is believed that AAL technologies will offer additional empowerment and support
for the everyday activities of PwDs, thus diminishing their special vulnerabilities. Nev-
ertheless, the belief in a ‘quick fix’ for certain issues related to PwDs may also mislead
healthcare professionals, who may gain an impression that they provided the best care
for the PwDs. This impression may be harmful within the care of PwDs because certain
activities cannot be replaced by services provided by AAL technologies. Amongst these
are, for example, human care, which is an important source of socialisation for PwDs,
eliminating some of their special vulnerabilities.
Although AAL technologies may provide PwDs and their caregivers with medical ben-
efits (e. g. better and more effective dementia care management, etc.) and/or financial
benefits (e. g. cheaper cost of management), they may also increase the PwDs’s vulnera-
bilities in these areas. Implementing AAL technologies that are not or only partially cov-
ered by health insurance companies may increase the financial gap between the affluent
and less affluent social groups of a population. The financial burden of AAL technolo-
gies plays a key role in the affordability of assistance, due to the fact that the growing
numbers of PwDs are no longer the financially active part of the society. Moreover, the
ever increasing pressure from the governments for the externalisation of elderly care (in-
cluding dementia care), may often be based solely on fiscal considerations. These fiscal
reasons should be strictly separated from the personal preferences of elderly individuals
to stay living in their homes for longer, even with the assistance of AAL technologies.
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On the societal level, Art. 8 ensures that such understandable and natural preferences of
PwDs should not be used to generate further vulnerabilities, or otherwise be abused.
Finally, PwDs may find themselves vulnerable under the social pressure or pressure of
healthcare professionals, or healthcare insurance systems to introduce AAL technologies
into their private homes, in order to avoid ‘missing out’ or having the request made at a
later date declined. It should be emphasised that refusal of using assistive technologies
should not be punished in the future, and unfair pressure for their acceptance on the
societal level exploits the vulnerability of PwDs.
5.3.2.4 Respect for Personal Integrity in Treatment of PwDs
Similar to the research activities, the respect for personal integrity of PwDs during clin-
ical practice should reflect a new approach towards the human body and its disease.
Although a person is biologically inseparable from the body, her treatment should not
focus exclusively on it as an object but should entail her subjective and personal perspec-
tive. Also, Art. 8 encourages the development of new approach to disease, which should
accommodate more subjective approaches, especially if there is no effective treatment.
There is no cure yet for dementia. Therefore, the relationship of physicians and other
healthcare professionals with PwDs should be based more on partnership, cooperation,
and symmetrical relationships.
5.4 balancing of principles
This section examines whether the principle of respect for vulnerability and personal
integrity, after specification in the case of PwDs and AAL technologies, contradicts any
other principles delineated in the UDBHR. In case of such a contradiction, Gert’s two-
step justification procedure will be applied for balancing purposes, as described in sec-
tion 1.2.
5.4.1 Principles Conflicting with Article 8
Three principles of the UDBHR may conflict with Art. 8 on the respect for vulnerability
and personal integrity. These are Art. 11 on the principle of non-discrimination and non-
stigmatisation, Art. 4 on the principle of maximising direct and indirect benefit while
minimising harm, and Art. 10 on the principle of equality, justice and equity. These
conflicts are presented below in greater detail.
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5.4.1.1 Conflict with Article 11
The conflict of the principle of respecting vulnerability and personal integrity (Art. 8)
and the principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatisation (Art. 10) can be ex-
pressed by the criticism formulated by Levine et al. (2004b). This criticism, as noted
earlier in this chapter, focuses on the tendency of interpreting vulnerability as a form
of or excuse for stereotyping research participants. All this stereotyping may occur even
if the prospective participant of a research study does not consider herself, nor the re-
searchers or RECs consider her to be, vulnerable. However, she may belong to one of
the strictly defined (e. g. by law, or other binding guideline) vulnerable groups.
Similar concerns led the bioethical community to review their position on the in-
clusion of vulnerable groups (e. g. pregnant women, children, prisoners, etc.) into re-
search. The driving force behind this shift in the approach towards vulnerable popula-
tions was that these groups became progressively underrepresented in research studies.
As noted earlier, the reasons why this occurred were various: either the tedious extra
work that was required in order to include vulnerable participants into research, or the
overly protective approach of ethical codes (e. g. Belmont Report 1978). The shift towards
a more active re-inclusion of vulnerable groups into research studies occurred in the
1990s (S. A. M. McLean 2014; Mastroianni and Kahn 2001).
Similarly, PwDs may suffer from both overly easy inclusion into research irrespective
of their vulnerable position, and unnecessary exclusion from research due to their vul-
nerable position. The former scenario follows Art. 8 of the UDBHR, focusing on the
unquestionably vulnerable condition of PwDs. The latter scenario may demonstrate the
reference to special vulnerability as discriminatory, and hence, violate Art. 11 of the
UDBHR.
The following sections, applying Gert’s two-step justification procedure will estimate
the possible consequences of actions in accordance with either of the two conflicting
principles. This will be then followed by the analysis of how strong the justifications for
the conflicting consequences are, attempting to balance the conflicting UDBHR princi-
ples for cases involving PwDs and for the application of AAL technologies.
consequences of violating article 8
The aim of referring to a principle of respect for vulnerability (and personal integrity)
since the Belmont Report (1978) is the provision of necessary protection for vulnerable
groups. Violating this principle leaves these populations either unprotected, or insuffi-
ciently protected. The former category of universal vulnerability remains irrespective
of the special vulnerabilities, as in the case of PwDs: memory impairments, physical
frailty, issues with recognition, comprehension and judgement, issues with organising
and planning, changes in mood and behaviour.
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The consequences of violating the principle of vulnerability and personal integrity
can be estimated on either individual-level or group-level.
Individual-Level
Disrespecting individual vulnerability and personal integrity could mean that either
physical or psychological harm is being done to the PwD. Such activity would, not
only counteract Art. 4 of the UDBHR but also, violate the basic ethical codes, which
have existed in medical settings since the time of Hippocrates, particularly that of non-
maleficence.
Disrespecting the individual vulnerability of PwDs by not providing extra protection
during participation in research may also mean treating PwDs as any other ordinary
research participant. Considering their conditions of MCI, memory impairment, issues
with comprehension and judgement, such an approach would translate into failing to
provide extra support, for example, during the request for informed consent. Failure to
provide necessary support for obtaining consent, and hence the expression of personal
autonomy and self-determination, would violate the very basic standards of modern
bioethics.
Ad absurdum, ignoring the extra needs of PwDs in the research of highly personalised
AAL technologies would at the same time mean a clear contradiction in terms. This
approach would be inhumane, while at the same time it would violate the basic standard
of conducting research, the principle of research integrity.
Group-Level
On a group-level, the violation of the principle of vulnerability and personal integrity
might result in increased freedom for researchers in research involving PwDs. This free-
dom may be manifested in an easier or more lax approach towards recruiting PwDs as
research participants. This would mean, for example, that research with PwDs as par-
ticipants would be much more ‘affordable’ and accessible for the researchers. Moreover,
as rightly noted by Kottow (2003), such an approach carries a greater danger of double
standards, exploitation, and paternalism.
Also, from historical experiences, it is evident that a careless approach has never been
beneficial. One may refer to the Nuremberg trials, which also included cases of people
participating in research studies against their wills. Such a ‘utilisation’ of PwDs would
mean, despite the relative freedom for researchers, an actual lack of freedom for the
PwDs.
The particular disrespect towards PwDs personal integrity would not only violate
their human rights (e. g. UDHR 1948, Art. 22) but would also thus infringe their hu-
man dignity. Within the weak hierarchy of the UDBHR, any prima facie principle that
contradicts Art. 3 cannot be considered as an ethical action guide.
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consequences of violating article 11
The violation of the principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatisation of Art. 11
in the UDBHR would mean that a certain level of discrimination and stigmatisation
towards PwDs is allowed. Its consequences, as noted by Levine et al. (2004b), could be
the stereotyping of the research participants, or—in extreme cases—the violation of their
human rights and human dignity.
The danger of stereotyping lies in exclusion of PwDs from research based either on
the fact that they belong to a vulnerable subpopulation, or on the consideration of them
as a homogenous group, having the same severity of dementia. Both of these claims are
invalid in the case of PwDs because they are a very heterogenous group. Not only the
severity but also the external signs and symptoms of dementia may vary considerably
between individuals with dementia. It is especially so in the early stages of the disease,
that is, in the groups of people who are most often involved in research studies.
However, it has to be emphasised that—using legal terminology—the possibility to
participate in research is not a right but a privilege. Participants must fulfil the con-
ditions of eligibility in terms of the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The number of
participants is often limited. An individual cannot claim a right to be a participant in a
research study, against the decision of the researcher, even if she fulfils the eligibility cri-
teria. Therefore, the notions of discrimination and stigmatisation should not be blurred
together with the refusal or non-eligibility to participate in a research study.
This statement remains valid even in situations when a rejected research participant
expresses her claim to the supposed direct or indirect benefits of the research. Not al-
lowing somebody to participate would mean withdrawing the possibility of gaining
any benefits resulting from participating in a study. However, in the world of scarce re-
sources, not allowing somebody to participate can occur but not because the researchers
want to withhold the possible benefits of participation. The study design may also re-
strict the number of participants based on the selection criteria. Research studies have
to produce meaningful, reproducible, and statistically significant results, which are well-
founded and valid, in order to provide relevant conclusions that contribute to the greater
benefit of the wider population. Moreover, participating in a research study does not
only carry the prospect of benefits but also harms. Research participation is also risky;
containing risks that have to be evaluated, not solely by the prospective participant but
also by the researchers.
Therefore, one can conclude that refusing a PwD’s wish and preference for partici-
pation does not necessarily mean an act of discrimination or stigmatisation against the
prospective participant. Such a refusal, as required by Art. 11 of the UDBHR, does not
mean a violation of the PwD’s human dignity, or human rights; just as it does not mean
the violation of the PwD’s fundamental freedoms.
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balancing of article 8 and article 11
Applying Gert’s second step from his two-step procedure, by balancing, one has to
answer the question of whether the conflicting principles of Art. 8 and Art. 11, and their
violations by one another presented above, can be permissible if they were made public.
If such permission can be granted, every reasonable and impartial human being will be
allowed to violate the principle. If permission cannot be granted in every situation, this
means that the violation is only weakly justified and may be penalised. If permission
can never be granted, the violation is not justified at all and should be prevented.
This is clearly highlighted in one particular conflict between Art. 8 and Art. 11. It
is the situation when the protection of the especially vulnerable PwDs in research is
interpreted as negative discrimination against any PwDs’ preference or wish to become
a research participant. The purpose of both articles is the protection of human dignity
and the fundamental rights of the individual; in this case, those of a PwD being recruited
into a research study.
Suspension of the requirements formulated in Art. 8, i. e. of respecting the PwD’s
special vulnerability, because of the special characteristics of the PwDs as research par-
ticipants, cannot be publicly allowed. PwDs are people with memory problems, who
have issues with recognition, comprehension and judgement, and who are unable to
organise and plan their everyday life. Moreover, they experience significant changes in
mood and behaviour. Even if one has only a few of these issues, others may appear dur-
ing the course of time, and/or may continue to progress to a more severe stage. These
progressive impairments have a significant effect on the personality of the PwD, and are
irreversible. Therefore, it would be imprudent and unethical to knowingly ignore these
factors and be surprised when these issues appear during a research study.
Referring to the principle of protecting the vulnerability of PwDs as a form of negative
discrimination against their participation in research thus seems to be a rather extreme
claim. Firstly, both articles are defined to protect the person’s human dignity, their con-
tradiction should be evaluated on the grounds whether the consequences violate the
human dignity of the individual or not. Since being disrespectful towards the vulnera-
bility of a PwD may almost certainly cause more harm than apparently discriminating
against a PwD by not allowing her to participate in a research study, one must cede
that the principle of respecting the vulnerability of the PwD should be favoured. The
imbalance between the claims of Art. 8 and Art. 11 is even greater if one considers the
fact that participation in a research study is subject to many other conditions (inclusion
criteria, minimal necessary number of participants to obtain statistically significant re-
sults, scarcity of resources of the research-team, etc.). Participation in research is not a
basic right of an individual but rather, a privilege. A statement of an incapacitated PwD
about willingness to participate in research in her advance directive should be consid-
ered as just a wish and not an action guide for researchers. In countries where advance
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directives are considered as legally binding (e. g. Austria, Switzerland, for more detail
on this topic see Chapter 6 on p. 205), the words ‘wish’ and ‘willingness’ should indicate
to researchers that the statements should be regarded only as an individual preference
of the PwD. Thus, the interpretation of Art. 11 as discriminatory against the respect for
vulnerability is rather distorted and poorly supported.
5.4.1.2 Conflict with Article 4
Another possible conflict of principles may exist be between Art. 8, respect for vulnerabil-
ity and personal integrity, and Art. 4, the principle of applying and advancing scientific
knowledge for the direct and indirect benefit to the patients and research participants;
benefits which should be maximised, while harms are minimised. The maximisation of
benefits of treatments and research cannot occur, if the patient or research participant
is excluded from research studies or treatment provision in clinical practice. Such exclu-
sion may occur, as noted earlier in this chapter, based on an incorrect understanding of
the special vulnerabilities of PwDs.
The conflict between Art. 8 and Art. 4 contrasts against the overly broad inclusion
of individuals into the especially vulnerable group, as noted by Lange et al. (2013). In
this case, PwDs’ fair opportunities of research participation or receiving treatment are
hindered. Additionally, no active steps are taken to abate their vulnerabilities, due to
misconceptions that their status quo is somewhat natural and unavoidable. Such practice
indirectly increases the vulnerabilities of PwDs. Of greater concern is the fact that these
vulnerabilities remain unaddressed.
As a reaction to this practice, a shift in inclusion of vulnerable populations into re-
search has been promoted, since the 1990s, which focuses on the provision of potential
direct and indirect benefits of research, rather than on the possible harms. This counters
the exclusion of vulnerable groups based on supported with the false justifications of
protection (Mastroianni and Kahn 2001).
consequences of violating article 4
The possible benefits and harms of AAL technologies, and the participation of PwDs in
research of AAL technologies are presented in depth in Chapter 4.
One may easily recognise that this conflict of principles is similar to the previous con-
flict discussed, between Art. 8 and Art. 11, namely, that the conflict of Art. 8 and Art. 4
is a consequence of the conflict between Art. 8 and Art. 11. Art. 11 was used to argue
that the ‘right’ of PwDs to participate in a research can be violated by protecting one’s
vulnerability and personal integrity. Analogously, Art. 4 may be utilised for arguing that
by such ‘discrimination,’ one is bereaved of the potential direct and indirect benefits of
participation in a research.
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balancing of article 8 and article 4
The question based on Gert’s two-step procedure may be stated as follows: can the sus-
pension of the requirements of Art. 8 for the prospective direct and indirect benefits for
the PwD to participate in a research study be publicly allowed? The answer may again
be negative, given the fact that participation in research is a wish and not an automatic
basic right of individuals. Furthermore, the negative claim may be supported by the
possibility of dubious results from a research study. By the nature of and reasons for
conducting a research study, it is not guaranteed that a participant will benefit from the
participation. The serious and progressively manifesting impairments of PwDs provide
strong support for a high level of caution during recruitment for research participation.
This high level of caution is further supported by the formulation of Art. 4 itself, namely,
the requirement to minimise the harms for research participants (and patients in clinical
practice).
Therefore, suspending the requirement to protect vulnerability and personal integrity
in favour of potential (and possibly questionable) research benefits cannot be publicly
allowed. At the same time, remaining passive and maintaining the status quo of PwDs
may amplify their special vulnerabilities, without the hope of any resolution. By violat-
ing Art. 4, the goals of Art. 8 are also being violated in the case of PwDs.
In contrast, a more proactive approach towards the identification to direct and indirect
benefits that reduce of vulnerabilities is more promising, so long as any negative con-
sequences, harms, and risks are eliminated or minimised. A more proactive approach
would result in of greater social inclusion of PwDs into R&D processes, higher self-
esteem and possibly lower levels of depressions, which would help address conditions
often experienced with PwDs.
Thus, the balancing of the conflict of Art. 8 and Art. 4 promotes the proactive involve-
ment of PwDs into research activities instead of their exclusion. However, in clinical
practice, this balance favours more a cautionary approach, due to the lack of any cura-
tive treatment of dementia. Only management options that have direct or indirect bene-
fits on PwDs would be justified sufficiently for clinical practice, especially with regard
to AAL technologies. Otherwise such options may induce even more vulnerabilities for
PwDs, which directly violates Art. 8 of the UDBHR.
5.4.1.3 Conflict with Article 10
In light of the previous conflicts, an additional conflict may be possible between Art. 8,
protection of vulnerability and personal integrity, and Art. 10, respect for the fundamen-
tal equality in dignity and rights, together with just and equitable treatment. This con-
flict may occur if the group of especially vulnerable people, which can include PwDs, is
defined too widely and generally. The effect of such a wide interpretation of especially
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people may lead to their exclusion from research studies. More importantly, certain
rights, which they never ceased to hold, may also be also violated, resulting in the pos-
sible infringement of their basic human rights, human dignity, and right to just and
equitable treatment.
consequences of violating article 10
Just as with the conflict between Art. 8 Art. 4 described above, this conflict can be iden-
tified as similar to the conflict between Art. 8 and Art. 11. The same type of argument
can apply. Disrespect of the prospective benefits provided by participation in a research
may, in an extreme case, be interpreted as discrimination, and hence as a violation of
the standards requiring equity and justice.
balancing of article 8 and article 10
This conflict of principles is the weakest conflict because all the arguments listed for the
resolution of the conflicts of Art. 8 and Art. 11, and Art. 8 and Art. 4 are applicable in
the case of the conflict between Art. 8 and Art. 10.
As required by Gert’s second step of the two-step justification, the suspension of the
requirements defined in Art. 8 for the research involvement of PwDs cannot be publicly
allowed. The distinctive argument in this case is that by fulfilling the requirements of
Art. 8, one is at the same time also fulfilling the requirements of Art. 10. By protecting
the vulnerable during research (and therapy), one respects and protects the dignity and
fundamental rights of PwDs, and thus, ensures they are also treated justly. Since par-
ticipation in research is not a basic human right but a privilege, not allowing a PwD
to participate in a research study due to her vulnerability (or other exclusion criteria)
cannot be understood as an unjust or unrighteous act.
5.5 summary
As a result of the specification and balancing of Art. 8, applied to PwDs and the R&D
and deployment AAL technologies for their care, the following recommendations can
be formulated.
5.5.1 Vulnerability of PwDs Based on UDBHR
• The concept of vulnerability is a descriptive notion. Nevertheless, it is not a value-
neutral concept. Vulnerability, having prescriptive meaning for human conduct, by
describing genuine human identity also reveals considerations for every human
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activity. This prescriptive meaning of vulnerability should also be translated into
the development and application of AAL technologies.
• Two types of vulnerabilities can be distinguished according to Art. 8 of the
UDBHR: universal vulnerability and special vulnerability. The former is applica-
ble to every human being without exception, and is based on the general human
condition of average vulnerability that a person is subjected in any medical care.
The latter type of special or exceptional vulnerability is present when a person is
insufficiently protected due to her condition, and, therefore, she requires specific
ethical response.
• Vulnerability does not indicate a greater actual harm that already happened to the
PwD but it highlights a higher likelihood of harm when problems occur.
• The special vulnerability of PwDs translates into vulnerability in relation to meet-
ing the other ethical requirements of the UDBHR, such as Consent (Art. 6), Persons
without the capacity to consent (Art. 7), Human dignity and human rights (Art. 3).
• The most common forms of violation of the respect for vulnerability in research are
issues of double standards, exploitation, coercion, undue influence, or paternalism.
• PwDs should not be deprived of a chance to participate in research due to their es-
pecially vulnerable condition. Their progressively worsening condition should be
regularly reviewed and necessary measures for the protection of their vulnerability
and personal integrity should be established.
• Careful attention should be paid to the evaluation of juridic and deferential vul-
nerabilities of PwDs (undue influence from proxies, caregivers, etc.). The dangers
of deferential vulnerability caused by ICT should also be considered during R&D.
• PwDs should not be stigmatised and discriminated against due to their especially
vulnerable condition in research, or clinical practice.
• Removal of AAL technologies after the end of the research study may render PwDs
more vulnerable. The consequences of inflicting this type of harm on PwDs should
be considered during the design of the research study, and should be effectively
addressed in accordance with Art. 4 of the UDBHR (e. g. minimising harm).
• PwDs, most of whom are elderly, are prone to allocational vulnerability. Therefore,
the economic and societal effects of AAL technologies in relation to the vulner-
abilities of PwDs should be considered, and solutions that are ethically sound
provided.
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• Researchers during their consideration of vulnerabilities of PwDs should avoid its
overly broad or overly narrow and reductionist interpretation. Researchers should
also avoid the stereotyping of research participants who live with dementia.
• Contemporary methods of assessing vulnerability may prove to be useful for
considering special vulnerabilities for PwDs during research and therapy with
AAL technologies. These may include special scrutiny for considering vulnera-
bility (Levine et al. 2004b), layered vulnerability (Luna 2009), vulnerability as a
special protection (Hurst 2008), and special taxonomy for considering vulnerabil-
ity (Lange et al. 2013).
• Researchers conducting research with PwDs, as a part of their duties, should not
exacerbate or create additional vulnerabilities.
• Research with PwDs does not provide sufficient justification for alleviating the
protection of special vulnerability and personal integrity of the participants. The
UDBHR does not allow any moratorium on favouring research with vulnerable
PwDs in the light of prospective benefit of research activities. Nor is the disre-
gard of the special vulnerability of PwDs allowed, despite the wish of PwDs to
participate in a research study.
5.5.2 Personal Integrity of PwDs Involved in Research or Therapy
• Due to the deteriorating condition of PwDs, the most relevant of the three most
common variations of the definition of personal integrity appears to be the one
based on the negative right of non-interference. The right of non-interference by
others in the private sphere of the PwD also forms an integral part of basic human
rights.
• The UDBHR also represents the broader sense of personal integrity, which means
the prioritisation of the needs of groups identified as especially vulnerable. PwDs
may be considered one of these groups, based on their gradual impairments (with-
out any current cure) as especially vulnerable, both for research activities and in
clinical practice.
• The concept of personal integrity assists in the interpretation of the condition of
PwDs, reorienting the initial focus from the human body to the more subjective
perspectives of the individual, whose body is inseparable from the whole person.
Personal integrity also shifts the interest from the sole scientific description of the
disease to the whole person, who lives and experiences that disease.
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5.5 summary
• Personal integrity provides a foundation for other principles (e. g. autonomy, in-
formed consent), opening up the possibilities for a meaningful relationship be-
tween the PwD and her researcher. These relationships may take various forms:
new methods of communication, a more focused approach towards the PwD,
proactive involvement of the PwD in research, development of less invasive thera-
pies, a respectful approach towards the PwD, etc.
• Persons experiencing harm, due to their special vulnerability, have impaired capa-
bilities in retaining their personal integrity.
182
6
I N F O R M E D C O N S E N T O F P E O P L E W I T H D E M E N T I A
This chapter provides a normative analysis of the ethical issue of obtaining informed con-
sent from Persons with Dementia (PwDs). For the normative analysis a more focused
view of the ethical literature is required on the issue of informed consent. Therefore, an
interpretative section of the articles on informed consent present in the Universal Decla-
ration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) will precede the normative analysis of
these articles. This chapter provides answers for the following four questions:
1. What does the literature interpreting Art. 6 and Art. 7 of the UDBHR say about
the principle of informed consent, and how should the requirement of informed
consent be fulfilled?
2. How is the principle of informed consent interpreted in policy documents and
academic literature?
3. How should Art. 6 and Art. 7 of the UDBHR be understood in its application
to the circumstances of PwDs and the context of Ambient Assisted Living (AAL)
technologies?
4. Which principles of the UDBHR need to be balanced with the principle of in-
formed consent?
The answer to the first question of the chapter is provided by overviewing the available
handbooks and reports that directly interpret the UDBHR principles, with their dedi-
cated sections referring to the principles of informed consent. This literature is mostly
The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: Background, Principles
and Application (ten Have, Jean, and Kirby 2009), Handbook of Global Bioethics (ten Have
and Gordijn 2014), Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR (2005), and Report of the Interna-
tional Bioethics Committee of UNESCO (IBC) On Consent (IBC 2008).
The second question of the chapter overviews the most influential international and
policy documents, followed by the overview of the academic literature relevant for the
interpretation of the issue of informed consent in general, or with the use of Information
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and Communication Technology (ICT) (there has been very little deployment of AAL
technologies yet).
In the normative part of this chapter, first, the previously interpreted informed con-
sent principles of the UDBHR are specified to the specific context of PwDs and AAL
technologies. The specification will focus both on clinical research, and clinical practice
of PwDs. Secondly, any possible conflicts between Art. 6 or Art. 7 and other UDBHR
principles are identified, examined, and balanced, utilising the balancing process de-
scribed in section 1.2.
Finally, at the end of the chapter a summary of the specification and balancing process
is provided. This summary will aim to provide a concise overview of the normative
analysis of informed consent in the light of the UDBHR principles presented in this
chapter.
6.1 interpretation of principles
6.1.1 Principles of the UDBHR
Two articles of the UDBHR list the principles that relate to informed consent. These are
Art. 6–7. Art. 6 deals with the general requirements related to consent in preventive,
diagnostic, therapeutic, and research activities. Art. 7 provides a general rule for cases
where consent is being sought from people unable to provide consent.
6.1.1.1 Informed Consent
Article 6
1. Any preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic medical intervention is
only to be carried out with the prior, free and informed consent
of the person concerned, based on adequate information. The con-
sent should, where appropriate, be express and may be withdrawn
by the person concerned at any time and for any reason without
disadvantage or prejudice.
2. Scientific research should only be carried out with the prior, free,
express and informed consent of the person concerned. The infor-
mation should be adequate, provided in a comprehensible form and
should include modalities for withdrawal of consent. Consent may
be withdrawn by the person concerned at any time and for any
reason without any disadvantage or prejudice. Exceptions to this
principle should be made only in accordance with ethical and legal
standards adopted by States, consistent with the principles and pro-
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visions set out in this Declaration, in particular in Article 27, and
international human rights law.
3. In appropriate cases of research carried out on a group of persons
or a community, additional agreement of the legal representatives
of the group or community concerned may be sought. In no case
should a collective community agreement or the consent of a com-
munity leader or other authority substitute for an individual’s in-
formed consent.
articles 6 .1 and 6 .2
Definition of Informed Consent Based on UDBHR
This section specifies three areas of the principles of informed consent: a) how the arti-
cles of the UDBHR manage the requirement for informed consent for prevention, diag-
nosis, therapy, and research; b) what the requirements are for valid informed consent;
and finally c) how informed consent is influenced by the context of a given situation.
The principle of informed consent of the UDBHR in Art. 6 distinguishes between the
practices of prevention, diagnosis, and therapy on one hand, and research activity on the
other hand. Art. 6.1 and Art. 6.2 refer to these scenarios separately. In both of these princi-
ples, however, the requirements of valid informed consent are identical. The person con-
cerned should be requested to consent prior to the treatment or research activity, which
means that the request has to be, in an ideal situation, submitted beforehand (Kollek
2009; IBC 2008). The term ‘free’ means voluntary consent without any inducement (Ex-
planatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005). This requires a relationship between the person
concerned and the healthcare professional that enjoys mutual confidence, respect, and
confidentiality (IBC 2008).
The provision of adequate information stands for the requirement that the informa-
tion provided has to be relevant to the case at stake.1 Moreover, the information has to
be comprehensible for the receiver. In cases of doubt regarding whether the person con-
cerned has understood the provided information about the objectives, risks, benefits, etc.,
of the intervention, a mediator can be called upon. For these purposes, the notion of the
reasonable person standard has been developed (IBC 2008).2 The information has to be cor-
1 The ‘informed’ attribute adjacent to the word consent first appeared in 1957, in the Martin Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, Stanford University judgement. The ambiguous sentence in the judge-
ment is “in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with
the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent” (J. Bray 1957). The distinction between the
requirements of discretion and of informed consent is the basis of the majority of issues in clinical practice
and research up to now (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014).
2 In Canada, researchers identified five levels of understanding health-related information (Stanton-Jean et al.
2014):
1. Health promotion – read food labels, purchase food, plan and exercise regimen.
2. Health protection – read articles in newspapers, decide among product options.
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rectly structured. For the purposes of prevention, diagnosis, and therapy, this means that
the information about the diagnosis and possible prognosis, the nature and process of
intervention, expected benefits, and undesirable side effects (risks) has to be shared. This
involves, in certain cases, the evaluation of experiences and capabilities of the healthcare
professionals involved in their treatment, and their possible financial benefits in cases of
conflict of interests. Lastly but not least, in seeking consent for preventive, diagnostic, or
therapeutic interventions, the possibility of withdrawal has to be offered to the person
concerned. A withdrawal from treatment should in no case have an effect on care provi-
sion or discriminate against the person concerned. As the emergence of certain essential
circumstances may alter the initial willingness of the person to undergo treatment, simi-
larly they also may change their willingness to continue with treatment (IBC 2008). The
information presented to a research participant of a clinical study must include the aim,
methodology, duration of the study, followed by the expected benefits, risks involved,
and the possibility of withdrawal. Adequate information should further incorporate in-
dividually tailored, understandable information, which helps the person concerned to
make an informed decision. Seeking informed consent with adequate information is a
condition sine qua non in medical and research practice, where it is always the duty of
the professional to seek consent for treatment (IBC 2008).
Express consent in the UDBHR means that the decision made about the treatment by
the person concerned should leave no doubt about her will. Consent may be recorded
in various forms: written, oral, or if there are no other means, as a gesture (IBC 2008).
Seeking consent should never be solely procedural compliance with the administrative
requirements and minimal legal obligations (IBC 2008).
The Context of Requesting Informed Consent
The context plays an important role in the interpretation and application of the princi-
ple of informed consent. It is required in the two main types of consent: that requested
for prevention, treatment, or diagnosis; and that which is sought for clinical research.
3. Disease prevention – understand information related to test results, determine the risks involved in
screening results.
4. Healthcare maintenance – understand health history forms, calculate timing for medicine, follow di-
rections for medicine labels.
5. System navigation – understand application forms, statements, informed consent forms.
The last level of this list is rather bureaucratic and therefore poses the highest challenge for an individual
due to its complexity (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). Stanton-Jean et al. (2014) note that health literacy is at
the core of every valid informed consent. It is especially so when physicians worldwide are often not
prepared to explain at sufficient length the procedures to follow for treatments. Rather, consents requested
for research are often too technical, containing too much information for the participant, for the sake of
protection of the researchers and their sponsors. Disadvantaged countries are more vulnerable to exploit
this way. To overcome these issues the use of graphics, drawings, cartoons, pictograms, or videos are
highly encouraged during obtaining consent. Obtaining written consent does not automatically mean that
the consent is informed (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). Moreover, the level of health literacy may further regress
by the introduction of ICT devices in the care, due to the digital divide often present in the elderly cohort.
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While consent for clinical treatment is usually considered to be less critical, consent for
conducting research is considered to be more crucial (Kollek 2009). In most cases of
prevention, diagnosis, and treatment, implicit consent is sufficient (Kollek 2009). For ex-
ample, when a patient seeks the help of a physician to diagnose an ear infection, it is
implicitly assumed that the physician will examine the ear of the patient, and measure
the temperature, etc. Such an agreement is sometimes called a tacit agreement, i. e. where
no objection is raised against the decision of the healthcare professional (IBC 2008). It
is, however, not assumed that a physician will request that the patient undergoes a gy-
naecological examination, which appears to be wholly unconnected to the presupposed
ear infection (IBC 2008). The characteristics of obtaining informed consent depend on
a multitude of circumstances related to the intervention: its duration, quality, invasive
character, potential benefits and side effects, impact on third parties (i. e. family, rela-
tives), and economic consequences (IBC 2008).3
Seeking consent is a process, rather than a one-time event. Where possible, the health-
care professional is usually obliged to provide enough time for the person concerned
to think over the effects of the treatment. The general rule is that the more invasive the
treatment, and the more serious the physical, psychological, and socio-economic conse-
quences for the person concerned, the more express and formalised the consent should
be (IBC 2008).
Consent for conducting research is more crucial compared with the consent for treat-
ment. Different types of research require different types of consent: whether it is an
epidemiological, biobank study (involving genetic data), involving human tissues, or
health policy research, examining public health provision (Kollek 2009). Epidemiologi-
cal research involves certain data collections, which might require the protection of the
interest of third parties. In such cases, whenever the data obtained needs to be re-used,
extra consent should be sought from the research participants (IBC 2008). This is because
the participant can still be identified through the information that is reused (Stanton-
Jean et al. 2014). Requesting and obtaining overall prior consent (blank consent) for the
reuse of data in any future research is ethically unacceptable (IBC 2008).
The Right Not to Be Informed
For certain research including genetic data, concerns have been raised about the right
not to be informed (e. g. the results of a genetic test for a late onset disease; Explana-
tory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005). Newly emerging technological developments in the
fields of genetics, genomics, and nanotechnologies challenge the individualist founda-
tions (and with this, autonomy, confidentiality, individual decision-making) of informed
3 Stanton-Jean et al. (2014) note that if the healthcare system is not funded from public funds the persons
concerned may be more willing to refuse the expensive treatments, despite the benefits of such a treatment.
And in contrast, research participants may be more willing to participate in a research with higher risks
because of receiving free drugs and treatments during the period of the research (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014).
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consent. Although adequate information is one of the core requirements of informed
consent, the complexity of genetic information irreconcilably challenges this require-
ment. Moreover, disclosed genetic information can have a strong psychological effect on
its recipient. According to present standards, it is unjustifiable to disclose information to
a person who does not want to know, particularly when doing so removes the hope from
that person. However, the right not to know is not an absolute right. Therefore, before
the start of the research study, it is advisable to reach an agreement with the potential
participants about the options and potential scenarios within the study, and to define
a plan on how to cope with the information during the research. This is particularly
challenging, as it is almost impossible to forecast all of the potential outcomes of the
research. As a consequence, planning for the disclosure of information is limited in the
research. Moreover, there is a lack of guidance in this regard. Finally, certain cases show
that the right not to know is subjected to further limitations (e. g. in cases when sexually
transmitted diseases are found, etc.). Despite these limitations, the policy of right not
to know has made its way to international documents4 and it has been recognised by
some organisations (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). The UDBHR, however, does not mention
the right not to know. The reason for it not being adopted into the list of the principles
of the Declaration can be found in the character of the principles. The principles of the
UDBHR are general rules, instead of specific ones that include very detailed description
of specific cases (Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005).
Conflicting Values in Research
Research with human beings often encompasses conflicting values, which are present in
the UDBHR itself. On one hand, individualism, upheld in this case by informed consent,
protects the individual rights, interests, and freedoms of individuals by emphasising
these values. On the other hand, communitarianism, by referring to commonly shared
values like reciprocity, mutuality, solidarity, citizenry, or universality, puts the needs of
the community before the interests of the individuals (Knoppers and Chadwick 2005).
Within the UDBHR, this conflict can be, in specific cases, observed between Art. 6, which
relates to informed consent, and Art. 14 (in relation with Art. 13 and Art. 15), which
relates to the social responsibility of promoting health and social development. While the
former, amongst others, ensures the right to not participate in research, the latter defines
the highest attainable standard of health as a fundamental right of every human being.
A progressive standard of quality healthcare is difficult to achieve without responsible
people taking part in research activities for the greater good of the community. Kollek
(2009) notes that, in recent years, this conflict has lead to newly developed frameworks
4 For example, the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) has already recognised
such a right.
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that also extend to the question of informed consent (e. g. Knoppers and Chadwick
2005).
According to the IBC (2008), various practical decisive circumstances surround the
issue of consent for research. These usually take the form of answers to the questions
like, whether research is conducted on healthy volunteers or not, and if not, whether the
participants enjoy direct or indirect benefit from the research, whether the participants
are able to judge and thus, consent to the procedure, etc. PwDs do not belong to healthy
volunteers for research; therefore, the focus of these circumstances shifts to the problem
of benefit. The IBC (2008), interpreting the principles of consent discussed in Art. 6–7
of UDBHR, states that research that does not provide any direct health benefits for par-
ticipants who require special protections, must be conducted with utmost restraint and
ensure minimal risks and burdens for the participants. This research must also provide
benefits for other patients in the same category as the participants. If an adverse event
occurs, it should be treated, and the possibility of future recurrence minimised. The par-
ticipant should also be compensated for the adverse event. Similarly, in research, when
benefit for the participant is expected, the risks, in relation to the severity of the partici-
pant’s condition, should be minimised as much as possible. Although the IBC (2008) re-
marks that desperate situations allow riskier procedures, it lacks a deeper explanation of
what constitutes a desperate-enough situation, and how much riskier procedures would
be justified in such cases. Nevertheless, Art. 7 of the UDBHR recommends that if there
is a possibility to conduct the study with competent instead of incompetent ones, then
it should be done. In exceptional cases, when research may bring direct health benefit
to the participants, and at the same time, no comparably effective study can be under-
taken with competent participants, the research may be allowed with persons unable to
provide consent. Obviously, the same conditions apply to any other type of vulnerable
participants, while the possibility of withdrawing at any time should be regularly com-
municated. None of the participants should be pressurised to participate in a research
study, and researchers should refrain from enrolling prisoners, military personnel, or
other participants, who may be in a dependent situation (IBC 2008).
Informed Consent – A Culturally Bound Concept
The context of informed consent is a culturally bound one.5 By culture, Kollek (2009)
means the capacity of human beings to classify, codify, and communicate people’s ex-
periences in a symbolic manner. In this light, the definition of informed consent is very
much shaped by ideas of Western liberal individualism. These ideas identify person-
5 For further details see Mathooko and Kipkemboi (2014), B. Darwish (2014), Rendtorff (2014), Lolas (2014),
and Kalousova and Vries (2014), reflecting African, Arab, European, Latin American, and North American
perspectives, with multiple reference to the issue of informed consent. In addition the perspectives of
individual countries on the issue of informed consent is covered in ten Have and Gordijn (2014, section
VII).
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hood as the locus where one’s autonomous decisional capacity expresses itself and oc-
curs (Kollek 2009). Thus, there may be issues in the universal applicability of the re-
quirements of informed consent.6 Kollek (2009) concludes that different strategies for
the application of the principle of informed consent are needed. These strategies regard-
ing consent, according to Stanton-Jean et al. (2014), may vary again in clinical practice
and research. Consent in clinical practice can be challenged and retrospectively analysed
after reporting of an official complaint (e. g. by court, etc.). Consent in research, however,
can also be reviewed and discussed during the project (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). Any
consent strategy should generally be, firstly, ethically sound, and secondly, culturally
sensitive. Cultural sensitivity means a considered involvement of the communities con-
cerned into the procedure of seeking consent. However, modern medical treatments and
research are dominated more by the globally defined professional culture of the physi-
cians and researchers than the regional culture of the communities involved (Kollek
2009). The requirement for more cultural sensitivity and community involvement may
also be applicable to groups related to dementia care, or to involving to a greater extent
the dementia care receivers themselves.
Origins of the Requirement for Informed Consent
At the historical roots of the development of informed consent doctrine Kollek (2009)
notes a thorough change in the physician-patient relationship. Firstly, the relationship be-
tween the healthcare professional and the care receiver changed dramatically in the 20th
century, from a paternalistic relationship (Kollek 2009) to a more collaborative one (IBC
2008). This change, which occurred between 1960–1970s, was promoted in the new def-
inition of patient-physician relationship, based on the notion of autonomy and indi-
vidualism. Secondly, the development of the requirement for informed consent during
treatment relied on a secular interpretation of medicine. Illness was no longer consid-
ered as a punishment inflicted by a Supreme Being. A third reason for the development
of the informed consent requirement was the need to protect the patient or research par-
ticipant during the application of an empirical approach to medicine. Modern medicine
employs an empirical approach. Even in antiquity, it was recognised that there was a
6 The IBC (2008) classifies the various hurdles in obtaining informed consent into economic, educational,
and socio-cultural circumstances. The classification of economic circumstances includes poor training of
the healthcare professionals in developing countries, lack of time for the patients, scarcity of resources, or
a lack of social provision of healthcare resources. One of the issues related to low levels of education is
difficulty in accessing information. This can happen because of illiteracy of the care receiver, or because
of language barriers. Sometimes, issues in documenting consent can also occur, due either to illiteracy, or
to cultural reasons (e. g. certain cultures prefer oral communication, and may consider written text to be a
source of suspicion, distrust, or even, insult). Another socio-cultural issue encountered in obtaining consent
is the tradition of communal consent, where the decision-making process is delegated to an elder of the
family, or to the community leader. Another issue might be a certain amount of fatalism, which is present
in some religions and can reinforce paternalistic attitudes held by the person concerned. Finally, a socio-
cultural barrier to valid informed consent may be raised by the hierarchical structures of a society, when
consent may be compromised by the socio-economic status of the person concerned (IBC 2008).
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requirement to protect patients of empirical medicine (e. g. Hippocratic Oath; Kollek
2009). The IBC (2008) lists other possible reasons for the increased appreciation of the
role of informed consent in the modern day healthcare. Among these are the increas-
ingly prominent patients’ rights movement, and the novel ethical issues engendered by
emerging biomedical technologies (IBC 2008).
In addition, there are reasons, which supported the rise of the importance of informed
consent, that are exclusively related to research activities. The first of these reasons is the
public and political response to the research studies involving participants who were in-
jured by non-therapeutic interventions during the 19th century (Kollek 2009, Vollmann
and Winau 1996). As a result, the requirement for requesting informed consent from
research participants was issued as a ministerial directive in Germany in 1900 (Kollek
2009). The second reason for the rising importance of informed consent was the revela-
tion of the Nazi human experimentations, which ultimately led to the development of
“The Nuremberg Code (1947)” (Kollek 2009; IBC 2008). The third important rationale
for the informed consent standard was the formulation of what is known today as the
Ethical Principles for Medical Research involving Human Subjects (“Declaration of Helsinki”
2013), which was in 1964 adopted by the World Medical Association (WMA) (Kollek
2009), and is better known as the “Declaration of Helsinki” (1964).
Informed Consent as a Legal Requirement and its Justification
As the above-mentioned origins of informed consent may presage, the foundations of
informed consent in the 20th century were initially described by mostly legal concepts.
These concepts are embraced within the fundamental human rights theory: as the right
to integrity and self-determination. However, informed consent also has truly ethical
foundations. Among these are respect for persons, human dignity, and the Kantian idea
of not using a human being as mere means to an end but as an end in herself. Other
foundations are anthropological (bodily integrity), cultural, and social (setting limits to
states governing the individual) concepts (Kollek 2009).
The legal requirement for informed consent emerged as a consequence of the abuse
of patients and research participants, largely during World War II. Informed consent of-
fered a solution for avoiding the recurrence of such abuses. This justification is ultimately
based on the protection of each person’s right to integrity and self-determination. These
rights may further be supported by the more general requirements of common decency
toward others, and minimal respect to a person. Thereby, informed consent protects the
most basic rights of the individual. Furthermore, the protection provided by informed
consent does not only extend to the patient or research participant but to the physi-
cian or researcher as well (Kollek 2009). Informed consent ensures that the patient’s or
research participant’s approval is granted, and the physician or researcher cannot be
indicted/accused of enforcing an unwanted action upon the patient/participant.
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Informed Consent Doctrine
As a result of the historical development of informed consent described above, Kollek
(2009) recognises the emergence of an informed consent doctrine in bioethics. The in-
formed consent doctrine is built upon the indispensability of this standard within med-
ical care. The doctrine of informed consent is an unavoidable prerequisite of any med-
ical intervention or biomedical research. Although the foundations of the doctrine rest
initially on court decisions, it is also based on a wide variety of genuinely ethical no-
tions (Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005). The doctrine of informed consent may
thus be defined as an expression of respect for autonomy, self-determination, human
rights and human dignity, notions that form the core values of any democratic soci-
ety (Kollek 2009; IBC 2008). As such, this doctrine now constitutes the foundation of
many international agreements (cf. section 6.2). However, it should be borne in mind
that the doctrine of informed consent is a culturally bound doctrine (Kollek 2009).
Requirements for Application of Informed Consent
According to Kollek (2009), a considerable lack of clarity persists regarding the applica-
tion of informed consent in practice. The most well known procedure of application is
that described by Beauchamp and Childress (2009, pp. 120–121):7
I. Threshold elements (preconditions)
1. Competence
2. Voluntariness
II. Information elements
3. Disclosure
4. Recommendation (not part of research study)
5. Understanding
III. Consent elements
6. Decision (Voluntariness in Kollek 2009)
7. Authorisation (Formal consent in Kollek 2009)
7 Beauchamp and Childress (2009) in the 6th edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics categorise the former
attempts to categorise the requirements of informed consent as: a) definitions of informed consent dividing
them into consent-component (voluntary decision, authorisation to proceed) and information-component
(disclosure of information); b) definitions provided in most legal, regulatory, philosophical, medical, and
psychological literature list five distinctive components of informed consent, namely, competence, disclo-
sure, understanding, voluntariness, and consent; c) finally, some legal and medical definitions have only
one-element definitions focusing on the disclosure of information (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). The
last description relates to the narrow and reductionist legal definition of informed consent.
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Competence and voluntariness of consent, due to the special conditions of PwDs, are
discussed in section 6.1.1.2 interpreting Art. 7. One might question whether listing com-
petence and voluntariness as preconditions rather than essential conditions of informed
consent adds any value, especially in relation to PwDs. Therefore, for the interpretation
of Art. 6 in this section, the focus of Kollek (2009) on the essential conditions of valid con-
sent (the elements of information and consent, as denoted by Beauchamp and Childress
2009) is described. Firstly, the disclosure of relevant information depends considerably
on the content of the information itself, the method in which it is being presented, and
the timing and setting of the disclosure. The amount of information disclosed also plays
a crucial role. Research participants often find protocols too complicated and extensive.
The information may also be too complex for the participants to interpret correctly be-
cause they are unfamiliar with the basic concepts of the research study being presented
to them. The lengthy and detailed descriptions of the uncertainties of the research, an es-
sential part of any scientific study, may be misperceived by participants, whose trust may
then be undermined. The differing viewpoints of the participant and researchers must
be emphasised. Both parties enter the research activity with different interests (Kollek
2009).8
To overcome these issues, it is highly advisable for the researchers to repeat the in-
formation several times, and, if appropriate, in smaller, more digestible portions. This
means providing the participants with information repeatedly, in various forms, and
at different times (IBC 2008). The disclosure of information is a particularly interactive
process. The condition for repeated provision of information has been also proposed dur-
ing the drafting process of the articles of UDBHR that concern informed consent. The
rationale behind this reiterative step is the general recognition that informed consent,
by focusing on the fulfilment of its essential elements, is a procedural concept (Kollek
2009). Aspects of this interpretation of informed consent are noticeable also in one of
the first drafts of Art. 6 of UDBHR, where the committee interpreted informed consent
as an “ongoing participation” (Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005, p. 9). Ongoing
participation in research necessitates a more active role on the part of the participants,
where the disclosure of information is no longer a one-step uni-directional requirement
but rather a continuous and mutual effort to communicate and understand the informa-
8 In certain deontological codes, the practice of therapeutic privilege by the healthcare professional has
emerged. Therapeutic privilege is a practice, whereby a healthcare professional withholds information
because disclosure would very likely result in a gravely negative impact on the person concerned. The
disclosure of information is now an absolutely necessary systematic condition that healthcare profession-
als must comply with. Therefore, therapeutic privilege cannot be supported (IBC 2008). A similar practice
called therapeutic exception exists. Therapeutic exception is a practice whereby, under exceptional circum-
stances, a provisional limitation or delay of the information disclosure is required. Although therapeutic
exception is permissible, the general rule is that the information should be disclosed to the person con-
cerned as soon as it is available (IBC 2008). Therapeutic exceptions are only applicable in situations where
minimal or no major risks are posed to the person concerned, and where the participant is informed as
soon as possible, providing her with the earliest opportunity to refuse consent (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014).
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tion throughout the whole duration of participation in the research study (Explanatory
Memorandum on UDBHR 2005).
Secondly, the understanding of the information provided depends on the capacity
of the receiver of that information. The issue here, according to Kollek (2009), may be
the very specific one-dimensional focus of medical information. The presentation of
the medical information solely, without additional context of the immediate and far-
reaching implications, might distort the overall understanding of the receiver, making
the resulting decision improperly or insufficiently informed. Importance should also be
given to the values held by the research participant. Individual participants may differ
in terms of how they behave and react to disclosed information and which particular
values they uphold. These reactions, which are difficult to predict and which may need
to be managed, pose a challenge to the healthcare professional. A further challenge to
the professional is the overall difficulty in ascertaining whether a research participant
has understood the information provided, and if so, to what extent (Kollek 2009).
Thirdly, the assessment of the voluntariness of the participant in making her decision
has to ensure that her decision was not made under undue influence or intimidation.
The freedom to withdraw at any point from the research has to be communicated al-
ways to the participant (Kollek 2009). Stanton-Jean et al. (2014) remark that often a re-
fusal against one particular treatment does not automatically mean a refusal against all
treatments. Reasonable alternatives should be always communicated and explained in
detail (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). The participant must also be reassured that withdrawal
would not result in any prejudice or disadvantage being incurred (Kollek 2009).9
Finally, for research purposes, the consent for participation must be explicit. Formal
consent may be provided either by the participant, or by proxy. First-person consent is
usually provided as a form, which has to be completed, and signed by the participant.
Sometimes, an oral statement given in the presence of witness(es) may also be accepted
as formal consent for participation in a research study (Kollek 2009). It must be noted
that follow-ups of chronic diseases, or longstanding therapeutic relationships do not
necessitate repeated formal consents, so long as the essential conditions (e. g. newly
discovered drugs, surgical possibilities, or appearance of other new methods) do not
change the nature of the treatment or research (IBC 2008). Proxy consent usually oc-
curs when the person concerned is incapacitated, and therefore, a social or community
leader, marital partner, or other senior family member(s) decides upon her behalf. How-
ever, one should endeavour to identify and resolve any doubts regarding the consent
provided or withheld by a proxy that may be counter to the wishes of the incapacitated
person (Kollek 2009).
9 Healthcare professionals should also be aware of some key factors that affect people’s willingness to partic-
ipate in research usually include social status, asymmetric (hierarchical) relationships, social expectations
towards the participant (usually from relatives, the community, etc.), and (economic) benefits (e. g. incen-
tives; Kollek 2009).
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Types of Informed Consent
The circumstances (e. g. reasons, purposes of actions, possibility) may call for different
approaches of fulfilling the necessary requirements of obtaining valid consent. Informed
consent contexts and procedures can be region-specific and involve proprietary socio-
cultural elements (as noted by Art. 6.3). Additionally, international and national laws
and agreements may further regulate the practice of obtaining informed consent (IBC
2008). The context of obtaining consent may be further influenced by the type of re-
search, as noted by Stanton-Jean et al. (2014). Research with the use of placebo can place
the participants into a vulnerable position. Therefore, participants must be specifically
informed about the possible dangers of such studies (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014).
Another factor that might affect how consent is obtained involves whether the re-
search is conducted as part of a multi-centre and/or international study. In interna-
tional, multi-centre studies various adverse issues10 have been documented that have
been addressed by different good governance models, which have provided coherence
and reliability. Art. 21 of the UDBHR requires ethical reviews of the research study in
both the host and the funder states. These reviews should be consistent with the princi-
ples of UDBHR, and based on ethical and (inter)national legal standards (Stanton-Jean
et al. 2014).
The IBC (2008) leaves open the possibility of obtaining valid informed consent in
different ways that is appropriate to the circumstances of specific situations. In this
regard, the classification of the Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR (2005) of various
types of consents may be helpful (Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR 2005, p. 9):
• Explicit – given directly by the patient.
• Substituted – in the case of terminally ill persons.
• Presumed – in emergency situations.
As the last two types of consents suggest, there are cases when it is impossible to obtain
consent directly from the person concerned. In such cases, either substituted or pre-
sumed consent is formed, aggregating the important information from family proxies
or friends.
10 Researchers in multi-centre and international studies are often burdened by the need to obtain a number
of the ethical review approvals from multiple countries, which have country-specific legislative require-
ments. Researchers are also often frustrated by delays and by the bureaucratic processes that these reviews
usually entail. Another issue may be the lack of understanding of other researchers’ decision-making pro-
cesses. Studies may also suffer because of a lack of sufficient scientific expertise. The aforementioned issues
might be exacerbated by institutional accountability problems regarding the lack of clarity about which
transnational and multi-centre study partner is responsible for various aspects of the study. This issue of
accountability might be a consequence of various inherent deficiencies and hurdles encountered by the
monitoring process as the study progresses (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014).
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Consent and Data-Ownership, Data-Handling
The issues of consent related to biobanks introduce another issue, also relevant to AAL
technologies. This issue regards the question of data ownership. It is commonly accepted
that the owners of the genetic data gathered from participants are the institutions that
host databanks. These institutions are accountable for the proper management of these
data. However, the results of the research are the property of individual researchers,
unless it is specified otherwise in the consent forms (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). Similar
questions regarding data ownership and management also arise during the research &
development (R&D) of AAL technologies, when vast amounts of private, often confiden-
tial, medical data are collected. The R&D process may involve not only many researchers,
but also different research institutions, often in multiple countries with different legisla-
tions. These conditions all increase the complexity of the data-ownership and -handling,
both of which are scrutinised when obtaining consent from a research participant.
Reuse of Previously Collected Data from Research
It has been reported that obtaining specified consent for human tissue research is less
functional because of the reuse of the samples in later research studies (IBC 2008). New
technologies offer a great opportunity for re-using samples and data in new research.
The logical requirement of recontacting previous participants for informed consent is
an issue that is still not completely resolved (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). A similar issue
may be encountered with the data gathered during the use of AAL technologies from
PwDs, after they have been anonymised. With the case of genetic data in databanks,
a specific authorisation model has been developed by Caulfield et al. (2003), which
enables participants to preserve a certain amount of control over their data for future
analysis (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). Furthermore, in research related to health policies,
the request for consent has been deemed useless (IBC 2008). These research studies,
according to the IBC (2008), may be subject to Art. 27 of the UDBHR, whereby the
application of the principles of the UDBHR may be limited by law, including laws in the
interest of public safety. For example, for the sake of public health, where an individual’s
actions or inactions may pose a threat to the public safety, medical interventions without
the express consent of the person concerned may be justified. Restrictions of individual
rights and freedoms may be imposed in order to protect other individuals or the general
public (i. e. the rights and freedoms of others). Such actions are usually strictly regulated,
and made legitimate by ex officio measures (IBC 2008).
The topics of data-ownership, data-collection, and data-handling (or data-reuse) are ex-
tensive areas in their own right. The literature review in Chapter 3 corroborates this
fact.11 Therefore, this topic is not elaborated further in this thesis. Instead, the focus is
11 These topics are regularly mentioned in the academic literature, e. g. Allen et al. (2008); Conley et al. (2008);
Cook et al. (2009); A. Darwish and Hassanien (2011); Fairclough (2009); Kang et al. (2010); Jeffrey Kaye
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on topics that are relatively new and/or received little attention in relation to informed
consent of PwDs and AAL technologies.
article 6 .3
Art. 6.3 is considered to be an innovation of the informed consent doctrine (Kollek 2009).
This addition to the informed consent doctrine describes situations, where, in certain
cultures, legal representatives of the community may be needed to provide agreement
in addition to the informed consent required from the individuals concerned. For certain
genetic population studies, the heritage of a group should not be at the disposal of any
single individual. Such a requirement is in accordance with the requirement of engaging
in a common social responsibility (Art. 13).
In accordance with the principles described in Art. 6.3, Kollek (2009) demands the
application of a more culturally sensitive informed consent strategy in general, which
would involve local communities more into the decision-making process (Kollek 2009).
However, Art. 6.3 also stipulates certain limitations to this part of the informed con-
sent principle. Firstly, no matter how much the family or wider society is involved in
the consent decision, no action should be taken until it is explicitly approved by the per-
son concerned. Secondly, communal approval of informed consent may raise questions
about inappropriate paternalism. Such a practice may neglect the right of the individual
to make her own choices (Kollek 2009).
6.1.1.2 Persons without the Capacity to Consent
Article 7
In accordance with domestic law, special protection is to be given to
persons who do not have the capacity to consent:
(a) authorization for research and medical practice should be obtained
in accordance with the best interest of the person concerned and
in accordance with domestic law. However, the person concerned
should be involved to the greatest extent possible in the decision-
making process of consent, as well as that of withdrawing consent;
(b) research should only be carried out for his or her direct health ben-
efit, subject to the authorization and the protective conditions pre-
scribed by law, and if there is no research alternative of comparable
effectiveness with research participants able to consent. Research
which does not have potential direct health benefit should only be
(2010); Noury et al. (2011); Romdhane et al. (2012); A. Sharkey and N. Sharkey (2012); Viswanathan et al.
(2012); Wherton and Monk (2008); etc.
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undertaken by way of exception, with the utmost restraint, expos-
ing the person only to a minimal risk and minimal burden and if
the research is expected to contribute to the health benefit of other
persons in the same category, subject to the conditions prescribed
by law and compatible with the protection of the individual’s hu-
man rights. Refusal of such persons to take part in research should
be respected.
article 7
Legitimacy of Research with Incompetent Persons
The legitimacy of research with incompetent persons relies upon the identification of the
right balance between the purposes of the research and the protection of the rights and
dignity of the incompetent persons. According to Gefenas and Tuzaite (2014), research
with incompetent persons may involve having to “bypass” the basic research ethics
requirements, including informed consent (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014, p. 98). This is
not without precedent; the limitation of personal rights has been justified to safeguard
public health (J. F. Martin 2009). Another traditional example, where personal rights are
limited within medical care, is in psychiatry (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).12 As well as
the right to the opportunity to participate in research, incompetent persons also should
have the right to access and choose from various treatment options (Gefenas and Tuzaite
2014). Clearly, these scenarios may apply to PwDs, who may have be legally proclaimed
as having lost their decision-making capacity.
However, the question of research with incompetent persons is more problematic than
therapy with them. In exceptional cases, interventions may be allowed on participants
(newborns, mentally ill, victims of accidents, etc.) without any direct benefit from the
research. A more elaborate criteria of inclusion of incompetent research participants is
provided in international documents like the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(1997), along with national regulations (J. F. Martin 2009).
12 Gefenas and Tuzaite (2014) make an important distinction regarding this practice, between involuntary
hospitalisation and involuntary treatment. Before the 1970s, the two often meant the same thing. Today, it
is accepted that involuntary hospitalisation may be justified by the fact that a disorder requiring hospitali-
sation has been diagnosed, or that the assessment of the presence of the disorder requires hospitalisation.
Involuntary hospitalisation can take two forms: formal and informal. Informal involuntary hospitalisation
occurs when patients sign an admission form for voluntary hospitalisation but are then not allowed to
leave the institution at their will. Informal involuntary hospitalisation exists as a result of inconsistency
in legal regulations that are hard to apply in practice. In response, healthcare professionals tend to avoid
compulsory hospitalisations because of the complex legal procedures and other hurdles that can be en-
countered (scarce personnel, bureaucracy, court hearings, financial requirements, etc.). Such an adverse
practice results in a situation, when de facto involuntary patients are left without any safeguards. Involun-
tary hospitalisation however is not the same as involuntary treatment. Involuntary hospitalisation does not
automatically mean involuntary medication; the involuntarily hospitalised person still retains her right to
reject treatment (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
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The ultimate justification for permitting research with incompetent persons is based
on the assumption that it would be unacceptable to abandon groups of people who lack
the ability to make their own choices, by not allowing them to participate in and thereby,
potentially benefit from, research. These persons cannot be stripped of the right to partic-
ipate in research on their conditions, even if those conditions render them incapable of
consenting. Therefore, research of, amongst others, degenerative neurological diseases
is needed (J. F. Martin 2009). PwDs can be considered to constitute such a group.
Drafting Procedure of the UDBHR Principle(s) Regarding Informed Consent
During the drafting process of the principle(s) of informed consent, before the two arti-
cles were separated to become Art. 6 and Art. 7, the experts considered consent as the
key article of the whole UDBHR (J. F. Martin 2009). The challenge was the formulation
of exceptions to this principle. In the First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts (April,
2005), the experts started with an explicit reference to mentally disabled people. The in-
tergovernmental delegates, however, remarked that this part of the UDBHR concerning
informed consent should be more elaborate. As a result, two separate principles concern-
ing consent were developed for the Declaration. As previously described, Art. 6 deals
with the issue of informed consent by competent persons. Art. 7, on the other hand, is
devoted exclusively to incapacitated persons who are unable to provide informed con-
sent. The separation of these two themes into different principles was later approved
by all the delegates. No other restrictive conditions are provided in Art. 7. For these,
one has to refer to national and international laws and regulations (e. g. Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, etc.; J. F. Martin 2009).
Capacity as a Requirement of Consent, and its Assessment
The crucial notion of Art. 7 is capacity. Capacity is closely linked with competence.
The notion of capacity has mostly legal foundations. Legal systems, since their earliest
appearances, have dealt with groups entitled to different types of rights and preroga-
tives (J. F. Martin 2009). For example, in the Roman Empire, only a few people were
Roman citizens, who were accorded political rights. Moreover, in Europe, the legal sta-
tus of women was effectively the same as that of legal minors13 until the early 20th
century. Children, mentally ill persons, or incapacitated adults, even today, have special
legal status (J. F. Martin 2009; IBC 2008). To the present day, the loss of competence in a
legal sense means one’s loss of legal right in a specific functional domain (Gefenas and
Tuzaite 2014), for example, legally declared, by the Order of Supervision, incompetent
to manage one’s own finances (Bond et al. 2000). Although the bioethical notion of the
13 Legal minors should not be understood in this regard as only referring to children. Like legal minors,
women needed permission to exercise certain rights (e. g. husband’s permission to sell goods, even the
wife’s own private property; J. F. Martin 2009).
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loss of competence, covers the inability to make healthcare decisions, this incompetence
is much more nuanced. This interpretation is broader than the narrow legal definition.
Bowman (2008) emphasises that the legal interpretation of informed consent is an “ar-
tificial binary certainty,”14 which is too narrow an interpretation for cases involving
PwDs (Bowman 2008, pp. 51–52). Instead, the bioethical interpretation recognises that
capacity is not an ‘all or nothing’ concept but rather, a fluctuating one. Thus, capacity
is a continuum, which depends greatly on external variables. These variables have the
power to diminish, alter or enhance the PwD’s capacity to consent (Bowman 2008).15
Moreover, the broader interpretation of the loss of competence may also apply to cases
when the person still legally holds the right to decide about her healthcare (Gefenas
and Tuzaite 2014). According to Bowman (2008), although the assessment of capacity
rarely happens without clinical assistance, it still remains a legal rather than a medical
concept. At least this is the case in the United Kingdom, where the definition of the term
originates from the British common law (Bowman 2008, p. 52).
Capacity may be described as an ability in the following two areas (J. F. Martin 2009):
• Cognitive dimension – the ability to understand the given situation, and the issues
involved in that situation.
• Volitive dimension – the ability to make rational choices, and evaluate their conse-
quences and the ability to act effectively towards the implementing of the decisions
made by the person.
Incapacitated persons are, therefore, often unable to form an opinion on the situation,
and thus may be unable to possess a set of values and goals. Incapacitated persons
may also be unable to process and communicate the information. Finally, incapacitated
persons may be unable to reason and deliberate about their choices (Gefenas and Tuzaite
2014).
Another important distinction refers to circumstances during which the capacity to
exercise one’s autonomy is limited. A commonly shared experience is that there are
people who simply lack the capacity to provide informed consent. The legal limitations
14 A similar concern is expressed in Fountoulakis and Despos (2008), when they state: “The most important
elements many professionals are unaware of, is that capacity is not an all-or-nothing ‘on-off’ switch.” (Foun-
toulakis and Despos 2008, p. 72).
15 Bowman (2008) proposes a strong call for ‘virtuous’ practice by the professionals involved in the care for
PwDs. He does so by elaborating on the meaning of a rather old-fashioned term, ‘conscience.’ Although
this term is very limiting within medical ethics, Bowman (2008) asks how the ‘conscience’ of medical
professionals should be held to account. Her inquiry extends to the question of what will be demanded
from healthcare professionals to stay receptive towards the PwDs decision-making. The common goal
of the healthcare professional(s) should be to facilitate, rather than impede the capacity of PwDs. The
positivist “quasi-fetishistic preoccupation” with the narrow interpretation of autonomy (Bowman 2008,
p. 52) should be, according to her, transposed by a more relational understanding of the ethics of care,
with a more communitarian moral framework, focusing on respect, care, person-centred, and contextual
decision-making (Bowman 2008, pp. 52–57).
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to the inability of making valid autonomous decisions are usually correlated to a fixed
age (e. g. needing to be at least 18 years old to be deemed legally mature). Such an
incapacity is also called de iure incapacity. Another type of incapacity is more medico-
ethical, and is called de facto incapacity. Today, it is assumed that medical decisions
about treatment options, etc., should be based on the de facto capacity of an individual.
According to this approach, the chronological age of an individual is not decisive in
ultimately determining one’s valid ability to make decisions (J. F. Martin 2009).
The assessment of a person’s capacity is therefore essential. Healthcare professionals
during the process of capacity assessment of persons under guardianship focus primar-
ily on the capacity to judgement (capacité de discernment; J. F. Martin 2009), which is the
assessment of the volitive dimensions of the person concerned. Capacity is automatically
assumed in any adult person. It is incapacity, which needs to be proven. The assessment
of the capacity of an individual is therefore performed as a matter of appreciation based
on the professional experience of the caregiver (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014). This appre-
ciation has, however, its limits. Inevitably, the assessment is usually based on personal,
potentially subjective, perspectives. Naturally, one may also object that an appreciation
of one’s capacity by a professional cannot be detached from the actual culture and cus-
toms of the assessor’s background. These limits invoke certain risks. Firstly, sometimes,
it becomes difficult to recognise individuals that prefer to take greater risks in their lives
compared with others. Similarly, it can be very hard to identify those healthcare pro-
fessionals that are overly cautious towards their patients or research participants. The
second risk of assessment by appreciation lies in the fact that the decision of the as-
sessed individual must be related to reasonable outcomes of the situation, based on the
assessor’s opinion. If the assessed person’s concerned decision is not considered reason-
able enough by the healthcare professional, it is often automatically disregarded. The
result is that the person is stripped of her decision-making capacity (IBC 2008). Simi-
larly, an even more serious complaint is that healthcare professionals often request the
opinions of relatives or legal guardians by default, without first including the person
concerned, irrespective of her de facto decision-making capacity (J. F. Martin 2009, citing
Cassiers 2001, pp. 511–12). In such cases, the appreciation of one’s capacity by a health-
care provider does not occur at all. This negligence may extend to many vulnerable
individuals incapable of consent, including PwDs.
J. F. Martin (2009) proposes the extension of the assessment of the capacity of judge-
ment (volitive dimensions) in persons under guardianship by conducting additional
comparable evaluation. This comparable evaluation should reflect upon the specific con-
ditions of the incapacitated person involved and the severity of circumstances, as well
as the decisions related to them. A general rule in these cases is: the more important the
decision, the higher the requirement for competency (J. F. Martin 2009). One has to bear
in mind, however, that none of the tests provide exact measurements of one’s capacity of
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judgement (IBC 2008). The decision-making capacity of mature children should not be,
for example, hindered and undermined by setting the assessment criteria too high (J. F.
Martin 2009). If such a remark is valid for children (i. e. persons with limited decision-
making ability), it follows that a similar requirement should be applicable to PwDs. As
children may show signs of more developed decision-making capacity (compared with
competent adults), PwDs may similarly show signs of their remaining decision-making
capacity, which they used to fully possess. The assessment of the decision-making ca-
pacity of PwDs, together with the additional comparable evaluation, promotes the de
facto assessment of one’s capacity, instead of the narrow binary interpretation of de iure
decision-making capacity.
J. F. Martin (2009) distinguishes between two types of incapacities:
• Long-term, or permanent incapacity.
• Short-term, temporary incapacity.
Long-term incapacity includes conditions that severely alter the intellectual abilities of
individuals, for example, Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) (J. F. Martin 2009). Usually, with
long-term incapacitated persons, physicians/medical teams tend not to have to solely
take on non-clinical decisions. More often, the decisions are made by close relatives, or
are based on the formerly expressed living wills of the persons concerned (J. F. Martin
2009).
Short-term incapacity occurs during temporary coma, or confused states, where there
is a prognosis of likely recovery to full capacity to consent. In such emergency cases,
healthcare professionals who require consent often refer to the tool called presumed
consent. According to J. F. Martin (2009), presumed consent is a type of consent, which
is constructed from the information available that has been gathered about the person.
It is a consent decision that a person would most likely make, if she were able to do so.
Often this decision is made by the healthcare professional, due to time-pressure, after
consultation with relatives and other professionals (J. F. Martin 2009).
strategies for cases of lack of consenting capacity
Paternalism
In the case of lack of consenting capacity, various strategies are available for both the
person concerned, and the clinician. One of the strategies is outlined by the term pater-
nalism. Paternalism is usually defined as acting for (the benefit of) others (J. F. Martin
2009), or best interest judgement (IBC 2008). Paternalism can be further categorised into
authoritarian paternalism and benevolent paternalism. Authoritarian paternalism is an
adverse form of paternalism within the physician-patient relationship, which, in the
long-term, undermines trust of the patient in the physician, as well as the empathy of
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the physician towards the patient. Benevolent paternalism, however, does not necessar-
ily infringe upon the correct physician-patient relationship. This form of paternalism is
guided by a fiduciary effort to find the appropriate treatment, which aims to protect the
person concerned (J. F. Martin 2009).
Advance Directives
Another available strategy in coping with the lack of capacity for self-determination of
an individual is the advance directive. Advance directives were formerly also known
as living wills (expressing the decisions about what kinds of treatments in particular
situations are and are not acceptable for a patient; IBC 2008); or previously expressed
wishes (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014). Both of these notions belong now to a wider notion
of advance directives, also called care planning (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014), or advance
decision (Consent to treatment – Capacity 2014). Advance directives are a type of a repre-
sentation and substitute decision-making (J. F. Martin 2009). Advance directives should
be made by adult persons when they are competent, and expressed prior to the moment
the persons become incompetent. Directives should not be subjected to any influence
or constraints from the family or environment. Advance directives should be valid for
a defined period of time (usually 3–5 years), and periodically renewed (IBC 2008). The
healthcare professionals sometimes face a problem when the advance directive of a per-
son is outdated. In these cases, the wish of the person might have changed. Another
common issue of advance directives is that they may contain hypothetical wishes re-
lated to outcomes that were considered unacceptable at the time of formulation but that
then become acceptable when the situation arises and the person is no longer considered
competent to change the advance directive (IBC 2008).
Most of the advance directives may be categorised into two groups. One type of ad-
vance directive contains instructions about a well-defined situation. These instructions
usually concern emergency situations, end of life decisions, and/or research activities.
The purpose of advance directives that specify the course of action in emergency situ-
ations is defined by the need to rapidly save the patient’s life. In cases when the treat-
ment needs to be administered to counteract an acute medical emergency, the person
concerned may be unconscious, too confused, or simply unable to validly consent to any
treatment. In such cases, a general approach is accepted: namely, that professional con-
viction should not override the expressed directive, which has been validly made prior
the emergency situation (e. g. a physician should not resuscitate a patient with a valid
DNR statement). Advance directives can be made that define a person’s willingness to
participate in research activities. Research with people, who are not conscious, with no
available advance directive or statement from her relatives and closest friends, is highly
controversial among the researchers (IBC 2008).
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The other type of advance directive provides instructions about proxy decision mak-
ers (IBC 2008). This form of advance directive is associated with the term, therapeutic
representative (J. F. Martin 2009), or continuing power of attorney (Gefenas and Tuzaite
2014). An advance directive about a proxy, who is delegated as a therapeutic represen-
tative of a person in situations of incapacity or unconsciousness, has to be authorised
by a competent adult. The therapeutic representative is entrusted to make decisions, in
favour (and the best interest) of the incapacitated person. Individuals often use this op-
tion to extend their autonomy beyond the conditions of incurable long-term, debilitating
diseases (e. g. AD, etc.). Designating a therapeutic representative is considered to be one
of the simplest forms of advance directive (J. F. Martin 2009), and its aim is to provide a
personal voice regarding the person’s preferences (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
Formal Requirements for Advance Directives
The forms of advance directives, being a relatively new instrument in the hands of in-
dividuals, are not strictly subject yet to specific formal conditions. They usually have to
include the will(s) of the person concerned (J. F. Martin 2009), namely, the expressed
instructions about the rejection or acceptance of medical and non-medical interven-
tions (IBC 2008), or designating a therapeutic representative authorised to make deci-
sions on behalf of the person. In exceptional cases, advance directives can be also made
orally (J. F. Martin 2009). If no advance directive is available, the professional has a duty
to obtain the opinions of the relatives. This procedure is also represented by the notion
of substitute decision. Substitute decisions are made based on inquiries directed at the le-
gal representative regarding what the person concerned would have chosen if she would
be competent. It is important to note that healthcare professionals should consider the
possibility that a person’s interests may conflict with the decision represented by her rel-
atives. In such cases, if the timeframe allows, a legal recourse may be available. Certain
legal systems provide or require that parties concerned opt for a decision adjudicated
by a court or civil judiciary authority (IBC 2008). Moreover, some legal systems have de-
veloped guidelines aimed at minimising the occurrence of these (distressing) situations.
The guidelines in Québec require, upon admission to a nursing home, a comprehensive
overview of the health status of every new resident, which is followed by a discussion
about the orientation of care with the individual and her family, aimed towards the
development of a personalised plan of intervention (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014).
Gefenas and Tuzaite (2014) discuss the difficulties related to the implementation of
advance directives. The institution of advance directive is not fully implemented in all
national jurisdictions. In the US, where the custom of using advance directives is the
most widespread, they are used by only 22 % of all the patients. Living wills remain the
most frequently used type of advance directive (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
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The potential conflict between the interests of the person and the decision made by
her relatives also raises a question about which decision should be followed. Therefore,
the binding character of advance directives needs to be established. Some countries pre-
fer the strong binding character of advance directives (e. g. Switzerland,16 Austria17),
while others do not, thus allowing healthcare professionals to follow their conscience.
Healthcare professionals in some cases have expressed their reluctance towards a strong
binding character of advance directives because it may contravene their professional de-
ontological duties (J. F. Martin 2009). Until recently, healthcare professionals considered
advanced directives as a helpful tool but they did not follow them strictly. Today, the
binding force of advance directives is more commonly accepted, and their violation re-
quires stringent and more imperative justification (IBC 2008). The Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine (1997), signed by the member States of the Council of Europe,
the other States and the European Union Member States, specifies in Art. 9 that “wishes
shall be taken into account” (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997). However,
this phrasing is insufficient for providing legally binding status to advance directives for
those states which signed and ratified the Convention. Due to this fact, the integration
of legally binding advance directives by European Member States is slow (Gefenas and
Tuzaite 2014).18
Analogous Ethical Issues During Incapability to Consent In Other Populational Subgroups
Various subpopulations exist within a healthcare setting, who have limited or no capabil-
ity to consent. The following paragraphs list specific details about these subpopulations,
in relation to their limited ability or disability to provide informed consent; circum-
stances which may be analogous with those of PwDs.
Stanton-Jean et al. (2014) pick two major subpopulations: children and seniors.
Neonates and children do not satisfy fully the criteria of capacity to consent. In these
instances, family members may be delegated the responsibility of deciding for the per-
son concerned. Unfortunately, some family members are not motivated to act in the best
interests of the person under their guardianship. In these cases, within certain legal sys-
16 J. F. Martin (2009)
17 In Austria, it is obligatory to take advance directives into account, after fulfilling certain criteria. These are
as follows (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014):
1. Consultation with the physician has been provided.
2. The formulation of advance directive has been supervised by a lawyer.
3. The treatments refused have been described in detail within the advance directive.
4. The document is signed by a person concerned not more than 5 years ago.
18 “[ . . . ] taking previously expressed wishes into account does not mean that they should necessarily be
followed” (Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, p. 15, § 62).
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tems, the state is able to intervene, by making the child a ward of the court.19 Such an
intervention engenders very negative consequences affecting the relationship between
the relatives (e. g. guardians) and the physicians. Therefore, such a step towards the pro-
tection of the person concerned should only be taken as a last resort (IBC 2008). A similar
institution of being designated as a ward of the court is also employed in relation with
PwDs without the competency to consent, where the guardians may not necessarily act
in the best interest of the incompetent person (Alzheimer Society of Ireland 2004). Just
as with children, the designation of ward of court should be used as a last resort, due to
its detrimental effects on the relationships between the (formal and informal) caregivers.
Since the famous Gillick-case,20 additional maturity tests21 have to be provided to chil-
dren by the healthcare professionals. Analogous to the competence tests administered to
PwDs, this poses an additional burden for the healthcare professionals. Maturity tests
for children should not be overly demanding, making them impossible to pass (IBC
2008). These requirements are, again, similar to the requirements for competence test-
ing of PwDs. Just as children should not be excluded from the consenting process, the
same applies to PwDs. In the case of legally incompetent persons (children, etc.), the
institution of assent is widely applied. While giving consent refers to an “agreement
to a proposal,” assent indicates only “agreement with a proposal” (Ashcroft et al. 2007,
p. 313). The former is a normatively-transformative act (in a sense of action), the latter
is a state of mind or attitude (in a form of feelings or thoughts; Ashcroft et al. 2007).
Assent is different from consent because it addresses the limitations in understanding of
a person. The process of requiring assent considers the mental capacities, levels of ma-
19 In UK healthcare professionals may refer such cases for ruling to the Court of Protection, which ensures
that the conditions and requirements described in Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2005) are fulfilled (Consent to
treatment – Capacity 2014).
20 The Gillick-case in UK was an appeal to the House of Lords in 1985. The case was initiated by Mrs Vic-
toria Gillick, who sued her local health authority (West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority) and
the Department of Health and Social Security in 1982. Mrs Gillick objected to the practice of prescribing
contraception for children (mature minors) aged 16 years and younger. Her argument was that physicians
do not have the right to prescribe contraceptives for children because they are unable to consent. More-
over, she argued, that the physicians may abuse their power in relation to the legal minor. The case was
initially rejected, but this decision was reversed upon appeal in 1984. The was then referred to the House of
Lords and Law Lords. The ruling in 1985 went against Mrs Gillick’s claim. The House of Lords considered
this case to be one fundamentally about the ability of a legal minor to provide consent, rather than about
parental rights. The judgement became legally binding in 1985 in England, Wales, and later on in Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 1985; Ashcroft et al.
2007; NSPCC 2015).
21 These tests are know as ‘Gillick competency’ or ‘Fraser guidelines.’ Gillick competence is described by
the ruling of the Law Lords, Lord Scarman, Lord Fraser and Lord Bridge, “[ . . . ] whether or not a child
is capable of giving the necessary consent will depend on the child’s maturity and understanding and
the nature of the consent required. The child must be capable of making a reasonable assessment of the
advantages and disadvantages of the treatment proposed, so the consent, if given, can be properly and fairly
described as true consent” (Willmott 2010, p. 126). Lord Fraser provided specific guidelines for physicians
on contraceptive advice to children under the age of 16. For the Fraser guidelines, see Willmott (2010,
pp. 126–127). The definition of competency in Gillick competence is used today and accepted in all areas
of medical treatment. The use of the Fraser guidelines also expanded to other areas of reproductive health,
including abortion (Willmott 2010).
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turity, and overall development of the person concerned. Assent is also accepted by the
“Declaration of Helsinki” (2013) as a valid way of including a person into the consenting
process (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). The fact that full competency has not been acquired
yet (children), or has been lost (dementia), seems to be morally irrelevant for the process
of assenting.
The second group of seniors can include clinically confused persons (including peo-
ple with (late-onset) AD; IBC 2008). They once enjoyed decision-making capacity, which
has since been lost. According to the IBC (2008), it is unethical to consider these incom-
petent persons less seriously than any other fully competent person. The reason is that
in cases of clinically confused persons, the healthcare professionals usually have much
more information available (e. g. values, preferences, life stories, wishes remembered by
others, etc.) about the person concerned than in cases with neonates (IBC 2008). More-
over, the vulnerability of such persons should not necessarily mean their exclusion from
the consent-giving process for their participation in research or therapy. For this reason,
in Canada, the healthcare professional is required to include questions assessing the feel-
ings of the participant about her inclusion into studies (Stanton-Jean et al. 2014). When
the confused person’s consent is impossible to obtain, instead of exclusively relying on
the proxy consent, the professionals should also engage in complementarily building
the whole life-picture of the incapacitated person. As mentioned earlier, it is more likely
that the answer to the decision can be found in such a substituted judgement than the
exclusive reliance on proxy consent (IBC 2008).
IBC (2008) lists additional subpopulations: people with learning difficulties, mentally
ill patients, and unconscious patients (IBC 2008). Learning difficulties usually arise from
some intellectual disability or mental illness. PwDs may also exhibit intellectual dis-
ability as a result of their mild cognitive impairment (MCI) (cf. Chapter 2). No simple
capacity to consent can be assumed from people with learning difficulties due to their
intellectual disability or mental illness. However, IBC (2008) emphasises that only in
extremely rare and serious cases are such persons unable to make a decision. Conse-
quently, just as in the case of confused persons, the duty of the healthcare professional
is to collect as much information as possible about the person with learning difficulty,
which will provide the necessary data for a substituted judgement. When the impair-
ment extends to such a scale that the would-be wishes of the person concerned are
impossible to ascertain the decision-making process has to fall back onto the best inter-
est standard (IBC 2008). Due to dementia being an irreversible gradually progressing
disease, it seems acceptable that the course of action for consenting must follow the
steps of:
1. Obtaining consent from the person if possible; and
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2. If not possible, trying to to develop a substitute or hypothetical judgement together
with family members and friends about the possible consent; and
3. If this is not achievable, to finally, decide based on the best interest of the person
concerned.
Concluding Remarks/Rules For Research with Incapable Persons
As a conclusion to the interpretation of Art. 7 in this section, it is useful to refer to
J. F. Martin (2009), where he reiterates the cardinal rules linked with this principle.
These rules concern essentially two areas: dignity of the vulnerable research participant
(Art. 7b), and the involvement of the person in the consenting process (Art. 7a).
Firstly, the paramount rule within research with incapable persons is that, for fulfill-
ing the requirement of respecting their human dignity as well as special vulnerability,
the research should involve either direct benefit to the participants, or at least a chance
of significant improvement of their conditions, while all the risks related to the research
activities are minimised as much as possible (J. F. Martin 2009). If none of the afore-
mentioned goals is achievable, then the research conducted must provide a significant
improvement in the scientific understanding of the condition, disease, or disorder of the
person concerned, or other persons within the same category of condition. This latter
type of activity should also not expose the person to excessive risk or burdens (Gefenas
and Tuzaite 2014). If the same research can be conducted with persons able to consent,
this research design should be preferred (J. F. Martin 2009). Research with incompetent
persons should be conducted only if there is no alternative, and only as an exception.
Research with incompetent persons requires specific authorisation for research activity
from the person concerned, in written form (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
Secondly, the participant’s involvement into research also extend to cases when she is
freely expressing her view of not participating in the research anymore. The withdrawal
of consent should be guaranteed at all times, if it does not result in an undesirable out-
come for the person concerned (J. F. Martin 2009). However, this places the healthcare
professionals into difficult situations because children often express their aversion to-
wards treatments administered with syringes, e. g. vaccinations, or local anaesthesia. The
refusal of participation and treatment is another paramount rule requiring respect. Even
an incapable person may validly refuse participation in a research study. The require-
ments for intellectual capacity, including judgement, in cases of refusal are generally
less strict than those required for providing consent to participate in research. However,
small signs of opposition (e. g. gesture, weeping, fear from hospitals, etc.) should not im-
mediately be considered as refusals. As a guiding rule, it should be borne in mind that
the more adverse the effect of withdrawing from a study, the stricter the requirements
should be toward the capacity of judgement of the withdrawing individual. Any failure
to respect autonomy, however limited, should be minimised, while the consideration of
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the person’s whole situation (history, circumstances, previous care) should determine
the best way of preserving the participant’s integrity, health, and dignity (J. F. Martin
2009).
6.2 policy documents and academic literature
The global recognition of the requirement for informed consent is a result of the adop-
tion of certain international documents. A few of them have now become legally binding.
These documents, without exception, confirm the sine qua non condition of informed con-
sent in medical therapy and research (Kollek 2009).
6.2.1 Policy Documents
Before providing the overview of the fundamental policy documents regarding in-
formed consent, it should be noted that the policy of obtaining consent in the Republic
of Ireland is regulated by National Consent Policy (2013). This defines consent as “the
giving of permission or agreement for an intervention, receipt or use of a service or
participation in research following a process of communication about the proposed in-
tervention” (National Consent Policy 2013, p. 20). The following sections provide a closer
look at the documents that lead to the birth of policy documents such as the National
Consent Policy (2013).
6.2.1.1 The Nuremberg Code (1947)
The first appearance of the requirement of informed consent in a legally binding doc-
ument was in Germany, between 1891–1900. In 1891, the Prussian Minister of Interior
Affairs issued a directive to all prisons, in which he specified that tuberculosis treatment
must not be administered against the will of the patient. After the Neisser case,22 in the
year 1900, the Prussian Minister for Religious, Educational, and Medical Affairs issued
another directive to all hospitals and clinics in the country. This excluded all minor or
otherwise non-competent persons from participation in non-therapeutic clinical studies,
and necessitated that those involved must have provided “unambiguous consent” af-
ter the proper disclosure about the negative consequences of the study (Vollmann and
Winau 1996, p. 1446).
22 Albert Neisser (1855–1916) was a Prussian professor of dermatology and venerology at the University of
Breslau, who conducted studies on the treatment of syphilis. For the development of an effective vaccination
he injected a cell free serum into patients, who were mostly prostitutes, admitted with other medical
conditions. The vaccination, after a public outcry on cca. 600 cases collected by a psychiatrist Albert Moll,
was deemed as ‘unsuccessful.’ In 1898 the Royal Disciplinary Court condemned the activities of Neisser.
The main argument was not the questionable scientific background of the studies but the lack of consent
from the patients (Vollmann and Winau 1996).
209
6.2 policy documents and academic literature
The first international appearance of the requirement for informed consent was in
“The Nuremberg Code (1947)” (1996),23 which was a reaction to the controversial and
criminal research activities conducted during the Third Reich. After the end of World
War II, the tribunal at Nuremberg defined in the first paragraph of the code the ab-
solutely essential nature of the voluntary consent from a human participant in any
type of medical experiment. The tribunal stressed that “any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, overreaching,” “constraint” or “coercion” should not be part of valid
consent (“The Nuremberg Code (1947)” 1996, § 1). Also, the participant “should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension about the elements” of the study (nature, du-
ration, purpose, method, and meaning of the experiment) involved (“The Nuremberg
Code (1947)” 1996, § 1). This includes the knowledge of any inconveniences, hazards,
and effects, which should be expected. The duty and responsibility for ascertaining that
the consent is valid rests upon the “individual who initiates, directs or engages in the
experiment” and it cannot be delegated to anybody else (“The Nuremberg Code (1947)”
1996, § 1).
The requirement for valid informed consent decision has, since 1947, been incorpo-
rated into every important ethical guideline and legal instrument. However, its strin-
gency caused considerable issues. “The Nuremberg Code (1947)” (1996) delegitimised
research with human beings incapable of providing consent. This requirement had to
be later liberalised, to provide opportunities to find effective treatments for incompetent
persons. As noted by Gefenas and Tuzaite (2014), the most important consecutive profes-
sional and legal guidelines (e. g. UDBHR (2005) in Art. 7b, Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine (1997) in Art. 17, and CIOMS (2002) in Guideline 9) includes an alterna-
tive algorithm for ‘bypassing’ the strict rule phrased by “The Nuremberg Code (1947)”
(1996). Their development occurred by implementing two novelties: the two steps of lib-
eralisation of the requirement for informed consent, and the specification of the low-risk
standard of the balancing approach (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
The strict rule of the Nuremberg Code obstructed the development of therapeutic pro-
cesses and medications, and hampered research of novel approaches for people affected
by some of the most serious conditions. The first step in liberalisation was established
by the “Declaration of Helsinki” (1964). The authors of this declaration, the WMA rep-
resenting physicians, proposed a distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
research. While the latter remained prohibited in the “Declaration of Helsinki” (1964),
therapeutic research with people who are not competent to provide consent became
possible. Despite the introduction of this distinction, early phase research, i. e. where
the direct benefits to the participant remain questionable, was still problematic. There-
fore, further liberalisation of the Nuremberg Code’s rule for consent was needed. In the
1990s, with strict safeguards, the possibility of research without direct benefit to the par-
23 Also called the Doctors’ Trial or the ‘Medical Case’ (Human and Fluss 2001).
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ticipant was gradually accepted. These safeguards usually extend to circumstances that
such research must significantly contribute to better understanding of either the individ-
ual’s condition, or to the overall knowledge about that disease or disorder. Furthermore,
research without direct benefit must pose only minimal risk and minimal burden to the
research participant. Finally, the research participant must provide a valid consent for
participating in such study (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
The second attempt to alleviate the stringent rules of obtaining consent from incapac-
itated people occurred through balancing the principles of informed consent and the
risk-benefit ratio. The difficulty of obtaining informed consent in certain cases was ad-
dressed by focusing on other ethical principles and values during the decision-making
process. As a result of these attempts, a so-called ‘low-risk’ standard was developed.
The low-risk standard ensured that, during research with persons of limited capability
to consent, the research should not exceed the risks that are likely to be experienced
during routine examinations (CIOMS 2002).24 The low-risk standard is one of the most
important complex developments within the field of bioethics related to incapable per-
sons (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
6.2.1.2 Documents of International Biomedical Communities
Two documents from international biomedical communities became very influential in
the second half of the 20th century. One of them was the “Declaration of Helsinki” (1964),
a legally not binding document originally issued by the WMA, which has undergone
seven revisions (“Declaration of Helsinki” 2013).25 Paragraphs 25–32 deal with the re-
quirement of informed consent. The Declaration stipulates the following:
“In medical research involving human subjects capable of giving informed
consent, each potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims,
methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, institutional
affiliations of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential risks of
the study and the discomfort it may entail, post-study provisions and any
other relevant aspects of the study.”26 (“Declaration of Helsinki” 2013, § 26)
Paragraph 26 requires compliance with all the standards of valid consent for conducting
research on participants (adequate information, aims, methods of the study, sources of
24 The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) uses in this regard the term “minimal risk” (Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, Art. 17), which is further exemplified in the Explanatory Report to
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) as taking blood sample, making X-ray and ultrasonic
scans, etc. (Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, § 111–113).
25 An informative summary of the historical development of the “Declaration of Helsinki” between 1964–2013
can be found in Human and Fluss (2001, pp. 4–6).
26 The phrase “capable of giving consent” was introduced in “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013) instead of the
phrase “competent human subjects” in the earlier version Declaration of Helsinki (2008). This statement is
valid also to other sections of the “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013) respectively.
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funding, etc.). Paragraph 29 introduces the standard of seeking assent from incapaci-
tated participants in addition to the consent provided by the legal representative of the
person concerned. Paragraph 30 further defines the standard of research involving peo-
ple incapable of providing consent. According to this paragraph, such research may be
conducted only if the lack-of-competence condition is a necessary characteristic of the
research group. In this case, the researcher is obliged to seek consent from the legally
authorised representative. Interestingly, if no authorisation from the representative of
the incapacitated person is available, the “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013) allows the re-
searchers to proceed with the study. The only condition for such a practice is approval
from the Research Ethics Committee (REC), with the inability to provide consent ex-
plicitly stated in the research protocol. The researcher must obtain consent as soon as
the participant is capable of consenting, or as soon as the legal representative is avail-
able (“Declaration of Helsinki” 2013).
Although one of the general provisions is the statement of the responsibility of the re-
searcher for the protection of the participants (§ 9), the “Declaration of Helsinki” (2013)
provides one of the softest and most liberal requirements for seeking consent from par-
ticipants lacking capacity to consent.
The other document, the International Ethical Guidelines For Biomedical Research Involv-
ing Human Subjects, was issued by Council for International Organizations of Medical
Sciences (CIOMS) in 2002. Guideline 8 contains recommendations regarding research
with capable persons. It states that the risks and burdens of the study must be minimised,
the interventions involved should be reasonable and proportionate to the knowledge
gained. Guideline 9 defines the ‘low-risk’ standard of research interventions as ones
that should not incur risks that are greater than the risks linked with routine medical
or psychological interventions. However, the guideline has a more liberal approach to-
wards overcoming this recommendation. Slight or minor increase above the ‘low risk’
standard is permissible, if there is a strong enough scientific or medical rationale, or
if there is approval from the local REC. Guideline 4 deals with individual informed
consent. Guidelines 13 and 15 provide recommendations and commentaries for con-
ducting research with vulnerable persons, and persons incapable of providing valid
consent (CIOMS 2002).
6.2.1.3 Documents of the European Union and the Council of Europe
The documents agreed by the Member States of the Council of Europe (and legally bind-
ing to the Member States of the European Union who have already ratified them) include
two documents. The first of them is the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(1997), also called the Oviedo Convention. The Convention comes with an Explanatory
Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) which helps to inter-
pret the provisions of the Convention. Since then an Additional Protocol to the Convention
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on Human Rights and Biomedicine (2005) has been published, further specifying research
interventions on human beings that are carried out following the provisions of the Con-
vention.
The second document presented in this section is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
(2000/C 364/01) (2000), since then updated to EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2012/C
326/02) (2007).
convention on human rights and biomedicine (1997)
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with re-
gard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
also known as the EC’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997), presents the
first international legally binding document for the Member States of the European
Union on the topics of biomedicine and research. The entire Chapter II is dedicated to
tackling the issues of informed consent, and Art. 6–9 especially delineate protection of
persons unable to provide consent (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997).
According to Gefenas and Tuzaite (2014), the Convention provides a comprehensive
framework regarding incapable persons. Firstly, if needed, it encourages the European
Member States to introduce the substituted decision-making process during the provi-
sion of care. The standard of transferring the decision-making authority to a represen-
tative includes the requirement for the provision of the same amount of information to
the legal representative, as it would have been provided to the patient herself (Art. 6.4;
Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
Secondly, it requires that the healthcare professionals involve the person lacking the
capacity to consent in the decision-making procedure as much as possible (Art. 6.3). This
includes involvement through previously expressed wishes, life goals, values, or other
relevant information disclosed by the incapacitated person (Art. 9; Gefenas and Tuzaite
2014).
Thirdly, the risk-benefit ratio should be considered in the competency assessment for
medical therapy and research, which is also called the ‘sliding scale’ of competence eval-
uation. This holds that the higher the benefit ratio for the person (e. g. life-prolonging
intervention), the more stringent the assessment of competency for refusal should be of
the person, whose capacity is questioned (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
In emergency situations, any medically necessary interventions can be carried out, if it
provides an immediate benefit to the person who is unable to consent (Art. 8). In the case
of capable persons, the Convention allows for a higher level of risk (Art. 16.ii) than in
the case of persons incapable to consent (Art. 17.2). This is called ‘acceptable risk’ in non-
therapeutic research on capable persons. With persons unable to provide consent, only
research with the potential of real and direct benefit to their health is allowed (Art. 17.1.ii,
while fulfilling special conditions in accordance with Art. 17.2), which means that only
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research with lower levels of risk are acceptable. The Additional Protocol to the Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine (2005) defines the concept of minimal risk as “very
slight and temporary negative impact on the health of the person concerned” (Additional
Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 2005, Art. 17.1). This includes
procedures such as taking saliva or small amount of tissue samples, taking blood, one X-
ray exposure, or undergoing MRI without contrast medium (Gefenas and Tuzaite 2014).
charter of fundamental rights of the european union (2000)
Along with the Oviedo Convention, other documents of the European Union play impor-
tant role in interpreting informed consent. One of these is the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights (2000/C 364/01), which stipulates, in Art. 3.1, the right to respect for one’s physi-
cal and mental integrity. Art. 3.2 acknowledges, amongst others, “the free and informed
consent of the person concerned” in the fields of medicine and biology (EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights (2000/C 364/01) 2000). Additionally, the EU Clinical Trials Directive
(2001/20/EC) (2004) explicitly mentions in Art. 5 all the requirements regarding informed
consent for clinical trials on incapacitated adults (EU Clinical Trials Directive (2001/20/EC)
2004). These regulations are mandatory and extend to all the European Member States.
6.2.1.4 UNESCO documents
Before the UDBHR (2005), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga-
nization (UNESCO) issued two influential documents, which refer to the standard of
informed consent: Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997),
and International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003).
universal declaration on the human genome and human rights (1997)
The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) defines in Art. 5b
the requirements of informed consent (prior, free, informed, or consent from legal rep-
resentative). Art. 5c ensures the right not to be informed. Art. 9 lists the conditions that
allow limitations of the requirement to obtain consent. These limitations can only be
applied, if they are prescribed by law, for compelling reasons, within the limits of pub-
lic international law and the law of human rights (Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights 1997).
international declaration on human genetic data (2003)
The other document of UNESCO is the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data
(2003). Art. 8 of this Declaration defines the necessary requirements for obtaining in-
formed consent, and the limitations of this requirement (by domestic law, consistent
214
6.2 policy documents and academic literature
with international law and human rights). Art. 9 defines the conditions under which con-
sent may be withdrawn. Finally, Art. 10 reiterates the right to decide not to be informed
about research results by an individual (International Declaration on Human Genetic Data
2003).
6.2.2 Academic Literature
The central role of informed consent is evident in the academic literature regarding
informed consent, which is extensive. However, there are certain ethical issues, which
refer very specifically to the particular conditions of PwDs that cannot be described suf-
ficiently even with the detailed interpretation of the UDBHR principles. Moreover, many
of these ethical issues are still open, and hence constitute current academic disputes.
This section focuses on essential ethical issues that are particular to PwDs regarding
informed consent. Particular aspects of these ethical issues were not mentioned during
the interpretation of Art. 6 or Art. 7. However, they received specific attention in the
scholarly debate, while these may be also relevant in relation with informed consent of
PwDs. These ethical issues are categorised in the following larger groups: the issue of
informed consent in relation to research with placebo or placebo-effect; advance direc-
tives of PwDs; research with PwDs; informed consent and the involvement of ICT; and
ethical issues related to therapy with PwDs.
Other topics often discussed in the academic literature focused on issues, such as
PwDs’ decision-making competence in driving a motor vehicle (Johansson and Lund-
berg 2008), holding firearms (Pinholt et al. 2014; Johansson and Lundberg 2008), finan-
cial affairs (Fountoulakis and Despos 2008) or voting in elections (Appelbaum, Bonnie,
et al. 2005; Regan et al. 2011; Fukuyama 2003) will be omitted in this section.
6.2.2.1 Informed Consent and the Use of Placebos
The topic of informed consent is closely related to the issue of using placebos during
research studies. Placebos are defined as inert substances or treatments, used both in
treatment and clinical research (Louhiala and Puustinen 2008).27 The term placebo-effect
is the result of all verbal, non-verbal, and rituals of therapy, which efficacy cannot be
derived from pharmacological or physiological interventions (Miller and Colloca 2011).
Art. 6 does not explicitly specify the role of informed consent in the delivery or use of
27 The use of the term of placebo in the academic literature manifests remarkable variations. In its narrow
meaning, the term placebo represents a deliberate deception (both in research and therapy) of a person
by claiming the effectivity of a treatment, despite all the available evidence against any effect. Similarly,
placebo is called also when a treatment lacks any evidence of being beneficial for the given condition
but it had been prescribed in good faith. The information about the prescription of an inert substance
or treatment disclosed to the patient is also called placebo. Finally, genuine informed consent in research
settings today means that the research participant understands that, after randomisation, she may have
received placebo (Louhiala and Puustinen 2008).
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placebo during treatment or research. However, studies involving AAL technologies and
other ICT devices may have outcomes, which can be identified with a placebo-effect.
If one considers an analogy of a child and her ‘security-blanket,’ the child derives
comfort and feelings of security from the presence of a blanket, which is inert. Simi-
larly, the simple presence of non-functional robots or companion toys (Broekens et al.
2009) may be found comforting enough for the person to enhance one’s subjective feel-
ings of security, akin to the effect of (active) care-robots. The best example of the latter
may be the well-publicised robotic harp seal PARO (comPAnion RObot), which inter-
actively responds and expresses emotions to a patient, just as a real animal during an
animal-assisted therapy (Burton 2013). These therapies have demonstrated noticeable re-
duction of emotional, behavioural, and psychological symptoms by lowering agitation
levels and improving the mood of PwDs (Burton 2013). However, the validity of these
treatments may be still questioned because they are assumed to have placebo-effects or
novelty-effects, demand characteristics, experimenter expectancy effects, or informant
bias (Burton 2013).28
Alongside the question of validity, the consideration of such carebots (and other analo-
gous AAL technologies) functioning as placebos, may trigger ethical issues of deception,
whereby the PwDs are deceived into believing that the carebots are providing real care
based on love and respect. A further ethical issue in this situation is whether a positive
risk-benefit assessment may overrule the requirement and responsibilities of researchers
or physicians for proper information disclosure about a research study or treatment.
Since the ethical assessment of the use of placebos in research and therapy is still open
often with conflicting standpoints (Broekens et al. 2009), at this point of the interpreta-
tion it must suffice that AAL technologies are not bare from this ethical issue.
6.2.2.2 Advance Directives of PwDs
Ethicists reflected in particular on various novel methods of obtaining informed con-
sent from incapacitated persons. One of the method is the advance directive, which has
recently been discussed extensively in the academic literature.
A study by Fazel et al. (1999) suggested that only 20 % of PwDs were competent
enough to complete their advance directives, compared with a group of relatively
healthy elderly volunteers, whose capacity rate was around 78 %. They concluded that
only a relatively small proportion of PwDs diagnosed with dementia are competent
enough to complete advance directives (those with higher premorbid intelligence). More-
over, they found that competence was affected by aspects of higher intellectual func-
28 The positive effect of companion robots in therapy of PwDs may support the claim of Louhiala and Puusti-
nen (2008), which says that within the clinical therapy the use of the term ‘placebo’ should be exchanged
with ‘care effect.’ The positive effect of these devices on the PwDs cannot be fully explained, nevertheless
their beneficial effect on care is very real (Louhiala and Puustinen 2008).
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tioning, which are not fully assessed by the Mini-Mental State Examinations (MMSE)
test (Fazel et al. 1999).
It is important to remark that not long ago, physicians believed that a diagnosis of
dementia automatically rendered PwDs incompetent in expressing their advance direc-
tives (about 72 % in an US survey (Fazel et al. 1999). As noted earlier, the competence of
PwDs is not a binary, all-or-nothing switch (Fountoulakis and Despos 2008). The find-
ings of Fazel et al. (1999) shed light on the importance of determining specific dementia
subtypes. Different dementia subtypes affect different areas of the brain, and therefore,
different functions. Knowing which functions can be affected helps healthcare profes-
sionals and researchers identify which PwDs could be considered competent (Foun-
toulakis and Despos 2008).
the problem of ‘bad’ decisions of pwds
Fountoulakis and Despos (2008) also highlight problems encountered by healthcare pro-
fessionals when faced with a persons’ ‘bad’ decisions. The making of a ‘bad’ decision
should not automatically mean that the person or PwD making the decision lacks any
specific capacity, or competence. Both family members and healthcare professionals are
supposed to avoid ‘protecting’ a PwD from the her ‘bad’ decisions, when she is found
to be competent (Fountoulakis and Despos 2008, p. 72).
acting in the best interest of pwds
If healthcare professionals attempt to act against the wishes or desires of the PwD, they
may still interpret their actions to be in the ‘best interest’ of the PwD. As Holm (2001)
remarks, such an option creates more problems than it solves. For the application of the
‘best interest’ standard, one has to establish the following pre-conditions (Holm 2001):
• An a priori assumption of the person’s (in this case, PwD) incompetency to make
a decision within the given context.
• Create a definition of ‘best interest’, not only for the case of incompetence of PwD
but also for the cases of competent but irrational decisions.
Both of these pre-conditions are unacceptable in the debate about autonomy in bioethics
and health law. It would mean that PwDs would be the only class of people for who
would not be enabled to make occasionally foolish decisions (Holm 2001).
hurdles with the use of advance directives for pwds
Authenticity as a Link Between the Past – Present – Future
Hughes (2008) argues for the broadest possible view of a person and her capacity re-
garding advance directives. The assessment of competence should be interpreted not as
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a legal exercise of examining the decision-making capacity; instead, it should represent
a more evaluative interpretation, which involve a person’s subjective narratives (Hughes
2008).
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2005), which has been in force since 2007 in England and
Wales, determines that an advanced decision is invalid if a) a person has done anything
that is inconsistent with the previous decision, and b) there have been essential changes
in circumstances, which had been not anticipated when the refusal of treatment in the
advance decision was made (Hughes 2008). Advance directives encompass serious prob-
lems, when their authors aim to achieve a continuous link between the past – present –
and future. The advance directive is a decision made in the present, about the eventual
refusal of a treatment in the future. The aim is to control the future, thereby attempting
to expand the autonomy of a person to the time when she will not be able to express her
will directly to the healthcare professional. However, present wishes can be different to
wishes in the future, when the person has no capacity to change her advance directive.
The healthcare professional has no means of knowing the person’s actual wishes.
Therefore, Hughes (2008) proposes that for such cases, one should take into account,
firstly, the authenticity29 of the PwD’s personal and narrative story, and secondly, the
whole context of the person. The authenticity of a personal history means an appropri-
ate understanding of person’s life-story, so one is able to make the right decision, which
would be in accordance with the person’s narrative. Hughes (2008) remarks that any de-
tail might be interpreted as relevant. Also, a decision in an advance directive represents
a more elaborate story of a person’s life when it is renewed regularly (e. g. on an annual
basis) over a long period of time (e. g. the last twenty years), with the views represented
in it discussed thoroughly with the family and close friends regularly. Such a habit
of advance directive updating represents a more decisive connection between the past
and the present of a person’s narrative. Hence, the eventual decision of the healthcare
professional based on such an advance directive can be a justifiable end to a person’s
story. The authenticity of advance directives does not always need to be ‘reasonable’ or
‘rational’ (Hughes 2008).
29 Gefenas and Tuzaite (2014) also mention a criticism regarding the system of protection of incapable persons,
which is embraced in Art. 7 of the UDBHR. This criticism concerns the one-sided view of the minimalist-
libertarian interpretation of personal autonomy. The problem with the minimalist-libertarian account of
autonomy is that it provides a reductionist view on the relationship between the healthcare professional
and the person concerned. This very complex relationship cannot be represented by a simple contractual
relationship of two ‘strangers.’ The minimalist-libertarian interpretation ignores the general caring attitude
of the healthcare professionals, which is essential in relationships with vulnerable persons. The account
of autonomy as authenticity is mentioned as a counterpart to the libertarian interpretation of this relation-
ship. This alternative interpretation goes beyond the minimalist-libertarian understanding of autonomy by
focusing on the authenticity of the decision-making process of the person. Every single decision of the
person is imprinted with their values and whole personal life-story. Personal decisions should not be made
solely on rational grounds and explicit facts. Interpreting the decision-making process based on authen-
ticity means placing importance on personal motivations of the person concerned. Additionally, external
signs expressed both by the professional or the person concerned bear special significance (Gefenas and
Tuzaite 2014).
218
6.2 policy documents and academic literature
Additionally, the context in which the person is embedded is also important: one’s
personal and narrative story is embedded in social, cultural, historical, legal, moral and
spiritual realms, which aspects often overlap. The last stages of dementia are often ac-
companied with the lack or impossibility of rational, verbal, or emotional communica-
tion. Even in such a grave circumstances, one can express one’s wishes through bodily
interactions (Hughes 2008).
To be able to recognise the authenticity of the end of a person’s life, one must be a) at-
tuned to the person’s narrative, especially to its (subjective) normative nature, b) engaged
with the person’s normative nature, and c) respectful to the remaining embodied agent.
Only by following these requirements would it be possible to make a decision, about
the end of a person’s life, which would be in accordance with that person’s wishes and
at the same time, be a morally right decision (Hughes 2008).
Although these requirements can provide a better understanding of the wishes of the
person concerned, the compliance with them may be problematic. One of the reasons of
introducing AAL technologies is the empowerment of PwDs by enabling their indepen-
dent living, so that the ever increasing need for healthcare professionals can be better
organised. The increasing number of patients for a decreasing number of healthcare
professional renders the examination and interpretation of authenticity and personal
narrative story of individuals unlikely. This regrettable forecast is not likely to change
by the introduction of ICT devices because a correct interpretation of one’s personal
life-narrative cannot be delegated to a machine-automatisation.
Rupture Between Current and Previous Desires
Holm (2001) considers the possibilities regarding the connection of the PwD’s current
desires and her previous desires expressed in the pre-demented state. Dementia does not
only modify the connection, with its short- and long-term memory loss, between desires
and the objective state of world; it also changes one’s assessment of the consequences of
decisions and actions (Holm 2001).
Empirical observations also suggest that the desires of PwDs fluctuate, between those
of their ‘old selves’ and those of their ‘confused selves,’ which can be unconnected
to their previous selves. There is considerable ambiguity in assessing their authentic
desires. Holm (2001) distinguishes two possible results from such an assessment of au-
thentic desires:
• An authentic desire fits the image of the old self, but is not connected to the former
personality of the PwD.
• An authentic desire not only fits, but is also connected to the former personality of
the PwD.
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The former scenario means that the desire would be coincidentally acceptable for the
caregiver to accept/approve, however it would lack the connection with the person’s
psychology or narrative. This would raise doubts regarding its authenticity. The latter
scenario is more desirable; although there may be issues regarding the confirmation of
the connection with the former personality. Moreover, it would remain unclear, which
types of psychological or narrative connections should be taken seriously, and which
might be overridden. Even if one is able to divine the truly authentic desire of a PwD,
one will face serious practical issues in applying the account of authentic desires on
concrete decisions (Holm 2001).
A rather extreme solution for addressing the aforementioned issues would be to apply
the pure ‘best interest’ standard30 to every case of a PwD. Such a solution would bring
negative consequences like restricting one’s desires only to beneficial ones, to desires
that have been assessed by somebody else, or to simply inconsequential ones. PwDs
would then be a class of people that would not be able to occasionally make a reckless
decision. In this case, the PwD’s assessment of her best interest would be valued as
always less than the assessment of any other group of people. This might result in
psychological or physical coercion, which is unlikely to restore one’s sense of self (except
in the sense of being a powerless self; Holm 2001). Another extreme solution would be to
follow only and exclusively the advance directives of the patient. This is called the Pure
Autonomy Argument (PAA; Muramoto 2011). The foundation of this argument is based
on the human dignity of the person, her autonomy for making decisions. This translates
into always following previously expressed decisions to the full extent. In these cases,
the contemporaneous interests might often conflict with earlier wishes expressed in
advance directives (Muramoto 2011).31
30 Muramoto (2011) calls this Pure Beneficence Argument (PBA).
31 A similar discussion took place between the political philosophers, Ronald Dworkin, Rebecca Dresser, and
Seana Valentine Shiffrin. Dworkin defines two sets of interests that every mature human being formulates
within her lifetime: a) experiential interests, which are actions that one simply likes to do, and without which
life would be preposterous (e. g. playing football, cooking, eating well, etc.); b) critical interests, which are
convictions that reflect one’s ideas about good life, without which, one’s life would be worse (e. g. having
close relationships with one’s children, etc.). When an advance directive is being drafted, these critical in-
terests are usually emphasised, defining how one should be treated in the case of incompetence. Therefore,
according to Dworkin, advance directives represent the true competent person’s wishes and wills, even in
situations when one is not able to exercise these faculties anymore (Dworkin 1993). This view has been
challenged by Dresser (1995) and Shiffrin (2004), whose main objections are that Dworkin’s view denies
the person the knowledge about a treatment and the access to relevant information that might emerge
since the finalisation of the advance directive. Dworkin’s approach does not leave any room for changes
of heart, clarification of misunderstanding, etc.; nor are the decision-makers forced to explain and defend
their choices. Dworkin counts on the idea that the person before and during dementia are the same per-
sons. As such, Dworkin opposes the personal identity theory, which interprets the appearance of major
psychological changes as the emergence of a new, different person. Furthermore, Dworkin’s perception
does not allow for any kind of surprise ending. This fact seems to imply that a general non-treatment
standard should be adopted for any mental impairment (Dresser 1995). Finally, Dworkin’s approach does
not provide sufficient reasons to not respect the contemporary wishes of PwDs (Shiffrin 2004). For further
comments, also see Groves (2006) and Muramoto (2011). This discussion highlights that the best interest
standard raises difficulties from both ethical and legal perspectives.
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The opposition of these two approaches is unsolvable through purely ethical analysis
because they unavoidably incorporate metaphysical interpretations of the person and
her identity before and after the onset of dementia. Therefore, until these metaphysical
reflections are backed by more empirical analysis, the question of exclusive guidance
based on either the best interest standard or the advance directive remains ethically
unresolvable. However, as mentioned in earlier sections of this chapter, this does not
mean that legal guidelines are not in force (see the examples of Switzerland and Austria
in footnotes 17–16).
principled compromise
Huxtable (2012) also recognises the complexities regarding conflict between self-
determination of incompetent persons and the beneficence standard regarding their care.
He describes the clash of values imposed by these ethical principles as principled con-
flict: on the one hand one has to respect the person’s autonomy and self-determination,
on the other hand the healthcare professional or family proxy is required, and often
want, to act in the best interest of the person (Huxtable 2012).
Often these competing moral perspectives are based on life-experiences and com-
mitments of the persons involved, religious views and other values gained and lived
throughout one’s life. Therefore, it is extremely hard to find a termination of such con-
flict. Huxtable (2012) proposes the framework of principled compromise, a form of resolu-
tion that is based on certain principles acceptable for both parties during the decisive
process. Principled compromise is “achieved in relation to conflicts of principle, in a
manner which is itself also principled” (Huxtable 2012, p. 126).
Huxtable (2012) differentiates between necessary preconditions of principled compro-
mise, and fundamental rules that lead to the formulation of compromise. The former
he calls driving elements of compromise, the latter governing elements of compro-
mise (Huxtable 2012).
The necessary reasons for discussing and forming a principled compromise is
founded on the following six considerations (Huxtable 2012):
• Prudence serves as a starting point to the quest for any compromise, especially in
situations where the omission of such compromise would lead to terrible conse-
quences. Being part of the decision-making process may lead to losing of certain
important positions but it may also leave open the possibilities for gaining some
new ones. The other option would be only staying away from the decision-making
process, and at the end being dissatisfied with any of the decision that has been
made.
• The scarcity of resources poses unavoidable limitations to our decision-making
processes, which enforces the seeking of reasonable and necessary compromise.
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• The circumstances of the situation may require the need for decision because not
acting would result in an even worse consequence. These situations often cannot
be avoided, and morally encourage the decision-making parties to seek a compro-
mise.
• Coexistence in peace is a basic requirement for any society, howsoever short the
interaction between the parties lasts.
• Empirical and metaphysical uncertainty keeps certain questions regarding knowl-
edgeability and existence open (cf. see the discussion about whether the PwD in a
more advanced stage of dementia is a ‘new’ person, or not). Despite the advances
in medical and other scientific disciplines will provide many answers in the fu-
ture, it is unlikely that the remaining metaphysical and empirical uncertainties
will render the search for compromise obsolete.
• The moral and conceptual complexity of problematic situations should unavoidably
render the decision-making parties to reflect upon and consider the arguments of
the opposing party. The unavoidability of this feature is based on the empirical
and metaphysical uncertainties of existence. Sincere and intelligent arguments of
both parties, followed by the virtue of humility, should accomplish this.
The morality of compromise has three conditions or virtues, which governs the parties
towards reaching a compromise (Huxtable 2012):
• Parties should advance reflective moral stands, by allowing others to rise important
arguments. These arguments should reflect considered moral stands of reasonable
and intelligent people, not their biases or prejudices.
• Parties should be reliable, basing their discussion on trustworthiness, good faith,
and sincerity.
• Parties seeking compromise should also communicate respectfully with each other.
This limitation should results in effective communication. Other terms like toler-
ance, mutuality, cooperation, democratic spirit, or reciprocity are all linked with
respectful communication.
All these criteria ensure that during the discussions about seeking compromise the par-
ties will recognise each other as morally autonomous agents, thus working in coopera-
tion towards a commonly shared resolution of the moral conflict. What Huxtable (2012)
further emphasises is that, within the particular practice in UK, the decisions of courts
should be supported by a greater ethical engagement of ethical committees to serve as
mediators during the process of seeking principled compromise (Huxtable 2012).
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Applying the principled compromise framework to particular cases of PwDs may
be especially helpful. Principled compromise can be applied to cases when the self-
determination and autonomy of an incapacitated person is expressed in advance di-
rectives, however, this preference is questioned or precarious to apply due to welfarist
(i. e. best interest) concerns. Principled compromise may be helpful for every party in-
volved: healthcare professionals, proxies, or other legally authorised representatives.
6.2.2.3 Research with PwDs
In this section the following topics, present in the academic literature, related to research
with PwDs will be presented: the ‘conspiracy of silence’ phenomenon regarding PwDs;
the so-called ‘grey zone’ of informed consent of PwDs; motivations of PwDs for partic-
ipation in research studies; the recommendations of Alzheimer Europe for conducting
research with PwDs; the rolling informed consent procedure; and finally the topic of
delayed consent and its possible applicability in relation with PwDs.
the ‘conspiracy of silence’ phenomenon
Groves (2006) emphasises that research conducted on PwDs, in search of pathogenic and
clinical foundations of the disease, often offer no therapeutic benefit for the research
participant. Phase I studies in particular involve the administration of investigational
medication to participants in increasing dosages, in order to test the drug’s toxicity.
Although, these drugs may carry a potential for benefit (recognition for researchers,
profit for drug companies, etc.), the participants receive no direct health benefit (beyond
the fulfilment of their altruistic motivations). Groves (2006) warns that there might be
a “conspiracy of silence” about the phenomenon where the research results favour, to
some extent, the interests of the researchers rather than those of the participants (Groves
2006, p. 20). Moreover, if participants and proxies were consistently informed about
the lack of therapeutic benefits in Phase I studies, there is a danger that the enrolment
rates would decline. This contributes to the controversial nature of clinical research on
cognitively impaired older adults (Groves 2006).
‘grey zone’ of pwds’ consent – assessment of competency to consent
A prerequisite of obtaining valid informed consent for therapy or research with PwDs is
the assessment of the PwDs’ competency to consent. During therapy or research, PwDs
may find themselves in a ‘grey zone’ between competency and incompetency.32 This
‘grey zone’ is specific to PwDs with early stage or mild dementia. They might have
32 Bowman (2008) uses the expression “grey hinterland” (e. g. somewhere in between capacity and incapacity),
where PwDs may occasionally or, sometimes be found to have a decision-making capacity (Bowman 2008,
p. 73).
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decision-making competency in one moment, and lack it in the other moment. This
competency might then be regained later. Thus, this very specific condition poses ex-
traordinary requirements for obtaining valid informed consent from PwD, even within
a single research project. Due to this characteristic of PwDs, i. e. fluctuating within a
‘grey zone’ between competency and incompetency, it is important to continuously eval-
uate their level of competency to provide valid consent for treatment or participation in
research. Such evaluation is supposed to clarify whether the PwD is competent to pro-
vide valid consent on her own, or whether it should be sought from a legal guardian.
Vorm and Rikkert (2008) list several instruments available for clinicians to evaluate
the competency of potential participants with dementia to consent (Vorm and Rikkert
2008, pp. 86–87):
• Ability to evidence a choice.
• Ability to make a reasonable outcome of a choice.
• Ability to understand information.
• Ability to manipulate with information.
• Ability to appreciate the situation and its possible consequences.
The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool (MacCAT) is believed to be the best vali-
dation instrument at the moment (Vorm and Rikkert 2008). MacCAT is available for both
research and clinical application (e. g. MacCAT-CR, where CR means clinical research;
and MacCAT-T, where T stands for treatment), and shows good validity and reliability.
Wide application in clinical settings is however questionable because the completion of
the test requires 30-60 minutes, not including former training and familiarity with the
instrument. Another issue with the MacCAT and any other assessment instrument is the
inability to measure the moral capacity and/or emotional ability of the person. Both are
closely related to the decision-making capacity of the participant, the results of which
must be aligned with the life history of the person. Therefore, Vorm and Rikkert (2008)
recommend the combination of the MacCAT questionnaire with specific questions re-
garding the hopes, beliefs and personal history of the participant.
Also, the proportionality principle should be applied, as a criterion of capacity to con-
sent in research with PwDs. This means that the riskier and more burdensome the trial,
the higher the standards required for consent. For example, the consent requirements
for a therapeutic, low-risk study are the lowest; while on the other hand, they should be
the highest for a high risk non-therapeutic research study (Vorm and Rikkert 2008).
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motivations of pwds for participation in a research study
As noted in the literature review (Chapter 3), PwDs were found to be relatively ap-
proachable regarding participation in research activities. Participants take part in the
research projects for the following reasons: largely to compensate for feelings of loneli-
ness and social isolation, some out of curiosity, and some in order to contribute to the
development of AAL technologies (Grönvall and Kyng 2012; Novitzky et al. 2015).
Firstly, the reasons for concern arise due to the nature of the vulnerable position of
PwDs, e. g. in their limited and changing consenting abilities, and in their easy approach-
ability for research purposes. The convergence of these two factors may raise concerns
about the ethical nature of the study itself. The promise of being a part of a research
study, with daily contact with researchers to socialise with, while using neat-looking
technology may distort the insight unduly influencing the participants. The distorted
insight of the less pleasant and more worrying aspects of participation (e. g. blaming
oneself for ‘doing something wrong,’ Oberzaucher et al. 2009; causing some problem,
Wallace et al. 2010; etc.), may be disregarded by the PwDs.
Secondly, the previous concerns multiply in accord with the previously reported is-
sue, namely that PwDs are prone to please (and hence also unwillingly mislead) the
researchers (Novitzky et al. 2015; Oberzaucher et al. 2009; Wallace et al. 2010). PwDs
were already recruited for participation because of their diagnosis with mild-dementia,
meaning that they are most likely already in the process of developing MCI. This condi-
tion renders them more vulnerable to withdraw from a study, and instead, to do what
they are being told to do. Such behaviour may infringe upon the validity of the results
of the whole study.
Due to the aforementioned possible complications, it seems to be important to inves-
tigate and also record the motivations of the PwDs participation during the consent-
seeking process. Although, it may be difficult and time-consuming to investigate the
motivations of the PwDs as participants, this information may be helpful in clarifying
the interests of PwDs in their less capable periods. Both of the aforementioned issues
related to the PwDs’ motivations to participate may not only provide true answers,
whether PwDs have honest motives for their participation. Furthermore, it may also ex-
tend the autonomy of the PwDs beyond the period of their personal capability. Such
practice would also ensure that some sort of record about the wishes and interests of a
PwD is recorded for the later consideration of researchers.
recommendations of alzheimer europe and edcon
Recently specific recommendations from groups of specialists on dementia have been
published (e. g. initiatives of Alzheimer Europe, and European Dementia Consensus
Network), who tried to present some general remarks regarding how to conduct ethi-
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cally acceptable research with PwDs summarised in a form of recommendations (Vorm
and Rikkert 2008; EDCON and Stoppe 2008). The reason for these initiatives was mainly
that despite great similarities in national and international regulation, ethical codes in
practice are still highly heterogenous in dementia-related research. The assessment of
the capacity to consent is only a first step of assessment for research; further assess-
ments of mental status, hearing, speech and vision would also need to be performed.
Researchers generally agree with the statement that the confirmation of a diagnosis of
dementia does not reveal much about the capacity of the PwD (Vorm and Rikkert 2008).
Vorm and Rikkert (2008) emphasise that there have been very few studies regarding in-
formed consent in dementia research. In one of the few longitudinal studies on healthy
ageing and dementia, 100 % of persons without dementia and 92 % of persons with
mild-dementia proved capable of understanding informed consent information for a
non-therapeutic study. Understanding declined with moderate stages of dementia (par-
ticipant numbers were 250 PwDs, and 165 participants without dementia; Buckles et al.
2003).
Vorm and Rikkert (2008) cite the input of the organisation, Alzheimer Europe
(www.AlzheimerEurope.com), in the ongoing discussions with the Council of Europe’s
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and the Draft Additional Protocol to the Con-
vention on Biomedical Research about the participation of PwDs in research. Alzheimer
Europe adopted the following general principles (Vorm and Rikkert 2008, pp. 89–90):
• The diagnosis of dementia should not automatically mean a lack of legal capacity
of the affected person.
• Capacity is not an all-or-nothing matter, PwDs should be involved in decisions
concerning research even they are considered ‘unable to consent.’
• PwDs have a right to participate in research, if they express such desire.
• PwDs should be encouraged to write their advance directives clarifying their stand
regarding participation in research.
• The legal representative of an incompetent PwD, under certain conditions, should
be allowed to consent on behalf of a PwD to participation in research.
Based on these principles, Alzheimer Europe developed the following position on the
question of the participation of PwDs in research (Vorm and Rikkert 2008, p. 90):
• In the early stages of dementia, PwDs can themselves consent to participate in
research (irrespective of direct personal benefit), or declare their willingness to do
so, in their advance directives.
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• A clinician with the relevant expertise, unrelated to the actual research, should
assess the capacity of the PwD and check whether the person can make a decision
regarding whether to participate, and is fully aware of the possible consequences.
• Legal representatives should be able to consent on behalf of a PwD regarding
participation in research so long as the following conditions are met:
– The potential benefit for the PwD’s health outweighs the possible risks.
– The risk of causing discomfort or distress is minimal; the research has been
approved by an independent REC.
– The same results could not be obtained with other subjects.
– The legal representative does not benefit financially from the decision.
– The legal representative is authorised to give consent by a court or the PwD
herself.
– Safeguards have been taken to protect the privacy and dignity of the PwD.
• In all cases, an independent adviser should be appointed to be responsible for the
safety and welfare of the participants.
Alzheimer Europe also does not endorse the participation of PwDs in research that does
not offer any potential benefit for the participant, unless the PwD with sufficient capacity
has decided otherwise, either verbally or in the form of an advance directive (Vorm and
Rikkert 2008).
Vorm and Rikkert (2008) advise that researchers should adopt a step-by-step proce-
dure for performing clinical research with PwDs. This includes the provision of suffi-
cient time and effort in the delivery of the information to the participants about the
study. Also, a trial run should be implemented, which may help the PwDs understand
the study procedures better. One has to consider that the participants are PwDs, some
of whom suffer from depression. Furthermore, the quality of consent is tightly linked
with the proportion between the potential risks and burdens in the study, and its ben-
efits. On this ground, informed consent can be judged irrespective of the diagnosis of
dementia (Vorm and Rikkert 2008).
According to Vorm and Rikkert (2008), PwDs, deemed incompetent most of the time,
should not be included in research. This general rule can be ignored only if such an
inclusion is found to be necessary for the promotion of PwD’s health, whereby the
research cannot be performed on a competent person instead. Furthermore, research
with incompetent participants should only be permissible, if the condition that makes
the participant unable to consent is the necessary characteristic under investigation in
the research study (Vorm and Rikkert 2008).
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Extra precautions are necessary when including PwDs in research, particularly if the
PwD lacks the capacity to consent, and where there is an absence of any advance direc-
tive (Vorm and Rikkert 2008).
In the case of potential participants, who are under legal guardianship, the investiga-
tor of the research study should obtain informed consent from the legally authorised
representative,33 in accordance with the international and national legislation. In order
to better facilitate this, advance directives should encompass such a scenario by default.
In general, Vorm and Rikkert (2008) favour a dual consent procedure, when the in-
vestigator responsible for research acquires consent from the authorised representative,
followed by the assent (or consent, if the participant is capable of providing it) from the
PwD.
In 2008, a Consensus on Assessment of Competence has been reached, providing rec-
ommendations to be adopted in European countries (EDCON and Stoppe 2008). These
recommendations are as follows (EDCON and Stoppe 2008, p. 11):
1. The assessment of competence should be used to enhance the welfare of people
with dementia and should serve to provide help and shelter to those whose com-
petence is reduced and autonomy to those where competence is maintained.
2. The diagnosis of dementia should not be taken to automatically imply a lack of
competence.
3. Competence should be assessed with respect to specific purposes. It should not
be assumed that the lack of competence to perform with regard to a particular
purpose means that there is a lack of competence to perform with regards to other
purposes.
4. Competence should be assessed repeatedly at intervals defined by the purpose of
the assessment.
5. The assessment of competence requires special skills and should be performed by
persons who can use currently available methods in an optimal manner.
Árnason et al. (2011) remark that there is no pure and abstract understanding of clini-
cal treatments or research for a patient or research participant. For example, a research
participant who used to be a former engineer will understand the disclosed informa-
tion much easily if that is presented to him using the terminology of engineering, with
33 In academic literature and legal documents, this person is referred by various names: general attorney,
durable power of attorney, healthcare power of attorney, guardian, healthcare proxy, medical surrogate,
etc. Also the procedure of obtaining informed consent through these representatives is also referred to
by various names: substituted judgement, proxy consent, surrogate consent, etc. Although there might be
minor differences, the main ethical aspects are usually: a) a person consents for another person, b) this
method is used to extend the participant’s autonomy (Vorm and Rikkert 2008).
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metaphors linking the information to the knowledge gained for his former profession.
In every case, the professional’s duty is to find a correlation between the shared in-
formation by and the background knowledge of the participant. The correlation has
to be reached with the usage of comprehensible language; this means that the partici-
pant should be neither overloaded with information, nor under-informed (Árnason et al.
2011). These guidelines should be carefully noted in the case of PwDs living with MCI.
rolling informed consent
An alternative method of obtaining informed consent is the mechanism offered by the
introduction of rolling informed consent. The method has been discussed earlier, in the
literature review in Chapter 3.34 The benefits of this approach lie in the ability of the
PwD to reflect upon the possibility of withdrawal from research. This approach also
ensures that the researcher is up-to-date on the willingness and decision of the partici-
pant to participate and continue in the research activity. Furthermore, rolling informed
consent overcomes the overly legalistic interpretation of informed consent. The major
disadvantage of the approach it that is time-consuming. This can make the research ac-
tivity considerably slower and take longer than usual. Such objection, however, has little
strength from the ethical point of view, especially if this approach ensures the rights
and protection of the vulnerable participant. To fulfil the normative ethical requirement
for obtaining informed consent, rolling informed consent seems to be one of the possi-
ble ways of to obtaining valid consent from PwDs. The approach of rolling informed
consent is, of course, only possible in cases when a person is capable of (even limited)
decision-making, and is competent in providing valid consent.
delayed consent
As the discussion of Art. 6–7 of the UDBHR, other international documents, and the rec-
ommendations of expert groups suggest, direct consent from the individual, if possible,
should always be preferred compared with any form of substituted judgement. Never-
theless, PwDs may find themselves trapped in a particular situation that is relevant for
providing consent. This is when one is transiently incapacitated for a relatively short
34 To summarise, rolling informed consent involves:
a) The necessity of repeatedly providing information on an iterative basis (i. e. not only when re-
quested), and also asking for consent during the various stages of the treatment or research;
b) Listening to the content and nuances of the speech of the PwD and continuously assessing whether
her participation is voluntary and not subject to coercion, persuasion, manipulation, or simple dis-
tress, which if so subject, would be sufficient reason to end the session for the researcher, without
needing the expressed request of the participant (Astell et al. 2009); while also
c) Communicating the possibility of opting-out or withdrawing from treatment or research at any given
stage.
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amount of time, and after that becoming lucid again, temporarily recovering from the
incapacitated state. For situations like this, which can occur while research activities are
ongoing, researchers have two possible options. First, they may temporarily interrupt
the research and wait until the person recovers lucidity again. This might impede the
continuity of the research, causing gradually increasing delays. The second option is to
use a form of ‘retrospective consent,’ which involves seeking consent after the research
activity has been performed (without prior consent), when the person recovers from
the incapacitated state (e. g. Honeybul et al. 2014). Retrospective consent is already prac-
tised in medical treatment and research. It is used when a person is not competent at
the time of the life-saving treatment (e. g. mature minors, Ashcroft et al. 2007; whose
bone-marrow is required for donation to save the sibling’s life). Consent sought after
the research activity (often called also as ‘delayed consent’) is used in cases where the
research cannot be performed with competent participants, either because of time con-
straints or the permanent condition of the participant (Faden et al. 2014; Potter et al.
2013).
The protocol of the NICE-SUGAR (2004) in ICU environment allows the possibility
of a form of retrospective consent (i. e. delayed consent) where the respondents who
provided delayed consent were less likely to delegate the decision-making to another
person or an organisation (Potter et al. 2013). However, the NICE-SUGAR (2004) did not
focus on PwDs. There is a dearth of academic literature providing any further insight
into the possibilities of retrospective consent specifically in relation with PwDs.
6.2.2.4 Issues Related with Consent for Research with ICT
A considerable amount of current research is focused on the investigation of the effects
of AAL technologies for PwDs. There are particular nuances, which need to be consid-
ered at the early design phases of the R&D and during the research activity of any trial
in this area.
obtaining of consent with ict devices
A relatively new trend in the research with human participants is the obtaining of con-
sent with ICT devices. The benefits of such an approach are the personalised provi-
sion of important information about the study, and the easily accessible and retrievable
proofs of consent. A study conducted by Antoniou et al. (2011) provides insights into
the personalisation capabilities of electronic personalised information sheets. The forms
offered, by default, the necessary minimum of information about the study, with partic-
ipants then having the option to interrogate that information to obtain further details
on specific content of the form that they were interested in. However, the study itself
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admits that a relatively high percentage (23 %) of people consented to the ICT form
without even reading the necessary minimum information (Antoniou et al. 2011).
While Antoniou et al. (2011) see the benefit in electronic consent and information
forms in their possible personalisation for the individual, rather different benefits are
highlighted by other researchers. Purcaru et al. (2011) perceive that one of the goals of
electronic informed consent forms is the simplification of the document, which bene-
fits the participant. As they rightly remark, such a simplification should not however
result in a reduction of the time made available for understanding the form. The elec-
tronic informed consent form may be valuable in supporting consent as a continuous
interactive process. However, one of the desires of the authors was to achieve greater
standardisation of electronic informed consent forms, which seems to contradict the
aim of personalising forms by Antoniou et al. (2011).
It might be argued that obtaining consent has never been as easy as with the use of
ICT services and devices. The consenting process may be divided into smaller and more
focused segments. At the same time, ICTs can make the provision of the necessary infor-
mation considerably shorter. The utility of ICT for seeking consent became even greater
due to the ubiquity of mobile devices, where additional ways of delivering information
and supporting their understanding (e. g. video, audio, graphs, etc.) can be applied.
However, even healthy volunteers are prone to succumbing to the danger of routinisa-
tion during the provision of consent made by an electronic ICT service. Studies showed
that often the provision or refusal of informed consent occurs as an unreflective, habit-
ual act performed on electronic devices (Ploug and Holm 2013; Ploug and Holm 2014;
Ploug and Holm 2015). The reasons can be various: the form is too long to read, the
service offered by the form has been recommended to the reader by somebody else, the
text is incomprehensible, etc. PwDs may be at an advantage because the study showed
that as the average age of the consenting person rises, so too does the extent of their
reading the form. Also, the extent to which the information is read increases with the
number of female participants. Finally, there is a negative correlation between the high-
est achieved education level and the extent to which the information is read (Ploug and
Holm 2015).35
The study conducted by Ploug and Holm (2015) finds that the two common reasons
for not reading consent forms are the burden of reading and the low risk related to the
consequences of not reading the consent. This suggests that shortening consent forms
will not be sufficient to change reading behaviour (Ploug and Holm 2015). In this regard,
PwDs may be at greater risk because even if there is sufficient means for enhancing
readability, their assessment of risks might be fragmentary.
35 The previous two studies showed the opposite (Ploug and Holm 2013; Ploug and Holm 2014).
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dynamic consent
ICT provide researchers and research participants with novel opportunities in interact-
ing, re-consenting through the framework of dynamic consent. Dynamic consent is cur-
rently developed and investigated within biobank projects, however, the researchers
propose this approach or concept also to the wider application within clinical research
or other fields (Jane Kaye et al. 2014).
Dynamic consent is defined as “a new approach for engaging individuals about the
use of their personal information [ . . . ] [by] an interactive personalised interface that
allows participants to engage as much or as little as they choose and to alter their con-
sent choices in real time” (Jane Kaye et al. 2014, p. 2). The consent of an individual is
wrapped in an encrypted information container. Employing asymmetric cryptography,
the consent, together with other personal information, can be publicly shared with a
trusted research centre through a trusted authority. Thus, it is also ensured that the
research centre has access only to those information, for the access of which it had
been previously approved (Jane Kaye et al. 2014, and the documentation of the EnCoRe
Project36). The research centre thus gains access to the most recent consent and other
necessary sensitive medical information of the participant, relevant for the study, while
preserving the privacy of the participant. The flexibility and relative ease of receiving
information is also beneficial for the participant. She may easily alter or withdraw her
consent, follow-up on the use of her data and the results of the study, or being recon-
tacted for data reuse (Jane Kaye et al. 2014). Eventually other personal preferences or
advance directives may also be in the course of time included in this information con-
tainer. The container would then serve as a logbook of these information over a life-span
of the person.
However, even such a record of the preferences and long-term data on the evolution of
a PwD’s advance directive throughout time should not necessarily solve all the possible
issues delineated above. The PwD in her less lucid state may still request something
that may be contrary to her previously expressed wish in her own advance directive. A
researcher and physician may find herself in a dilemma which wish to follow, and how
she should justify that decision. Undoubtedly, the developing framework and concept
of dynamic consent may bring more data to this interpretative process, what in certain
circumstances can be beneficial to resolve a particular question, in other situations may
provide even more and unresolvable complexities.
36 EnCoRe – Ensuring Consent & Revocation Project: http://www.hpl.hp.com/breweb/encoreproject/index.
html (visited on 31/09/2015). The details of the process is described in deliverable D2.3 Third En-
CoRe Technical Architecture: http://www.hpl.hp.com/breweb/encoreproject/deliverables_material/
D2_3_EnCoRe_Architecture_V1.0.pdf (visited on 31/09/2015).
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informed consent of third parties
A further issue in research with ICT and informed consent regards the informed con-
sent of third parties. It emerges as an ethical issue where visual or audio research of
participants is in progress.37
The study by Wiles et al. (2008) identified the core ethical guidelines for visual re-
search, as follows (Kelly et al. 2013, Wiles et al. 2008):
• Researchers should strive to protect the rights, privacy, dignity and well-being of
those that they study.
• Research should (as far as possible) be based on voluntary informed consent.
• Personal information should be treated confidentially and participants
anonymised unless they choose to be identified.
• Research participants should be informed of the extent to which anonymity and
confidentiality can be assured in publication and dissemination and of the poten-
tial reuse of data.
Research with participant-created (visual) data has, until recently, been conducted by
deploying cameras to participants. The cameras were supposed to created pictures of
certain things at a defined time. Such an approach allowed researchers to shift from
the researchers’ created datasets to the participants’ created datasets. The introduction
of automated and wearable cameras allows researchers a more perfect collection of
participant-created data. The collection of data with this technology is more automated,
and more frequent, resulting in a much higher amount of data (Kelly et al. 2013).
Kelly et al. (2013) state that in order to fulfil the actual ethical standards, and to
maintain respect for the autonomy of research participants, participants should be made
fully aware of the fact that the audio-visual data will be aggregated, before informed
consent. Due to the larger volume of aggregated data, the need to respect confidentiality
and data security gains much higher importance. The possibility of causing harm by the
gathered data being leaked and mistakenly becoming public is also greater. Therefore,
the participants’ consent about data retention, and any potential secondary analyses that
might follow, should be explicit, if possible (Kelly et al. 2013).
Due to the automated nature of data capturing, the research participants’ control
over the data collection is also limited. Therefore, the following list of interventions
has been proposed by Kelly et al. (2013) to regain the loss of control (and autonomy)
37 Four main visual research data are traditionally identified: found or existing data (e. g. photo albums orig-
inally not made for research purposes); researcher-created data; respondent (participant) created research
data; and representations (e. g. photos, videos, films, drawings, and other graphical representations; Kelly
et al. 2013). This list from an ethical point of inquiry might be extended to all audio recordings and other
forms of representations from which individuals might be clearly identified.
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over the data collection. Firstly, it is advised that a privacy button be introduced. By
pushing the button on the wearable camera, the device pauses any data capture for cca. 7-
minute period (useful for activities during bathrooms visits, etc.). Secondly, participants
should be expressly advised that they can remove the device or turn them around,
so that the camera faces inward, whenever they wish, for whatever reason. Thirdly,
participants should be given the option to review and delete any unwanted recordings
(online banking, trying on clothes, etc.). Finally, all these options should be provided
to the participant, without the participant needing to provide an explanation for her
decisions (Kelly et al. 2013). It is possible that not all three options can be ensured
(esp. the second) in practice with PwDs.
Therefore, the participants should be always made aware that even with all the pre-
cautionary measures, unwanted recordings might be made. Therefore, the best standard
would be to give the participants the opportunity to review and delete these recordings
before the researcher gets them (Kelly et al. 2013).
Moreover, in certain cases, confidentiality is not always achievable. Especially when
activities are recorded, which might be criminally liable. Participants risk incriminat-
ing themselves with their own recordings, which may be subpoenaed. Only in excep-
tional cases, might research data be inadmissible through subpoena (e. g. of very limited
groups of: medical employees, clinical psychologists, etc.). Participants should also be
informed about these possibilities in advance to a satisfactory degree (Kelly et al. 2013).
The presence of third parties poses a very particular issue because these people’s pres-
ence is captured within the location where the research takes place, without their being
provided an opportunity to give informed consent. A participant may meet throughout
the course of their usual day many other people, who may knowingly or unknowingly
be captured on a recording (audio, video). Kelly et al. (2013) categorise third parties who
are likely to be thus captured as follows (Kelly et al. 2013):
• Family members, cohabitants, friends.
• Colleagues, coworkers.
• Strangers, general public.
Family Members, Cohabitants, Friends
In the first group, the existing guidelines should include protection of privacy in places
where one would be recorded unknowingly. This should embrace also third parties in
the homes of research participants. Kelly et al. (2013) consider it unnecessary to obtain
written informed consent from family members in such cases but verbal permission
prior to the recording should be sought. Researchers are obliged to provide the necessary
information on the recording process, the storage of the data and the ways in which
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these recordings will be disseminated. The privacy of friends and acquaintances should
be also respected. If prior verbal permission is impossible or impractical to obtain, it
should be sought on first contact (Kelly et al. 2013).
Colleagues, coworkers
The requirement of consent from the second group, that of colleagues and coworkers,
mostly depends on the research rationale and the appropriateness of recording in work-
places. These locations should be assessed by the researchers prior to device deployment.
Although in the case of PwDs, colleagues and coworkers are usually not an issue, chil-
dren may be present and thus pose a similar issue. Special attention should be given to
the presence of children, where parents should be informed in advance about the fact
and nature of the ongoing research. Studies focusing on leisure-time physical activities
or travel may not require the wearing of the recording device to work. However, research
focusing on diet or sedentary behaviour might necessitate the wearing of a recording
device during working hours. In these cases, participants should seek verbal permission
from managers and supervisors. They should also inform their colleagues about the
presence of such a recording device. Third parties may ask the research participant to
remove or turn off this device, in which case, the participant should do so. Participants
who work with their clients should be advised that a study with recording devices is
not appropriate for them (Kelly et al. 2013).
Strangers, General Public
As the third group, strangers and general public, is usually present in public spaces, it is
not necessary to obtain individual informed consent. This is so only if the recordings are
not published or disseminated in a way in which the individuals are recognisable. Par-
ticipants, however, should turn the devices off in those public places in which privacy or
security might be expected (e. g. gym changing rooms, airport security checkpoints, etc.).
Considerations should also be given to the fact that studies in certain cultural settings
may not be allowed (e. g. aboriginal communities, etc.). For all of these aforementioned
cases, researchers should provide clear guidance for participants when the devices are
being deployed (Kelly et al. 2013).
Additional Recommendations
There might be situations when wearing of a recording device might be considered as
potentially hostile and, by suspicious third parties, as intrusive. In such cases, it has been
found to be effective to prepare the participants to provide basic and simple information
about the nature and purpose of the study. The participants should also eventually offer
the removal of the device if it burdens the third party. Participants should also inform
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any third parties that by expressed request, they are allowed to delete the recordings
they do not want to share with the research team (Kelly et al. 2013).
Other cases report that the wearing of a recording device may pose a security threat
for the participant because of the possibility of mugging. Providing instructions for
the participants to remove the device in situations in which they feel uncomfortable or
threatened might reduce such risks and related potential harms (Kelly et al. 2013).
In certain cases, third parties may not be aware of the ongoing recording. Kelly et al.
(2013) admit that this might pose serious ethical and legal issues. However, a distinction
is often applied regarding the focus of the research, which is on the participant and
not on the third parties that may incidentally be recorded. Kelly et al. (2013) note that
nevertheless, the ethical standard of respect for autonomy directs that the privacy of
third parties must be protected. If the study is designed to investigate the influence on
the research participant by third parties (e. g. eating, drinking habits in group settings),
the anonymity of these third parties should be preserved. None of the disseminated and
published material should enable the identification of the research participants (Kelly
et al. 2013).
Finally, participants of the research study should be made aware that the recorded
data will need to be processed. This might be done by automatic algorithms or trained
researchers. Therefore, participants should be informed that the recordings may also be
viewed by the researchers (Kelly et al. 2013).
6.2.2.5 Issues Related to Obtaining Consent During Therapy Involving ICT/AAL
The aim of this section is to present few ethical issues that are likely to occur when
AAL technologies will be applied in clinical therapy. These are: the issue regarding the
definition of AAL technologies (their ambient nature, and partial- or full-autonomy); un-
realistic expectations of PwDs regarding ICT and their abilities; the issue of information
overload inherent in ICT; the problem of ‘infinite memory’ of the lifelogging capabilities
of AAL; and finally the third-party consent.
ambient and autonomous technology, and the issue of request for
consent
One of the crucial attributes of AAL technologies is their ability to disappear into the
background of the environment. Sensor technologies may collect the data and respond
to some events or states in an automated manner. For example, a higher blood pressure
or pulse rate might be related only to the fear of watching a horror movie, and not to a
worsening health condition. While the former should not trigger the safety procedures
of calling for help, the latter should. Cases like these naturally pose issues about consent
in relation with AAL technologies. The person using ambient technologies might forget
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their presence, during which time, the AAL technology may perform certain undesirable
tasks.
The automated and autonomous nature of these technologies certainly pose ethical
risks to the PwDs, as noted by Joost van Hoof, Kort, et al. (2007). They might expose
the PwDs, due to their inability to fully comprehend the extent of data collection and
transmission by ICT, to misuse, criminal activities, privacy breaches, or dehumanising
treatment (Joost van Hoof, Kort, et al. 2007). Additionally, such a scenario, would strip
PwDs of their freedom to make decisions, making them the only group of people with-
out this right (Holm 2001). The reaction to an undesired activity of the AAL technology
may also be detrimental from the point of view of dementia management, as it could
cause higher levels of anxiety in the PwD (e. g. the issue of ‘false alarms,’ etc.).
Even if the ICT service would require consent from the PwD, there is still a risk
that, within a shared dwelling, the consent is provided illegitimately by somebody else
(e. g. carer, family member, etc.), and not by the PwD directly. Thus, an unobtrusive au-
thentication of the PwD for consent will be needed. This might be challenging to achieve
because of the possible forgetfulness of the PwDs. For these reasons, authentication by
fingerprint-reading, voice- or face-recognition seem to be preferable.
Even by introducing these precautionary measures, the question of autonomous ICT
and the requirement for consent remains unresolved. Therefore, further research is re-
quired for more focused and detailed insight into the extent to which needs of PwDs
can be served by autonomous decisions made by ICT. The research should target the
use of autonomous devices in particular contexts, i. e. when such activity is acceptable
for the person compared with when it is not, for example, when it results in a greater
state of disturbance for the person. Also, more research is needed to establish a valid
proportion between the need for and the degree of autonomous ICT and the require-
ment of informed consent for certain actions of PwDs. Such research should also seek
to identify how often consent should be sought from PwDs during the research and/or
clinical practice.
unrealistic expectations from ict
During clinical trials and clinical application the deployment of AAL technologies into
the home environments of PwDs, researchers and clinicians should not be mislead by
the enthusiasm of the PwDs and caregivers about the ICT services. The initial levels of
acceptance and expectations of older people regarding ICT devices are reported to be
very high (Marcellini 2012). Therefore, it should be advised that, from the very early
experimental stages, a realistic view of ICT should be promoted through appropriate
training. Such practice would result in the promotion of acceptance of the AAL tech-
nologies (Marcellini 2012). Additionally, it might prove to be helpful for the overall as-
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sessment of the need and usefulness for ICT services in the care for the PwDs, resulting
in the effort being more ethically sound.
information overload of pwds
The PwDs are more vulnerable to the information overload (Duquenoy and Whitehouse
2006; Kang et al. 2010), which may occur during the acquisition of informed consent. The
concerns about information overload might be addressed to some extent by the division
of the information, into smaller, more digestible blocks, distributed on a wider timeline.
However, despite all these efforts, the overload of information is not completely avoid-
able, due to the unfortunate condition of PwDs. As one of the possible consequences of
information overload, the problem of routinisation, mentioned earlier, may also apply
to this issue (Ploug and Holm 2015). Therefore, an appropriate, and probably person-
alised, balance of information will need to be tailored for every individual PwD. This
means that the information should be interactively and dynamically adjusted to the ac-
tual state of the person’s competence and other faculties, in order to obtain informed
consent successfully and ethically.
aal as lifelogs and the issue of ‘infinite memory’
AAL technologies may function also as lifelogs. Lifelogs are a form of pervasive com-
puting, which consists of unified, digital record (Jacquemard et al. 2014). Thus, lifelogs,
due to their ‘infinite memory’ capabilities, are not only perfect for logging information
about health status, physiological data, or other relevant health information, they are
also useful for storing the consent and previously expressed wishes and preferences of
individuals. While prima facie, one might consider this beneficial, especially for forget-
ful PwDs, this might not be necessarily so. Generally speaking, forgetting is an intrinsic
form of controlling one’s memory (Jacquemard et al. 2014). This control may be lost. One
might prefer certain memories to be forgotten, without reminder. The opposite scenario
might result in lethargy, depression, or anxiety. Analogously, if the previous consent of
the PwD is always remembered and recorded, this may not be easily changed in cases of
diminishing competency. Therefore, it seems important to regularly renew the consent
of PwDs, although the frequency has to be carefully set. Regular requests for consent
can enforce the PwD’s feeling of control over the AAL technologies, the PwD’s involve-
ment in their care, and reaffirm their feeling of security. However, seeking consent too
often may be considered burdensome and upsetting for the PwD. Therefore, an indi-
vidually tailored approach that strikes the right balance needs to be developed for the
consent-seeking process, with the emphasis on avoiding causing anxiety, routinisation,
or reducing acceptability. These conditions pose a very high requirement on researchers
and developers of the AAL technologies.
238
6.3 specification of the udbhr principles
third-party consent in therapy
Finally, the formerly mentioned issue of third party consent is also present during clin-
ical application. Although there are some proposals for best practices (Kelly et al. 2013)
in this regard, the solutions are far from perfect and will require more specific regulation
and further ethical investigations.
6.3 specification of the udbhr principles
The ethical requirements for respecting one’s autonomy and self-determination, and
therefore requesting one’s consent for treatment or research participation is one of the
most elaborated topics in bioethics. Since its emergence in the early 1900s and especially
since the Nuremberg trial, the informed consent doctrine is a fundamental element of
any research involving human beings. Also, the informed consent doctrine may be con-
sidered one of the main driving forces for the birth of bioethics, as a new field in science.
Since its emergence, informed consent has become more well-defined and nuanced in
application to the special requirements of the times. Research with persons without the
capacity to provide valid consent, and the safeguarding of their benefits (maximisation
of direct and indirect benefits, while minimising risks and harms) has, since the 1990s,
been incorporated by degrees to international guidelines.
The informed consent of PwDs is very specific in a few particular aspects. Firstly,
PwDs constitute a group whose consent may fluctuate between valid and invalid con-
sent. Secondly, this may cause ethical issues with the interpretation of the recorded con-
sents of advance directives, either through being supported or questioned by family or
healthcare professionals. Moreover, the incapacitated PwD may also manifest contradic-
tory wishes to previously expressed directives. Thirdly, due to the fact that no effective
treatments for dementia (and its development) are available, one has to consider the re-
search of AAL technologies for PwDs as non-therapeutic research. The implementation
of AAL technologies into the care about PwDs can, thus, only be categorised as assistive.
In the following sections, the principles in Art. 6–7 of the UDBHR, on PwDs capable
and incapable of providing valid and informed consent, are specified for the areas of
research and clinical practice. Special attention will be paid to the possible effects of
AAL technologies upon the informed consent of PwDs in these contexts.
6.3.1 Clinical Research
Most of Art. 6 and Art. 7 concerns research, defining standard requirements for valid
informed consent (as being prior, free, express and informed), that is as a result of
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adequate and comprehensible disclosure of information, which is communicated along
with all the possibilities of withdrawal.
Regarding PwDs, these criteria are fulfilled either when the person is still competent
enough to provide valid consent for research (i. e. having mild dementia), or through
her wish to participate expressed in her advance directive, or through the authorisa-
tion of the therapeutic representative (i. e. in cases of moderate or severe dementia).
In exceptional cases, PwDs may be incompetent to provide valid consent for research
participation, even in mild the stages of dementia.
However, it is important to emphasise that informed consent should never be inter-
preted as a legal requirement. The capacity of every human being forms rather a con-
tinuum, and the consenting abilities of PwDs fluctuates. As presented by EDCON and
Stoppe (2008), and supported by authors like Fountoulakis and Despos (2008), PwDs’
competence to consent is not an on-off, binary, all-or-nothing switch. Also, the diagnosis
of dementia should not automatically render PwDs incompetent of making medical de-
cisions (EDCON and Stoppe 2008), including wishes of participating in research (Vorm
and Rikkert 2008). PwDs, according to the recommendations of the professional expert
bodies, EDCON, and Alzheimer Europe, or academic literature, should not be auto-
matically declared incompetent after the diagnosis of dementia. PwDs may manifest
limited competencies for providing valid consent that may be sufficient for the neces-
sary treatment or successful participation to research. Therefore, the validity of every
PwD’s consent should be evaluated individually and within the context of the activity
the consent is being sought for.
6.3.1.1 Consent of Competent PwDs for Research
The question at stake with involving PwDs in research with AAL technologies is, what
kind of protections should be provided for PwDs as research participants? For therapeu-
tic research, the inclusion criteria should be less stringent, due to the likely benefits the
participant may receive, which may alleviate the pain and burdens that she may be expe-
riencing. For non-therapeutic research, however, the inclusion criteria should be rather
strict because it is unlikely that the participant will enjoy any direct health benefits as its
result. The research of AAL technologies can be regarded, at best, as assistive means for
reducing the consequences of dementia. AAL technologies do not, and cannot address
the causes of dementia. The requirement defined in Art. 7b but more importantly in
Art. 4 of the UDBHR requires that maximisation of direct and indirect benefits, which,
in the case of researching non-therapeutic treatments, should require strict assessment
of inclusion of PwDs into research studies. The reason behind this requirement is the
protection of especially vulnerable groups of possible research participants, whose capa-
bilities to consent, and defend their well-being may be severely diminished.
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Consequently, the standards for requesting consent from PwDs for research participa-
tion should be evaluated rigorously, due to the fact that such research is non-therapeutic,
and does not provide participants with any direct benefit, and which is also risky.
consent of pwd and data ownership
When a PwD in the early stages of dementia, with very mild disturbances in memory
and cognition, consents to participate in a research study, which involves ICT, one of the
crucial points to clarify is the data ownership. The involvement of a PwD into research
is justified only if the research is investigating for some specific aspects of dementia or
dementia-related complications, which cannot be obtained from other fully competent
and less impaired (or even healthy) research participants. These research studies often
collect medical, personal, and other sensitive data, which either remain in the possession
of the PwD, or their management is transferred to the research centre. In the former
case, any future reuse of these data needs to be authorised again by the PwD, and
only anonymised data can be published. This poses certain challenges for the researcher
and the research centre because the PwD’s condition may rapidly deteriorate, causing
significant issues for the future study.
As a result of the consideration of such a scenario, researchers may be tempted to
ask for broader consent from a PwD, which would authorise the researchers to reuse
the data, while it is being stored in the research centre. However, signing such a broad
consent can be ethically and/or legally questionable. It is also in the interest of the
researchers to use data legally obtained from research participants, while fulfilling high
standards of research ethics.
One possible solution, proposed by Jane Kaye et al. (2014), is the use of dynamic
consent, which may enable the researchers in the future to maintain regular contact with
the participants with dementia, informing them about the results of the research; and
recontacting them easily if their data needs to be reused. Dynamic consent also appears
to be the correct means for fulfilling the requirement of ‘express consent’ defined in
Art. 6.2 because it maintains the most straightforward connection between the PwD,
who offers the data, and the researchers, who require consent.
community interests for pwds’ participation in research
Art. 6.3 refers mainly to the “legal representatives of the group or community” from
whom additional agreement for research authorisation may be sought. This condition
in the UDBHR is helpful in recruiting research participants from different cultural and
ethnic groups, where the local customs require such approval.
However, it may be questioned whether this condition of Art. 6.3 should also be ex-
tended to PwDs, requiring additional authorisation for research participation from the
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mediators between the (group of) PwDs and the researchers. This question was also
raised earlier in Chapter 5, in relation to special vulnerability and personal integrity,
again by EDCON. The special vulnerabilities of PwDs, with the likelihood of fluctu-
ating capabilities to provide valid consent for research, would justify the extension of
this standard to this case. If the legal institution of mediators for PwDs is approved for
PwDs, it would provide additional levels of security for research, and would also cer-
tainly elevate the ethical standards of research conducted with this especially vulnerable
population.
regular review of consent
Even though a PwD is capable of providing valid consent at the beginning of a re-
search study, Art. 6.2 requires that the withdrawal of her consent should be allowed
and granted for any reason, at any time. This requirement may cause additional issues
during the progress of the research study, if a PwD becomes incapable of reaffirming
or withdrawing previously granted consent. To circumvent such an adverse scenario,
regular reviews of the PwD’s consent should be scheduled. This may occur either in a
form of rolling informed consent, or through the framework of dynamic consent (with
the assistance of ICT devices). If a PwD does not satisfactorily confirm (i. e. with un-
derstanding, competence, and voluntariness) the extension of her consent for the next
part of the research study, her lack of confirmation should be treated as a withdrawal
of consent. It should be reminded that a PwD’s condition may worsen so much that she
becomes incapable of expressing any statement regarding her previous consent. The de-
gree of change in a PwD’s condition renders further inclusion of such participant in the
research study ethically unjustifiable, unless otherwise explicitly specified for precisely
this scenario in the design of the research study.
The regular review of a PwD’s consent may function as an effective reporting tool, to
report updated user needs, which, during the progression of dementia, change consid-
erably within a relatively short period of time. Such review would enable researchers to
provide necessary adjustments for the PwDs, in response to their changing conditions
and needs.
6.3.1.2 Consent of Incompetent PwDs for Research
The phrasing at the beginning of Art. 7, referring to the requirement of “special pro-
tection” towards incapacitated persons, resembles the requirement of protection and
respect for special vulnerabilities in Art. 8, described in Chapter 5.
Art. 7 of the UDBHR, on consent from persons without capacity, is divided into two
sections. Section A refers to the authorisation for research and medical practice of the
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person incompetent to consent. Section B defines the additional requirements for the
involvement of such a person in research.
authorisation for research of incompetent pwds
The phrasing of Art. 7a defines the condition, under which the authorisation for research
participation of the incompetent person (PwD) is permitted, which is specified as in
the ‘best interest’ of the person concerned. It appears that this phrasing disregards the
internal step of developing a substitute or hypothetical judgement by relatives and/or
researchers, as has been defined earlier in this chapter, allowing such practice for cases
in clinical practice. The UDBHR’s formulation moves directly from express consent of
the PwD with capacity to consent, to the best interest standard for the authorisation of
the incompetent PwD. Furthermore, it is not defined in detail who should be allowed
to authorise the participation of an incompetent PwD in research. Whoever it is, she
should be doing it without exception in the best interest of the incapacitated PwD.
Following up on the interpretation of competence of PwDs earlier in this chapter, the
consenting capacity of PwDs may fluctuate, ranging anywhere from temporary incom-
petence to competence, within a relatively short interval of time. The second part of
Art. 7a, however, ensures that the PwD incompetent to consent, should still be involved,
to the greatest extent possible, in the authorisation. This provides sufficient basis for
taking into account the limited consenting capabilities of PwDs.
However, the authorisation of participation in a research study may come from the
advance directive of the PwD. An additional controversy may emerge during this sce-
nario, namely, who should be the person that interprets the authorisation for research
participance of the PwD? If it is a therapeutic representative (usually a close relative or
family member), she may be in a conflict of interest due to financial or other interests.
If the authorisation should be interpreted by a researcher, it may also trigger conflicts
of interests. Researchers, having interests in the success and goals of the research, fol-
lowing their own agenda, may be succumb to the phenomenon called the ‘conspiracy of
silence’ (Groves 2006).
There are additional issues with the best interest standard itself, as presented at length
in this chapter. Due to the fluctuation of the consenting capacity of the PwD, the autho-
risation for research participation granted in her advance directive may conflict with
wishes manifest in the changing behaviour of the PwD during a temporary non-lucid
period. Furthermore, acting according to the ‘best interest’ standard does not necessar-
ily mean that the interests imagined by the researcher/proxy for the PwD are really
the best. Hence, the best interest standard mentioned in Art. 7a for the authorisation
of research participation, in the case of incapacitated PwDs, should be referred to as a
standard for not causing harm to the PwD, not violating her autonomy unnecessarily,
and at the same time, preserving and actively protecting her human dignity and rights.
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Fulfilling this interpretation of the ‘best interest’ standard may be achieved by the ap-
plication of principled compromise between all the stakeholders involved in the decision-
making process, including the PwD with limited competency, as defined by Huxtable
(2012).
additional requirements for research with incompetent pwds
Art. 7b further limits the inclusion of incompetent PwDs into research studies, by spec-
ifying which conditions must apply for such inclusion. In addition to the authorisation
of PwDs’ participation, which should be granted in the best interest of the PwDs along
with their inclusion into the decision-making process to the greatest extent possible
(Art. 7a), the requirements for research with PwDs must also fulfil further protective
conditions: it should be carried out for the direct health benefit of the PwD, and the
research cannot be conducted with comparable effectiveness on competent participants.
Art. 7b does not categorically rule out research studies that do not have direct health
benefit for PwDs. They may be conducted only by “way of exception, with the utmost
restraint” (Art. 7b). This exception is further specified in the UDBHR as (Art. 7b):
• PwDs during research studies without direct health benefit should only be ex-
posed to minimal risks and minimal burdens.
• PwDs may be participants of research studies without direct health benefit only
if the research results may significantly contribute to the health benefit of other
PwDs.
• Research studies where PwDs participate without any direct health benefits should
comply with the legal conditions of the given country, and special protection
should be given to the human rights of each individual PwD.
• PwDs participating in research studies without direct health benefit have the right
to refuse participation.
The minimal risks and burdens, as noted earlier in this chapter, should not be greater
than that experienced or potentially experienced by PwDs during their usual everyday
activities (cf. footnote 24).
Even the aforementioned conditions presented in Art. 7 do not resolve the issues re-
lated to research authorisation. An incapacitated PwD’s advance directive, the authorisa-
tion of the therapeutic representative and family proxies, the interests of the researchers,
and the ostensible refusal behaviour of the incompetent PwD may all question the va-
lidity of the research participation authorisation. The problem here remains the same:
which of these ‘authorisations’ or ‘refusals’ should be taken seriously, if most of these oc-
cur at the same time? One can easily imagine a situation, when the PwD in her advance
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directive expressed her wish to participate in research studies, and while the therapeutic
representative supports this decision the family members do not. Moreover, the incom-
petent PwD herself shows certain signs of disapproval, all of which make it difficult
to interpret the true wishes of the PwD, including the refusal to participate. Art. 7b,
with the use of the word ‘refusal,’ seemingly does not include consideration of such sce-
nario. The word ‘refusal’ in Art. 7b suggests that this decision should have been made
somehow before research participation. However, as the specific conditions of PwDs
indicate, PwDs may be competent enough in their effective expression of their refusal
of participation, even though they are no longer capable of providing valid informed
consent. Therefore, the condition for ‘refusal’ of research participation by incompetent
persons in the case of PwDs should be extended to the withholding previously granted
consent. This extension of meaning is justified by the supportive statements on research
withdrawal in Art. 6.2 and Art. 7a, and the provision of special protections defined in
Art. 7. AAL technologies, moreover, should allow the monitoring of any change in the
authorisation for participation, signalling to researchers if refusal is occurring regularly
and under specific circumstances.
R&D of AAL technologies usually occur within a larger research project. By definition,
AAL technologies involve a certain amount of monitoring, surveillance, and other data
analysis. Certain tasks of larger combined research studies may focus on the pathogenic
aspects of dementia and their compensation with AAL technologies, which may require
incompetent PwDs as research participants. However, other parts of these larger com-
bined research studies regarding AAL technologies may focus more on tasks that can be
completed by competent PwDs. The rationale behind Art. 7b authorising research stud-
ies with incompetent persons, alongside the direct health benefit criterion, is the lack of
comparable effectiveness of the research conducted with competent persons. It may be
argued that Art. 7b requires that during the design of larger research projects, special
consideration should be paid and additional justifications provided for the inclusion of
incompetent PwDs, while strictly separating these from the tasks that may be conducted
with the collaboration of competent research participants with dementia.
6.3.2 Clinical Practice
Upon closer inspection, only two sections of the pair of UDBHR principles related to
informed consent refer to medical treatments explicitly. Art. 6.1 refers to preventive,
diagnostic, and therapeutic medical treatments, and Art. 7a refers to authorisation for
medical practice with incapacitated persons.
Due to the likelihood that the PwDs are seldom alone during their treatments (in a
therapeutic, non-research setting), and also the fact that inherent surveillance capabili-
ties in this respect cannot be ignored, additional consent will be needed from informal
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caregivers, and/or family members. This consent will need to include a statement that
by being a PwD’s caregiver, who uses AAL technologies for care management infor-
mation about her and the care she provides may be included in data being recorded
and stored about this management. Furthermore, information about how these data are
being further processed and managed, and about when the data will be irrecoverably
destroyed should also be a part of consent for people who participate in the care for a
PwD.
This issue highlights another related problem, which is the consent of third parties.
PwDs, who enjoy a longer stay in their home dwellings, also want to continue engaging
uninterrupted social lives, by being free to invite guests or other members of their wider
family. These people may not be informed about the PwD’s diagnosis. Eventually, it is
the preferred choice of the PwD not to disclose such information to these third parties. It
appears that such a preference of PwDs should be protected, given the requirements de-
fined in Art. 4, on the autonomy of persons, further supported by protecting the PwDs
special vulnerability with Art. 8, and possibly by avoiding stigmatisation of PwDs re-
quired by Art. 11. Neither Art. 6 nor Art. 7 consider the scenario where unrelated people
to the treatment or research (i. e. third parties) are knowingly or unknowingly partici-
pating in some form in the activities related to PwDs. It remains a question whether
such an addition to the UDBHR in relation to PwDs is necessary, and if so, how such a
requirement to obtain consent from third parties, and the autonomy of PwDs opposing
such requirement can be satisfactorily balanced.
The clinical practice of dementia management with AAL technologies may violate
the autonomy of PwDs in other areas. The definition of AAL technologies, in particular
the assistive services offered by ambient intelligence (AmI) through their intelligence,
adaptability, and ubiquitousness, characteristics which may be further extended by the
condition of ‘disappearance into background’ suggest a certain level of autonomy rep-
resented by the devices themselves. If such automation is present in the home envi-
ronment of PwDs, where AAL technologies in certain scenarios may act, in effect, in
an autonomous way, this would pose a threat to the requirement for PwDs’ consent in
therapy (Art. 6.1) but also to their respect for autonomy and self-determination (Art. 5).
Recent developments in the IT sector shed light on other related issues of consent,
the level of control of ICT devices, and the security of their users. The series of recently
discovered security issues (i. e. bugs, vulnerabilities)38 forced operating system develop-
ers to encourage their users to upgrade to newer systems (e. g. from the widely popular
38 For Android devices it was Stagefright: http://fortune.com/2015/07/28/
stagefright-google-android-security/ (visited on 28/10/2015); for Windows systems it was a
zero-day exploit of Internet Explorer, CVE-2014-1776: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?
name=CVE-2014-1776 (visited on 28/10/2015); for OS X and iOS systems it was XARA allowing unautho-
rised access to KeyChain: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1505.06836.pdf (visited on 28/11/2015); and for all of
these systems, including Linux it was the FREAK attack, allowing interception of HTTPS connections:
https://freakattack.com (visited on 28/10/2015).
246
6.3 specification of the udbhr principles
Windows XP used even after the discontinuation of official support, or Android 4.2 to
4.4 or higher, etc.). However, these newer operating systems, besides the higher secu-
rity protection and offered official support, also come with upgraded user-interfaces,
new functionalities and different behaviours compared with their previous versions. All
these changes require study and adjustments of workflows for the users. It is not hard
to imagine that such requirement cannot be fulfilled by PwDs. PwDs’ special vulnera-
bility does not allow them to study and adhere to the new elements and functionalities
of the user-interface. PwDs being only single users, and not corporate users, lose the
official support from IT companies by not upgrading their systems. On top of this, due
to their inability to upgrade the systems on their devices, they also lose control over
their private and medical data that are stored in these devices, by exposing these to
hackers. These issues should be included in the consent forms when offering treatment
with AAL technologies.
To provide the end-users with the greatest possible security protection, companies of-
fering operating systems offer remotely controlled automatic updates to their systems.39
A PwD, unaware of the differences introduced by the new system into her workflow,
may face extreme difficulties after such pseudo-intentional consent. Although the PwD
may have ‘consented’ to such an upgrade (in hope of greater security), at the end she
may find herself so unfamiliar with the system upgrade that it becomes unusable. This
may result in raised levels of anxiety and worse management of dementia as well as
a greater digital divide and the loss of the computer-using functionality in PwDs. The
support behind AAL technologies, therefore, must factor in the need for long-term and
system-wide support of the ICT devices deployed to the PwDs.
6.3.2.1 Unresolvable Issue of Understanding in PwDs
As mentioned in this chapter, informed consent for treatment purposes is usually con-
sidered as less critical (N.B. not to be confused with absent) than consent for research.
However, this rather general statement has to be carefully evaluated for the clinical prac-
tice with PwDs. PwDs in early stages of dementia with only mild symptoms usually
manifest all the necessary conditions for valid informed consent (e. g. competence, vol-
untariness, understanding). However, as dementia progresses, PwDs may temporarily
or permanently reveal loss in (at least) one of these essential requirements of valid in-
formed consent. Even if one holds the view that a limited competence and voluntariness
of PwDs in non-lucid states is preserved, based on external signs exhibited by PwDs, a
physician may find the sufficient level of understanding absent. Even though all the ef-
forts have been made to receive a confirmation that the PwD understood the disclosed
39 Such automatic upgrade, with minimal need for user input, has been recently advertised:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonkelly/2015/10/30/windows-10-upgrades-now-automatic/ (visited
on 30/10/2015).
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information, such feedback cannot always be granted. Moreover, even if such signs of
apparent understanding of the disclosed information for consenting purposes has been
confirmed by the PwD, this does not necessarily mean that a) the PwD actually under-
stood the information, and b) this understanding will prevail for the period of time for
which the consent was requested.
One may further speculate about what ‘proper’ understanding means, even in the case
of fully competent, and completely healthy, individuals. Although this remark reaches
the limits of epistemological phenomena, it is important to note that the requirement of
express consent (Art. 6.1–2, and tacitly in Art. 7a) does not fully provide physicians with
definite proof about the PwD’s understanding, beyond any doubt. Moreover, as it has
been presented in the case of authorisation for research (section 6.3.1.2), acting based on
the best interest standard may also lead to disputes about therapy/research with PwDs
that result in a deadlock. Therefore, for the resolution of these issues, one of the roles
of the mediators, alongside those of protecting the interests and preferences of PwDs,
should be the facilitation of an environment of principled compromise, as described by
Huxtable (2012).
6.3.2.2 Obtaining Consent with ICT
One of the greatest achievements of the introduction of ICT devices into healthcare for
PwDs may be the possibility of obtaining consent in circumstances, which were previ-
ously considered impossible. ICT devices in general, and AAL technologies in particular,
may facilitate a setting through which the consent of PwDs may be requested, regularly
checked (rolling informed consent), and the PwD continuously informed. The provision
of this information may occur in a much more piecemeal way, avoiding the issues of in-
formation overload, allowing the PwDs to digest the information over a longer period of
time. Ultimately, such a mechanism may partially assuage the social isolation of PwDs,
by enabling their inclusion into treatment and/or research in a much more proactive
way.
The framework of dynamic consent appears to provide promising elements to this
goal (Jane Kaye et al. 2014). Moreover, the independent authority, where the information
about consent are stored and managed can also provide a basis for the independent
mediator, whose role should be the protection of the interests and preferences of PwDs,
along with the protection of their human dignity.
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6.4 balancing of principles
6.4.1 Principles Conflicting with Article 6
During the specification of Art. 6 of the UDBHR no other conflicting principles have
been identified.
6.4.2 Principles Conflicting with Article 7
The specification of Art. 7 highlighted several possible conflicts with other principles.
These conflicts relate to Art. 4, on the benefit and harm of patients and research partici-
pants, and Art. 5, on autonomy and individual responsibility.
The possible conflict between Art. 7 and Art. 4 may occur during the authorisation
for research participation of an incompetent PwD, when the ‘best interest’ requirement
is interpreted. There may be issues, for example, if the opinions of the therapeutic rep-
resentative of the PwD, or the PwD’s family members’ idea of the PwD’s best interest
diverges from that defined in Art. 4 under maximisation of direct and indirect health
benefits. Relatives may consider participation in research as providing the best care for
the PwD, which apparently would be in the best interest of the PwD. Any effort to ex-
clude the PwD from research participation might then be interpreted as contravening
the maximisation of (possible) direct and indirect benefits. However, such an interpreta-
tion of best interest is too narrow because it fails to recognise that research participation
comes with specific, and potentially relatively high risks.
Another possible conflict between Art. 6 on consent (including Art. 7 indirectly), and
Art. 5 on respecting autonomy may emerge from the possible semi- or fully-automated
functioning of AAL technologies. Overcoming the self-determination and autonomy of
PwDs with the autonomy of AAL technologies would, in effect, place the decision of the
AAL technologies (and their creators) above that of the current users. This would result
in the disrespect of the PwD’s autonomy and right to self-determination, by skipping the
requirement for express consent (Art. 6). This would also impinge on the PwD’s human
dignity. Therefore, due to the strong links of Art. 5 to the highest ranking article, Art. 3
on human dignity, in the weak hierarchy of the UDBHR principles, further balancing is
no longer required.
6.5 summary
As a result of the specification of the UDBHR principles the following synopsis can
be formulated. For easier overview, they will be categorised under the following four
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categories of clinical research, advance directives, requirements for caregivers, and the
development and deployment of AAL technologies:
6.5.1 Informed Consent of PwDs During Research Involving AAL Technologies
• The assessment of a PwD’s capacity to consent should always be followed by fur-
ther assessments of her mental status, hearing, speech, and vision.
• Informed consent interpreted solely on the basis of legal requirements should,
especially in the case of PwDs, be avoided. PwDs constitute a ‘grey zone’ regarding
the requirement of informed consent, so strict adherence to regulations can result
in harmful and unethical consequences.
• The diagnosis of dementia should not always automatically imply the lack of com-
petence to provide informed consent.
• PwDs have the right to participate in research, should they express such a desire.
• The assessment of the capacity of a PwD to consent to participation in a research
study should always be conducted by a specialist with the necessary expertise in
an optimal manner, who is also independent and unrelated to the research.
• The risk-benefit ratio should always be part of the competency assessment of
PwDs, irrespective of whether it is for medical therapy or research. If the research
participation confers no, or very little, direct health benefits for the participant,
the ethical standards for conducting research with PwDs require that the research
activity should be undertaken with utmost restraint, and should provide benefits
for the same category of people as participants. The research should pose minimal
risks and burdens to the participants (e. g. as much as the participant would face
in her normal everyday life).
• If there is a way of conducting the research with healthy volunteers instead of
vulnerable populations, such as the PwDs, it should be done. Research with vul-
nerable populations can only be allowed if there is a prospect of direct health
benefit to the participants, and if no comparable study can be undertaken.
• The prospective participant of a research study should always be informed in ad-
vance, and a meaningful discussion should be conducted between the researcher(s)
and PwD about the aims, nature, and consequences of the study. All the potential
benefits and harms should be clearly explained.
• A trial run of the research study with PwDs is advisable. It will also help the PwDs
to better understand the study procedures.
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• The use of rolling informed consent should be applied, whenever possible,
throughout the research study. This approach is in accordance with the ongoing
process of obtaining consent from the participant, and hence with the appropri-
ate interpretation of the informed consent requirement of the UDBHR. Rolling
informed consent also ensures that the voluntariness of participation is regularly
assessed.
• Consent from PwDs should be obtained in accordance to the current ethical stan-
dards. This means that it is the responsibility of the researcher(s) to assess whether
the PwD’s competency has changed during the research study, and to conduct the
research in compliance with the requirements delineated in the respective articles
of the UDBHR (i. e. Art. 6 or Art. 7). If such scenario is not defined in the design
of the study, the researcher bears the responsibility for excluding the participant
from the rest of the study, or require amendment from the REC.
• If a person is not fully competent to provide valid informed consent, she should,
at least, always be requested to provide assent, if possible.
• Consent should also always be obtained in a culturally sensitive manner (as re-
quired by Art. 12).
• Invasive research should trigger the need for higher consenting capacity. Invasive
research should not necessarily mean only corporeal invasiveness but also the
invasion of privacy (into home, etc.).
• The possibility of withdrawing from participating in a research study should be
clearly and regularly communicated. The decision to stop participating in a re-
search study does not need a reason, and the decision should not have any nega-
tive consequences on the healthcare management of the PwD.
• The assessment of the capacity of judgement in persons under guardianship re-
quires a comparable evaluation. As this happens by a matter of appreciation, it is
advisable that this be performed by more than one specialist/researcher.
• The life-story and the personal narrative of PwDs, with their documented values,
preferences, wishes, remembrance by others, should be respected. This can further
serve as a basis for any substituted or presumed consent, or hypothetical judge-
ment.
• The PwDs and their proxies should be always re-contacted for permission to re-use
data, obtained during research, for further scientific purposes.
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• The appointment of an independent adviser, whose responsibility it is to protect
the safety, welfare and interests of the PwDs during the research study, is highly
advisable.
6.5.2 Recommendations For Advance Directives
• The PwD should be advised to formulate an advance directive, as soon as possible
after the initial diagnosis of dementia. Studies suggest that the competence to for-
mulate advance directives after the initial diagnosis decreases quickly. Therefore,
having some form of an advance directive before a diagnosis of dementia would
be ideal.
• The advance directive should incorporate the designation of a therapeutic repre-
sentative, and the definition of the conditions under which the PwD is willing to
participate in research.
• Advance directives should be updated regularly.
• When a PwD is admitted into a professional institution, if is advisable for health-
care professionals to record their advance directives, if possible.
• It is advisable to also record the motivation(s) that would lead the PwD to enrol
into a research study, for later evaluation.
• A ‘right not to know’ should be documented in the advance directive of the PwD.
• The life-story (personal narrative) of the PwDs should, if possible always, be taken
into account in interpreting the advance directive. This requirement should also
serve as a reference point for requests for ward of the court protection, in case of
conflict between the proxies and advance directives.
• The researchers must adhere to national regulations regarding the legal weight of
advance directives.
• It is not advisable to conduct research with incompetent PwDs, who lack any
advance directive or statement from their relatives.
• Lifelogs can prove to be helpful in recording the advance directive of a PwD but
also in documenting the various elements of one’s personal narrative, helping the
healthcare professionals in interpreting the PwD’s will in an incompetent state.
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6.5.3 Requirements For Formal and Informal Caregivers
• Different subtypes of dementia affect different domains of the intellectual func-
tioning. Therefore, healthcare professionals should help assess and identify the
domains in which the PwD should be still considered competent.
• With the advent of ICT, express informed consent became easier to obtain. There-
fore, formal and informal caregivers should encourage the development and use
of ICT devices for PwDs. Such frequent use will likely result in improvements in
the recording of PwDs’ wishes, making them more traceable.
• Tacit agreements for research (and treatment) should be minimised in the care of
PwDs with AAL technologies.
• Healthcare professionals should fall back onto the ‘best interest’ standard, during
the care for PwDs, only as a last resort. While it is possible to obtain any form
of (even partial) direct consent or assent, it should be obtained. The rationale for
this requirement consists of the lack of clarity regarding the vestigial traces of a
PwD’s psychological narrative, some of which is essential, and which others are
not important and can be overlooked.
• Healthcare professionals should make the effort to acknowledge the PwD’s authen-
ticity, by being attuned to the person’s narrative, staying engaged with the person’s
normative values, and being respectful to the remaining traces of personality.
• Healthcare professionals should be aware of the tendency to consider the seem-
ingly irrational desires of the PwDs as signs of incompetency. While on their own,
these may be interpreted as irrational desires, seemingly disconnected from the
PwDs’ former personalities, together with the whole life-story of the person, the
desires may be completely rational and valid.
• Researchers and healthcare professionals should adopt a step-by-step procedure
for performing clinical research with PwDs.
• Researchers and healthcare professionals should avoid the approach described as
a ‘conspiracy of silence’, which covertly places that the research above the interests
of the participants.
• Research with PwDs should include the right, individually personalised, balance
between information overload, and the under-informing of research participants.
The information should be divided into and presented in small, digestible blocks,
and distributed on a wider timescale.
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• Researchers and healthcare professionals should adhere to the highest standards
of transparency for conducting research. Only such an approach will secure the
willingness of participants to take part in research.
6.5.4 Recommendations For the Development and Deployment of AAL Technologies
• Due to the ubiquitousness of ICT devices, they may prove useful in the obtaining
of informed consent in situations where it was not currently possible. Therefore, a
well-balanced method of repeatedly asking PwDs for consent with the support of
ICT should be developed.
• Asking for consent with ICT devices is prone to routinisation, thus effective mea-
sures should be developed to prevent these.
• ICT devices should be developed to ensure that they are only used by authenti-
cated users. For PwDs the authentication should be made unobtrusive and user-
friendly. The preferred ways of validating the authorised user is by fingerprint,
voice, face-recognition, or other biomarkers.
• ICT devices should be made user-friendly in order to optimise their acceptability
for PwDs.
• The expectations of PwDs regarding AAL technologies are commonly very high.
Therefore, their users should be warned in advance that the technology is still
being tested; and a realistic view about the used ICT should be emphasised during
the R&D.
• As the autonomy and privacy of PwDs must be respected, similarly the autonomy,
privacy, and confidentiality of eventual third parties should be respected when
deploying and using ICT technologies in research and clinical application.
• Researchers and computer engineers have to adhere to the highest standards of
security and encryption during data retention and data transfer, given the fact that
these data are of a private and medical nature. The researchers should ensure that
the data will not be misused or abused for criminal activities, privacy breaches, or
dehumanising actions.
• PwDs should be informed about precautionary measures that they can implement
to prevent data recording when they do not want to be recorded. PwDs should
also have the opportunity to review and delete the recorded data, before they are
submitted for analysis.
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• Both research participants and researchers should be made aware that the collected
data may be subpoenaed. Both parties should be informed about this fact before
the start of the research study.
• PwDs, or their legal representative(s), should always be allowed to retain a certain
degree of control over their data, despite the state of PwDs. The sensitive nature
of these data requires that the alleviation of the right to retain control, and the
ultimate surrender of this right should always be clearly stated by the PwD herself
or her legal representative. Such a statement should also always be recorded and
documented.
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C O N C L U S I O N
7.1 summary
7.1.1 Introduction
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the responsible development, clinical re-
search, and application of AAL technologies for PwDs, by providing a normative anal-
ysis of the most prominent ethical issues related to research and clinical application of
AAL technologies for PwDs. The normative analysis is concluded with recommenda-
tions.
The importance of this subject is growing, and it is expected to continue doing so due
to ageing populations worldwide. As the number of PwDs rises, so will the demand for
care, and the burden placed upon informal and formal caregivers, including physicians,
and healthcare systems (cf. Chapter 1). Therefore, in recent years, the possibility of care
provision support using assistive technologies has been investigated. These technolo-
gies are aimed mainly at allowing PwDs to stay at home for longer, by compensating
for their impairments, and empowering them in their everyday activities, as well as sup-
porting caregivers, and providing data for researchers in dementia to help them better
understand this currently incurable and difficult-to-diagnose condition.
The main research objectives of this dissertation are the following:
1. Ethical Challenges and Opportunities – The identification of the ethical challenges
and opportunities associated with the development and application of AAL tech-
nologies for PwDs, and the selection of the most prominent ethical issues. These
prominent ethical issues are identified from the systematic literature review pre-
sented in Chapter 3 and are as follows:
• Values of the goals of AAL technologies.
• Special vulnerability of PwDs.
• Informed consent of PwDs.
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2. Interpretation of UDBHR Principles – The interpretation of the UDBHR principles
related to the most prominent ethical issues. This interpretation is based on the
overview of the related essential literature and policy documents.
3. Normative Analysis of Ethical Issues – The normative analysis of the most prominent
ethical issues in specifying the UDBHR principles to the context of PwDs and AAL
technologies.
4. Conclusions of the Ethical Analysis – The analysis is concluded with a list of recom-
mendations regarding how to tackle the ethical issues related to the application of
AAL technologies for PwDs.
7.1.2 Findings
The first research objective is met by an extensive literature review in Chapter 3. This
review lists a comprehensive set of ethical challenges and opportunities (cf. Table B.2),
highlighting three prominent ethical issues that provide the content for the normative
analysis. These prominent ethical issues are: the value of the goals of AAL technologies
for PwDs, the special vulnerability of PwDs, and the requirement of informed consent
in the case of PwDs.
For the normative analysis (the second research objective of this dissertation), the
principles of the UDBHR are employed. The UDBHR principles are considered to be
prima facie principles (in the sense of Ross 2002) with a weak hierarchy (where Art. 3 is
the strongest, and Art. 12 the weakest principle). The interpretation of these principles
employs the essential literature regarding the UDBHR articles, followed by key inter-
national and national policy documents that further contextualise the interpretation of
UDBHR principles, and academic literature on recent and ongoing scholarly debates
that may be generally related to the UDBHR principles.
The third research objective is met by the specification of the interpreted UDBHR
principles to the specific contexts of PwDs and AAL technologies. This specification
focused on two areas: clinical research, and clinical practice. Whenever the specification
of a UDBHR principle yielded a conflict with another UDBHR principle, the conflict was
analysed using a balancing step (described in section 1.2).
The fourth research objective comprises a list of recommendations based on the find-
ings of the first three research objectives, mainly on the normative analysis.
7.1.2.1 Value of the Goals of AAL Technologies
One of the main findings of the analysis of the value of the goals of AAL technologies is
the assumption of the a priori positive impact of these goals, which was apparent in the
academic literature. The aims of AAL technologies, to enable PwDs to stay at home for
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longer, to empower them during their activities of daily living (ADLs), and to provide
assistance, were uncritically assumed to be of value, with only occasional mention of
ethical issues in the academic literature.
Inconclusiveness has been noticed regarding the differing motives of the various stake-
holders during the R&D and deployment of AAL technologies for PwDs. The motivation
of PwDs for accepting the assistance of AAL technologies can be significantly different
(and even contradictory) to the motives of formal and informal caregivers, including
physicians, who perceive AAL technologies as a way to alleviate their care burden. Re-
searchers perceive the main role of AAL technologies as an important source of valuable
data about the PwDs, a motive which may conflict with that of PwDs who seek, amongst
other things, comfort. Finally, healthcare systems are interested in increasing the deploy-
ment of AAL technologies, in order to externalise the costs related to PwDs, although
this may prove counter-productive in the future.
The goals (cf. Chapter 3) of AAL technologies are very ambitious. The challenge is
not only that the AAL technologies have to fulfil the divergent needs of their various
current users (e. g. heterogeneous group of PwDs, formal and informal caregivers, etc.)
but that they also need to extend to future implementation in various parts of the world,
where new, culturally diverse user needs may be encountered.
Art. 4 of the UDBHR may provide valuable guidance for the ethical development
and deployment of AAL technologies, e. g. by requiring the active involvement of PwDs
in the R&D process of AAL technologies. Researchers that lack expertise or familiarity
with PwDs should be informed during the R&D about the special needs of their users,
and about the need to avoid the malignant approaches (e. g. treachery, disempowerment,
infantilisation, etc., cf. Table 4.1) towards PwDs defined by T. Kitwood (1997).
Although some doom scenarios may overstate the case, it is recognised that some of
the risks linked with the use of AAL technologies cannot be completely eradicated (Co-
eckelbergh 2015a).
7.1.2.2 Special Vulnerability of PwDs
The origin of the special vulnerabilities of PwDs is not based solely on their MCI. Their
special vulnerabilities come from various sources, some of which are related to their
condition, while others are related to specific situations. These situations can include
clinical research and application of AAL technologies for PwDs. The normative analysis
describes several of these sources of vulnerability.
PwDs are especially vulnerable when their needs and demands are ignored. This
can occur during research as well as clinical practice with AAL technologies. Another
circumstance in which PwDs are especially vulnerable is one where undue influence is
exercised by proxies or close relatives, which can occur again in both clinical research
and application. Similarly, PwDs are particularly vulnerable in the presence of AAL
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technologies that are invasive or record personal data because of their impairments.
For example, data safety and protection must be actively managed, which cannot be
performed by the PwDs themselves. Moreover, the infinite memory of lifelogs may cause
distress and anxiety, thereby increasing the vulnerability of PwDs.
PwDs may also be particularly vulnerable in clinical research or practice with AAL
technologies for healthcare because of a lack of regulation or less rigorous testing stan-
dards. During research, PwDs may be exposed to unnecessary risks e. g. when prema-
ture or faulty prototypes are tested. PwDs are especially vulnerable as research partici-
pants and researchers can themselves be a source of vulnerability for PwDs. PwDs may
also be vulnerable as patients in clinical practice, exposed to potentially over-aggressive
therapy, which can cause distress and anxiety. PwDs are often vulnerable to isolation
and stigmatisation, which may be exacerbated in clinical practice where human care is
replaced by AAL technologies.
PwDs are also especially vulnerable because of their MCI. Their condition makes
them more vulnerable to being victims of fraud and confidence tricks. Another source of
vulnerability may stem from the exclusion of PwDs from developing countries because
of lack of access to research or application of AAL technologies, which raises ethical
concerns about double standards and negligence.
The vulnerability of PwDs may be minimised by involving them responsibly in the
R&D process, and by not ignoring their specific requirements and demands. AAL tech-
nologies can provide PwDs with opportunities to socialise and to benefit from greater
empowerment, independence, and more effective management of their dementia care.
According to Art. 8 of the UDBHR, the respect for special vulnerability is closely
linked with the respect for personal integrity. Researchers and caregivers therefore need
to also respect the personal integrity of PwDs during research and clinical practice. This
can lead to the development of meaningful relationships between researchers/caregivers
and PwDs, enabling them to better consider the needs and wishes of the PwDs, and the
appropriateness and relevance of research and treatment goals. Thus, PwDs should be
perceived as more than mere data sources that are secondary to the AAL technologies
during R&D. In clinical practice, respect for personal integrity means that treatment
should not be focused on the needs of PwDs from only a biological perspective but also
from the personal and subjective perspective of the PwD. The relationship of caregivers
and physicians with PwDs should therefore be based on partnership, cooperation, and
symmetry.
7.1.2.3 Informed Consent
The requirement of valid informed consent remains a challenge in relation to PwDs.
The three main criteria of valid informed consent (e. g. competence, understanding, and
voluntariness, cf. Árnason et al. 2011) cannot always be fulfilled by PwDs. Methods of
260
7.1 summary
rolling informed consent may be used to track any changes in the informed consent of
PwDs. Eventually, a principled compromise may be employed in order to resolve issues
between the self-determination of incompetent persons (e. g. as expressed in advance
directives) and the need for caregivers to act in their best interest.
Despite the issues encountered with informed consent of PwDs, professional bodies
(e. g. Alzheimer Europe, EDCON) do not recommend the exclusion of PwDs from re-
search activities.
ICT introduce novel opportunities for obtaining consent from PwDs, or for updating
previously provided consents. The approach of dynamic consent is also promising in
this regard.
An additional issue during the care of PwDs is the problem of consent from third
parties, who temporarily or permanently share the location with PwDs and AAL tech-
nologies. The prospective autonomy (i. e. artificial intelligence) of AAL technologies may
result in the technology questioning a decision made by PwDs (or others). This issue
may escalate in the future with the advancement of AAL technologies.
The introduction of mediating persons between researchers/physicians and PwDs
may be beneficial in order to protect the interests of the PwDs.
7.1.3 Implications
This dissertation presents that alongside the obvious issues of security and privacy, there
are distinctive ethical issues related to the clinical research and clinical application of
AAL technologies. These ethical issues relate to all the stakeholders involved in the care
of PwDs (i. e. formal and informal caregivers, physicians, researchers, PwDs, design-
ers, ICT engineers). Moreover, these ethical issues are relatively under-represented in
published scholarly debate. This implies that there are important ethical issues that are
relevant for the R&D and clinical application of AAL technologies, which have not been
fully or sufficiently considered.
Firstly, the reflection about the ultimate purpose and goals of AAL technologies, and
whom they are really aimed for, needs to be regularly reviewed in research projects.
The lack of success of AAL technologies (reported by Joost van Hoof, Wouters, et al.
2011, referring to Nispen 2004) developed purposely for PwDs should not discourage
researchers in the pursuit of research with PwDs because of the expected increase of
PwDs in populations worldwide. Rebranding AAL technologies, which have been de-
veloped and tested with PwDs, for the elderly in general implies additional ethical com-
plications, which may negatively impact, not only the justification of previous research
projects, but also the prospect of much needed research for PwDs in the future.
Secondly, researchers should design their research projects in a way that would enable
PwDs to receive direct benefits of AAL technologies whenever possible. The vulnerabil-
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ity of PwDs makes research projects with only aspirational benefits ethically question-
able, since these studies need additional justification for involving PwDs. Moreover, re-
search projects investigating multiple technologies (e. g. video surveillance and analysis)
may test many of these technologies on healthy volunteers, including elderly people in
general. According to Art. 3.2, there is no excuse to use AAL technologies solely in the
interests of scientific knowledge or society, especially if it overrides the interests and wel-
fare of individuals with dementia. It has been analysed in this dissertation that respect
for the vulnerability and personal integrity of PwDs should not result in their being
subject to additional discrimination and stigmatisation.
Thirdly, ethical issues in obtaining valid informed consent remain an essential fea-
ture of research with PwDs. Although the introduction of ICT into this process may be
beneficial in monitoring any changes in the consent, such technology also introduces
additional ethical issues. Amongst these are the issues of third party consent, or the
prospective autonomy (i. e. artificial intelligence) of technologies (which may ignore
PwDs’ decisions that they deem meaningless or ‘bad’). A considerable amount of lit-
erature refers to advance directives as one of the solutions for extending the PwD’s
autonomy. However, as it has been argued in this thesis, even the existence of an ad-
vance directive from a PwD may not provide enough security in interpreting the actual
desires of the person concerned. Therefore, the analysis of the topic of informed consent
highlighted a grey area between competence and incompetence, which is yet another
issue that will be exacerbated by the growing number of PwDs.
The dissertation also provides, as a result of the normative analysis, in summary,
a number of recommendations. These recommendations are supposed to support re-
searchers, healthcare professionals, and RECs in the ethical development of AAL tech-
nologies within this important field of research.
From the point of view of policy and regulation, future testing and approval proce-
dures for AAL technologies in the healthcare setting needs to be stricter. RECs should
also clearly distinguish between AAL technologies that are developed for PwDs and
those developed for the elderly in general, by requiring strong justification of the inclu-
sion of PwDs in research with AAL technologies. In their reviews, RECs should scruti-
nise the direct benefits of these technologies, clearly separating them from indirect and
aspirational benefits. RECs should also require better disclosure of information about
the potential benefits of research participation to PwDs. AAL technologies should not
be considered as simply as another type of technology present in the care of PwDs. Their
risks and benefits should always be deeply scrutinised by RECs. Community Advisory
Boards (Horn 2007) that represent the interests of PwDs may assist in these delibera-
tions.
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7.2 outlook
As the section 1.3 concerning the relevance of research related to PwDs highlights, re-
search and clinical practice with the assistance of AAL technologies is expected to gain
greater importance in the future.
The ethical assessment of these projects needs to pay increasing attention to the valid-
ity and justification of the inclusion of PwDs into research projects of AAL technologies.
As noted in the literature, researchers already perceive an increase in technology push
from industry. This technology push may grow in the future, and RECs should be in-
formed about this.
The advances in ICT in relation to artificial intelligence pose additional concerns about
the ‘smartness’ and partial- or full-autonomy of AAL technologies in the future. This
may become a greater issue in relation to the specific condition of PwDs, such as their
MCI. Further research about the benefits and risks in this regard is required.
AAL technologies involve a great number of sensors for their operation. As these
sensors are gradually becoming smaller, there is a chance of their implementation in
vivo. This may pose further ethical concerns in relation to PwDs with limited ability to
provide valid informed consent.
The topic of third party consent requires satisfactory resolution. It may become one
of the major obstacles in the acceptance of AAL technologies by society. Furthermore,
it may result in the stigmatisation of PwDs who require the help of AAL technologies,
further worsening their vulnerable situation. It is one of the resulting ethical implications
of this dissertation that such a scenario should be avoided.
Future research should also consider the assessment of the potential placebo effect
of AAL technologies for PwDs because to date, no studies have been conducted with
placebo controls. However, the consideration of placebo controlled trials of AAL tech-
nologies with PwDs is a matter for discussion in order to assess its feasibility. Data is
required to ensure that the benefits observed in trials and clinical practice are due to
the direct effects of AAL technologies, in order to justify their use, especially for the
provision of healthcare and for PwDs.
Finally, further investigations are needed into the societal consequences of the de-
ployment of AAL technologies for PwDs and the elderly in general. Further analysis
should be conducted regarding whether governmental incentives to externalise care for
PwDs would further widen the gap between the economically affluent PwDs and the
economically impoverished PwDs.
263

A P P E N D I C E S
265

A
U N I V E R S A L D E C L A R AT I O N O N B I O E T H I C S A N D H U M A N
R I G H T S 1
The General Conference,
Conscious of the unique capacity of human beings to reflect upon their own existence
and on their environment, to perceive injustice, to avoid danger, to assume responsibil-
ity, to seek cooperation and to exhibit the moral sense that gives expression to ethical
principles,
Reflecting on the rapid developments in science and technology, which increasingly af-
fect our understanding of life and life itself, resulting in a strong demand for a global
response to the ethical implications of such developments,
Recognizing that ethical issues raised by the rapid advances in science and their techno-
logical applications should be examined with due respect to the dignity of the human
person and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms,
Resolving that it is necessary and timely for the international community to state uni-
versal principles that will provide a foundation for humanity’s response to the ever-
increasing dilemmas and controversies that science and technology present for hu-
mankind and for the environment,
Recalling the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights adopted by the General Confer-
ence of UNESCO on 11 November 1997 and the International Declaration on Human
Genetic Data adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on 16 October 2003,
Noting the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December
1966, the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
1 This is the full text of the UDBHR (2005). Resolution adopted by UNESCO on the report of Commission III
at the 18th plenary meeting, on 19th October 2005. Online: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=
31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
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Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965, the United Nations Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979, the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, the United Nations
Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992, the Standard Rules on the Equaliza-
tion of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations in 1993, the UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Scien-
tific Researchers of 20 November 1974, the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial
Prejudice of 27 November 1978, the UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities of the
Present Generations Towards Future Generations of 12 November 1997, the UNESCO
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity of 2 November 2001, the ILO Convention
169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries of 27 June 1989,
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture which was
adopted by the FAO Conference on 3 November 2001 and entered into force on 29 June
2004, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
annexed to the Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, which
entered into force on 1 January 1995, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health of 14 November 2001 and other relevant international instruments
adopted by the United Nations and the specialized agencies of the United Nations sys-
tem, in particular the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
and the World Health Organization (WHO),
Also noting international and regional instruments in the field of bioethics, including
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe, which was adopted in 1997 and entered
into force in 1999, together with its Additional Protocols, as well as national legislation
and regulations in the field of bioethics and the international and regional codes of
conduct and guidelines and other texts in the field of bioethics, such as the Declaration
of Helsinki of the World Medical Association on Ethical Principles for Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects, adopted in 1964 and amended in 1975, 1983, 1989, 1996 and
2000 and the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human
Subjects of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, adopted in
1982 and amended in 1993 and 2002,
Recognizing that this Declaration is to be understood in a manner consistent with domes-
tic and international law in conformity with human rights law,
Recalling the Constitution of UNESCO adopted on 16 November 1945,
Considering UNESCO’s role in identifying universal principles based on shared ethical
values to guide scientific and technological development and social transformation in
order to identify emerging challenges in science and technology taking into account the
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responsibility of the present generations towards future generations, and that questions
of bioethics, which necessarily have an international dimension, should be treated as
a whole, drawing on the principles already stated in the Universal Declaration on the
Human Genome and Human Rights and the International Declaration on Human Ge-
netic Data and taking account not only of the current scientific context but also of future
developments,
Aware that human beings are an integral part of the biosphere, with an important role
in protecting one another and other forms of life, in particular animals,
Recognizing that, based on the freedom of science and research, scientific and techno-
logical developments have been, and can be, of great benefit to humankind in increas-
ing, inter alia, life expectancy and improving the quality of life, and emphasizing that
such developments should always seek to promote the welfare of individuals, families,
groups or communities and humankind as a whole in the recognition of the dignity
of the human person and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms,
Recognizing that health does not depend solely on scientific and technological research
developments but also on psychosocial and cultural factors,
Also recognizing that decisions regarding ethical issues in medicine, life sciences and asso-
ciated technologies may have an impact on individuals, families, groups or communities
and humankind as a whole,
Bearing in mind that cultural diversity, as a source of exchange, innovation and creativity,
is necessary to humankind and, in this sense, is the common heritage of humanity, but
emphasizing that it may not be invoked at the expense of human rights and fundamental
freedoms,
Also bearing in mind that a person’s identity includes biological, psychological, social,
cultural and spiritual dimensions,
Recognizing that unethical scientific and technological conduct has had a particular im-
pact on indigenous and local communities,
Convinced that moral sensitivity and ethical reflection should be an integral part of the
process of scientific and technological developments and that bioethics should play a
predominant role in the choices that need to be made concerning issues arising from
such developments,
Considering the desirability of developing new approaches to social responsibility to
ensure that progress in science and technology contributes to justice, equity and to the
interest of humanity,
Recognizing that an important way to evaluate social realities and achieve equity is to
pay attention to the position of women,
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Stressing the need to reinforce international cooperation in the field of bioethics, tak-
ing into account, in particular, the special needs of developing countries, indigenous
communities and vulnerable populations,
Considering that all human beings, without distinction, should benefit from the same
high ethical standards in medicine and life science research,
Proclaims the principles that follow and adopts the present Declaration.
general provisions
Article 1 – Scope
1. This Declaration addresses ethical issues related to medicine, life sciences and as-
sociated technologies as applied to human beings, taking into account their social,
legal and environmental dimensions.
2. This Declaration is addressed to States. As appropriate and relevant, it also pro-
vides guidance to decisions or practices of individuals, groups, communities, insti-
tutions and corporations, public and private.
Article 2 – Aims
The aims of this Declaration are:
(a) to provide a universal framework of principles and procedures to guide States in
the formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments in the field of
bioethics;
(b) to guide the actions of individuals, groups, communities, institutions and corpora-
tions, public and private;
(c) to promote respect for human dignity and protect human rights, by ensuring re-
spect for the life of human beings, and fundamental freedoms, consistent with
international human rights law;
(d) to recognize the importance of freedom of scientific research and the benefits de-
rived from scientific and technological developments, while stressing the need for
such research and developments to occur within the framework of ethical princi-
ples set out in this Declaration and to respect human dignity, human rights and
fundamental freedoms;
(e) to foster multidisciplinary and pluralistic dialogue about bioethical issues between
all stakeholders and within society as a whole;
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(f) to promote equitable access to medical, scientific and technological developments
as well as the greatest possible flow and the rapid sharing of knowledge concern-
ing those developments and the sharing of benefits, with particular attention to
the needs of developing countries;
(g) to safeguard and promote the interests of the present and future generations;
(h) to underline the importance of biodiversity and its conservation as a common
concern of humankind.
principles
Within the scope of this Declaration, in decisions or practices taken or carried out by
those to whom it is addressed, the following principles are to be respected.
Article 3 – Human dignity and human rights
1. Human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected.
2. The interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole inter-
est of science or society.
Article 4 – Benefit and harm
In applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice and associated tech-
nologies, direct and indirect benefits to patients, research participants and other affected
individuals should be maximized and any possible harm to such individuals should be
minimized.
Article 5 – Autonomy and individual responsibility
The autonomy of persons to make decisions, while taking responsibility for those deci-
sions and respecting the autonomy of others, is to be respected. For persons who are not
capable of exercising autonomy, special measures are to be taken to protect their rights
and interests.
Article 6 – Consent
1. Any preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic medical intervention is only to be car-
ried out with the prior, free and informed consent of the person concerned, based
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on adequate information. The consent should, where appropriate, be express and
may be withdrawn by the person concerned at any time and for any reason with-
out disadvantage or prejudice.
2. Scientific research should only be carried out with the prior, free, express and
informed consent of the person concerned. The information should be adequate,
provided in a comprehensible form and should include modalities for withdrawal
of consent. Consent may be withdrawn by the person concerned at any time and
for any reason without any disadvantage or prejudice. Exceptions to this principle
should be made only in accordance with ethical and legal standards adopted by
States, consistent with the principles and provisions set out in this Declaration, in
particular in Article 27, and international human rights law.
3. In appropriate cases of research carried out on a group of persons or a commu-
nity, additional agreement of the legal representatives of the group or community
concerned may be sought. In no case should a collective community agreement or
the consent of a community leader or other authority substitute for an individual’s
informed consent.
Article 7 – Persons without the capacity to consent
In accordance with domestic law, special protection is to be given to persons who do not
have the capacity to consent:
(a) authorization for research and medical practice should be obtained in accordance
with the best interest of the person concerned and in accordance with domestic law.
However, the person concerned should be involved to the greatest extent possible
in the decision-making process of consent, as well as that of withdrawing consent;
(b) research should only be carried out for his or her direct health benefit, subject to
the authorization and the protective conditions prescribed by law, and if there is
no research alternative of comparable effectiveness with research participants able
to consent. Research which does not have potential direct health benefit should
only be undertaken by way of exception, with the utmost restraint, exposing the
person only to a minimal risk and minimal burden and, if the research is expected
to contribute to the health benefit of other persons in the same category, subject
to the conditions prescribed by law and compatible with the protection of the
individual’s human rights. Refusal of such persons to take part in research should
be respected.
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Article 8 – Respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity
In applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice and associated tech-
nologies, human vulnerability should be taken into account. Individuals and groups of
special vulnerability should be protected and the personal integrity of such individuals
respected.
Article 9 – Privacy and confidentiality
The privacy of the persons concerned and the confidentiality of their personal informa-
tion should be respected. To the greatest extent possible, such information should not be
used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which it was collected or consented
to, consistent with international law, in particular international human rights law.
Article 10 – Equality, justice and equity
The fundamental equality of all human beings in dignity and rights is to be respected
so that they are treated justly and equitably.
Article 11 – Non-discrimination and non-stigmatization
No individual or group should be discriminated against or stigmatized on any grounds,
in violation of human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Article 12 – Respect for cultural diversity and pluralism
The importance of cultural diversity and pluralism should be given due regard. How-
ever, such considerations are not to be invoked to infringe upon human dignity, human
rights and fundamental freedoms, nor upon the principles set out in this Declaration,
nor to limit their scope.
Article 13 – Solidarity and cooperation
Solidarity among human beings and international cooperation towards that end are to
be encouraged.
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Article 14 – Social responsibility and health
1. The promotion of health and social development for their people is a central pur-
pose of governments that all sectors of society share.
2. Taking into account that the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health
is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of
race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition, progress in science
and technology should advance:
(a) access to quality health care and essential medicines, especially for the health
of women and children, because health is essential to life itself and must be
considered to be a social and human good;
(b) access to adequate nutrition and water;
(c) improvement of living conditions and the environment;
(d) elimination of the marginalization and the exclusion of persons on the basis
of any grounds;
(e) reduction of poverty and illiteracy.
Article 15 – Sharing of benefits
1. Benefits resulting from any scientific research and its applications should be shared
with society as a whole and within the international community, in particular with
developing countries. In giving effect to this principle, benefits may take any of the
following forms:
(a) special and sustainable assistance to, and acknowledgement of, the persons
and groups that have taken part in the research;
(b) access to quality health care;
(c) provision of new diagnostic and therapeutic modalities or products stemming
from research;
(d) support for health services;
(e) access to scientific and technological knowledge;
(f) capacity-building facilities for research purposes;
(g) other forms of benefit consistent with the principles set out in this Declara-
tion.
2. Benefits should not constitute improper inducements to participate in research.
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Article 16 – Protecting future generations
The impact of life sciences on future generations, including on their genetic constitution,
should be given due regard.
Article 17 – Protection of the environment, the biosphere and biodiversity
Due regard is to be given to the interconnection between human beings and other forms
of life, to the importance of appropriate access and utilization of biological and genetic
resources, to respect for traditional knowledge and to the role of human beings in the
protection of the environment, the biosphere and biodiversity.
application of the principles
Article 18 – Decision-making and addressing bioethical issues
1. Professionalism, honesty, integrity and transparency in decision-making should
be promoted, in particular declarations of all conflicts of interest and appropriate
sharing of knowledge. Every endeavour should be made to use the best available
scientific knowledge and methodology in addressing and periodically reviewing
bioethical issues.
2. Persons and professionals concerned and society as a whole should be engaged in
dialogue on a regular basis.
3. Opportunities for informed pluralistic public debate, seeking the expression of all
relevant opinions, should be promoted.
Article 19 – Ethics committees
Independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees should be established,
promoted and supported at the appropriate level in order to:
(a) assess the relevant ethical, legal, scientific and social issues related to research
projects involving human beings;
(b) provide advice on ethical problems in clinical settings;
(c) assess scientific and technological developments, formulate recommendations and
contribute to the preparation of guidelines on issues within the scope of this Dec-
laration;
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(d) foster debate, education and public awareness of, and engagement in, bioethics.
Article 20 – Risk assessment and management
Appropriate assessment and adequate management of risk related to medicine, life sci-
ences and associated technologies should be promoted.
Article 21 – Transnational practices
1. States, public and private institutions, and professionals associated with transna-
tional activities should endeavour to ensure that any activity within the scope of
this Declaration, undertaken, funded or otherwise pursued in whole or in part in
different States, is consistent with the principles set out in this Declaration.
2. When research is undertaken or otherwise pursued in one or more States (the host
State(s)) and funded by a source in another State, such research should be the
object of an appropriate level of ethical review in the host State(s) and the State
in which the funder is located. This review should be based on ethical and legal
standards that are consistent with the principles set out in this Declaration.
3. Transnational health research should be responsive to the needs of host countries,
and the importance of research contributing to the alleviation of urgent global
health problems should be recognized.
4. When negotiating a research agreement, terms for collaboration and agreement on
the benefits of research should be established with equal participation by those
party to the negotiation.
5. States should take appropriate measures, both at the national and international
levels, to combat bioterrorism and illicit traffic in organs, tissues, samples, genetic
resources and genetic-related materials.
promotion of the declaration
Article 22 – Role of States
1. States should take all appropriate measures, whether of a legislative, administra-
tive or other character, to give effect to the principles set out in this Declaration
in accordance with international human rights law. Such measures should be sup-
ported by action in the spheres of education, training and public information.
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2. States should encourage the establishment of independent, multidisciplinary and
pluralist ethics committees, as set out in Article 19.
Article 23 – Bioethics education, training and information
1. In order to promote the principles set out in this Declaration and to achieve a better
understanding of the ethical implications of scientific and technological develop-
ments, in particular for young people, States should endeavour to foster bioethics
education and training at all levels as well as to encourage information and knowl-
edge dissemination programmes about bioethics.
2. States should encourage the participation of international and regional intergov-
ernmental organizations and international, regional and national non governmen-
tal organizations in this endeavour.
Article 24 – International cooperation
1. States should foster international dissemination of scientific information and en-
courage the free flow and sharing of scientific and technological knowledge.
2. Within the framework of international cooperation, States should promote cultural
and scientific cooperation and enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements en-
abling developing countries to build up their capacity to participate in generating
and sharing scientific knowledge, the related know-how and the benefits thereof.
3. States should respect and promote solidarity between and among States, as well
as individuals, families, groups and communities, with special regard for those
rendered vulnerable by disease or disability or other personal, societal or environ-
mental conditions and those with the most limited resources.
Article 25 – Follow-up action by UNESCO
1. UNESCO shall promote and disseminate the principles set out in this Declaration.
In doing so, UNESCO should seek the help and assistance of the Intergovernmen-
tal Bioethics Committee (IGBC) and the International Bioethics Committee (IBC).
2. UNESCO shall reaffirm its commitment to dealing with bioethics and to promoting
collaboration between IGBC and IBC.
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final provisions
Article 26 – Interrelation and complementarity of the principles
This Declaration is to be understood as a whole and the principles are to be understood
as complementary and interrelated. Each principle is to be considered in the context of
the other principles, as appropriate and relevant in the circumstances.
Article 27 – Limitations on the application of the principles
If the application of the principles of this Declaration is to be limited, it should be by law,
including laws in the interests of public safety, for the investigation, detection and prose-
cution of criminal offences, for the protection of public health or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. Any such law needs to be consistent with international
human rights law.
Article 28 – Denial of acts contrary to human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any claim to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to human
rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity.
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Table B.1 – Database Search Syntax
No. Search Syntax
“ambient intelligence”
01 “ambient intelligence” AND ethic*
“ambient assistive living”
02 “ambient assistive living” AND ethic*
“ambient assisted living”
03 “ambient assisted living” AND ethic*
“(AAL)”
04 “(AAL)” AND ethic*
05 “(AAL)” AND ethic* AND ambient
“assistive technologies”
06 “assistive technologies” AND ethic*
“supportive technologies”
07 “supportive technologies” AND ethic*
pervasive AND technology
pervasive AND technology AND ethic*
08 pervasive AND technology AND ethic* AND dementia
sensor AND dementia
09 sensor AND dementia AND ethic*
ubiquitous AND technology
ubiquitous AND technology AND ethic*
10 ubiquitous AND technology AND ethic* AND dementia
Table B.1: Database Search Syntax
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Table B.2 – Mepham’s Ethical Matrix of Ethical Issues for AAL Technologies Used for PwDs
Research & Development (R&D) Clinical Trials Clinical Application
Persons with Dementia (PwD) Abandonment (lack of user involvement in R&D) AmI has “life on its own” Acceptance
Dignity Anxiety Ageing at place
Familiarity Control Alienation
Feedback Discomfort Anxiety
Honesty Easy-to-learn Autonomy
Integrity Easy-to-use Comfort/discomfort
Involvement into R&D Enablement Control
Mismatched expectations Error-free Cultural background
Not only informed consent but interviews (simple
sentences TASC)
Failure, error Customization
Participatory design approach False (positives) alarm(s) Daily activity (ADL, IADL)
Personhood Fear Dehumanization
Privacy by design Home Dependence
Risk assessment Information overload Digital divide
Safety Informed consent Dignity
Self-reports (Titration approach) Insecurity eInclusion
Special approach Integration Embarrassment/stigmatization, handicapped-look,
social exclusion
Virtual reality Intrusive(ness) Enablement
Laboratorization of living
environment/medicalization of home
Error-free
Mobility Exclusion (self-excluded)
Pervasive(ness) Face-to-face, person-to-person communication,
reciprocity of feelings
Prevent harm (e.g. fall accidents) Failure, error
Privacy False (positives) alarm(s)
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Table B.2 – Continued From Previous Page
Research & Development (R&D) Clinical Trials Clinical Application
Resistance Fear
Safety Freedom
Security Home
Socializing Impairment
Special approach Imprisonment
Support Independence
Technophobia Institutionalization
Unmet needs Integrity
Voice control >LCD control Limitation
Wandering Living independently, extramuralization
Loneliness
Mobility
Monitoring
Pervasive(ness)
Prevent harm
Privacy
Quality of life (QoL)
Resistance
Safety
Security
Socializing
Support
Surveillance
Technophobia
Trust
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Table B.2 – Continued From Previous Page
Research & Development (R&D) Clinical Trials Clinical Application
Unmet needs
Wandering
Well-being
Formal/Informal Care-givers
(nurses, proxies)
Continuous monitoring Acceptance Acceptance
Feedback Easy-to-learn Against institutionalization (ageing at place)
Focus groups Easy-to-use Bad care/shallow care
Honesty Familiarity Cultural background
Mismatched expectations Fear Dehumanization
Monitoring Interoperability Dependence
Privacy by design Life-cycle of ICT Dignity
Social exclusion/eInclusion Limitations of ICT Easy-to-learn
Who will gain?, whose benefit (cui bono)? Mismatched expectations Easy-to-use
Misuse – whose responsibility? Effectiveness
Overprotection Efficacy
Prevent harm Efficiency
Reciprocal accountability Enablement
Resistance Face-to-face, person-to-person communication,
reciprocity of feelings
Safety Familiarity
Security Impairment
Technophobia Institutionalization
Trust Interoperability
Unmet needs Life-cycle of ICT
User-friendly design Mismatched expectations
Well-being Misuse – whose responsibility?
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Table B.2 – Continued From Previous Page
Research & Development (R&D) Clinical Trials Clinical Application
Monitoring
Overprotection
Quality of life (QoL)
Reciprocal accountability
Resistance
Support
Technologification, technology push, technological
push
Technology paternalism
Technophobia
Trust
Unmet needs
User-friendly design
Well-being
Researchers and Clinicians Allocation of resources Bias Bad care/shallow care
Continuous monitoring Confidentiality Bias
Dignity Daily activity (ADL/IADL) Confidentiality
Holistic approach, human-centred approach,
human-centered approach, (value) sensitive design,
intuitive design, proactive design
Data security Data security
Personhood Dignity Dignity
Who will gain?, whose benefit (cui bono)? Disability Disability
Easy-to-learn Easy-to-learn
Easy-to-use Easy-to-use
Honesty Effectiveness
Informed consent Enablement
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Table B.2 – Continued From Previous Page
Research & Development (R&D) Clinical Trials Clinical Application
Laboratorization of living
environment/medicalization of home
Honesty
Life-cycle of ICT Human-centred approach
Meaningful data collection Impairment
Misuse – whose responsibility? Independence
Monitoring Integration
Overprotection Interoperability
Personhood Is the person really in a need for AmI?
Prevent harm (e.g. fall accidents) Life-cycle of ICT
Prioritization of medical data Living independently, extramuralization
Proportionality Misuse – whose responsibility?
Reduce insecurity Mobility
Reliability Monitoring
Rights Overprotection
Safety Prevent harm
Security Prioritization of medical data
Trust Proportionality
Well-being Quality of life (QoL)
Reliability
Rights
Safety
Security
Socializing
Support
Trust
Well-being
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Table B.2 – Continued From Previous Page
Research & Development (R&D) Clinical Trials Clinical Application
What is normal ADL/IADL?
Software/Hardware Engineers Allocation of resources Customization Bandwidth prioritization
Compatibility Failure, error Comfort/discomfort
Cost-benefit ratio False (positives) alarm(s) Commercial
Customization Familiarity Cost
Data security Home Data security
DoS attacks Indispensability of 3rd parties Easy-to-learn
Feedback Information overload Error-free
Hacks Interoperability Failure, error
Impact assessment Laboratorization of living
environment/medicalization of home
False (positives) alarm(s)
Implantable sensors overheat Lax testing Familiarity
Integration Life-cycle of ICT Home
Interoperability Limitations of ICT Imprisonment
Involvement into R&D Low prestige Indispensability of 3rd parties
Low prestige ICT development Meaningful data Information overload
Mismatched expectations What is normal ADL/IADL? Interoperability
Mobility Prioritization Life-cycle of ICT
Participatory design approach Privacy by design Limitations of ICT
Privacy by design Proportionality Loneliness
QoS Quick fix, technological fix Marketing
Quick fix, technological fix Resistance Prioritization
Resistance Risk assessment Proportionality
Risk assessment Safety Quick fix, technological fix
Special approach Security Safety
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Table B.2 – Continued From Previous Page
Research & Development (R&D) Clinical Trials Clinical Application
Technologification, technology push, technological
push
Technologification, technology push, technological
push
Security
Technology paternalism Technology paternalism Support
Transparency Technophobia Technology paternalism
Unmet needs Technosis Technophobia
User friendly design Testing Technosis
Virtual reality Tracking for safety, not with physical restrictions Testing
Wizard design Transparency Transparency
Trust Trust
Unmet needs
Very few testing in actual homes
Designers Acceptance Acceptance Acceptance
Alienation Adaptation Adaptation
Anxiety Anxiety Anxiety
Bias Comfort Comfort/discomfort
Dehumanization Control Commercial
Design-for-all approach Customization Compatibility
Dignity Dignity Control
Feedback Discomfort (e.g. battery, etc.) Cost
Focus groups Familiarity Cultural background
Impact assessment Indispensability (of 3rd parties) Customization
Intrusive(ness) Integration Dependence
Involvement into R&D (participatory design
approach)
Intrusive(ness) Digital divide
Mismatched expectations Laboritarization/medicalization of home Dignity
Privacy by design Life-cycle of ICT Easy-to-learn
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Table B.2 – Continued From Previous Page
Research & Development (R&D) Clinical Trials Clinical Application
Proactive design Limitations of ICT Easy-to-use
Risk assessment Mismatched expectations Efficiency
Safety Misuse – whose responsibility? Embarrassment/stigmatization, handicapped-look,
social exclusion
Sensitive Prevent harm (e.g. fall accidents) Enablement
Special approach Resistance Ergonomics
Testing Support Failure, error
Trust Technologification, technology push, technological
push
Familiarity
Unmet needs Technology paternalism Indispensability (of 3rd parties)
User friendly design Technophobia Integration
Wizard design Testing Integrity
Trust Interoperability
Unmet needs Laboritarisation/medicalisation of home
Life-cycle of ICT
Limitations of ICT
Marketing
Misuse – whose responsibility?
Mobility
Prevent harm
Resistance
Technologification, technology push, technological
push
Technology paternalism
Technophobia
Technicians Home Indispensability (of 3rd parties)
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Table B.2 – Continued From Previous Page
Research & Development (R&D) Clinical Trials Clinical Application
Sensitive installation of devices Special approach during maintenance
Trust Support
Trust
Table B.2: Mepham’s Ethical Matrix of Ethical Issues for AAL Technologies Used for PwDs
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Table B.3 – Overview of the Ethical Issues In the Resulted Literature
Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
User involvement in
R&D
Francis et al. (2009),
Wallace et al. (2010)
Francis et al. (2009),
Gaul and Ziefle (2009)
Allen et al. (2008),
Aarts et al. (2007),
Borenstein and
Pearson (2010),
Burleson et al. (2012),
Duquenoy (2004),
Francis et al. (2009),
M. Hersh et al. (2003),
Kosta, O. Pitkänen,
et al. (2008), Kosta,
Olli Pitkänen, et al.
(2010),
Lorenzen-Huber et al.
(2011), Maguire et al.
(2011), Maier and
Kempter (2009),
Newell et al. (2011),
O’Neill, Parente, et al.
(2011), Picking et al.
(2012), Pulli et al.
(2012), Sponselee et al.
(2008), Wallace et al.
(2010), Wright (2011)
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Table B.3 – Continued From Previous Page
Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
Acceptance of ICT Abascal and Azevedo
(2007), Duquenoy and
Whitehouse (2006),
Fairclough (2009), Francis
et al. (2009), Gaul and
Ziefle (2009), Grönvall
and Kyng (2012),
Holzinger et al. (2008),
S. Lauriks et al. (2007),
Steve Lauriks et al. (2010),
Mordini et al. (2009),
O’Neill, Mason, et al.
(2011), Oppenauer et al.
(2007), Panek and Zagler
(2008), Portet et al. (2011),
Remmers (2010), Salces
et al. (2006), Sponselee
et al. (2008), J. van Hoof
et al. (2011), Wallace et al.
(2010), Zaad and
Ben Allouch (2008)
Informed consent,
independence,
self-determination
B. Hofmann (2012), Kosta,
Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010),
Picking et al. (2012),
Remmers (2010), Scanaill
et al. (2006)
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Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
Control, customisation Decker (2012), Duquenoy
and Whitehouse (2006),
Kang et al. (2010), Kosta,
Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010),
Portet et al. (2011),
J. van Hoof et al. (2011),
Wallace et al. (2010), Zaad
and Ben Allouch (2008)
Prevention of harm,
medicalization of
home environment
Ahonen et al. (2010b),
Batchelor et al. (2012),
Belbachir et al. (2010),
Cavoukian et al. (2010),
Chan, Estève, et al. (2008),
Friedewald and Raabe
(2011), B. Hofmann (2012),
Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al.
(2010), Landau and
Werner (2012), Piasek
et al. (2013), Sponselee
et al. (2008), J. van Hoof
et al. (2011)
Ageing at home,
autonomy,
dependence on a
system
A. Darwish and Hassanien
(2011), Harrefors et al.
(2012), Kosta, O. Pitkänen,
et al. (2008), Kosta,
Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010),
Maguire et al. (2011),
Portet et al. (2011),
J. van Hoof et al. (2011)
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Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
Embarrassment,
stigmatization, social
isolation
Kumar and H.-J. Lee (2011),
Chan, Campo, et al.
(2009), Dishman and
Carrillo (2007), Fairclough
(2009), Francis et al.
(2009), Kosta,
Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010),
S. Martin et al. (2010),
A. McLean (2011), O’Neill,
Mason, et al. (2011),
Oppenauer et al. (2007),
Palm (2012), Portet et al.
(2011), Louise Robinson
et al. (2009), Salces et al.
(2006), A. Sixsmith and
J. Sixsmith (2008), Sorell
and Draper (2012),
Sponselee et al. (2008),
Kleinberger et al. (2007),
J. van Hoof et al. (2011),
Wright (2011), Wright and
Wadhwa (2010), Zwijsen
et al. (2010)
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Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
Monitoring,
surveillance
Gaul and Ziefle (2009),
Grönvall and Kyng (2012),
B. Hofmann (2012),
Jeffrey Kaye (2010), Kosta,
O. Pitkänen, et al. (2008),
Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al.
(2010), Lynch et al. (2009),
Mordini et al. (2009),
Oppenauer et al. (2007),
Remmers (2010), Salces
et al. (2006)
Social exclusion, digital
divide, familiarity
with ICT, affordability
Abascal and Nicolle (2005),
Batchelor et al. (2012),
Daniel et al. (2009),
Francis et al. (2009),
B. Hofmann (2012), Kosta,
O. Pitkänen, et al. (2008),
Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, et al.
(2010), A. McLean (2011),
Mordini et al. (2009),
Niemelä et al. (2007),
Oppenauer et al. (2007),
Satava (2003), Walsh and
Callan (2011), Wright and
Wadhwa (2010), Zaad and
Ben Allouch (2008),
Zwijsen et al. (2010)
Benefit A. Darwish and Hassanien
(2011), B. Hofmann (2012)
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Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
Data collection, safety,
protection
Fairclough (2009) Abascal and Azevedo
(2007), Chan, Estève,
et al. (2008),
Duquenoy (2004),
Kosta, O. Pitkänen,
et al. (2008), Kumar
and H.-J. Lee (2011)
Prevalence of
technological
rationality in human
care
Dekkers (2009),
B. Hofmann (2012), Oost
and Reed (2011),
R. Sparrow and
L. Sparrow (2006),
Sponselee et al. (2008)
Instrumentalisation of
care, the value of
human care, tasks not
suitable for ICT
Borenstein and Pearson
(2010), Coeckelbergh
(2010), B. Hofmann (2012),
Oost and Reed (2011),
Portet et al. (2011),
A. Sharkey and
N. Sharkey (2012),
R. Sparrow and
L. Sparrow (2006), Stip
and Rialle (2005), Vallor
(2011), Walsh and Callan
(2011)
B. Hofmann (2012),
R. Sparrow and
L. Sparrow (2006)
Overprotection,
paternalism, previous
working habits, rigid
application of
protocols
S. Martin et al. (2010),
Sponselee et al. (2008),
L. Robinson et al. (2007)
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Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
Not-invented-here
syndrome
Sponselee et al. (2008)
Motives for
participation in
research, eagerness to
please, power
relationship
Grönvall and Kyng (2012),
Maier and Kempter
(2009), Oberzaucher et al.
(2009), Wallace et al.
(2010)
S. Brown et al. (2004),
S. Brown et al. (2006),
Francis et al. (2009),
Maier and Kempter
(2009), Sponselee et al.
(2008), Wallace et al.
(2010), Walsh and
Callan (2011)
Meaningfulness and
prioritization of data
Allen et al. (2008), Conley
et al. (2008), Cook et al.
(2009), A. Darwish and
Hassanien (2011), Kang
et al. (2010), Jeffrey Kaye
(2010), Noury et al. (2011),
Romdhane et al. (2012),
Sponselee et al. (2008),
Viswanathan et al. (2012),
Wherton and Monk (2008)
Safety and security B. Hofmann (2012),
S. Lauriks et al. (2007)
Chan, Estève, et al.
(2008), A. Darwish
and Hassanien (2011)
Human-centred
approach
B. Hofmann (2012), Portet
et al. (2011), Scanaill et al.
(2006), Zaad and
Ben Allouch (2008)
Allocation of resources Duquenoy (2004)
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Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
ICT and diagnosis,
automated machine
diagnosis
Camarinha-Matos and
Afsarmanesh (2011),
Chan, Estève, et al. (2008),
A. Darwish and
Hassanien (2011),
Dishman and Carrillo
(2007), Friedewald and
Raabe (2011), Fairclough
(2009), Gaul and Ziefle
(2009), B. Hofmann (2012),
Kosta, O. Pitkänen, et al.
(2008), Kosta,
Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010),
Merilahti et al. (2012),
Plaza et al. (2011), Palm
(2012), Kleinberger et al.
(2007)
Technical or ‘quick’ fix,
R&D for PwD as low
prestige endeavour
B. Hofmann (2012),
Mordini et al. (2009)
Mismatched
expectations
Allen et al.
(2008),Duquenoy and
Whitehouse (2006),
Duquenoy (2004),
J. van Hoof et al.
(2011)
Interoperability,
compatibility of
systems
Chan, Estève, et al.
(2008), A. Darwish
and Hassanien (2011),
Román et al. (2009)
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Table B.3 – Continued From Previous Page
Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
Special status of human
experimentation
Mordini et al. (2009)
Indispensable third
parties
Decker (2012),
B. Hofmann (2012),
Kosta, Olli Pitkänen,
et al. (2010),
J. van Hoof et al.
(2011), Wright (2011)
J. van Hoof et al. (2011)
Testing of AAL
technologies, impact
assessment
B. Hofmann (2012),
Portet et al. (2011)
Cahill et al. (2007),
Chan, Estève, et al.
(2008), Chan, Campo,
et al. (2009),
Steve Lauriks et al.
(2010), Portet et al.
(2011), Scanaill et al.
(2006), Wright (2011)
Principle of
proportionality
B. Hofmann (2012)
Easy to learn, error free
ICT
Portet et al. (2011)
Different life-cycle of
technology and
service, technology
push
Chan, Campo, et al.
(2009), Kosta,
O. Pitkänen, et al.
(2008), Kosta,
Olli Pitkänen, et al.
(2010)
The role of AAL
technologies
Rapoport (2012)
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Person with dementia Formal caregivers, informal
proxies
Researchers, clinicians Software/hardware
engineers
Designers Technicians
Design-for-all approach,
heteronomous group
of PwD
Abascal and Azevedo
(2007), A. Darwish
and Hassanien (2011),
Duquenoy and
Whitehouse (2006),
Kosta, O. Pitkänen,
et al. (2008), Kosta,
Olli Pitkänen, et al.
(2010), Newell et al.
(2011), Portet et al.
(2011), Sponselee et al.
(2008), Wallace et al.
(2010)
Definition of disability Abascal and Nicolle
(2005), Appleyard
(2005), Darzentas and
Miesenberger (2005),
Lynch et al. (2009)
Sensitive installation of
devices
J. van Hoof et al. (2011)
Table B.3: Overview of the Ethical Issues In the Resulted Literature
303

B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Aarts, Emile, Panos Markopoulos, and Boris Ruyter (2007). “The Persuasiveness of Am-
bient Intelligence.” In: Security, Privacy, and Trust in Modern Data Management. Ed. by
Milan Petkovic´ and Willem Jonker. In collab. with Milan Petkovic´ and Willem Jonker.
Data-Centric Systems and Applications. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 367–381.
isbn: 978-3-540-69861-6. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-69861-6_24. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/m757771368ug4746/abstract/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
Abascal, Julio and Luis Azevedo (2007). “Fundamentals of Inclusive HCI Design.” In:
Universal Acess in Human Computer Interaction. Coping with Diversity. Ed. by Constan-
tine Stephanidis. Vol. 4554. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin /
Heidelberg, pp. 3–9. isbn: 978-3-540-73278-5. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/92m6253u60350m65/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Abascal, Julio and Colette Nicolle (2005). “Moving towards inclusive design guidelines
for socially and ethically aware HCI.” In: Interacting with Computers 17 (5), pp. 484–
505. issn: 09535438. doi: 10.1016/j.intcom.2005.03.002. url: http://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0953543805000226 (visited on 04/05/2012).
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (2005). Additional
Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Re-
search. Protocol. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. url: http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/195.htm (visited on 02/23/2015).
Agrawal, Manish (2003). “Voluntariness in Clinical Research at the End of Life.” In:
Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 25.4, S25–S32. issn: 0885-3924. doi: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-3924(03)00057-5. url: http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0885392403000575.
Ahonen, Pasi et al. (2010a). “Dark scenarios.” In: Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intel-
ligence. Ed. by David Wright et al. Vol. 1. The International Library of Ethics, Law
and Technology. Springer Netherlands. Chap. 3, pp. 33–142. isbn: 978-1-4020-6662-7.
doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-6662-7_3. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
hr8r307825p12636/abstract/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
— (2010b). “Safeguards.” In: Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence. Ed. by
David Wright et al. Vol. 1. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technol-
ogy. Springer Netherlands. Chap. 5, pp. 179–251. isbn: 978-1-4020-6662-7. doi: 10.
1007/978- 1- 4020- 6662- 7_5. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
w3948tt7618421x7/abstract/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
305
Bibliography
Aldrich, Frances K. (2003). “Smart Homes: Past, Present and Future.” English. In: Inside
the Smart Home. Ed. by Richard Harper. Springer London. Chap. 2, pp. 17–39. isbn:
978-1-85233-688-2. doi: 10.1007/1-85233-854-7_2. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/1-85233-854-7_2.
Allen, Meghan et al. (2008). “Involving domain experts in assistive technology research.”
In: Universal Access in the Information Society 7 (3), pp. 145–154. issn: 1615-5289. doi:
10.1007/s10209- 008- 0112- 5. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
r960k65581q1451w/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Alzheimer Society of Ireland (2004). D6 - Caring for the Carer: Legal & financial arrange-
ments. Factsheet. The Alzheimer Society of Ireland. url: http://www.alzheimer.
ie/Alzheimer/media/SiteMedia/Helpline%20and%20Information%20Resources/D6-
Legal-financial-arrangements.pdf (visited on 01/21/2015).
Alzheimer’s Disease International (2013). The Global Impact of Dementia 2013–2050. Policy
Brief for Heads of Government. Alzheimer’s Disease International. url: http://www.
alz.co.uk/research/GlobalImpactDementia2013.pdf (visited on 07/21/2014).
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders: DSM-5. 5th ed. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Amer
Psychiatric Pub Incorporated. isbn: 978-0-89042-554-1. url: http://books.google.
sk/books?id=EIbMlwEACAAJ.
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2005). An Act to make new provision relating to persons who lack
capacity; to establish a superior court of record called the Court of Protection in place of the
office of the Supreme Court called by that name; to make provision in connection with the
Convention on the International Protection of Adults signed at the Hague on 13th January
2000; and for connected purposes. Act. Parliament of the United Kingdom. Chap. 9.
url: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/contents.
Andorno, Roberto (2007). “Global bioethics at UNESCO: in defence of the Universal Dec-
laration on Bioethics and Human Rights.” In: Journal of Medical Ethics 33.3, pp. 150–
154. doi: 10.1136/jme.2006.016543. url: http://jme.bmj.com/content/33/3/150.
Antoniou, Evangelia E. et al. (2011). “An empirical study on the preferred size of the
participant information sheet in research.” In: Journal of Medical Ethics 37.9, pp. 557–
562. doi: 10.1136/jme.2010.041871. eprint: http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/9/
557.full.pdf+html. url: http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/9/557.abstract.
Appelbaum, Paul S., Richard J. Bonnie, and Jason H. Karlawish (2005). “The Capacity
to Vote of Persons With Alzheimer’s Disease.” In: The American Journal of Psychiatry
162.11, pp. 2094–2100. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.162.11.2094. url: http://journals.
psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=177869.
Appelbaum, Paul S. and Thomas Grisso (1995). “The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study. I: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment.” In: Law and Hu-
306
Bibliography
man Behavior 19.2, pp. 105–126. doi: 10.2307/1394303. url: http://www.jstor.org/
stable/1394303.
Appleyard, Richard (2005). “Disability Informatics.” In: Consumer Health Informatics.
Ed. by Deborah Lewis et al. Health Informatics. Springer New York, pp. 129–
142. isbn: 978-0-387-27652-6. url: http : / / www . springerlink . com / content /
u43vu75m58695482/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Aristotle (1959). Politics. Trans. by H. Rackham. Vol. 264. Loeb Classical Library. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press. isbn: 978-0-67-4992917. url: http://www.hup.
harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674992917.
— (2009). Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by David Ross. With annots. by Lesley Brown. With
an intro. by Lesley Brown. Oxford World’s Classics. Oxford University Press. isbn:
978-0-19-921361-0.
Árnason, Viljhámur, Hongwen Li, and Yali Cong (2011). “Informed Consent.” In: The
SAGE Handbook of Health Care Ethics. Core and Emerging Issues. Ed. by Ruth Chadwick,
Henk ten Have, and Eric M. Meslin. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC: SAGE Publication Inc. Chap. 10, pp. 106–116. isbn: 978-1-4129-4534-
9. doi: 10.4135/9781446200971. url: http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/hdbk_
healthcareethics/SAGE.xml.
Ashcroft, Richard Edmund et al., eds. (2007). Principles of Health Care Ethics. 2nd ed. John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 838 pp. isbn: 978-0-470-02713-4.
Astell, Arlene et al. (2009). “Involving older people with dementia and their carers in
designing computer based support systems: some methodological considerations.”
In: Universal Access in the Information Society 8 (1), pp. 49–58. issn: 1615-5289. doi:
10.1007/s10209- 008- 0129- 9. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
x100235u06860736/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Bamigboye, Ade (2009). “The Consumerisation of Home Healthcare Technologies.” In:
Handbook of Digital Homecare. Ed. by Kanagasingam Yogesan et al. Series in Biomed-
ical Engineering. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 95–116. isbn: 978-3-642-01387-4.
url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/h210455172077mw4/abstract/ (vis-
ited on 06/01/2012).
Batchelor, Rachel et al. (2012). “Challenges of ethical and legal responsibilities when
technologies’ uses and users change: social networking sites, decision-making ca-
pacity and dementia.” In: Ethics and Information Technology 14 (2), pp. 99–108. issn:
1388-1957. doi: 10.1007/s10676-012-9286-x. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/8501l5318g6rm143/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Beauchamp, Tom L. and James F. Childress (2009). Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 6th ed.
New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 417 pp. isbn: 978-0-19-533570-5.
Belbachir, A. N. et al. (2010). “Biologically-inspired stereo vision for elderly safety at
home.” In: Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik 127 (7), pp. 216–222. issn: 0932-383X.
307
Bibliography
doi: 10.1007/s502-010-0750-1. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
kn7541h3h5nu82t8/abstract/ (visited on 04/05/2012).
Benoit, Michel et al. (2015). “Is it possible to use highly realistic virtual reality in the
elderly? A feasibility study with image-based rendering.” In: Neuropsychiatric Dis-
ease and Treatment 11, pp. 557–563. doi: 10.2147/NDT.S73179. url: https://www.
dovepress.com/is-it-possible-to-use-highly-realistic-virtual-reality-in-
the-elderly--peer-reviewed-article-NDT.
Bentham, Jeremy (1780). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London:
T. Payne and Son.
Beyleveld, Deryck (2011). “Privacy, Confidentiality and Data Protection. Core and
Emerging Issues.” In: The SAGE Handbook of Health Care Ethics. Ed. by Ruth Chad-
wick, Henk ten Have, and Eric M. Meslin. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singa-
pore, Washington DC: SAGE Publication Inc. Chap. 9, pp. 95–105. isbn: 978-1-4129-
4534-9. doi: 10.4135/9781446200971. url: http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/
hdbk_healthcareethics/SAGE.xml.
Bond, John B. Jr. et al. (2000). “The Financial Abuse of Mentally Incompetent Older
Adults: A Canadian Study.” In: Journal of Elder Abuse & Neglect 11.4, pp. 23–38. doi:
10.1300/J084v11n04_03.
Borenstein, Jason and Yvette Pearson (2010). “Robot caregivers: harbingers of expanded
freedom for all?” In: Ethics and Information Technology 12 (3), pp. 277–288. issn: 1388-
1957. doi: 10.1007/s10676- 010- 9236- 4. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/736g22114l661107/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Borson, Soo et al. (2000). “The Mini-Cog: a cognitive ‘vital signs’ measure for demen-
tia screening in multi-lingual elderly.” In: International journal of geriatric psychiatry
15.11, pp. 1021–1027.
Bowman, Deborah (2008). “Who decides who decides? Ethical perspectives on capac-
ity and decision making.” In: Competence Assessment in Dementia. Ed. by European
Dementia Consensus Network and Gabriela Stoppe. Wien - New York: Springer.
Chap. 5, pp. 51–60. isbn: 978-3-211-72369-2. doi: 10.1007/978-3-211-72369-2. url:
http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-211-72369-2.
Brand, Matthias and Hans J. Markowitsch (2008). “Brain Structures Involved in Demen-
tia.” In: Competence Assessment in Dementia. Ed. by European Dementia Consensus
Network and Gabriela Stoppe. Wien - New York: Springer. Chap. 2, pp. 25–34. isbn:
978-3-211-72369-2. doi: 10.1007/978-3-211-72369-2. url: http://link.springer.
com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-211-72369-2.
Bray, J. (1957). Salgo v. Leland Stanford etc. Bd. Trustees, 154 Cal.App.2d 560. url: http://
forensicpsychiatry.stanford.edu/Files/Salgo%20v.%20Leland%20Stanford.htm
(visited on 01/30/2015).
308
Bibliography
Bray, Jennifer et al. (2015). “Understanding the needs of people with dementia and
family carers.” In: Nursing Older People 27.7, pp. 18–23. issn: 1472-0795. doi: 10.
7748/nop.27.7.18.e699. url: http://journals.rcni.com/doi/abs/10.7748/nop.
27.7.18.e699.
Broad, C. D. (1930). Five Types of Moral Theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Broek, Ger van den, Filippo Cavallo, and Christian Wehrmann, eds. (2010). AALIANCE
Ambient Assisted Living Roadmap. Vol. 6. Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environ-
ments (AISE). Amsterdam: IOS Press. isbn: 978-1-60750-499-3.
Broekens, Joost, Marcel Heerink, and Henk Rosendal (2009). “Assistive social robots in
elderly care: a review.” In: Gerontechnology 8.2, pp. 94–103. doi: 10.4017/gt.2009.
08.02.002.00.
Bronswijk, JEMH van et al. (2005). “De intelligente thuisomgeving: een betaalbare zorg
voor de lange duur.” Dutch. In: Handboek Zorg Thuis. Ed. by E.A. Zuidema et al.
Maarssen: Elsevier Gezondheidszorg, pp. C–5. isbn: 90-352-2649-6.
Brown, S et al. (2004). “Care in the Community.” In: BT Technology Journal 22 (3), pp. 56–
64. issn: 1358-3948. doi: 10.1023/B:BTTJ.0000047120.60489.7a. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/u77r735253658wvq/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
— (2006). “Care in the Community.” In: Intelligent Spaces. Ed. by Alan Steventon and
Steve Wright. Computer Communications and Networks. Springer London, pp. 65–
80. isbn: 978-1-84628-429-8. doi: 10.1007/978-1-84628-429-8_5. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/p4034u527vm56468/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Buber, Martin (1923). Ich und du. Insel-Verlag. url: http://books.google.ie/books?id=
VscrAAAAIAAJ.
— (1937). I and Thou. Trans., with an introd., by Ronald Gregor Smith. Edinburgh: T. &
T. Clark. url: http://books.google.ie/books?id=3rrXAAAAMAAJ.
— (1970). I and Thou. Trans., with an introd., by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons. isbn: 0-684-71725-5.
Buckles, V. D. et al. (2003). “Understanding of informed consent by demented individ-
uals.” In: Neurology 61.12, pp. 1662–1666. issn: 0028-3878. doi: 10.1212/01.WNL.
0000098933.34804.FC.
Burleson, Winslow, Naomi Newman, and Ryan Brotman (2012). “Empowering Indepen-
dent Living for People with Autism: Designing Supportive, Low-Cost, Interactive
E-Health Environments.” In: Persuasive Technology. Design for Health and Safety. Ed.
by Magnus Bang and Eva L. Ragnemalm. Red. by Gerhard ikum. Vol. 7284. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 13–30. isbn: 978-3-642-31037-9. doi:
10.1007/978-3-642-31037-9_2. url: http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.
1007/978-3-642-31037-9_2 (visited on 04/10/2013).
309
Bibliography
Burton, Adrian (2013). “Dolphins, dogs, and robot seals for the treatment of neurological
disease.” In: The Lancet Neurology 12.9, pp. 851–852. doi: 10.1016/S1474-4422(13)
70206-0. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1474-4422(13)70206-0.
Cahill, Suzanne et al. (2007). “Technology in dementia care.” In: Technology and Disability
19.2, pp. 55–60. url: http://hdl.handle.net/2262/49835.
Camarinha-Matos, Luis and Hamideh Afsarmanesh (2011). “Collaborative Ecosystems
in Ageing Support.” In: Adaptation and Value Creating Collaborative Networks. Ed. by
Luis M. Camarinha-Matos, Alexandra Pereira-Klen, and Hamideh Afsarmanesh.
Vol. 362. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology. Springer
Boston, pp. 177–188. isbn: 978-3-642-23329-6. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-23330-2_20.
url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/7v6x3w0h34403q26/abstract/ (vis-
ited on 04/05/2012).
Cˇapek, Karel (1920). Rossum’s Universal Robots. kolektivn’i drama o vstupn’i komedii a trˇech
aktech. Czech. Aventinum. 25. Otakar Štorch-Marien. 96 pp.
Care in Crisis 2014 (2014). Report. Age UK. url: http://www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/
EN-GB/Campaigns/CIC/Care_in_Crisis_report_2014.pdf (visited on 08/13/2015).
Cassiers, L. (2001). “Incapable.” In: Nouvelle encyclopédie de bioéthique. médecine, environ-
nement, biotechnologie. Ed. by Gilbert Hottois and Jean-Noël Missa. Bruxelles: De
Boeck Supérieur, pp. 509–514. isbn: 2804137120.
Caulfield, Timothy, Ross Upshur, and Abdallah Daar (2003). “DNA databanks and con-
sent: A suggested policy option involving an authorization model.” In: BMC Med-
ical Ethics 4.1, p. 1. issn: 1472-6939. doi: 10 . 1186 / 1472 - 6939 - 4 - 1. url: http :
//www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/4/1.
Cavoukian, Ann et al. (2010). “Remote home health care technologies: how to ensure
privacy? Build it in: Privacy by Design.” In: Identity in the Information Society 3 (2),
pp. 363–378. issn: 1876-0678. doi: 10.1007/s12394-010-0054-y. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/u0678r87r4802648/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Chadwick, Ruth, Henk ten Have, and Eric M. Meslin, eds. (2011). The SAGE Hand-
book of Health Care Ethics. Core and Emerging Issues. Los Angeles, London, New
Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC: SAGE Publication Inc. isbn: 978-1-4129-4534-9.
doi: 10.4135/9781446200971. url: http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/hdbk_
healthcareethics/SAGE.xml.
Chan, Marie, Eric Campo, et al. (2009). “Smart homes - Current features and future
perspectives.” In: Maturitas 64 (2), pp. 90–97. issn: 03785122. doi: 10 . 1016 / j .
maturitas.2009.07.014. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S0378512209002606 (visited on 04/05/2012).
Chan, Marie, Daniel Estève, et al. (2008). “A review of smart homes-Present state and
future challenges.” In: Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine 91 (1), pp. 55–
310
Bibliography
81. issn: 01692607. doi: 10.1016/j.cmpb.2008.02.001. url: http://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0169260708000436 (visited on 04/05/2012).
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000/C 364/01) (2000). Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union. Charter. Nice: European Union. url: http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm (visited on 02/23/2015).
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2012/C 326/02) (2007). Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union. Charter. Entry into force 01/12/2009. Strasbourg: European
Union. url: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:
12012P/TXT (visited on 08/11/2015).
Childress, James F. (2009). “Methods in Bioethics.” In: The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics.
Ed. by Bonnie Steinbock. Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. Chap. 1, pp. 15–45. isbn: 9780199562411. url: http://books.google.sk/
books?id=hBtMPgAACAAJ.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius (1999). Cicero: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws. Ed. by James
E. G. Zetzel. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. isbn: 9780521459594.
EU Clinical Trials Directive (2001/20/EC) (2004). Clinical Trials Directive. Directive
2001/20/EC. European Parliament and Council. url: http : / / ec . europa . eu /
health/files/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2001_20/dir_2001_20_en.pdf (visited on
02/23/2015).
21 CFR (2009). Code of Federal Regulations. Title 21 – Food and Drugs. U.S. Government
Publishing Office. url: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR- 2009- title21-
vol1/pdf/CFR-2009-title21-vol1.pdf.
21 CFR H (2009). Code of Federal Regulations. Title 21 – Food and Drugs. Subchapter H —-
Medical Devices. U.S. Government Publishing Office.
21 CFR 11 (2009). Code of Federal Regulations. Title 21 – Food and Drugs. Part 11 – Electronic
Records; Electronic Signatures. U.S. Government Publishing Office. url: https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2009-title21-vol1/pdf/CFR-2009-title21-vol1-
part11.pdf.
45 CFR 46 (2009). Code of Federal Regulations. Title 45 – Public Welfare. Part 46 – Protection
of Human Subjects. U.S. Government Publishing Office. url: http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CFR-2009-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2009-title45-vol1-part46.pdf.
Coeckelbergh, Mark (2010). “Health Care, Capabilities, and AI Assistive Technologies.”
In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2), pp. 181–190. issn: 1386-2820. doi: 10.
1007 / s10677 - 009 - 9186 - 2. url: http : / / www . springerlink . com / content /
y6j9244p317q318g/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
— (2012). “"How I Learned to Love the Robot": Capabilities, Information Technolo-
gies, and Elderly Care.” In: The Capability Approach, Technology and Design. Ed. by
Ilse Oosterlaken et al. Vol. 5. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology. Springer
311
Bibliography
Netherlands, pp. 77–86. isbn: 978-94-007-3879-9. url: http://www.springerlink.
com/content/n252613515862624/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Coeckelbergh, Mark (2015a). “Care robots and the future of ICT-mediated elderly care: a
response to doom scenarios.” In: AI & Society. issn: 0951-5666. doi: 10.1007/s00146-
015-0626-3. url: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00146-015-
0626-3.
— (2015b). “The Art of Living with ICTs: The Ethics–Aesthetics of Vulnerability Coping
and Its Implications for Understanding and Evaluating ICT Cultures.” In: Founda-
tions of Science, pp. 1–10. issn: 1233-1821. doi: 10.1007/s10699-015-9436-9. url:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-015-9436-9.
Coleman, Carl H. (2009). “Vulnerability as a Regulatory Category in Human Subject
Research.” In: The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 37.1, pp. 12–18. issn: 1748-720X.
doi: 10.1111/j.1748-720X.2009.00346.x. url: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2009.00346.x/abstract.
Conley, Edward et al. (2008). “Simultaneous trend analysis for evaluating outcomes
in patient-centred health monitoring services.” In: Health Care Management Science
11 (2), pp. 152–166. issn: 1386-9620. doi: 10 . 1007 / s10729 - 008 - 9061 - z. url:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/c41522704g744755/abstract/ (visited
on 06/01/2012).
Consent to treatment – Capacity (2014). Assessing capacity to give consent. National Health
Service (NHS). url: http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Consent- to- treatment/
Pages/Capacity.aspx.
Constitution of WHO (2006). Constitution of the World Health Organization. Constitution.
World Health Assembly. url: http : / / www . who . int / governance / eb / who _
constitution_en.pdf (visited on 11/17/2015).
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997). Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and
Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Convention. Oviedo, Spain:
Council of Europe. url: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/
164.htm (visited on 10/27/2014).
Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997). Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Ex-
planatory Report. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. url: http://conventions.coe.
int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/164.htm (visited on 01/27/2015).
CRPD (2006). Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Optional Protocol.
Convention. New York: United Nations. url: http://www.un.org/disabilities/
documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf.
312
Bibliography
Cook, Diane J., Juan C. Augusto, and Vikramaditya R. Jakkula (2009). “Ambient in-
telligence: Technologies, applications, and opportunities.” In: Pervasive and Mobile
Computing 5 (4), pp. 277–298. issn: 15741192. doi: 10.1016/j.pmcj.2009.04.001.
url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S157411920900025X (visited
on 04/05/2012).
Corradetti, Claudio (2009). Relativism and Human Rights. A Theory of Pluralistic Universal-
ism. Springer. isbn: 978-1-4020-9985-4. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9986-1.
Active Implantable Medical Devices Directive 90/385/EEC (1990). Council Directive
90/385/EEC of 20 June 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating
to active implantable medical devices. Official Journal of the European Communities.
url: http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
31990L0385&qid=1459789153661&from=en.
EU Medical Device Directive (93/42/EEC) (1993). Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June
1993 concerning medical devices. Official Journal of the European Communities. url:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1993L0042:
20071011:en:PDF.
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (2002). International Ethical
Guidelines For Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, p. 60. isbn: 9290360755.
url: http://www.cioms.ch/index.php/printable-publications?task=view&id=
48&catid=57.
Craik, Elizabeth M. (2015). The ‘Hippocratic’ Corpus. Content and Context. London - New
York: Routledge. isbn: 978-1-315-73672-3.
Daniel, Kathryn M., Carolyn L. Cason, and Sherry Ferrell (2009). “Emerging Technolo-
gies to Enhance the Safety of Older People in Their Homes.” In: Geriatric Nursing
30 (6), pp. 384–389. issn: 01974572. doi: 10.1016/j.gerinurse.2009.08.010. url:
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0197457209003139 (visited on
04/05/2012).
Daniels, Norman (2008). Just Health. Meeting Health Needs Fairly. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. isbn: 978-0-511-48037-9.
Darwish, Ashraf and Aboul Ella Hassanien (2011). “Wearable and Implantable Wireless
Sensor Network Solutions for Healthcare Monitoring.” In: Sensors 11 (6), pp. 5561–
5595. issn: 1424-8220. doi: 10.3390/s110605561. url: http://www.mdpi.com/1424-
8220/11/6/5561/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
Darwish, Bahaa (2014). “Arab Perspectives.” In: Handbook of Global Bioethics. Ed. by Henk
A. M. J. ten Have and Bert Gordijn. Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York - London:
Springer. Chap. 17, pp. 269–291. isbn: 978-94-007-2512-6. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-
2512-6_87. url: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
Darzentas, Jenny and Klaus Miesenberger (2005). “Design for All in Information Technol-
ogy: A Universal Concern.” In: Database and Expert Systems Applications. Ed. by Kim
313
Bibliography
Andersen, John Debenham, and Roland Wagner. Vol. 3588. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 406–420. isbn: 978-3-540-28566-3.
url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/bw7p6x2leuq6nama/abstract/ (vis-
ited on 06/01/2012).
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (1995). Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council. Official Journal of the European Communities. url:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:l14012&
from=EN.
Decker, Michael (2012). “Service robots in the mirror of reflective research.” In: Poiesis
& Praxis 9 (3-4), pp. 181–200. issn: 1615-6609, 1615-6617. doi: 10.1007/s10202-012-
0111-8. url: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10202-012-0111-8 (visited on
04/10/2013).
Decker, Michael et al. (2011). “Service robotics: do you know your new companion?
Framing an interdisciplinary technology assessment.” In: Poiesis & Praxis: Interna-
tional Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science 8 (1), pp. 25–44. issn: 1615-
6609. doi: 10.1007/s10202- 011- 0098- 6. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/e00675737v132x70/abstract/ (visited on 04/05/2012).
Definition of an older or elderly person (2015). Proposed Working Definition of an Older Person
in Africa for the MDS Project. World Health Organization. url: http://www.who.int/
healthinfo/survey/ageingdefnolder/en/ (visited on 11/30/2015).
DeGrazia, David (1992). “Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory: Theories, Cases, and
Specified Principlism.” In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17.5, pp. 511–539. doi:
10.1093/jmp/17.5.511. eprint: http://jmp.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/5/
511.full.pdf+html. url: http://jmp.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/5/511.
abstract.
Dekkers, Wim (2009). “On the notion of home and the goals of palliative care.” In:
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (5), pp. 335–349. issn: 1386-7415. doi: 10 .
1007 / s11017 - 009 - 9121 - 5. url: http : / / www . springerlink . com / content /
j73w350n7517685l/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Demiris, George (2004). “Electronic home healthcare: concepts and challenges.” In: In-
ternational Journal of Electronic Healthcare 1.1, pp. 4–16. url: http://inderscience.
metapress.com/content/TGLWVRRV7TPTFWWL.
d’Entrèves, Alessandro Passerin (1970). Natural Law. An Introduction to Legal Philosophy.
2nd ed. London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd. isbn: 978-0-09-102601-1.
Development of Medical Technology: Opportunities for Assessment (1976). Report. Office of
Technology Assessment. url: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_5/DATA/
1976/7617.PDF (visited on 11/12/2015).
Diermaier, Josef et al. (2008). “Distributed Accelerometers as a Main Component in
Detecting Activities of Daily Living.” In: Computers Helping People with Special Needs.
314
Bibliography
Ed. by Klaus Miesenberger et al. In collab. with Klaus Miesenberger et al. Vol. 5105.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 1042–1049.
isbn: 978-3-540-70539-0. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-70540-6_156. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/05857u04hk053237/abstract/ (visited on 04/05/2012).
Dishman, Eric and Maria C. Carrillo (2007). “Perspective on everyday technologies for
Alzheimer’s care: Research findings, directions, and challenges.” In: Alzheimer’s and
Dementia 3 (3), pp. 227–234. issn: 15525260. doi: 10.1016/j.jalz.2007.04.387. url:
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1552526007004827 (visited on
04/05/2012).
Doorn, Neelke (2010). “A procedural approach to distributing responsibilities in R&D
networks.” In: Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics
of Science 7 (3), pp. 169–188. issn: 1615-6609, 1615-6617. doi: 10.1007/s10202-010-
0086-2. url: http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s10202-010-0086-2
(visited on 03/19/2012).
Dresser, Rebecca (1995). Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy. Report
6. The Hastings Center, pp. 32–38. doi: 10.2307/3527839. url: http://www.jstor.
org/stable/3527839.
Duquenoy, Penny (2004). “Intelligent Ethics.” In: Building the Information Society. Ed. by
Renè Jacquart. In collab. with Renè Jacquart. Vol. 156. IFIP International Federation
for Information Processing. Springer Boston, pp. 597–602. isbn: 978-1-4020-8156-9.
doi: 10.1007/978- 1- 4020- 8157- 6_56. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/387153165380j771/abstract/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
Duquenoy, Penny and Harold Thimbleby (1999). “Justice and Design.” In: Human-
Computer Interaction-INTERACT ’99. Ed. by M. Angela Sasse and Chris Johnson. Am-
sterdam: IOS Press, pp. 281–286. isbn: 978-0-9673355-0-6. url: http://eprints.mdx.
ac.uk/9880/1/Justiced%20%26%20Design%20paper%20scan%20from%20proceedings.
pdf.
Duquenoy, Penny and Diane Whitehouse (2006). “A 21st century ethical debate: Pursu-
ing perspectives on ambient intelligence.” English. In: The Information Society: Emerg-
ing Landscapes. Ed. by Chris Zielinski, Penny Duquenoy, and Kai Kimppa. Vol. 195.
IFIP International Federation for Information Processing. WOS:000235187200018.
New York: Springer, pp. 293–314. isbn: 978-0-387-30527-1. doi: 10.1007/0- 387-
31168-8_18. url: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/0-387-31168-
8_18.
Dworkin, Ronald (1993). Life’s dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and
Individual Freedom. Knopf. isbn: 978-0-39-458941-1. url: http://books.google.sk/
books?id=u4gp6Le3EbYC.
Dyson, R. W., ed. and trans. (2002). Aquinas: Political Writings. Cambridge Texts In The
History of Political Thought. Cambridge University Press. isbn: 0-521-37569-X.
315
Bibliography
Eckstein, Sue, ed. (2003). Manual for Research Ethics Committees. 6th ed. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. isbn: 0-521-81004-3.
Edward W. Keyserlingk Kathleen Glass, Sandra Kogan Serge Gauthier (1995). “Proposed
Guidelines for the Participation of Persons with Dementia as Research Subjects.” In:
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 38.2, pp. 317–362. doi: 10.1353/pbm.1995.0049.
url: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/perspectives_in_biology_and_medicine/
v038/38.2.keyserlingk.html. Supplement.
Emanuel, Ezekiel J., David Wendler, and Christine Grady (2000). “What Makes Clinical
Research Ethical?” In: The Journal of the American Medical Association 283.20, pp. 2701–
2711. doi: 10.1001/jama.283.20.2701. eprint: http://jama.ama- assn.org/
content/283/20/2701.full.pdf+html. url: http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/
283/20/2701.abstract.
Emanuel, Ezekiel J., David Wendler, Jack Killen, et al. (2004). “What Makes Clinical
Research in Developing Countries Ethical? The Benchmarks of Ethical Research.”
In: The Journal of Infectious Diseases 189, pp. 930–7. url: http://jid.oxfordjournals.
org/content/189/5/930.full.pdf.
Epple, Dorothea Marie (2002). “Senile Dementia of the Alzheimer Type.” In: Clinical So-
cial Work Journal 30 (1), pp. 95–110. issn: 0091-1674. doi: 10.1023/A:1014230529175.
url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/1are7t8yhte6hep8/abstract/ (vis-
ited on 06/01/2012).
European Dementia Consensus Network and Gabriela Stoppe, eds. (2008). Competence
Assessment in Dementia. Wien - New York: Springer. isbn: 978-3-211-72369-2. doi:
10.1007/978-3-211-72369-2. url: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%
2F978-3-211-72369-2.
Eurostat (2011). Population projections. European Commission. url: http : / / epp .
eurostat . ec . europa . eu / statistics _ explained / index . php / Population _
projections.
Evans, Donald (2014). “Benefit and Harm.” In: Handbook of Global Bioethics. Ed. by Henk
A. M. J. ten Have and Bert Gordijn. Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York - London:
Springer. Chap. 5, pp. 58–73. isbn: 978-94-007-2512-6. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-
2512-6_67. url: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
Explanatory Memorandum on UDBHR (2005). Explanatory Memorandum on the Elaboration
of the Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics. First Intergovern-
mental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft Declaration on Universal
Norms on Bioethics (21 February 2005). Paris: United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). url: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0013/001390/139024e.pdf.
Eysenbach, G. (2001). “What is e-health?” In: Journal of Medical Internet Research 3.2, e20.
doi: 10.2196/jmir.3.2.e20. url: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11720962.
316
Bibliography
Faden, Ruth R., Tom L. Beauchamp, and Nancy E. Kass (2014). “Informed Consent,
Comparative Effectiveness, and Learning Health Care.” In: New England Journal of
Medicine 370.8. PMID: 24552325, pp. 766–768. doi: 10.1056/NEJMhle1313674. eprint:
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMhle1313674. url: http://www.nejm.
org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMhle1313674.
Fagan, Andrew (2015). Human Rights. Ed. by James Fieser and Bradley Dowden. url:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/ (visited on 03/05/2016).
Fairclough, Stephen H. (2009). “Fundamentals of physiological computing.” In: In-
teracting with Computers 21 (1-2), pp. 133–145. issn: 09535438. doi: 10 . 1016 / j .
intcom.2008.10.011. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S0953543808000738 (visited on 03/19/2012).
Fazel, Seena, Tony Hope, and Robin Jacoby (1999). “Dementia, intelligence, and the com-
petence to complete advance directives.” In: Lancet 354.9172, p. 48. issn: 00995355.
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(99)01911-X. url: http://www.thelancet.com/journals/
lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(99)01911-X/fulltext.
Bangkok Declaration (1993). Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting For Asia of the World
Conference On Human Rights. Declaration. World Conference on Human Rights 29
March – 2 April 1993. Bangkok: Ministers and representatives of Asian States. url:
http://faculty.washington.edu/swhiting/pols469/Bangkok_Declaration.doc
(visited on 03/05/2016).
Fisher, Elliot S. and H. Gilbert Welch (1999). “Avoiding the unintended consequences
of growth in medical care: How might more be worse?” In: Journal of American Med-
ical Association 281.5, pp. 446–453. doi: 10.1001/jama.281.5.446. eprint: /data/
Journals/JAMA/4597/JSC80266.pdf. url: http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.
aspx?articleid=188743.
Flaming, Don (2001). “Using phronesis instead of ‘research-based practice’ as the guid-
ing light for nursing practice.” In: Nursing Philosophy 2.3, pp. 251–258. issn: 1466-
769X. doi: 10.1046/j.1466-769X.2000.00066.x. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/
j.1466-769X.2000.00066.x.
Foddy, Bennett (2012). “The Right and Wrong of Growing Old: Assessing the Argu-
ment from Evolution.” In: Philosophy & Technology, pp. 1–14. issn: 2210-5433. doi:
10.1007/s13347- 012- 0066- 7. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
f05420g5320v6p74/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Folstein, Marshal F., Susan E. Folstein, and Paul R. McHugh (1975). ““Mini-mental state”.
A practical method for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician.” In:
Journal of Psychiatric Research 12.3, pp. 189–198. doi: 10.1016/0022-3956(75)90026-
6. url: http://www.journalofpsychiatricresearch.com/article/0022-3956(75)
90026-6/abstract.
317
Bibliography
Formulating strategies for health for all by the year 2000 (1979). Guiding principles and essential
issues. Document. Geneva: Executive Board. url: http://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/10665/40669/1/924180002X.pdf (visited on 11/17/2015).
Fountoulakis, Konstantinos N. and Katerina Despos (2008). “Testamentary and finan-
cial competence issues in dementia.” In: Competence Assessment in Dementia. Ed. by
European Dementia Consensus Network and Gabriela Stoppe. Wien - New York:
Springer. Chap. 7, pp. 71–76. isbn: 978-3-211-72369-2. doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 211-
72369-2. url: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-211-72369-2.
Fox, Ken (2002). “Hotep’s Story: Exploring the Wounds of Health Vulnerability in the
US.” In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23.6, pp. 471–497. issn: 1386-7415. doi:
10.1023/A:1021320815915. url: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:
1021320815915.
Fox, Patrick (1989). “From Senility to Alzheimer’s Disease: The Rise of the Alzheimer’s
Disease Movement.” In: The Milbank Quarterly 67.1, pp. 58–102. issn: 0887-378X. doi:
10.2307/3350070. url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3350070.
Francis, Peter, Sandrine Balbo, and Lucy Firth (2009). “Towards co-design with users
who have autism spectrum disorders.” In: Universal Access in the Information Society
8 (3), pp. 123–135. issn: 1615-5289, 1615-5297. doi: 10.1007/s10209-008-0143-y.
url: http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s10209-008-0143-y (visited
on 03/19/2012).
Frankena, William K. (1973). Ethics. 2nd ed. Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
Inc. isbn: 0-13-290478-0.
Friedewald, Michael and Oliver Raabe (2011). “Ubiquitous computing: An overview of
technology impacts.” In: Telematics and Informatics 28 (2), pp. 55–65. issn: 07365853.
doi: 10.1016/j.tele.2010.09.001. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/
retrieve/pii/S0736585310000547 (visited on 04/05/2012).
Fukuyama, Francis (2003). Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Rev-
olution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. isbn: 9780374706180. url: http://
books.google.ie/books?id=UVRim2WvW50C.
Gaul, Sylvia and Martina Ziefle (2009). “Smart Home Technologies: Insights into
Generation-Specific Acceptance Motives.” In: HCI and Usability for e-Inclusion. Ed. by
Andreas Holzinger and Klaus Miesenberger. Vol. 5889. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 312–332. isbn: 978-3-642-10308-7. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-
10308-7_22. url: http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/978-3-642-
10308-7_22 (visited on 04/11/2013).
Gefenas, Eugenijus and Egle Tuzaite (2014). “Persons Without the Capacity to Consent.”
In: Handbook of Global Bioethics. Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have and Bert Gordijn.
Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York - London: Springer. Chap. 7, pp. 85–103. isbn:
318
Bibliography
978-94-007-2512-6. doi: 10 . 1007 / 978 - 94 - 007 - 2512 - 6 _ 70. url: http : / / link .
springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
Gert, Bernard (2004). Common Morality: Deciding What to Do. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. isbn: 0-19-517371-6.
— (2005). Morality: Its Nature and Justification. Revised Edition. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. isbn: 978-0-19-517689-6.
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1985). Judgement. (1985) 3 All ER
402. British and Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII). url: http://www.bailii.
org/uk/cases/UKHL/1985/7.html.
Gilligan, Carol (2009). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development.
Harvard University Press. isbn: 978-0-67-4037618. url: http://books.google.ie/
books?id=OujZ0iSyNWgC.
Glare, Peter G. W. (1968). Oxford Latin Dictionary. Clarendon Press.
Glendon, Mary Ann (1993). Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse. Free
Press. isbn: 978-0029118238.
— (2004). “The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” In: North-
western Journal of International Human Rights 2.1. url: http://scholarlycommons.
law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol2/iss1/5.
Global elderly care in crisis (2014). Editorial 9921. The Lancet, p. 927. isrn: 0140-6736.
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60463-3. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/
retrieve/pii/S0140673614604633.
Gordijn, Bert and Henk A. M. J. ten Have (2014). “Future Perspectives.” In: Handbook
of Global Bioethics. Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have and Bert Gordijn. Dordrecht -
Heidelberg - New York - London: Springer, pp. 829–844. isbn: 978-94-007-2512-6.
doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6_131. url: http://link.springer.com/book/10.
1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
Grad, Frank P. (2002). “The Preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organi-
zation.” In: Bulletin of the World Health Organization. Public Health Classics 12 (80),
pp. 981–984. url: http://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/80(12)981.pdf (visited
on 11/17/2015).
Grady, Christine (2009). “Vulnerability in Research: Individuals with Limited Financial
and/or Social Resources.” In: The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 37.1, pp. 19–
27. issn: 1748-720X. doi: 10.1111/j.1748- 720X.2009.00347.x. url: http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2009.00347.x/abstract.
Grisso, Thomas and Paul S. Appelbaum (1995). “The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study. III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments.”
In: Law and Human Behavior 19.2, pp. 149–174. doi: 10.2307/1394305. url: http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/1394305.
319
Bibliography
Grisso, Thomas, Paul S. Appelbaum, et al. (1995). “The MacArthur Treatment Compe-
tence Study. II: Measures of Abilities Related to Competence to Consent to Treat-
ment.” In: Law and Human Behavior 19.2, pp. 127–148. doi: 10.2307/1394304. url:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1394304.
Grönvall, Erik and Morten Kyng (2012). “On participatory design of home-based health-
care.” In: Cognition, Technology & Work. issn: 1435-5558, 1435-5566. doi: 10.1007/
s10111-012-0226-7. url: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10111-012-0226-
7 (visited on 04/10/2013).
Groves, Kashina (2006). “Justified Paternalism: The nature of beneficence in the care of
dementia patients.” In: Penn Bioethics Journal 2 (2): Bioethics Without Borders, pp. 17–
20. url: http://www.bioethicsjournal.com/v2i2/groves.html.
Harrefors, Christina et al. (2012). “Professional Caregivers’ Perception on how Persons
with Mild Dementia Might Experience the Usage of a Digital Photo Diary.” In: The
Open Nursing Journal 6, pp. 20–29. url: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3322432/.
Harris, Richard (2014). Heading toward the caregiving cliff. The Washington Post. url: http:
//www.washingtonpost.com/national/health- science/heading- toward- the-
caregiving-cliff/2014/03/04/eb1661ec-9846-11e3-afce-3e7c922ef31e_story.
html.
Heintz, Emelie et al. (2015). “Framework For Systematic Identification of Ethical Aspects
of Healthcare Technologies: The SBU Approach.” In: International Journal of Technol-
ogy Assessment in Health Care 31.03, pp. 124–130. doi: 10.1017/S0266462315000264.
url: http://gup.ub.gu.se/records/fulltext/219819/219819.pdf.
Hermerén, Göran (2012). “The principle of proportionality revisited: interpretations and
applications.” In: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15.4, pp. 373–382. issn: 1386-
7423. doi: 10.1007/s11019-011-9360-x. url: http://link.springer.com/article/
10.1007%2Fs11019-011-9360-x.
Hersh, Marion et al. (2003). “The Final Product: Issues in the Design and Distribution
of Assistive Technology Devices.” In: Hersh, Marion and Michael Johnson. Assis-
tive Technology for the Hearing-impaired, Deaf and Deafblind. Ed. by Marion Hersh and
Michael Johnson. Springer London. Chap. 9, pp. 297–305. isbn: 978-1-85233-855-8.
url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/u252252037780k71/abstract/ (vis-
ited on 06/01/2012).
Hobbes, Thomas (1998). Leviathan. With an intro. by J. C. A. Gaskin. Oxford World’s
Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. isbn: 0-19-283498-3.
Hodkinson, HM (1972). “Evaluation of a mental test score for assessment of mental
impairment in the elderly.” In: Age and ageing 1.4, pp. 233–238. doi: 10.1093/ageing/
1.4.233. url: http://ageing.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/4/233.short.
320
Bibliography
Hoffmann, Tammy C. and Del Mar Chris (2015). “Patients’ expectations of the benefits
and harms of treatments, screening, and tests: A systematic review.” In: JAMA In-
ternal Medicine 175.2, pp. 274–286. doi: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2014.6016. eprint:
/data/Journals/INTEMED/932716/irv140001.pdf?v=635580609520500000. url:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2014.6016.
Hofmann, Bjørn (2012). “Ethical Challenges with Welfare Technology: A Review of the
Literature.” In: Science and Engineering Ethics 19.2, pp. 389–406. issn: 1353-3452, 1471-
5546. doi: 10.1007/s11948- 011- 9348- 1. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
index/10.1007/s11948-011-9348-1 (visited on 03/19/2012).
Hofmann, Bjørn Morten (2015). “Too much technology.” In: The BMJ 350. issn: 1756-1833.
doi: 10.1136/bmj.h705. url: http://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h705.short.
Hofmann, Bjørn et al. (2014). “Harmonization of Ethics in Health Technology As-
sessment: A Revision of the Socratic Approach.” In: International Journal of Tech-
nology Assessment in Health Care 30 (01), pp. 3–9. issn: 1471-6348. doi: 10 .
1017 / S0266462313000688. url: http : / / journals . cambridge . org / article _
S0266462313000688.
Holm, Søren (2001). “Autonomy, authenticity, or best interest: Everyday decision-making
and persons with dementia.” In: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 4.2, pp. 153–159.
issn: 1386-7423. doi: 10.1023/A:1011402102030. url: http://link.springer.com/
article/10.1023%2FA%3A1011402102030.
Holzinger, Andreas, Klaus Schaupp, and Walter Eder-Halbedl (2008). “An Investigation
on Acceptance of Ubiquitous Devices for the Elderly in a Geriatric Hospital Envi-
ronment: Using the Example of Person Tracking.” In: Computers Helping People with
Special Needs. Ed. by Klaus Miesenberger et al. Vol. 5105. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 22–29. isbn: 978-3-540-70539-0. url:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/3utr4w5t310t3524/abstract/ (visited on
06/01/2012).
Honeybul, Stephen et al. (2014). “Long-term survival with unfavourable outcome: a qual-
itative and ethical analysis.” In: Journal of Medical Ethics. doi: 10.1136/medethics-
2013-101960. eprint: http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2014/06/25/medethics-
2013-101960.full.pdf+html. url: http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2014/06/
25/medethics-2013-101960.abstract.
Hope, Tony et al. (2009). Dementia: ethical issues. Report. Cambridge: Nuffield Council
on Bioethics. url: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/
Nuffield%20Dementia%20report%20Oct%2009.pdf.
Horn, Lyn (2007). “Research Vulnerability: An Illustrative Case Study From The South
African Mining Industry.” In: Developing World Bioethics 7.3, pp. 119–127. issn: 1471-
8847. doi: 10.1111/dewb_151.x. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/dewb_151.x.
321
Bibliography
HTA Glossary (2015). url: http://htaglossary.net/tiki-index.php?page=health%
20technology.
Hughes, Julian C. (2008). “Assessment of competency and advance directives.” In: Com-
petence Assessment in Dementia. Ed. by European Dementia Consensus Network and
Gabriela Stoppe. Wien - New York: Springer. Chap. 8, pp. 77–84. isbn: 978-3-211-
72369-2. doi: 10.1007/978-3-211-72369-2. url: http://link.springer.com/book/
10.1007%2F978-3-211-72369-2.
“Declaration of Helsinki” (1964). “Human Experimentation. Code of Ethics of World
Medical Association.” Declaration of Helsinki. In: British Medical Journal 2.5402.
Adopted by the 18th World Medical Assembly, Helsinki, Finland, June 1964, p. 177.
url: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1816102/.
Human, Delon and Sev S. Fluss (2001). “The World Medical Association’s declaration
of Helsinki: Historical and contemporary perspectives.” Version 5. In: World Medical
Association, pp. 1–24. url: http : / / www . wma . net / en / 20activities / 10ethics /
10helsinki/draft_historical_contemporary_perspectives.pdf.
Hume, David (1960). A Treatise of Human Nature. Being an Attempt to introduce the ex-
perimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 3 vols.
Oxford: Clarendon Press. isbn: 978-1-775410-67-6.
Hurst, Samia A. (2008). “Vulnerability In Research And Health Care; Describing The
Elephant In The Room?” In: Bioethics 22.4, pp. 191–202. issn: 1467-8519. doi: 10.
1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00631.x. url: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.
1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00631.x/full.
Hutcheson, Francis (2014). Selected Philosophical Writings. Ed. by John McHugh. Vol. 16.
Library of Scottish Philosophy. Andrews UK Limited. isbn: 9781845405083.
Huxtable, Richard (2012). Law, Ethics and Compromise at the Limits of Life: To Treat or not to
Treat? Biomedical Law and Ethics Library. Taylor & Francis. isbn: 9781136227028.
ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline (1996). ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline. Guide-
line For Good Clinical Practice E6(R1). Guideline. ICH Expert Working Group. url:
http://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/
Efficacy/E6/E6_R1_Guideline.pdf.
Ignatieff, Michael (2005). “Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights
Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights Introduction: American
Exceptionalism and Human Rights.” In: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights.
Ed. by Michael Ignatieff. Princeton – Oxford: Princeton University Press. isbn: 0-691-
11648-2.
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003). Declaration. United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). url: http://www.unesco.
org/new/en/social- and- human- sciences/themes/bioethics/human- genetic-
data/ (visited on 02/23/2015).
322
Bibliography
IRB Guidebook (1993). Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP). url: http://www.
hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_guidebook.htm.
Jacquemard, Tim et al. (2014). “Challenges and Opportunities of Lifelog Technologies: A
Literature Review and Critical Analysis.” English. In: Science and Engineering Ethics
20.2, pp. 379–409. issn: 1353-3452. doi: 10.1007/s11948-013-9456-1. url: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-013-9456-1.
Johansson, Kurt and Catarina Lundberg (2008). “Assessment of fitness to drive, posses-
sion of provessional drivers’ license, possession of firearms, and polit’s certificate in
clients with dementing conditions.” In: Competence Assessment in Dementia. Ed. by
European Dementia Consensus Network and Gabriela Stoppe. Wien - New York:
Springer. Chap. 10, pp. 93–102. isbn: 978-3-211-72369-2. doi: 10.1007/978-3-211-
72369-2. url: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-211-72369-2.
Jonas, Hans (1979). Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische
Zivilisation. Suhrkamp Verlag. isbn: 978-3-518-39992-7.
Kagan, Shelly (1989). The Limits of Morality. Ed. by Derek Parfit. Oxford Ethics Series.
Oxford: Clarendon Press. isbn: 0-19-823916-5.
Kalousova, Lucie and Raymond De Vries (2014). “North American Perspectives.” In:
Handbook of Global Bioethics. Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have and Bert Gordijn. Dor-
drecht - Heidelberg - New York - London: Springer. Chap. 20, pp. 327–338. isbn:
978-94-007-2512-6. doi: 10 . 1007 / 978 - 94 - 007 - 2512 - 6 _ 83. url: http : / / link .
springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
Kang, Hyun Gu et al. (2010). “In Situ Monitoring of Health in Older Adults: Tech-
nologies and Issues.” English. In: Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 58 (8).
WOS:000280643700023, pp. 1579–1586. issn: 0002-8614. doi: 10.1111/j.1532-5415.
2010.02959.x.
Kant, Immanuel (1991). The Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. by Raymond Geuss. Trans. and
comm., with an introd., by Mary Gregor. Texts in German Philosophy. New York -
Port Chester - Melbourne - Sydney: Cambridge University Press. isbn: 0-521-31657-
x.
Katz, Sidney et al. (1963). “The Index of ADL: A Standardized Measure of Biological and
Psychosocial Function.” In: Journal of American Medical Association 185.12, pp. 914–
919. doi: 10.1001/jama.1963.03060120024016.
Katzman, R. (1976). “The prevalence and malignancy of alzheimer disease: A ma-
jor killer.” In: Archives of Neurology 33.4, pp. 217–218. doi: 10 . 1001 / archneur .
1976.00500040001001. url: http://archneur.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?
articleid=574311.
Kaye, Jane et al. (2014). “Dynamic consent: a patient interface for twenty-first century
research networks.” In: European Journal of Human Genetics. doi: 10.1038/ejhg.2014.
323
Bibliography
71. url: http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/ejhg201471a.
html.
Kaye, Jeffrey (2010). “Technology and Dementia: The Way Ahead.” In: Supporting People
with Dementia Using Pervasive Health Technologies. Ed. by Maurice D. Mulvenna and
Chris D. Nugent. Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing. Springer Lon-
don, pp. 221–234. isbn: 978-1-84882-551-2. doi: 10.1007/978-1-84882-551-2_15.
url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/u835138l16657541/abstract/ (vis-
ited on 06/01/2012).
Kelly, Paul et al. (2013). “An Ethical Framework for Automated, Wearable Cameras in
Health Behavior Research.” In: American Journal of Preventive Medicine 44.3, pp. 314–
319. issn: 0749-3797. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2012.11.006. url:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379712008628.
Kemp, Peter and Jacob Dahl Rendtorff (2009). “The Barcelona Declaration. Towards
an integrated approach to basic ethical principles.” In: Synthesis Philosophica 23.2,
pp. 239–251. url: http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/58331 (visited on 03/23/2015).
Kidholm, Kristian et al. (2012). “A Model For Assessment of Telemedicine Applica-
tions: MAST.” In: International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 28 (01),
pp. 44–51. issn: 1471-6348. doi: 10.1017/S0266462311000638. url: http://journals.
cambridge.org/article_S0266462311000638.
King, Nancy M. P. (2000). “Defining and Describing Benefit Appropriately in Clinical
Trials.” In: The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28.4, pp. 332–343. issn: 1748-720X.
doi: 10.1111/j.1748-720X.2000.tb00685.x. url: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2000.tb00685.x/abstract.
Kipnis, Kenneth (2001). Vulnerability in Research Subjects: A Bioethical Taxonomy. Commis-
sioned Papers and Staff Analysis. Report and Recommendations. Bethesda, Maryland:
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), G–1. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/1805/25 (visited on 03/23/2015).
— (2003). “Seven vulnerabilities in the pediatric research subject.” In: Theoretical
medicine and bioethics 24.2, pp. 107–120. doi: 10.1023/A:1024646912928. url: http:
//link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1024646912928.
Kitwood, T. (1997). Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First. Ed. by Brian Gear-
ing. Rethinking ageing series. McGraw-Hill Education: Open University Press. isbn:
9780335198559. url: http://books.google.sk/books?id=fpeLRAAACAAJ.
Kitwood, Tom (1990). “The Dialectics of Dementia: With Particular Reference to
Alzheimer’s Disease.” In: Ageing & Society 10 (2), pp. 177–196. issn: 1469-1779. doi:
10.1017/S0144686X00008060. url: http://journals.cambridge.org/article_
S0144686X00008060.
Kleinberger, Thomas et al. (2007). “Ambient Intelligence in Assisted Living: Enable El-
derly People to Handle Future Interfaces.” In: Universal Access in Human-Computer
324
Bibliography
Interaction. Ambient Interaction. Ed. by Constantine Stephanidis. Vol. 4555. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 103–112. isbn: 978-3-540-73280-8. url:
http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/978-3-540-73281-5_11 (visited on
04/11/2013).
Knoppers, Bartha Maria and Ruth Chadwick (2005). “Human genetic research: emerging
trends in ethics.” In: Nature Review Genetics 6.1, pp. 75–79. issn: 1471-0056. doi: 10.
1038/nrg1505. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrg1505.
Kohlberg, Lawrence (1958). “The Development of Modes of Thinking and Choices in
Years 10 to 16.” Doctoral Dissertation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
— (1981). The Philosophy of Moral Development. Essays on Moral Development. San Fran-
cisco: Harper and Row. isbn: 978-0060647605.
Kohlberg, Lawrence and Richard H. Hersh (1977). “Moral Development: A review of
the Theory.” In: Thery into Practice. Moral Development 16.2, pp. 53–59. url: http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/1475172.
Kollek, Regine (2009). “Article 6: Consent.” In: The UNESCO Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights: Background, Principles and Application. Ed. by Henk
A. M. J. ten Have, Michèle S. Jean, and Michael Kirby. Ethics Series. Paris: UNESCO
Publishing. Chap. 8, pp. 123–138. isbn: 978-92-3-104088-7. url: http://unesdoc.
unesco.org/images/0017/001798/179844e.pdf (visited on 09/22/2014).
König, Alexandra et al. (2015). “The role of Information and Communication Technolo-
gies in clinical trials with patients with Alzheimer’s disease and related disorders.”
In: Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience 7.110. issn: 1663-4365. doi: 10.3389/fnagi.2015.
00110. url: http://www.frontiersin.org/aging_neuroscience/10.3389/fnagi.
2015.00110/full.
Kosta, Eleni, Olli Pitkänen, et al. (2010). “Mobile-Centric Ambient Intelligence in Health-
and Homecare-Anticipating Ethical and Legal Challenges.” In: Science and Engineer-
ing Ethics 16 (2), pp. 303–323. issn: 1353-3452, 1471-5546. doi: 10.1007/s11948-009-
9150-5. url: http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s11948-009-9150-5
(visited on 03/19/2012).
Kosta, Eleni, O. Pitkänen, et al. (2008). “Ethical-Legal Challenges in User-Centric AmI
Services.” English. In: 3rd International Conference On Internet And Web Applications
And Services (ICIW 2008). Ed. by A Mellouk et al. WOS:000290504500004. New York:
IEEE, pp. 19–24. isbn: 978-1-4244-4238-6. doi: 10.1109/ICIW.2008.81.
Kottow, Michael H. (2003). “The Vulnerable and the Susceptible.” In: Bioethics 17.5-6,
pp. 460–471. issn: 1467-8519. doi: 10.1111/1467-8519.00361. url: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/1467-8519.00361.
— (2005). “Vulnerability: what kind of principle is it?” In: Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy 7.3, pp. 281–287. doi: 10.1007/s11019-004-6857-6. url: http://link.
springer.com/article/10.1007/s11019-004-6857-6 (visited on 03/23/2015).
325
Bibliography
Kumar, Pardeep and Hoon-Jae Lee (2011). “Security Issues in Healthcare Applications
Using Wireless Medical Sensor Networks: A Survey.” In: Sensors 12 (1), pp. 55–91.
issn: 1424-8220. doi: 10 . 3390 / s120100055. url: http : / / www . mdpi . com / 1424 -
8220/12/1/55/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
Landau, Ruth and Shirli Werner (2012). “Ethical aspects of using GPS for tracking
people with dementia: recommendations for practice.” English. In: International
Psychogeriatrics 24 (3). WOS:000299878600003, pp. 358–366. issn: 1041-6102. doi:
10 . 1017 / S1041610211001888. url: http : / / journals . cambridge . org / action /
displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8478561.
Lange, Margaret Meek, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds (2013). “Vulnerability in Re-
search Ethics: a Way Forward.” In: Bioethics 27.6, pp. 333–340. issn: 1467-8519. doi:
10.1111/bioe.12032. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12032.
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory. 1st ed.
Oxford University Press. isbn: 978-0199256051.
Lauriks, Steve et al. (2010). “Review of ICT-Based Services for Identified Unmet Needs
in People with Dementia.” In: Supporting People with Dementia Using Pervasive Health
Technologies. Ed. by Maurice D. Mulvenna and Chris D. Nugent. Advanced Infor-
mation and Knowledge Processing. Springer London, pp. 37–61. isbn: 978-1-84882-
551-2. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/rr54254556317513/abstract/
(visited on 06/01/2012).
Lauriks, S. et al. (2007). “Review of ICT-based services for identified unmet needs in
people with dementia.” In: Ageing Research Reviews 6 (3), pp. 223–246. issn: 15681637.
doi: 10 . 1016 / j . arr . 2007 . 07 . 002. url: http : / / linkinghub . elsevier . com /
retrieve/pii/S1568163707000372 (visited on 04/05/2012).
Lawton, M. Powell and Elaine M. Brody (1969). “Assessment of older people: self-
maintaining and instrumental activities of daily living.” In: The Gerontologist 9.3,
pp. 179–186. doi: 10.1093/geront/9.3_Part_1.179.
Lee, Duckki, Sumi Helal, and Brian Johnson (2010). “An Action-Based Behaviour Model
for Persuasive Telehealth.” In: Aging Friendly Technology for Health and Independence.
In collab. with Yeunsook Lee et al. Vol. 6159. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 121–129. isbn: 978-3-642-13777-8. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/6574738j01g63116/abstract/ (visited on 04/05/2012).
Levinas, Emmanuel (1972). Humanisme de l’autre homme. Fata Morgana.
Levine, Carol et al. (2004a). ““Special Scrutiny”: A Targeted Form of Research Protocol
Review.” In: Annals of Internal Medicine 140.3, pp. 220–223. doi: 10.7326/0003-4819-
140-3-200402030-00013. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-140-3-
200402030-00013.
— (2004b). “The Limitations of “Vulnerability” as a Protection for Human Research
Participants.” In: The American Journal of Bioethics 4.3. PMID: 16192138, pp. 44–
326
Bibliography
49. doi: 10 . 1080 / 15265160490497083. url: http : / / dx . doi . org / 10 . 1080 /
15265160490497083.
Lewis, V. Bradley (2011). Platonic Philosophy And Natural Law. Witherspoon Institute. url:
http://www.nlnrac.org/classical/plato (visited on 03/05/2016).
Littman, David (1999). Universal Human Rights and “Human Rights in Islam”. url: https:
//web.archive.org/web/20060501234759/http://mypage.bluewin.ch/ameland/
Islam.html (visited on 03/05/2016).
Locke, John (2003). Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration. With
essays by John Dunn Ruth W. Grant Ian Shapiro. Ed., with an introd., by Ian Shapiro.
Rethinking the Western Tradition. New Haven - London: Yale University Press. isbn:
0-300-10018-3.
Lolas, Fernando (2014). “Latin American Perspectives.” In: Handbook of Global Bioethics.
Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have and Bert Gordijn. Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York -
London: Springer. Chap. 19, pp. 311–325. isbn: 978-94-007-2512-6. doi: 10.1007/978-
94-007-2512-6_82. url: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-
2512-6.
Lorenzen-Huber, Lesa et al. (2011). “Privacy, Technology, and Aging: A Proposed
Framework.” In: Ageing International 36 (2), pp. 232–252. issn: 0163-5158. doi: 10.
1007 / s12126 - 010 - 9083 - y. url: http : / / www . springerlink . com / content /
44r07l4314r03986/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Louhiala, Pekka and R. Puustinen (2008). “Rethinking the placebo effect.” In: Medical
Humanities (34), pp. 107–109. doi: 10.1136/jmh.2008.000307. url: http://mh.bmj.
com/content/34/2/107.abstract.
Luna, Florencia (2009). “Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerability: Layers Not Labels.”
In: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 2.1, pp. 121–139. url: http:
//muse.jhu.edu/journals/ijf/summary/v002/2.1.luna.html.
Luna, Florencia and Sheryl Vanderpoel (2013). “Not the Usual Suspects: Addressing
Layers of Vulnerability.” In: Bioethics 27.6, pp. 325–332. issn: 1467-8519. doi: 10 .
1111/bioe.12035. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12035.
Lynch, Scott M., J. Scott Brown, and Miles G. Taylor (2009). “Demography of Disability.”
In: International Handbook of Population Aging. Ed. by Peter Uhlenberg. Vol. 1.5. Inter-
national Handbooks of Population. Springer Netherlands, pp. 567–582. isbn: 978-1-
4020-8356-3. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-8356-3_25. url: http://www.springerlink.
com/content/r6j012x0x377ph50/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
MacIntyre, Alasdair (1999). Dependent Rational Animals. Why Human Beings Need the
Virtues. The Paulus Carus Lectures. Chicago: Carus Publishing Company. isbn: 0-
8126-9397-3.
— (2007). After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory. 3rd ed. Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press. isbn: 978-0-268-03504-4.
327
Bibliography
Macklin, Ruth (2003). “Bioethics, Vulnerability, and Protection.” In: Bioethics 17.5-6,
pp. 472–486. issn: 1467-8519. doi: 10 . 1111 / 1467 - 8519 . 00362. url: http : / /
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8519.00362/full.
— (2005). “Yet Another Guideline? The UNESCO Draft Declaration.” In: Developing
World Bioethics 5.3, pp. 244–250. issn: 1471-8847. doi: 10.1111/j.1471-8847.2005.
00122.x. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2005.00122.x.
Maeda, Eisaku and Yasuhiro Minami (2006). “Steps towards Ambient Intelligence.” In:
NTT Technical Review 4.1, pp. 50–55. issn: 1348-3447. url: https://www.ntt-review.
jp/archive/ntttechnical.php?contents=ntr200601050.pdf.
Maguire, Martin et al. (2011). “A Study of User Needs for the ‘Techno Kitchen’.” In: HCI
International 2011 – Posters’ Extended Abstracts. Ed. by Constantine Stephanidis. In
collab. with Constantine Stephanidis. Vol. 174. Communications in Computer and
Information Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 66–71. isbn: 978-3-642-22095-
1. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-22095-1_14. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/n060j1776861wg08/abstract/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
Maheu, M., P. Whitten, and A. Allen (2002). E-Health, Telehealth, and Telemedicine: A Guide
to Startup and Success. Jossey-Bass health series. Wiley. isbn: 978-0787959036. url:
http://books.google.sk/books?id=T8gwu1okBW4C.
Mahoney, Diane F. et al. (2007). “In-home monitoring of persons with dementia: Ethical
guidelines for technology research and development.” In: Alzheimer’s & Dementia
3.3, pp. 217–226. issn: 1552-5260. doi: http : / / dx . doi . org / 10 . 1016 / j . jalz .
2007 . 04 . 388. url: http : / / www . sciencedirect . com / science / article / pii /
S1552526007004839.
Maier, Edith and Guido Kempter (2009). “AAL in the Wild - Lessons Learned.” In:
Universal Access in Human-Computer Interaction. Intelligent and Ubiquitous Interaction
Environments. Ed. by Constantine Stephanidis. In collab. with Constantine Stephani-
dis. Vol. 5615. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,
pp. 218–227. isbn: 978-3-642-02709-3. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-02710-9_25. url:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/m876mx227lk472u1/abstract/ (visited on
04/05/2012).
Mandell, Alan M. and Robert C. Green (2011). “Alzheimer’s Disease.” In: The Handbook
of Alzheimer’s Disease and Other Dementias. Ed. by Andrew E. Budson and Neil W.
Kowall. .1. Wiley-Blackwell Handbooks of Behavioral Neuroscience. Oxford: Black-
well Publishing, pp. 3–92. isbn: 978-1-4051-6828-1.
Marcellini, F. (2012). “Happy Aging: Perspectives and needs of older people towards
technology.” In: Gerontechnology 11 (2), pp. 390–391. doi: 10.4017/gt.2012.11.02.
151.00.
Marson, Daniel C. et al. (2000). “Assessing financial capacity in patients with alzheimer
disease: A conceptual model and prototype instrument.” In: Archives of Neurology
328
Bibliography
57.6, pp. 877–884. doi: 10.1001/archneur.57.6.877. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.
1001/archneur.57.6.877.
Martin, Jean F. (2009). “Article 7: Persons Without the Capacity to Consent.” In: The
UNESCO universal declaration on bioethics and human rights: Background, principles and
application. Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have, Michèle S. Jean, and Michael Kirby. Ethics
Series. Paris: UNESCO Publishing. Chap. 9, pp. 139–153. isbn: 978-92-3-104088-7.
url: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001798/179844e.pdf (visited on
09/22/2014).
Martin, Suzanne, Johan E. Bengtsson, and Rose-Marie Dröes (2010). “Assistive Technolo-
gies and Issues Relating to Privacy, Ethics and Security.” In: Supporting People with
Dementia Using Pervasive Health Technologies. Ed. by Maurice D. Mulvenna and Chris
D. Nugent. Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing. Springer London,
pp. 63–76. isbn: 978-1-84882-551-2. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
j576272k13461370/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Mastroianni, Anna and Jeffrey Kahn (2001). Swinging on the Pendulum: Shifting Views of
Justice in Human Subjects Research. Report 3. Hastings Center, pp. 21–28. doi: 10.
2307/3527551. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3527551.
Mathooko, Jude M. and Julius K. Kipkemboi (2014). “African Perspectives.” In: Handbook
of Global Bioethics. Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have and Bert Gordijn. Dordrecht -
Heidelberg - New York - London: Springer. Chap. 16, pp. 253–268. isbn: 978-94-007-
2512-6. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6_81. url: http://link.springer.com/
book/10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
Maurer, Konrad, Stephan Volk, and Hector Gerbaldo (1997). “Auguste D and
Alzheimer’s disease.” In: The Lancet 349, pp. 1546–49. url: http : / / alzheimer .
neurology.ucla.edu/pubs/alzheimerLancet.pdf.
McBride, William Griffith (1961). “Thalidomide and congenital abnormalities.” In: The
Lancet 278.7216, p. 1358.
McCallum, Simon and Costas Boletsis (2013). “Dementia Games: A Literature Review
of Dementia-Related Serious Games.” English. In: Serious Games Development and
Applications. Ed. by Minhua Ma et al. Vol. 8101. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 15–27. isbn: 978-3-642-40789-5. doi: 10.1007/978-3-
642-40790-1_2. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40790-1_2.
McLean, Athena (2011). “Ethical frontiers of ICT and older users: cultural, pragmatic
and ethical issues.” In: Ethics and Information Technology 13 (4), pp. 313–326. issn:
1388-1957. doi: 10.1007/s10676-011-9276-4. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/008203x445420048/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
McLean, Sheila Ann Manson (2014). “Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal
Integrity.” In: Handbook of Global Bioethics. Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have and Bert
Gordijn. Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York - London: Springer, pp. 105–117. isbn:
329
Bibliography
978-94-007-2512-6. doi: 10 . 1007 / 978 - 94 - 007 - 2512 - 6 _ 71. url: http : / / link .
springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
Meacher, Michael (1972). Taken for a Ride: Special Residential Homes for Confused Old People:
A Study of Separatism in Social Policy. Prentice Hall Press. isbn: 978-0582127012.
Meiland, F. J. M. et al. (2014). “Participation of end users in the design of assistive
technology for people with mild to severe cognitive problems; the European Rosetta
project.” In: International Psychogeriatrics 26 (05), pp. 769–779. issn: 1741-203X. doi:
10.1017/S1041610214000088. url: http://journals.cambridge.org/article_
S1041610214000088.
Meiland, Franka et al. (2010). “Identifying User Needs and the Participative Design Pro-
cess.” In: Supporting People with Dementia Using Pervasive Health Technologies. Ed. by
Maurice D. Mulvenna and Chris D. Nugent. Advanced Information and Knowledge
Processing. Springer London, pp. 79–100. isbn: 978-1-84882-551-2. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/v805853470821768/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Meinert, Curtis L. (2012). Clinical Trials Dictionary. Terminology And Usage Recommenda-
tions. 2nd ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. isbn: 978-1-118-29515-1.
Mepham, Ben (2008). Bioethics - An introduction for the biosciences. 2nd ed. USA: Oxford
University Press. 440 pp. isbn: 978-0-19-921430-3. url: http://ukcatalogue.oup.
com/product/9780199214303.do.
Merilahti, Juho, Juha Pärkkä, and Ilkka Korhonen (2012). “Estimating Older People’s
Physical Functioning with Automated Health Monitoring Technologies at Home:
Feature Correlations and Multivariate Analysis.” In: Grid and Pervasive Computing
Workshops. Ed. by Mika Rautiainen et al. Vol. 7096. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 94–104. isbn: 978-3-642-27915-7. url:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/k364636l885nt7r1/abstract/ (visited
on 06/01/2012).
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Bibliothèque des idées.
Paris: Éditions Gallimard.
Mihailidis, Alex et al. (2008). “The COACH prompting system to assist older adults with
dementia through handwashing: An efficacy study.” In: BMC Geriatrics 8 (1), pp. 1–
18. issn: 1471-2318. doi: 10.1186/1471-2318-8-28. url: http://www.springerlink.
com/content/22r0j62v8211425w/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Mill, John Stuart (2003). Utilitarianism and On Liberty. Including Mill’s ‘Essay on Bentham’
and selections from the writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. Ed., with an introd.,
by Mary Warnock. 2nd ed. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. isbn: 0-631-23352-0.
Miller, Franklin G and Luana Colloca (2011). “The placebo phenomenon and medical
ethics: Rethinking the relationship between informed consent and risk–benefit as-
sessment.” In: Theoretical medicine and bioethics 32.4, pp. 229–243. doi: 10 . 1007 /
330
Bibliography
s11017 - 011 - 9179 - 8. url: http : / / www . hs . umt . edu / liberal / documents /
MillerandColloca.pdf.
Mittelstadt, Brent Daniel (2013). “On the Ethical Implications of Personal Health Mon-
itoring. A Conceptual Framework for Emerging Discourses.” Ph.D. Thesis. Centre
for Computing and Social Responsibility. url: https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/275891024_On_the_Ethical_Implications_of_Personal_Health_
Monitoring_A_Conceptual_Framework_for_Emerging_Discourses?ev=prf_pub.
Mittelstadt, B et al. (2011). “Ethical Issues of Personal Health Monitoring: A Literature
Review.” In: ETHICOMP 2011 Conference Proceedings. Presented at the ETHICOMP.
url: http://www.academia.edu/2014198/Ethical_Issues_of_Personal_Health_
Monitoring_A_Literature_Review.
Mok, TzeMing, Flora Cornish, and Jen Tarr (2014). “Too Much Information: Visual Re-
search Ethics in the Age of Wearable Cameras.” In: Integrative Psychological and Be-
havioral Science, pp. 1–14. issn: 1932-4502. doi: 10.1007/s12124-014-9289-8. url:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-014-9289-8.
Moore, Mary (1999). “The evolution of telemedicine.” In: Future Generation Computer
Systems 15.2, pp. 245–254. issn: 0167-739X. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-
739X(98)00067-3. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0167739X98000673.
Mordini, Emilio et al. (2009). “Senior citizens and the ethics of e-inclusion.” In: Ethics
and Information Technology 11 (3), pp. 203–220. issn: 1388-1957. doi: 10.1007/s10676-
009- 9189- 7. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/55w76284760740w4/
abstract/ (visited on 04/05/2012).
Morris, John C (1993). “The Clinical Dementia Rating (CDR): current version and scoring
rules.” In: Neurology 43.11, pp. 2412–2414. url: http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/
1994-19989-001.
Moyle, Wendy et al. (2013). “Exploring the Effect of Companion Robots on Emotional Ex-
pression in Older Adults with Dementia: A Pilot Randomized Controlled Trial.” In:
Journal of Gerontological Nursing 39 (5), pp. 46–53. doi: 10.3928/00989134-20130313-
03. url: http://www.healio.com/nursing/journals/jgn/%7B4148aa00- 206b-
4ba9-9e37-d730b6aecb90%7D/exploring-the-effect-of-companion-robots-on-
emotional-expression-in-older-adults-with-dementia-a-pilot-randomized-
controlled-trial#.
Moyn, Samuel (2010). The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History. Cambridge – London:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. isbn: 978-0-674-04872-0.
Müller, Ulrich, Pia Winter, and Manuel B Graeber (2013). “A presenilin 1 mutation in
the first case of Alzheimer’s disease.” In: The Lancet Neurology 12.2, pp. 129–130.
issn: 1474-4422. doi: 10.1016/S1474-4422(12)70307-1. url: http://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1474442212703071.
331
Bibliography
Muramoto, Osamu (2011). “Socially and temporally extended end-of-life decision-
making process for dementia patients.” In: Journal of Medical Ethics 37.6, pp. 339–
343. doi: 10.1136/jme.2010.038950. eprint: http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/6/
339.full.pdf+html. url: http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/6/339.abstract.
National Consent Policy (2013). Policy Document. Version 1.1. Ireland: Quality and
Patient Safety Division. url: http : / / www . hse . ie / eng / about / Who /
qualityandpatientsafety/National_Consent_Policy/consenttrainerresource/
trainerfiles / NationalConsentPolicyM2014 . pdf. National Consent Advisory
Group.
Neves, Maria Patráo (2009). “Article 8: Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal
Integrity.” In: The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: Back-
ground, Principles and Application. Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have, Michèle S. Jean, and
Michael Kirby. Ethics Series. Paris: UNESCO Publishing, pp. 155–165. isbn: 978-92-
3-104088-7. url: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001798/179844e.pdf
(visited on 09/22/2014).
Newell, A. et al. (2011). “User-Sensitive Inclusive Design.” In: Universal Access in the Infor-
mation Society 10 (3), pp. 235–243. issn: 1615-5289. doi: 10.1007/s10209-010-0203-y.
url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/lq36q58020437864/abstract/ (vis-
ited on 06/01/2012).
Newman, Eamonn et al. (2012). “Dem@Care: Multi-Sensing Monitoring for Intelligent
Remote Management and Decision Support.” In: CLARITY Showcase (21st November
2012). Poster. Clontarf Castle Hotel, Dublin, Ireland.
Nickel, James W. (1987). Making Sense of Human Rights. Philosophical Reflections on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. University of California Press. isbn:
9780520059948.
Niemelä, Marketta et al. (2007). “Supporting Independent Living of the Elderly with
Mobile-Centric Ambient Intelligence: User Evaluation of Three Scenarios.” In: Am-
bient Intelligence. Ed. by Bernt Schiele et al. Vol. 4794. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 91–107. isbn: 978-3-540-76651-3. doi: 10.
1007/978- 3- 540- 76652- 0_6. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
v03558301124634l/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Nispen, Bas van (2004). Zorgdomotica. Een inventarisatie van knelpunten en struikelblokken
met aanbevelingen om de grootschalige implementatie van zorgdomotica voor ouderen en
mensen met functiebeperkingen in Nederland te versnellen en te verbeteren. Dutch. Den
Haag: Nederlands Instituut voor Telemedicine. url: http://www.feitenencijfers.
nl/Uploads/Files/zorgdomotica-web.pdf (visited on 11/12/2015).
Noddings, Nel (2002). “Caring, Social Policy, and Homelessness.” In: Theoretical Medicine
and Bioethics 23.6, pp. 441–454. issn: 1386-7415. doi: 10.1023/A:1021385717732. url:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1021385717732.
332
Bibliography
Normand, Roger and Sarah Zaidi (2008). Human Rights at the UN. The Political History
of Universal Justice. With a forew. by Richard A. Falk. United Nations Intellectual
History Project. Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. isbn: 978-0-
253-21934-3.
NICE-SUGAR (2004). Normoglycaemia in Intensive Care Evaluation. Survival Using Glucose
Algorithm Regulation. A multi-centre, open label, randomised controlled trial of two
target ranges for glycaemic control in Intensive Care Unit patients. Research Pro-
tocol. Australia, New Zealand Intensive Care Society Clinical Trials Group Cana-
dian Critical Care Trials Group (CCCTG), and The George Institute for International
Health. url: https://studies.thegeorgeinstitute.org/nice/docs/PROTOCOL.pdf
(visited on 08/05/2015).
Noury, Norbert et al. (2011). “Smart Sweet Home. . . A Pervasive Environment for Sens-
ing our Daily Activity?” In: Activity Recognition in Pervasive Intelligent Environments.
Ed. by Liming Chen et al. Vol. 4. Atlantis Ambient and Pervasive Intelligence. At-
lantis Press, pp. 187–208. isbn: 978-94-91216-05-3. url: http://www.springerlink.
com/content/m53742450r245138/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Novitzky, Peter et al. (2015). “A Review Of Contemporary Work On The Ethics Of Am-
bient Assisted Living Technologies For People With Dementia.” In: Science and Engi-
neering Ethics 21 (3), pp. 707–765. issn: 1471-5546. doi: 10.1007/s11948-014-9552-x.
url: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-014-9552-x (visited on
06/24/2014).
Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Cornwall: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
isbn: 0-631-19780-X.
NSPCC (2015). A child’s legal rights. Gillick competency and Fraser guidelines. National So-
ciety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC). url: http://www.nspcc.
org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-protection-system/legal-definition-child-
rights-law/gillick-competency-fraser-guidelines/ (visited on 08/04/2015).
Nussbaum, Martha Craven (2007). Frontiers Of Justice. Oxford University Press. isbn:
978-0-19-569018-7. url: http://books.google.sk/books?id=aslVPwAACAAJ.
Nussbaum, Martha and Amartya Sen, eds. (1993). The Quality of Life. WIDER Studies
in Development Economics. Clarendon Press. isbn: 9780198287971. url: https://
global.oup.com/academic/product/the-quality-of-life-9780198287971.
Oberzaucher, Johannes et al. (2009). “A Videophone Prototype System Evaluated by
Elderly Users in the Living Lab Schwechat.” In: HCI and Usability for e-Inclusion. Ed.
by Andreas Holzinger and Klaus Miesenberger. In collab. with Andreas Holzinger
and Klaus Miesenberger. Vol. 5889. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 345–352. isbn: 978-3-642-10307-0. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-
10308- 7_24. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/5l67613026h717mr/
abstract/ (visited on 04/05/2012).
333
Bibliography
O’Brien, John T. (2005). “Brain imaging in dementia.” In: The Journal of Quality Research
in Dementia (1). url: http://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/documents_
info.php?documentID=77&pageNumber=4 (visited on 09/24/2014).
OHRP (1993). IRB Guidebook. Guidebook. Office for Human Research Protections
(OHRP). url: http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_guidebook.htm (visited
on 06/12/2015).
O’Neill, Sonja A., Sarah Mason, et al. (2011). “Video Reminders as Cognitive Prosthetics
for People with Dementia.” In: Ageing International 36 (2), pp. 267–282. issn: 0163-
5158. doi: 10.1007/s12126- 010- 9089- 5. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/e63623936g2gt257/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
O’Neill, Sonja A., Guido Parente, et al. (2011). “Assessing Task Compliance Following
Mobile Phone-Based Video Reminders.” In: Engineering in Medicine and Biology Soci-
ety, EMBC, 2011 Annual International Conference of the IEEE, pp. 5295–8. doi: 10.1109/
IEMBS.2011.6091310. url: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.
jsp?arnumber=6091310.
Oost, Ellen and Darren Reed (2011). “Towards a Sociological Understanding of Robots
as Companions.” In: Human-Robot Personal Relationships. Ed. by Maarten H. Lamers
and Fons J. Verbeek. In collab. with Maarten H. Lamers and Fons J. Verbeek.
Vol. 59. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and
Telecommunications Engineering. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 11–18. isbn: 978-
3-642-19385-9. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/wx75j3gg0l342q4v/
abstract/ (visited on 04/05/2012).
Oppenauer, Claudia et al. (2007). “Technology in Old Age from a Psychological Point of
View.” In: HCI and Usability for Medicine and Health Care. Ed. by Andreas Holzinger.
Vol. 4799. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 133–142. isbn: 978-3-
540-76804-3. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-76805-0_11. url: http://www.springerlink.
com/index/10.1007/978-3-540-76805-0_11 (visited on 04/11/2013).
Palm, Elin (2012). “A Declaration of Healthy Dependence: The Case of Home Care.” In:
Health Care Analysis. issn: 1065-3058, 1573-3394. doi: 10.1007/s10728-012-0228-
x. url: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10728- 012- 0228- x (visited on
04/10/2013).
Panek, P. and W. L. Zagler (2008). “A Living Lab for Ambient Assisted Living in the
Municipality of Schwechat.” In: Computers Helping People with Special Needs. Ed. by
Klaus Miesenberger et al. In collab. with Klaus Miesenberger et al. Vol. 5105. Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 1008–1015. isbn:
978-3-540-70539-0. doi: 10 . 1007 / 978 - 3 - 540 - 70540 - 6 _ 151. url: http : / / www .
springerlink.com/content/xq654k6883u46018/abstract/ (visited on 04/05/2012).
Pellegrino, Edmund D. (1995). “Toward a Virtue-Based Normative Ethics for the Health
Professions.” In: Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 5.3, pp. 253–277. doi: 10.1353/ken.
334
Bibliography
0.0044. url: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ken/summary/v005/5.3.pellegrino.
html.
— (2009). “Article 4: Benefit and Harm.” In: The UNESCO Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights: Background, Principles and Application. Ed. by Henk
A. M. J. ten Have, Michèle S. Jean, and Michael Kirby. Ethics Series. Paris: UNESCO
Publishing, pp. 99–109. isbn: 978-92-3-104088-7. url: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0017/001798/179844e.pdf (visited on 09/22/2014).
Pellegrino, Edmund D. and David C. Thomasma (1993). The Virtues in Medical Practice.
Oxford University Press. isbn: 9780199748754.
Perusini, Gaetano (1909). “Über klinisch und histologisch eigenartige psychische
Erkrankungen des späteren Lebensalters.” In: Histologische und histopathologische Ar-
beiten über die Gehirnrinde 3, pp. 297–351.
Piasek, Paulina, Kate Irving, and Alan F. Smeaton (2013). “Case study in SenseCam use
as an intervention technology for early-stage dementia.” In: International Journal of
Computers in Helathcare 1.4, pp. 304–319. issn: 1755-3202. url: http://doras.dcu.
ie/17745/.
Picking, Rich et al. (2012). “The Easyline+ project: evaluation of a user interface devel-
oped to enhance independent living of elderly and disabled people.” In: Universal
Access in the Information Society 11 (2), pp. 99–112. issn: 1615-5289, 1615-5297. doi:
10.1007/s10209-011-0246-8. url: http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/
s10209-011-0246-8 (visited on 03/19/2012).
Pinholt, Ellen M. et al. (2014). ““Is There a Gun in the Home?” Assessing the Risks of
Gun Ownership in Older Adults.” In: Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, pp. 1–
5. issn: 1532-5415. doi: 10.1111/jgs.12836. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jgs.
12836.
Plato (1997a). Complete Works. Ed. by D. S. Hutchinson John M. Cooper. With annots. by
John M. Cooper. With an intro. by John M. Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Co. isbn: 978-0-87220-349-5.
— (1997b). “Gorgias.” In: Complete Works. Ed. by D. S. Hutchinson John M. Cooper.
With annots. by John M. Cooper. With an intro. by John M. Cooper. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co. Chap. 23, pp. 791–869. isbn: 978-0-87220-349-5.
— (1997c). “Laws.” In: Complete Works. Ed. by D. S. Hutchinson John M. Cooper. With
annots. by John M. Cooper. With an intro. by John M. Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co. Chap. 34, pp. 1318–1616. isbn: 978-0-87220-349-5.
Plaza, Inmaculada et al. (2011). “Mobile applications in an aging society: Status and
trends.” In: Journal of Systems and Software 84 (11), pp. 1977–1988. issn: 01641212.
doi: 10 . 1016 / j . jss . 2011 . 05 . 035. url: http : / / linkinghub . elsevier . com /
retrieve/pii/S016412121100135X (visited on 04/05/2012).
335
Bibliography
Ploug, Thomas and Søren Holm (2013). “Informed consent and routinisation.” In: Journal
of Medical Ethics 39.4, pp. 214–218. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-101056. eprint:
http://jme.bmj.com/content/39/4/214.full.pdf+html. url: http://jme.bmj.
com/content/39/4/214.abstract.
— (2014). “Agreeing in Ignorance: Mapping the Routinisation of Consent in ICT-
Services.” In: Science and Engineering Ethics 20.4, pp. 1097–1110. issn: 1353-3452. doi:
10.1007/s11948-013-9492-x. url: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s11948-013-9492-x.
— (2015). “Routinisation of informed consent in online health care systems.” In: Inter-
national Journal of Medical Informatics. issn: 1386-5056. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.ijmedinf.2015.01.003. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S1386505615000064.
Portet, François et al. (2011). “Design and evaluation of a smart home voice interface for
the elderly: acceptability and objection aspects.” In: Personal and Ubiquitous Comput-
ing, pp. 127–144. issn: 1617-4909, 1617-4917. doi: 10.1007/s00779-011-0470-5. url:
http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s00779-011-0470-5 (visited on
03/19/2012).
Post, Stephen G. (1995). The Moral Challenge of Alzheimer Disease: Ethical Issues from Diag-
nosis to Dying. 1st ed. The Moral Challenge of Alzheimer Disease. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Potter, J. E., S. McKinley, and A. Delaney (2013). “Research participants’ opinions of
delayed consent for a randomised controlled trial of glucose control in intensive
care.” In: Intensive Care Medicine 39.3, pp. 472–480. issn: 0342-4642. doi: 10.1007/
s00134-012-2732-8. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00134-012-2732-8.
Price, Daniel E. (1999). Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights. A Compara-
tive Study. Greenwood Publishing Group. isbn: 9780275961879.
Pulli, Petri et al. (2012). “User interaction in smart ambient environment targeted for
senior citizen.” In: Medical and Biological Engineering and Computing, pp. 1–8. issn:
0140-0118. doi: 10.1007/s11517-012-0906-8. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/p5353062t37t0t73/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Purcaru, Daniel et al. (2011). “e-Informed Consent in Clinical Trials - Ethical Consid-
erations.” In: Recent Advances in Applied & Biomedical Informatics and Computational
Engineering in Systems Applications. Ed. by Myriam Lazard et al. Vol. 3, p. 11. isbn:
978-1-61804-028-2. url: http://www.wseas.us/e- library/conferences/2011/
Florence/AIASABEBI/AIASABEBI-59.pdf (visited on 06/16/2014).
Quinton, Anthony (1973). The Nature of Things. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. isbn:
0710074530. url: http://books.google.ie/books/about/The_nature_of_things.
html?id=sOOeAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y.
336
Bibliography
Rapoport, Michele (2012). “Being a body or having one: automated domestic technolo-
gies and corporeality.” In: AI & SOCIETY 28 (2), pp. 209–218. issn: 0951-5666, 1435-
5655. doi: 10.1007/s00146- 012- 0406- 2. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
index/10.1007/s00146-012-0406-2 (visited on 03/19/2012).
Rawls, John (1993). Political Liberalism. John Dewey essays in philosophy. Columbia Uni-
versity Press. isbn: 9780231052481. url: http : / / books . google . sk / books ? id =
JHNPbt7pEeQC.
— (1999). A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. Harvard University Press. isbn:
9780674042582. url: http://books.google.sk/books?id=kvpby7HtAe0C.
Regan, Paul, Neal Hudson, and Barry McRory (2011). “Patient participation in public
elections: a literature review.” In: Nursing Management 17.10, pp. 32–36. doi: 10.
7748/nm2011.03.17.10.32.c8358. url: http://rcnpublishing.com/doi/abs/10.
7748/nm2011.03.17.10.32.c8358 (visited on 06/14/2014).
Remmers, Hartmut (2010). “Environments for ageing, assistive technology and self-
determination: ethical perspectives.” English. In: Informatics for Health & Social
Care 35 (3-4). WOS:000285003100009, pp. 200–210. issn: 1753-8157. doi: 10.3109/
17538157.2010.528649. url: http://informahealthcare.com/doi/abs/10.3109/
17538157.2010.528649.
Rendtorff, Jacob Dahl (2002). “Basic ethical principles in European bioethics and biolaw:
Autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability – Towards a foundation of bioethics
and biolaw.” In: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5, pp. 235–244. issn: 1572-8633.
doi: 10.1023/A:1021132602330. url: http://link.springer.com/article/10.
1023/A:1021132602330.
— (2014). “European Perspectives.” In: Handbook of Global Bioethics. Ed. by Henk A. M. J.
ten Have and Bert Gordijn. Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York - London: Springer.
Chap. 18, pp. 293–310. isbn: 978-94-007-2512-6. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-2512-
6_85. url: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
Rendtorff, Jacob Dahl and Peter Kemp, eds. (2000a). Basic Ethical Principles in European
Bioethics and Biolaw. Vol. 1. Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw.
Report to the European Commission of the BIOMED-II Project: Basic Ethical Prin-
ciples in Bioethics and Biolaw 1995-1998. Centre for Ethics and Law, Copenhagen,
Denmark and Institut Borja de Bioètica, Barcelona, Spain. isbn: 84-923525-4-X. url:
http://books.google.sk/books?id=vCPPJgAACAAJ.
— eds. (2000b). Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw. Vol. 2. Basic
Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw. Report to the European Com-
mission of the BIOMED-II Project: Basic Ethical Principles in Bioethics and Biolaw
1995-1998. Centre for Ethics and Law, Copenhagen, Denmark and Institut Borja de
Bioètica, Barcelona, Spain. isbn: 84-923525-5-8. url: http://books.google.sk/
books?id=vCPPJgAACAAJ.
337
Bibliography
Report of the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO (IBC) On Consent (2008). Report.
International Bioethics Committee. url: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/
001781/178124e.pdf (visited on 11/13/2014).
Research Involving Those Institutionalized as Mentally Infirm (1978). Report and Recom-
mendations. Bethesda, Maryland: The National Commission For the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. url: http://videocast.
nih.gov/pdf/ohrp_research_mentally_infirm.pdf (visited on 11/25/2015).
Richardson, Henry S. (1990). “Specifying norms as a way to resolve concrete ethical
problems.” In: Philosophy & Public Affairs 14.4, pp. 279–310. url: http://www.jstor.
org/stable/2265316.
Ricoeur, Paul (1988). “L’identité narrative.” In: Esprit 7-8, pp. 295–314. url: http://cat.
inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=11806939.
Robert, Philippe H et al. (2013). “Recommendations for ICT use in Alzheimer’s disease
assessment: Monaco CTAD expert meeting.” In: The journal of nutrition, health & aging
17.8, pp. 653–660. doi: 10.1007/s12603-013-0046-3. url: http://link.springer.
com/article/10.1007%2Fs12603-013-0046-3.
Robinson, Louise et al. (2009). “Keeping In Touch Everyday (KITE) project: developing
assistive technologies with people with dementia and their carers to promote inde-
pendence.” English. In: International Psychogeriatrics 21 (3). WOS:000266567800011,
pp. 494–502. issn: 1041-6102. doi: 10.1017/S1041610209008448.
Robinson, L. et al. (2007). “Balancing rights and risks: Conflicting perspectives in
the management of wandering in dementia.” English. In: Health Risk & Soci-
ety 9 (4). WOS:000250225000004, pp. 389–406. issn: 1369-8575. doi: 10 . 1080 /
13698570701612774. url: http : / / www . tandfonline . com / doi / abs / 10 . 1080 /
13698570701612774.
Román, Isabel, Jorge Calvillo, and Laura M. Roa (2009). “Personalizing Care: Integration
of Hospital and Homecare.” In: Handbook of Digital Homecare. Ed. by Kanagasingam
Yogesan et al. Series in Biomedical Engineering. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 33–
52. isbn: 978-3-642-01387-4. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-01387-4_3. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/w2k5767t2281j5q5/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Romdhane, R. et al. (2012). “Automatic video monitoring system for assessment of
Alzheimer’s Disease symptoms.” In: The Journal of Nutrition, Health & Aging 16 (3),
pp. 213–218. issn: 1279-7707. doi: 10.1007/s12603-012-0039-7. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/y2hq46ht57730311/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Rorty, Richard (1998). “Human Rights, Rationality, And Sentimentality.” In: Truth and
Progress. Philosophical Papers. Ed. by Richard Rorty. Cambridge University Press.
Chap. 9, pp. 167–185. isbn: 9780521556866. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511625404.010.
338
Bibliography
Ross, William David (2002). The Right and the Good. Ed., with an introd., by Philip
Stratton-Lake. With a forew. by William David Ross. 2nd ed. British moral philoso-
phers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 183 pp. isbn: 978-0-19-925265-7.
— (2008). Foundations of Ethics. Read Books. url: http://books.google.co.uk/books?
id=f0HJxysIJPcC.
Roth, Martin et al. (1999). CAMDEX-R: the Cambridge examination for mental disorders of the
elderly. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press. isbn: 9780521462617. url: http://www.
cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/medicine/mental- health- psychiatry-
and-clinical-psychology/camdex-r-revised-cambridge-examination-mental-
disorders-elderly-2nd-edition.
Sakamoto, Hyakudai (1999). “Towards a New ‘Global Bioethics’.” In: Bioethics 13.3-4,
pp. 191–197. issn: 1467-8519. doi: 10.1111/1467-8519.00146. url: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/1467-8519.00146.
Salces, Fausto et al. (2006). “Ambient Interfaces for Elderly People at Home.” In: Ambient
Intelligence in Everyday Life. Ed. by Yang Cai and Julio Abascal. Vol. 3864. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 256–284. isbn: 978-
3-540-37785-6. doi: 10.1007/11825890_13. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/u5mx624xv252g233/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Satava, Richard M. (2003). “Biomedical, Ethical, and Moral Issues Being Forced by Ad-
vanced Medical Technologies.” In: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
147.3, pp. 246–258. url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558213.
Scanaill, Cliodhna et al. (2006). “A Review of Approaches to Mobility Telemonitoring of
the Elderly in Their Living Environment.” In: Annals of Biomedical Engineering 34 (4),
pp. 547–563. issn: 0090-6964. doi: 10.1007/s10439-005-9068-2. url: http://www.
springerlink.com/content/8lv188303p742g86/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Sellman, Derek (2009). “Practical wisdom in health and social care: teaching for profes-
sional phronesis.” In: Learning in Health and Social Care 8.2, pp. 84–91. issn: 1473-6861.
doi: 10.1111/j.1473-6861.2009.00222.x. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.
1473-6861.2009.00222.x.
Sen, Amartya (2009). The Idea of Justice. Harvard University Press. isbn: 9780674036130.
url: http://books.google.sk/books?id=enqMd%5C_ze6RMC.
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus (2010). Natural Questions. Ed. by Elizabeth Asmis, Shadi Bartsch,
and Martha C. Nussbaum. Trans. by Harry M. Hine. The Complete Works of Lucius
Annaeus Seneca. Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press. isbn: 978-0-
226-74838-2.
Seppala, Timothy J. (2014). Kinect and Unreal Engine 4 power Alzheimer’s and dementia care
project. url: http://www.engadget.com/2014/03/17/unreal-engine-4-alzheimers-
dementia-therapy/ (visited on 07/22/2014).
339
Bibliography
Sharkey, Amanda and Noel Sharkey (2012). “Granny and the robots: ethical issues in
robot care for the elderly.” In: Ethics and Information Technology 14 (1), pp. 27–40. issn:
1388-1957. doi: 10.1007/s10676-010-9234-6. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/nn452hh1p3t37732/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Shiffrin, Seana Valentine (2004). “Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Permanently De-
mented.” In: Ronald Dworkin and His Critics. with Replies by Dworkin. Ed. by Justin
Burley. Chap. 11, pp. 195–217. isbn: 978-0-47-0996386. doi: 10.1002/9780470996386.
ch11. eprint: http : / / cdn . law . ucla . edu / SiteCollectionDocuments / Faculty /
Shiffrin-AutonomyBeneficence.pdf.
Sixsmith, Andrew and Judith Sixsmith (2008). “Ageing in Place in the United Kingdom.”
In: Ageing International 32 (3), pp. 219–235. issn: 0163-5158. doi: 10.1007/s12126-
008- 9019- y. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/c34235804mg63p8w/
abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Sorell, Tom and Heather Draper (2012). “Telecare, Surveillance, and the Welfare State.”
In: American Journal of Bioethics 12 (9). WOS:000307451500014, pp. 36–44. doi: 10.
1080/15265161.2012.699137. url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.
1080/15265161.2012.699137.
Soto, Maria E. and Bruno Vellas (2008). “Medical Factors Interfering with Competence
in Dementia.” In: Competence Assessment in Dementia. Ed. by European Dementia
Consensus Network and Gabriela Stoppe. Wien - New York: Springer, pp. 35–40.
isbn: 978-3-211-72369-2. doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 211- 72369- 2. url: http://link.
springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-211-72369-2.
Sparrow, Robert and Linda Sparrow (2006). “In the hands of machines? The future
of aged care.” In: Minds and Machines 16 (2), pp. 141–161. issn: 0924-6495. doi:
10.1007/s11023- 006- 9030- 6. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
f2t210488724v482/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Spiekermann, Sarah and Frank Pallas (2006). “Technology paternalism - wider implica-
tions of ubiquitous computing.” In: Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology
Assessment and Ethics of Science 4 (1), pp. 6–18. issn: 1615-6609. doi: 10.1007/s10202-
005- 0010- 3. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/b2812617ug4718pv/
abstract/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
Sponselee, Anne-mie et al. (2008). “Smart Home Technology for the Elderly: Percep-
tions of Multidisciplinary Stakeholders.” In: Constructing Ambient Intelligence. Ed.
by Max Mühlhäuser, Alois Ferscha, and Erwin Aitenbichler. In collab. with Max
Mühlhäuser, Alois Ferscha, and Erwin Aitenbichler. Vol. 11. Communications in
Computer and Information Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 314–326. isbn:
978-3-540-85379-4. doi: 10 . 1007 / 978 - 3 - 540 - 85379 - 4 _ 37. url: http : / / www .
springerlink.com/content/r58157k2274g014n/abstract/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
340
Bibliography
Stanberry, Benedict (2001). “Legal ethical and risk issues in telemedicine.” In: Computer
Methods and Programs in Biomedicine 64.3, pp. 225–233. issn: 0169-2607. doi: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0169-2607(00)00142-5. url: http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0169260700001425.
Stanton-Jean, Michèle, Hubert Doucet, and Thérèse Leroux (2014). “Informed Consent.”
In: Handbook of Global Bioethics. Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have and Bert Gordijn.
Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York - London: Springer. Chap. 43, pp. 737–753. isbn:
978-94-007-2512-6. doi: 10.1007/978- 94- 007- 2512- 6_117. url: http://link.
springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
Stapleton, Larry (2008). “Ethical decision making in technology development: a case
study of participation in a large-scale information systems development project.” In:
AI & Society 22 (3), pp. 405–429. issn: 0951-5666. doi: 10.1007/s00146-007-0150-
1. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/q6621726x80244m2/abstract/
(visited on 06/01/2012).
Statistics Bureau, Japan (2011). Statistical Handbook of Japan 2011. Handbook. Statistics
Bureau and the Director-General for Policy Planning of Japan. Chap. 2. url: http:
//www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/index.htm.
Stip, E. and V. Rialle (2005). “Environmental cognitive remediation in schizophrenia:
Ethical implications of “smart home” technology.” English. In: Canadian Journal of
Psychiatry-Revue Canadienne De Psychiatrie 50 (5). WOS:000234708500009, pp. 281–291.
issn: 0706-7437. url: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15968845.
Stratton-Lake, Philip (2002). “Introduction.” In: Ross, William David. The Right and the
Good. Ed., with an introd., by Philip Stratton-Lake. With a forew. by William David
Ross. 2nd ed. British moral philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. ix–l. isbn:
978-0-19-925265-7.
Strickland, Eliza (2014). Can therapeutic mobile games help patients with cognitive illnesses?
Can therapeutic mobile games help patients with cognitive illnesses? url: http : / /
spectrum.ieee.org/at- work/start- ups/startup- profile- akili- diagnoses-
alzheimers-with-a-game.
Strohminger, Nina and Shaun Nichols (2014). “The essential moral self.” In: Cognition
131.1, pp. 159–171. issn: 0010-0277. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.
2013 . 12 . 005. url: http : / / www . sciencedirect . com / science / article / pii /
S0010027713002497.
Sulmasy, David P. (2008). “Dignity, Rights, Health Care, and Human Flourishing.” In:
Autonomy and Human Rights in Health Care. Ed. by David N. Weisstub and Guillermo
D’iaz Pintos. Vol. 36.1. International Library Of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine.
Springer Netherlands, pp. 25–36. isbn: 978-1-4020-5840-0. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-
5841-7_2. url: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-5841-
7_2.
341
Bibliography
Sunderland, Trey et al. (1989). “Clock drawing in Alzheimer’s disease: A novel measure
of dementia severity.” In: Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 37.8, pp. 725–729.
url: http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1990-01969-001.
Svenaeus, Fredrik (2003). “Hermeneutics of Medicine in the Wake of Gadamer: the Issue
of Phronesis.” In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 24.5, pp. 407–431. issn: 1573-1200.
doi: 10.1023/B:META.0000006935.10835.b2. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:
META.0000006935.10835.b2.
ten Have, Henk A. M. J. and Bert Gordijn, eds. (2014). Handbook of Global Bioethics. Dor-
drecht - Heidelberg - New York - London: Springer, pp. 3–18. isbn: 978-94-007-2512-
6. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-2512-6. url: http://link.springer.com/book/10.
1007/978-94-007-2512-6.
ten Have, Henk A. M. J. and Michèle S. Jean (2009). “Introduction.” In: The UNESCO
universal declaration on bioethics and human rights: Background, principles and applica-
tion. Ed. by Henk A. M. J. ten Have, Michèle S. Jean, and Michael Kirby. Ethics
Series. Paris: UNESCO Publishing, pp. 17–56. isbn: 978-92-3-104088-7. url: http:
//unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001798/179844e.pdf (visited on 09/22/2014).
ten Have, Henk A. M. J., Michèle S. Jean, and Michael Kirby, eds. (2009). The UNESCO
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: Background, Principles and Appli-
cation. Ethics Series. Paris: UNESCO Publishing. isbn: 978-92-3-104088-7. url: http:
//unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001798/179844e.pdf (visited on 09/22/2014).
Teng, E. L. and H. C. Chui (1987). “The modified mini-mental state examination (3MS).”
In: Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 48.8, pp. 314–318. url: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/3611032.
Teng, Evelyn L. et al. (1994). “The Cognitive Abilities Screening Instrument (CASI):
A Practical Test for Cross-Cultural Epidemiological Studies of Dementia.” In:
International Psychogeriatrics 6.1, pp. 45–58. issn: 1741-203X. doi: 10 . 1017 /
S1041610294001602. url: http : / / journals . cambridge . org / article _
S1041610294001602.
Belmont Report (1978). The Belmont Report. Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Research. Report of the National Commission for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. url:
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html (visited on
01/30/2015).
ICD-10: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines (1992a). The ICD-10 Classification of
Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines. Royal
College of Psychiatrists. isbn: 9789241544221. url: http://www.who.int/entity/
classifications/icd/en/bluebook.pdf?ua=1.
342
Bibliography
ICD-10: Diagnostic criteria for research (1992b). The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Be-
havioural Disorders: Diagnostic criteria for research. Geneva: Royal College of Psychia-
trists. url: http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/GRNBOOK.pdf?ua=1.
The Medical Devices Regulations (1994). No. 3017. London: Medical Devices Agency. url:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1994/3017/made.
“The Nuremberg Code (1947)” (1996). In: The BMJ 313.7070, p. 1448. doi: 10.1136/bmj.
313.7070.1448. url: http://www.bmj.com/content/313/7070/1448.1.
The Principle of Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal Integrity (2013). Report of the
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO (IBC). Report. International Bioethics
Committee. url: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002194/219494E.pdf
(visited on 11/13/2014).
UDHR (1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Declaration. Resolution 217A.
Paris: General Assembly. url: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-
human-rights/index.html.
Thimbleby, Harold (1994). “Treat people like computers? Designing usable systems for
special people.” In: Extraordinary People and Human-Computer Interaction. Interfaces
for users with disabilities. Ed. by A. Edwards. New York: Cambridge University Press.
url: http://www.cs.swansea.ac.uk/~csharold/cv/files/special.pdf.
Tierney, Brian (2005). “Historical Roots of Modern Rights: Before Locke And After.” In:
Ave Maria Law Review 3.1. url: http://lr.avemarialaw.edu/Content/articles/
v3i1.tierney.copyright.pdf (visited on 03/05/2016).
Toboso, Mario (2011). “Rethinking disability in Amartya Sen’s approach: ICT and equal-
ity of opportunity.” In: Ethics and Information Technology 13 (2), pp. 107–118. issn:
1388-1957. doi: 10.1007/s10676-010-9254-2. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/n2523824l3544012/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Tombaugh, Tom N. (2004). “Trail Making Test A and B: Normative data stratified by
age and education.” In: Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology 19.2, pp. 203–214. doi:
10 .1016 /S0887 - 6177(03) 00039- 8. eprint: http :/ /acn .oxfordjournals .org /
content / 19 / 2 / 203 . full . pdf + html. url: http : / / acn . oxfordjournals . org /
content/19/2/203.abstract.
Tomlinson, Tom (2012). Methods In Medical Ethics. Critical Perspectives. New York: Oxford
University Press. isbn: 978-0-19-516124-3. url: http://books.google.com/books?
id=9lK8AwX5a0cC.
Topo, Päivi (2009). “Technology Studies to Meet the Needs of People With Dementia and
Their Caregivers: A Literature Review.” In: Journal of Applied Gerontology 28.1, pp. 5–
37. doi: 10.1177/0733464808324019. eprint: http://jag.sagepub.com/content/28/
1/5.full.pdf+html. url: http://jag.sagepub.com/content/28/1/5.abstract.
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). Treaty Of Amsterdam Amending The Treaty On European Union,
The Treaties Establishing The European Communities And Certain Related Acts. Treaty.
343
Bibliography
European Communities. url: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/
pdf/amst-en.pdf (visited on 11/27/2015).
Tuokko, Holly et al., eds. (1995). The clock test: administration and scoring manual. Toronto,
Ont.
UDBHR (2005). Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Declaration. Paris:
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
pp. 80–95. url: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php- URL_ID=31058&URL_
DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997). Declaration. United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). url: http://
www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/human-
genome-and-human-rights/ (visited on 02/23/2015).
Vallor, Shannon (2011). “Carebots and Caregivers: Sustaining the Ethical Ideal of Care
in the Twenty-First Century.” In: Philosophy & Technology 24 (3), pp. 251–268. issn:
2210-5433. doi: 10.1007/s13347-011-0015-x. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/p1v784663073q357/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Van de Poel, Ibo (2005). “Engineering design ethics.” In: Encyclopedia of science, technol-
ogy, and ethics. Ed. by C. Mitcham. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA. isbn: 978-
0028658346.
Van der Roest, Henriëtte G. et al. (2009). “What do community-dwelling people with
dementia need? A survey of those who are known to care and welfare services.”
In: International Psychogeriatrics 21 (05), pp. 949–965. issn: 1741-203X. doi: 10 .
1017 / S1041610209990147. url: http : / / journals . cambridge . org / article _
S1041610209990147.
Van Wielingen, L. E. et al. (2004). “Awareness of financial skills in dementia.” In: Aging
& Mental Health 8.4, pp. 374–380. doi: 10.1080/13607860410001709728. url: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1080/13607860410001709728.
Van Hoof, Joost, H. S. M. Kort, et al. (2007). “Ambient intelligence, ethics and privacy.”
In: Gerontechnology 6.3, pp. 155–163. doi: 10.4017/gt.2007.06.03.005.00. url:
http://gerontechnology.info/index.php/journal/article/view/704.
Van Hoof, Joost, E. J. M. Wouters, et al. (2011). “Ambient Assisted Living and Care in The
Netherlands: The Voice of the User.” In: International Journal of Ambient Computing
and Intelligence 3.4, pp. 25–40. doi: 10.4018/jaci.2011100103. url: http://www.igi-
global.com/article/ambient-assisted-living-care-netherlands/61138.
Van Hoof, J. et al. (2011). “Ageing-in-place with the use of ambient intelligence tech-
nology: Perspectives of older users.” In: International Journal of Medical Informatics
80 (5), pp. 310–331. issn: 13865056. doi: 10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2011.02.010. url:
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1386505611000566 (visited on
03/19/2012).
344
Bibliography
Van Wynsberghe, Aimee (2012). “Designing Robots for Care: Care Centered Value-
Sensitive Design.” In: Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (2), pp. 407–433. issn: 1353-
3452. doi: 10.1007/s11948- 011- 9343- 6. url: http://www.springerlink.com/
content/j6521426463u1164/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Vanlaere, Linus and Chris Gastmans (2007). “Ethics in Nursing Education: Learning
To Reflect On Care Practices.” In: Nursing Ethics 14.6, pp. 758–766. doi: 10.1177/
0969733007082116. url: http://nej.sagepub.com/content/14/6/758.abstract.
Veatch, Robert M. (1981). A Theory of Medical Ethics. Colophon books. Basic Books. isbn:
9780465084395.
Verbeek, Peter-Paul (2005). What things do: Philosophical reflections on technology, agency,
and design. Penn State University Press. isbn: 978-0271025407.
— (2011). Moralizing technology: Understanding and designing the morality of things. Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. isbn: 978-0226852935.
Vincent, R. J. (1986). Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge University
Press. isbn: 978-0-521-33995-7.
Viswanathan, Hariharasudhan, Baozhi Chen, and Dario Pompili (2012). “Research Chal-
lenges in Computation, Communication, and Context Awareness for Ubiquitous
Healthcare.” In: Communications Magazine, IEEE 50 (5), pp. 92–99. doi: 10.1109/
MCOM.2012.6194388. url: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?
arnumber=6194388.
Vollmann, Jochen and Rolf Winau (1996). “Informed consent in human experimentation
before the Nuremberg code.” In: The BMJ 313.7070, pp. 1445–1447. doi: 10.1136/
bmj.313.7070.1445. url: http://www.bmj.com/content/313/7070/1445.short.
Vorm, Anco van Der and Marcel G. M. Olde Rikkert (2008). “Informed consent in de-
mentia research.” In: Competence Assessment in Dementia. Ed. by European Demen-
tia Consensus Network and Gabriela Stoppe. Wien - New York: Springer. Chap. 9,
pp. 85–92. isbn: 978-3-211-72369-2. doi: 10.1007/978-3-211-72369-2. url: http:
//link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-211-72369-2.
Wallace, Jonathan et al. (2010). “ICT Interface Design for Ageing People and People
with Dementia.” In: Supporting People with Dementia Using Pervasive Health Technolo-
gies. Ed. by Maurice D. Mulvenna and Chris D. Nugent. With a forew. by June An-
drews. Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing. London: Springer Lon-
don, pp. 165–188. isbn: 978-1-84882-551-2. doi: 10.1007/978-1-84882-551-2. url:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/w0717j522ux47018/abstract/ (visited on
06/01/2012).
Walsh, Kieran and Aoife Callan (2011). “Perceptions, Preferences, and Acceptance of In-
formation and Communication Technologies in Older-Adult Community Care Set-
tings in Ireland: A Case-Study and Ranked-Care Program Analysis.” In: Ageing Inter-
national 36 (1), pp. 102–122. issn: 0163-5158. doi: 10.1007/s12126-010-9075-y. url:
345
Bibliography
http://www.springerlink.com/content/g76w4717271w3556/abstract/ (visited on
04/05/2012).
Weber, Matthias M. (1997). “Aloys Alzheimer, a coworker of Emil Kraepelin.” In: Journal
of Psychiatric Research 31.6, pp. 635–643. issn: 0022-3956. doi: http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/S0022-3956(97)00035-6. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0022395697000356.
Weimar, U. et al. (2009). “Microsystem Technology for Ambient Assisted Living
(AAL).” In: Procedia Chemistry 1 (1), pp. 710–713. issn: 18766196. doi: 10.1016/j.
proche.2009.07.177. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S1876619609001788 (visited on 04/05/2012).
Weiser, Mark (1991). “The Computer for the 21st Century. Specialized elements of
hardware and software, connected by wires, radio waves and infrared, will be
so ubiquitous that no one will notice their presence.” In: Scientific American
265.3, pp. 94–104. issn: 0036-8733 (print), 1946-7087 (electronic). doi: 10 . 1038 /
scientificamerican0991 - 94. url: http : / / www . ubiq . com / hypertext / weiser /
SciAmDraft3.html.
Weiser, Mark and John Seely Brown (1996). “The Coming Age of Calm Technology.” In:
doi: 10.1.1.129.2275. url: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
rep=rep1&type=pdf&doi=10.1.1.129.2275.
Wherton, Joseph P. and Andrew F. Monk (2008). “Technological opportunities for sup-
porting people with dementia who are living at home.” In: International Journal
of Human-Computer Studies 66 (8), pp. 571–586. issn: 10715819. doi: 10 . 1016 / j .
ijhcs . 2008 . 03 . 001. url: http : / / linkinghub . elsevier . com / retrieve / pii /
S1071581908000268 (visited on 04/05/2012).
Wichert, Reiner et al. (2012). “Communications in Computer and Information Science.”
In: Constructing Ambient Intelligence. Ed. by Reiner Wichert, Kristof Van Laerhoven,
and Jean Gelissen. Vol. 277. AmI 2011 Workshops, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
November 16-18, 2011. Revised Selected Papers. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 146–
151. isbn: 978-3-642-31478-0. doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 642- 31479- 7_22. url: http:
//link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-31479-7_22.
Wiles, Rose et al. (2008). “Visual ethics: Ethical issues in visual research.” In: N/A. Na-
tional Centre for Research Methods Working Paper. unpublished: http://eprints.
ncrm.ac.uk/421/.
Willemain, T. R. and Roger Greenwood Mark (1971). “Models of remote health systems.”
In: Biomedical Sciences Instrumentation (8), pp. 9–17. url: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/4401767.
Williams, Alan (1994). Economics, QALYs and medical ethics. A health economist’s perspec-
tive. Discussion Paper 121. Centre for Health Economics - York Health Economics
Consortium - NHS Centre for Reviews & Dissemination. url: http://www.york.ac.
346
Bibliography
uk/media/che/documents/papers/discussionpapers/CHE%20Discussion%20Paper%
20121.pdf.
Willmott, Anne (2010). “Consent and Confidentiality.” In: Listening to Children and Young
People in Healthcare Consultations. Ed. by Adrian M. Hastings and S. Redsell. Radcliffe
Series. Radcliffe Publishing. Chap. 8, pp. 125–136. isbn: 9781846193460.
Declaration of Helsinki (1975). World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. Recommen-
dations guiding medical doctors in biomedical research involving human subjects. Revised
by the 29th World Medical Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, 1975. World Medical Associa-
tion. url: http://ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/node/3931.
Declaration of Helsinki (2000). World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical Prin-
ciples for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects. Amended by 52nd WMA Gen-
eral Assembly, Edinburgh, Scotland, October 2000. World Medical Association. url:
http://www.eddatatraining.net/assets/documents/ethics- references.pdf
(visited on 07/27/2015).
Declaration of Helsinki (2008). World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical prin-
ciples for medical research involving human subjects. 59th WMA General Assembly,
Seoul, Republic of Korea. World Medical Association. url: http://www.wma.net/
en/30publications/10policies/b3/17c.pdf (visited on 06/12/2015).
“Declaration of Helsinki” (2013). “World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.
Ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects.” In: Journal of
American Medical Association 310.20. 64th WMA General Assembly, Fortaleza, Brazil,
pp. 2191–2194. doi: 10.1001/jama.2013.281053. url: http://jama.jamanetwork.
com/article.aspx?articleid=1760318.
World Population Prospects (2006). World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. Popula-
tion Ageing. Report. United Nations. url: http://www.un.org/esa/population/
publications/wpp2006/wpp2006_ageing.pdf.
Wright, David (2011). “A framework for the ethical impact assessment of information
technology.” In: Ethics and Information Technology 13 (3), pp. 199–226. issn: 1388-1957.
doi: 10.1007/s10676-010-9242-6. url: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
a6g05r6331224448/abstract/ (visited on 06/01/2012).
Wright, David, Serge Gutwirth, et al., eds. (2010). Safeguards in a World of Ambient In-
telligence. Vol. 1. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology. Springer
Netherlands. isbn: 978-90-481-8786-7. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-6662-7. url: http:
//link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4020-6662-7.
Wright, David and Kush Wadhwa (2010). “Mainstreaming the e-excluded in Europe:
strategies, good practices and some ethical issues.” In: Ethics and Information Tech-
nology 12 (2), pp. 139–156. issn: 1388-1957. doi: 10.1007/s10676-009-9213-y. url:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/f68n81326162r254/abstract/ (visited on
04/05/2012).
347
Bibliography
Zaad, Lambert and Somaya Ben Allouch (2008). “The Influence of Control on the Accep-
tance of Ambient Intelligence by Elderly People: An Explorative Study.” In: Ambient
Intelligence. Ed. by Emile Aarts et al. In collab. with Emile Aarts et al. Vol. 5355. Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 58–74. isbn: 978-
3-540-89616-6. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-89617-3_5. url: http://www.springerlink.
com/content/u0g2165611127358/abstract/ (visited on 03/19/2012).
Zilka, Norbert and Michal Novak (2006). “The tangled story of Alois Alzheimer.” In:
Bratislava Medical Journal 107.9-10, p. 343345. issn: 1336-0345. url: http://www.bmj.
sk/2006/107910-02.pdf.
Zion, Deborah, Lynn Gillam, and Bebe Loff (2000). “The Declaration of Helsinki, CIOMS
and the ethics of research on vulnerable populations.” In: Nature Medicine 6.6,
pp. 615–617. issn: 1078-8956. doi: 10.1038/76174. url: http://www.nature.com/nm/
journal/v6/n6/full/nm0600_615.html.
Zwijsen, Sandra A., Alistair R. Niemeijer, and Cees M.P.M. Hertogh (2010). “Ethics of
using assistive technology in the care for community-dwelling elderly people: An
overview of the literature.” In: Aging & Mental Health 15.4, pp. 419–427. doi: 10.
1080/13607863.2010.543662. url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.
1080/13607863.2010.543662.
348
